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The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe

BRIEFING PAPER

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The New Radical Right:

Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe

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THE 'NEW' RADICAL RIGHT: A POLICY BRIEF

Introduction & context

The tragic attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011 were a grim **reminder of the threat from right wing violence.** Shortly afterwards, the discovery of a neo-Nazi group guilty of a decade of murders in Germany cemented the fear that right-wing violence could be on the rise across Europe.

Beyond organised terrorist attacks and lone wolves like Anders Breivik, the Norwegian attacker**,** there has been a **mounting campaign of harassment and violence against asylum seekers and ethnic minorities** in many European towns and cities. While they rarely make the headlines and are not classified as matters of national security, their extent and impact on communities should at least cause us to question whether we have a proper handle on the extent of the threat from right-wing violence. We might also need to reconsider how we measure threat and ask whether our notions of national security are lacking, given that they fail to capture violence on this scale.

These shocking events need to be viewed within the broader context of **the rising presence of non-violent radical right political parties** across Europe. In countries like Austria, Hungary, Sweden and the Netherlands, these parties have enjoyed mounting electoral success. In many of those countries where they have fared less well at the ballot box, they have nevertheless often contributed towards the **mainstreaming of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim ideas and discourses,** which help to create a broader climate conducive to radical right thinking.

This policy brief sets out what we know about both trends – violent and non-violent – and asks important questions about the known or potential links between the two that need to guide policy formation. Although cautious about overstating the rise of both, it seeks to understand what is happening on the ground and how the picture differs across Europe. It closes with a number of recommendations for policy makers and practitioners and those looking to commission new data and research to fill the current knowledge gaps.

'New radical right' political parties

In recent years, there has been a **resurgence of radical right politics in Europe**. Parties such as the Alliance of European National Movements in Hungary, the Front National in France, Tricolour Flame in Italy, the Swedish National Democrats, and the National Front in Belgium have enjoyed growing support, some electoral success, and have been increasingly

successful at getting their arguments and policies represented in the mainstream.

Although often not new parties at all, their novel ways of operating set them apart as what might be termed the 'new radical right'. They have illustrated their ability to **shift their politics opportunistically in order to capture the mood of disaffected voters** across the traditional left-right political spectrum, often espousing the language of liberal democracy in the process.

In many ways, they have a lot to teach mainstream politicians about how to operate in the new media age: **the new radical right is pioneering a new style of politics**. They are increasingly promoting **younger, charismatic, well-educated and politically savvy leaders** in an effort to shake off their old reputations and rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the electorate. With leadership as diverse as Pia Kjærsgaard of the Danish People's Party, whom followers fondly refer to as 'Mamma Pia,' and the enigmatic late Jörg Haider, former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, these parties successfully play into the media's requisite for charisma and political spectacle.

They have **embraced new technologies, are expert campaigners and understand how to mobilise across national borders**. All European radical right parties now operate expensive and well-designed websites and many engage in the creative use of mainstream social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook. Some of their websites and blogs, such as that of the French Front National, have extensive English sections, which is a reflection of the ways in which these parties reach beyond their national boundaries and serve as models to their European counterparts. This **increasing international cooperation** allows them to share ideas, funding and operational know-how, and present themselves as part of an international and 'normalised' movement.

It is **important not to exaggerate their success**; the story of the radical right in Europe has been as much one of electoral failure as success. The radical right is represented in only a minority of the national parliaments of the European Union, and those that are represented reached their peak several years ago. For example, between 1999 and 2002, the Austrian Freedom Party's share of the vote fell by half. Even the French Front National, often understood to be a prototype radical right party, found its support drop from a record 15.3 per cent in 1997 to just 4.3 per cent in 2007.

However, although they are not all winning electorally, **they are being successful on a number of other important indicators**: they are **influencing policy formulation, mainstreaming their issues** on the political agenda, **shifting social attitudes**, and generating more than their fair share of **coverage in the media.** In short, they have managed to **popularise their own views on traditional radical right issues**, such as immigration, asylum and minorities, squeezing out room for alternative progressive and liberal approaches. Considering their success in broader terms such as this suggests the need to tackle the new radical right on more than just the electoral front. In other words, their absence from

parliaments does not mean they are not making an impact.

The appeal of these parties cannot be attributed to smart new campaigns alone; it must be acknowledged that **their views strike a chord with a growing number of people who feel mainstream politicians have failed them**. Radical right parties have filled this vacuum and have learned from some of their mistakes of old by couching their views in the language of liberal democracy, rather than racism and intolerance.

Right-wing extremist violence

Against this backdrop of a resurgent non-violent radical right politics, **concerns have emerged about the threat from right wing extremist violence**. Again, it is **important not to exaggerate the scale of the threat**; European countries have not experienced a sustained campaign of violence or terrorism from extreme right-wing groups. **But although large-scale attacks like that experienced in Norway in 2011 are rare, they are not unheard of.** In 2007, an activist and former election candidate for the British National Party (BNP) was imprisoned for **stockpiling chemical explosives** as a response to his fears about 'the evils of uncontrolled immigration' and a 'forthcoming race war'. In 2010 in Germany, the authorities **confiscated several improvised explosive and incendiary devices** from activists linked to neo-Nazi group Kameradschaft Aachener Land (KAL).

There are, however, reasons to be cautious about how the threat might develop. First, security agencies such as Europol have warned that **shifts in the modus operandi of right-wing extremist groups makes them potentially more effective and increasingly difficult to monitor**. This is in part due to their use of new technologies, such as social media, and the development of cross-European networks. They are also becoming more professional in their operations. Furthermore, there is evidence from Germany that, as membership of radical right parties declines, affiliations to non-electoral neo-Nazi groups have risen.

Second, whereas the use of terrorism by right-wing groups is much rarer than by other groups, **right-wing extremists are engaged in high-frequency lower level acts of violence** that are having a significant impact on community safety and intergroup tensions. For example, in 2011 in Italy, two Senegalese street vendors were murdered by a member of the extreme right group, Casa Pound. In the same year in Germany, authorities discovered that the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a neo-Nazi cell, was linked to the murder of nine immigrants and a policewoman over a ten-year period, and a bombing in Cologne in 2004. And in Russia in recent years, hundreds of racially motivated attacks and tens of racially motivated murders have been recorded.

Dominant concepts of 'national security' do not accommodate these kinds of attacks, and they are not captured by established methods of threat assessment. But, for the individuals and communities subject to daily acts of violence and abuse, the cumulative impact of terror cannot be denied. This perhaps raises the

question of whether our approaches to national security need a serious re-think, and whether we need new ways of assessing threats that reflect both the national picture and local lived realities. **Third, definitions of extremism vary across Europe and agencies record acts of violence in different ways**. This makes it impossible to compare like with like, and difficult to get a **comprehensive view of the scale** of the problem.

Right-wing violent extremism encompasses a broad spectrum of people and activities. First, there are organised **political parties** that regularly contest elections. They seek to work within legal frameworks, but may have members who are individually associated with violence. Second, **grassroots social movements** that seek to mobilise public support and activist involvement. Again, they are often not formally involved in inciting violence, but become a resting place for those looking to move in that direction, and their demonstrations often end in civil unrest. Third, there are **smaller groups and networks** without formal membership or rigid structures, which tend to adopt more extreme ideological positions. And, finally, there are **'lone wolves'** or lone operators that do not have formal links to established groups and tend to act in isolation.

We still know relatively little about the causes and drivers of right-wing violent extremism. Indeed, any form of clandestine activity is notoriously difficult to study with any degree of accuracy. But based on what we do know, we can begin to build up a picture of the problem. On the whole, the perpetrators of right-wing extremist violence tend to be **young men with average or low levels of education**. Radical right party supporters do share in this distinct social profile: young or old men from the **working or middle classes, possessing few formal qualifications and often pessimistic about their economic prospects.**

However, **these factors do not by themselves provide a convincing account of why some citizens are susceptible to right-wing extremist violence a**nd, importantly, why most who share them do not become attracted to these movements. There has been **some evidence to suggest that individuals are more motivated by a combination of 'thrill-seeking,' opportunistic or criminal motivations** rather than an ideological worldview.

Perhaps the most important knowledge gap relates to **our poor understanding of the connection – or not – between violent and non-violent forms of right-wing extremism**. We still need to answer some basic questions: is there a continuous spectrum from one to the other? Do violent movements rely on non-violent groups to 'set the scene' for their actions? Or, does the presence of radical right political parties in power divert support from violent movements? Are there practical connections between them? And how do new technologies impact on the operations of both?

These are not academic questions; only through a proper understanding of both violent and non-violent right-wing movements and parties can policy makers work out where the problem lies, and

therefore what to do about it. In other words, should we draw the line around the use of violence, or the spread of intolerance? Are we concerned about the proliferation of radical right ideologies and narratives in mainstream politics and their impact on wider community relations, or about the potential for violence? And in response terms, can we really separate the two? These questions about the role of ideology in radicalisation are well rehearsed in discussions about other forms of violent extremism, not least jihadist extremist violence.

Practical & policy recommendations

The papers that follow chart what we know about both the new radical right and right-wing violent extremism across Europe. Six months on from the tragic events in Norway, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue launched the papers at a specially convened one-day workshop with policy makers, analysts, practitioners and former extremists from a number of European countries. While everyone agreed that there are no simple solutions, a number of practical and policy recommendations emerged:

- The need for new data;
- The need for sustainable funding cycles;
- The need for involvement by frontline workers;
- The need to invest in community capacity;
- The need for collaborate approaches to community order challenges;
- The need to encourage responsible reporting;
- The need to bridge the gap between politics and people.

The need for new data

There is a need to **conduct research and gather new data** and also look at ways to more effectively use what we know already. Wherever possible, this needs to be **cross-European and longitudinal**. And work needs to be done to make data sets comparable, especially where definitions of extremism diverge. A number of research questions are critical:

- What are the personal, social and environmental drivers for right-wing violent extremism?
- What is the relationship – if any – between right-wing violent extremism and the new radical right?
- In understanding right-wing extremism, can we draw lessons from other forms of extremism? And are policy solutions similar across different forms of extremism, thus allowing for efficiencies and economies of scale?
- What is the interplay between different forms of extremism? Is there such a thing as 'cumulative extremisms'? How do extremist groups play off one another on the ground, in cyberspace and on the level of narrative and political rhetoric?

The need for sustainable funding cycles

Many governments are beginning to increase their funding for initiatives to tackle right-wing violent extremism, including initiatives for individuals looking to disengage from these movements. Practitioners talk of the **challenges of short-term, unpredictable funding cycles** and the fact that **inconsistent support for individuals can be more harmful** than no support at all. Governments, local authorities and funding bodies need to be **clear about their commitment, and work with practitioners to design funding arrangements that provide the most effective response** and do not inadvertently make matters worse.

The need for involvement by frontline workers

Frontline workers have an important role to play in tackling the threat from right-wing extremist violence. They include a range of professionals, such as teachers, doctors, mental health professionals, social workers and youth workers. For many, they will need **training and information** to help them spot the signs of radicalisation, and know-how about where and how to report their concerns. For a handful of professionals, they will play a hands-on role in working with individuals at risk from radicalisation, or looking to disengage from violent movements. This **one-to-one work involves highly specialised interventions** and should only be conducted by those with specific and tested experience. **More investment is needed in this kind of training.**

Wherever possible, opportunities should also be identified **to apply lessons learned from work on one form of extremism to another**. While the specifics of the radicalisation process, ideological underpinnings and context will inevitably differ, some intervention methods and tools can be transferred. Working in a joined-up way would help to **streamline responses** and provide **efficiency savings** in what will be an increasingly tight fiscal environment.

The need to invest in community capacity

Just as policy has taken account of the role of communities in relation to the threat from Al Qaeda related and inspired violent extremism, **communities have a contribution to make** to efforts to prevent right wing extremist violence. Communities can act as the **early warning system** on the ground, are effective in **keeping young people away from harm**, and play a pivotal role in **supporting individuals who choose to disengage** from violent movements. **Lessons need to be learned from work with Muslim communities** to ensure mistakes are not repeated or resources duplicated, and it is vital to **transfer learning between countries** from those with more experience with the far right to those with less. Some local authorities have invested in training opportunities for community members, whereas others have created frameworks or processes for wider engagement of community members.

The need for collaborative approaches to public order challenges

The new radical right is becoming increasingly active as a street movement across many

European cities, and this raises challenges of public disorder. Some places are trying **new collaborative approaches, where police continue to lead but work in partnership with communities, local politicians, local media**, and others. For example, during an EDL march in Luton in 2011, the local council deployed 100 volunteers to act as **community mediators**, helping to disseminate information, pick up on and respond to community concerns in real time, and quash rumours before they spread. This greatly enhanced the response capability and was more effective than the police acting alone. This model should be adopted more widely. There also examples of **police use of social media tools during demonstrations** to collect and disseminate information quickly and effectively. Again, this should be picked up by police forces across Europe.

The need to encourage responsible reporting

Research by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue shows how **media coverage impacts on community relations** and attitudes towards those who are different. But influencing the behaviour of the media is notoriously difficult, and ethically problematic in the face of the need to maintain a free press. But there are steps that can be taken to help **promote more balanced** and informed coverage, such as **networking** opportunities between journalists, those working to tackle right-wing extremism, and communities for whom it is a significant problem. **Training** journalists in the ideologies and practices of extremists can also be helpful in enabling them to better understand the potential impact of their reporting. There are demand as well as supply side measures than can be taken, such as initiatives to promote more **critical media consumption.**

The need to bridge the gap between politics and people

At the heart of the story about the rise of both the radical right and right-wing violent extremism is a growing disconnection between politicians and their electorates. It is a circular and self-reinforcing problem: voters feel worried about their changing societies; so politicians either adopt hard-line rhetoric which they cannot back up with policies and results, or alternatively choose to side-step the issue altogether and, as a result, voters feel even more let down and disillusioned with mainstream political parties. In the 24/7 media age, and in the face of a more sophisticated radical right opponent, it is not easy for politicians to break this cycle. But change is needed: there must be **greater honesty** on issues of immigration, minority communities and security; **politicians must work harder to connect** directly through face-to-face and technical means; and **political parties need to work beyond their own membership** at the local level to serve the whole community, not just their own political constituency.

In short, we need to understand the adoption of radical right ideologies as a rational choice, fuelled by real or perceived grievances. We need to **engage with white working class communities**, not as 'backwards' communities susceptible to the radical right, but as diverse

and resilient communities whose voices are not often heard in political debates. There are real opportunities to bring the disillusioned back into the political mainstream, but it will take sustained commitment and a lot of hard work. It will also require the **recruitment of a new kind of local politician, selected on the basis of their skills and commitment to the local community**, rather than their composition of their professional networks and their commitment to the party.

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THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT IN EUROPE

Introduction

The past five years have been characterised by a wave of electoral successes at the local and national levels for so-called 'radical right' political parties, or what others have variously termed the 'populist right,' the 'far right,' or 'extreme right'. From Austria and Hungary to the Netherlands and Sweden, these parties have begun to gain traction.

Against the backdrop of increasingly critical rhetoric and policy surrounding migration and Islam in Europe, and bitter proclamations that multiculturalism has failed, the influence of these parties extends beyond the national parliaments and town halls where they are increasingly represented. Their ideas have become increasingly intertwined with mainstream politics; in some cases the rhetoric of the radical right is no longer confined to the political margins, but used quite comfortably by the mainstream. Indeed, it is important to note that they may address legitimate concerns and they certainly claim to serve as a conduit for channelling these concerns into the political arena.

Despite historical and contextual differences between these various parties, they share an agenda of radical change to national policies on themes reaching across immigration, religion and national culture. Though these parties seek to operate within and abide by the rules of democracy, the radical changes they seek are grounded in a critique of *liberal* democracy. This paper refers to them collectively as the 'radical right'.

This paper aims to explore the rise of the radical right, outlining the diverse range of actors operating within this party family and how their politics and success can be characterised. It complicates the notion that the radical right is sweeping European democracies with electoral successes, demonstrating that its story is as much one of electoral failure as one of success. However, it looks beyond electoral results and identifies several possible indicators of these parties' 'success,' and seeks to develop a general framework for policy interventions. While this paper will focus largely on radical right political parties, it is written in pair with a paper on "Right-Wing Extremist Violence: Causes and Consequences" by Matthew Goodwin, to lay the groundwork for a broader discussion on the relationship between the democratic radical right and more extreme anti-democratic elements, like its illegal or violent manifestations.

In the wake of the Oslo bombing and Utøya massacre in July 2011 and the discovery later that year of a neo-Nazi terrorist group guilty of a decade of murders in Germany, public attention has once again turned to scrutinise the 'rise' of the radical right in Europe. Beyond organised terror and so-called 'lone wolves', a mounting wave of harassment and violent outbursts targeting asylum seekers and ethnic minorities has also presented itself in many European countries, notably in countries like Germany and Sweden in recent years (Lööw 1998; Pred 2000; See Goodwin 2012). In many cases, European Muslims in particular have been targeted.

However, there remains confusion over the nature of radical right parties and how they relate to incidents of intolerance and violence that have been seen across Europe in recent years. Radical right political parties are predominantly non-violent and operate within the rules of democracy; in fact, most actively seek to disassociate themselves from historical or perceived ties to their extreme and violent counterparts. They cannot simply be placed along a continuum of the moderate to the extreme. The relationship between illegal, anti-democratic and violent manifestations of the radical right—the extreme elements—and radical right parties is complex and varies across Europe. It is furthermore important when examining 'the radical right' that we do not approach these parties as part of a uniform movement; their activists and supporters are not homogeneous.

What is common amongst radical right parties is that they present a number of distinct challenges to the social and political systems in Europe. Though their presence may not constitute a democratic crisis, their success can reshape the political environment, lending an air of legitimacy to policies and positions founded upon intolerance (Schain et. al 2002). This is the case not only for immigration policy, but also for policies ranging across housing, employment and education. Their presence can weaken social cohesion, undermining the social fabric of democracy (Schain et. al 2002); there is some evidence to suggest that the success of these parties correlates with rising ethnic prejudice (Andersen & Evans 2004); and there is proof that their presence can tend to increase the salience of certain attitudes, like anti-immigration sentiment.

These parties thrive on and foster mistrust and disillusionment with mainstream political structures. As this malaise continues to grow it will further impair the ability of politicians and policy makers to relate to and effectively serve the electorate. Although most voters have not responded to the rise of these parties by rejecting the democratic system, antipathy to mainstream politicians is becoming widespread in a number of European countries. Radical right parties are responding and in doing so are shaping the nature of politics, choosing strong and charismatic leaders and new types of political discourse, and shifting the relationship between leaders and followers within established parties (Bale 2003; Mény & Surel 2002).

The ideologies of the radical right are far from simple, increasingly spanning left-wing and centre spectrums, mixing modern populist discourses with unchanging extreme elements of the earlier radical right. The electoral success of these parties allows them to expand and strengthen their organisations and to distribute literature and propaganda more widely. Even without electoral success, the visibility, organisation and reach of radical right propaganda and messaging have dramatically increased in recent years. While speculations about the radical right 'taking over' Europe are often grossly overestimated, the radical right is still largely underestimated in the scope of change it may bring to European societies. Its party members and voters are often seen as un-educated, the 'losers' of modernisation processes and globalisation. In reality, these parties are displaying a growing capacity to shape voters' opinions and affect policy formation and their voters are diverse, increasingly encompassing the middle class and other social and economic groups.

This paper explores the 'rise' of the radical right. It presents a typology of the European radical right based on the pre-existing foundations of these parties, from extremist sub-cultures and nationalist foundations to protest movements, post-communism authoritarian and militant politics and new parties. It shows how a 'new radical right' has emerged in recent years which – regardless of its electoral success or influence on public discourse – is helping to shape a new style of politics. In fact, it shows that electorally the radical right has had as many failures as successes, dismissing the idea that Europe is being swept by a wave of radical and extreme right-wing politics. But electoral success is only one indicator of success, alongside representation, influence on policy, influence on mainstream parties, influence on the European radical right, media coverage, impact on attitudes and impact on extremism. Adopting a broader analytical approach highlights the mixed results of the radical right across Europe. The paper closes with the challenges for policy makers, and sets out a framework for interventions in relation to radical right political parties.

The evidence points to the rise of a new radical right across Europe, but this is not to be confused with a universal Europe-wide escalation of support for extreme right-wing movements. Our understanding of the link -or not- between this and the rise of the extreme right wing is patchy, and we still know relatively little about how sustainable either trend will be. However, the young demographic of both radical right party members and violent right wing extremists suggests that the challenge will not disappear overnight, and policy makers and politicians must proceed with caution.

A typology of the European radical right

The radical right 'family' does not lend itself to simple definitions. The terms 'populist,' 'neo-nationalist,' 'far right,' 'radical right' and 'extreme right' are often used interchangeably to describe parties of this nature. Terms like the 'extreme right' invoke a sense of extremeness in a political and ideological space, but there are questions as to whether a party must exhibit ideological features characteristic of the pre-

World War Two extreme right in order to be called 'extreme.' Some of these parties are directly inspired by fascist intellectuals from the 1930s, while others have no sympathy for this past, and even criticise the lack of direct democracy in parliamentary democracies. Some have programmes that, like the traditional mainstream right, promote a free market economy, whereas others have objected to this, particularly when it comes to international trade (Van der Brug & Fennema 2006). Others may be characterised simply as 'neo-nationalist', as they represent a re-emergence of nationalism, challenging recent transnational and global transformations in Europe (Gingrich & Banks 2006).

Despite the plethora of possible terms and characteristics describing these parties, the centrality of the immigration issue for this party family in Europe is undisputed. The construction of enemies is prevalent within these parties, with the enemy of the radical right often encompassing both political elites and immigrants, often Muslims in particular. Populism is increasingly used to characterise the radical right, based on their political strategy of reaching out to the electorate as the representatives of 'the common people'.

Often the differentiating factor between these parties (and their electoral successes) is their different origins and the historical transformations they have undergone to develop into political organisations. Parties whose pre-existing foundations were embedded in openly-neo-Nazi and white supremacist networks, which were in many cases engaged in violence, face a number of challenges in their attempts to succeed in the modern political system. Their challenges differ significantly from those of parties originating from less controversial anti-tax protest party backgrounds. This section presents a typology of radical right parties on the basis of their origins, dividing them into the following broad categories: national foundations, extremist sub-cultures, protests movements, post-communist and new parties. They are outlined in figure 1 below. The parties in bold have reaped over 5% per cent of the vote in at least one national election, in some cases gaining representation in parliaments and governments. Some have argued that a legitimate nationalist foundation or a protest and party transformation background is a requirement for electoral success (Ivarsflaten 2006). However, this is not a sufficient condition alone. These histories are "powerful, but they [are] not deterministic" (Art 2011: 44). This typology is merely one method of distinguishing between these parties, and is based on information gathered from a number of sources (Art 2011; Mudde 2005) detailing the histories and characteristics of these parties. As in any attempt to categorise these parties, there will always be outliers or misfits.

Figure 1: Typology of radical right parties (by pre-existing foundations)

Pre-existing foundations	Country	Radical Right Party
Extremist sub-cultures	Belgium	National Front
	Germany	The Republicans, National Democratic Party of Germany, German People's Union
	The Netherlands	Centre Democrats
	Sweden	National Democrats, **Sweden Democrats**
	United Kingdom	British National Party, National Front
Nationalist foundations	Austria	**Austrian Freedom Party**
	Belgium	**Flemish Interest**
	France	**Front National**
	Italy	**National Alliance, Northern League**
Protest movements or party transformations	Denmark	**Danish People's Party**
	Finland	**True Finns**
	Norway	**Norwegian Progress Party**
	Switzerland	**Swiss People's Party**
Post-communist authoritarian and militant politics (Central and Eastern European variety)	Bulgaria	**National Union Attack**
	Czech Republic	**The Association for the Republic—Republican Party of Czechoslovakia**
	Hungary	**Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)**
	Latvia	**People's Movement for Latvia**

	Poland	**Self-Defence, The League of Polish Families**
	Romania	**The Greater Romania Party**
	Slovakia	**Slovak National Party**
	Slovenia	**Slovenian National Party**
New parties	The Netherlands	**List Pim Fortuyn, Party for Freedom**
	Sweden	**New Democracy**
Sources: Art 2011: 54; Mudde 2007; Author's own collection of data.		

The legacies of the radical right in regions and countries like Austria, Flanders and Italy consisted of relatively strong **nationalist foundations**—political parties, associations and networks dominated by collaborators after the Second World War, most of whom possessed some degree of political and social legitimacy (Art 2011). The Austrian Freedom Party emerged in 1956 through a coalition of nationalists and, oddly enough, liberals—whom Jörg Haider nudged out of the party soon after becoming party leader in 1986 (Mudde 2011). In the French case, the organisations and networks that provided the foundation for the Front National were the nationalist residue of decolonisation. Though such nationalist foundations were certainly comprised of both moderates and extremists, their political representatives were not rooted in the extreme margins of society: for example, the Italian Social Movement was dominated by lawyers and the Austrian Freedom Party contained a higher percentage of university graduates than other Austrian parties (Art 2011).

The post-war nationalist landscape in several other countries was dominated instead by extremist and anti-democratic factions. In these countries, radical right parties emerged entrenched in **extremist subcultures**. Several radical right groups in regions and countries like the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, Sweden and Wallonia were built upon small networks of extremists, many openly espousing Nazism and fascism or nostalgia for war (Art 2011). For example, the Sweden Democrats emerged into the Swedish political scene in 1988, born from the *Bevara Sverige Svenskt* (Keep Sweden Swedish) movement and heavily implicated in white supremacist subcultures. Several of the party's founders had been involved in openly Nazi and skinhead circuits, including the neo-Nazi party *Nordiska Rikspartiet* (Nordic National Party) and the fascist organisation *Nysvenska Rörelsen* (Neo-Swedish Movement), and many of the party's early events were attended by skinheads in uniforms touting Nazi flags.

Other radical right parties, like the Danish People's Party, the Norwegian Progress Party

and the Swiss People's Party, originated entirely independently from nationalist underpinnings and fascist histories, emerging as **protest movements** and developing through **party transformations**. The Danish and Norwegian cases began as anti-tax protest parties, which underwent splits and transformations through the 1980s, and increasingly came to rely on themes of immigration and national identity. The Swiss People's Party began as an agrarian party and gradually shifted to the radical right by the early 1990s. These parties were dominated by moderates and contained virtually no extremists, as many members had not initially joined because of their stance on immigration (Art 2011).

In the Central and Eastern European context, radical right parties emerged as a **post-communist** phenomenon, largely addressing post-communist issues, such as corruption, minorities and EU enlargement (Mudde 2005). These parties tend to be far more authoritarian, and have mobilised anti-EU sentiments, anti-Semitism and hate against other ethnic groups, particularly the Roma. They also tend to be less organised than their Western European counterparts, more anti-democratic and more militant (Minkenberg 2000).

Finally, in recent years a handful of radical right parties have emerged **without any pre-existing foundations** or party structures. A recent example, the Dutch Party for Freedom, was founded in 2005 by Geert Wilders, formerly a member of the mainstream conservative party. It quickly grew to become the third-largest party in the country, currently supporting the minority government led by the mainstream right.

The 'new' radical right?

A typology based on histories is in itself an indication that the radical right is not new. Its genuinely 'new' elements are best represented by movements like Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom, whose politics, particularly economic, do not easily match the models which radical right parties across Europe have tended to fit, but whose successfully propagated anti-Islam rhetoric serves as a role model for similar parties. Also new are street-based movements, like the English Defence League (EDL), which gained traction as extra-parliamentary forces and are potentially now moving slowly into the political arena. A recent alliance between the EDL and the British Freedom Party (BFP) will allow the EDL to field candidates for the first time in local elections (*The Independent* 2011). The 'new' elements of the radical right further complicate the landscape of these parties; they are increasingly difficult to classify and pose a number of new threats to European liberal democracy. Islamophobia is often the common thread that pieces these movements and parties together, more so than their actual politics, which can range across the left-right spectrum.

What is new about today's radical right is that it has in many cases managed to span even traditionally left-wing and centre spectrums, combining strong anti-establishment resentment and calls for democratic reform with the use of identity politics as 'mobilising agents' (Guibernau 2010: 16). This new form of radical right politics contrasts with the difficulties of

traditional radical right parties to renew and reshape their ideologies. It does not cling to the stereotypes of traditional right-wing extremism; these parties instead often do not have a consistent programme. They are increasingly drawing upon the most convenient conception of the 'enemy.' Their key topics, themes, and enemy stereotypes may thus change over time, vary by context and generally be rather opportunistic.

These parties are increasingly espousing the language of liberal democracy, often defending women's rights and even homosexuality. It is important to note that we cannot in all cases disregard this ideological framing as adaptable and instrumental: for example, Geert Wilders was a strong advocate for individual rights long before founding the Party for Freedom. In some cases, however, it is clear that these parties disguise intolerant ideologies in new, more acceptable languages, employing these languages to carve a space for themselves *within* liberal democracy.

The new radical right is furthermore embracing the digital age and new technologies that may enhance their success. All European radical right parties now operate expensive and well-designed websites, some of which, such as that of the French Front National, have English sections. This is a reflection of the ways in which these parties reach beyond their national boundaries and serve as models to their counterparts in other countries. A recent report highlighted the use of Facebook in mobilising online support for the radical right and painted a portrait of a growing generation of young internet-savvy radical right activists in Europe (Bartlett et. al 2011).

The new radical right is increasingly mobilising across national borders. The use of international networks by self-proclaimed nationalists, who often stand against 'internationalism' and supra-national co-operation like the EU, is counter-intuitive. However, radical right parties are particularly adept at networking and building strategic alliances with others in their camp. Recent examples include the Alliance of European National Movements, which was formed in 2009 by Jobbik, Front National, Tricolour Flame, Sweden's National Democrats and Belgium's National Front. In 2010, an international conference of global far right activists and leaders was organised in Tokyo.

During campaigns, radical right parties are increasingly drawing upon these networks to invite internationally well-known anti-Islam activists to their events. For example, during the Sweden Democrats' 2010 election campaign, the party invited Robert Spencer, the American founder of Jihad Watch, and Alan Lake of the EDL to speak at Sweden Democrats events. Bringing international leaders promoting anti-Islam sentiments to their national campaign events allows these parties to present themselves as part of an increasingly normalised phenomenon of Islamophobia in Europe and the United States, rather than as the socially marginalised groups they may in reality be. International networks can also damage these parties' reputations if they become associated with the blunders of any other party in the network. However, radical right parties are

exchanging strategies and best practice, which allows them to develop more innovative responses than many of the mainstream parties.

Few give these groups credit for their entrepreneurial spirit. The radical right often needs to create its own opportunities. Their success is dependent upon their ability to manipulate their party histories and relationship to the electorate. The politicians of the new radical right have gained power by virtue of their capacity to manufacture potent public personalities, carefully tailored to their national context. With leadership as diverse as Pia Kjærsgaard, whom followers fondly refer to as 'Mamma Pia,' and the charismatic late Jörg Haider, they are shifting the style of successful political behaviour and political leadership in Europe. Studies have demonstrated that these parties may impact upon established parties and party systems, shaping the style of their leadership, their type of political discourse and methods of communication.

These parties have in many cases demonstrated an ability to politicise issues which were once not particularly salient to voters. For example, the Danish radical right successfully managed to take "issue ownership" of immigration concerns just as it became particularly salient to the Danish public in the 1980s (Rydgren 2005). They are particularly successful in (re)engaging young and working class people in politics, which for other parties has in many cases proved difficult. They are a dynamic and flexible force, and can no longer be seen as the unbending single-issue parties they were once assumed to be.

The radical right on the 'rise'?

In recent decades, Europe has seen a pattern of mounting electoral success for many radical right parties at the local, national, and European levels, reaching across countries as diverse as Austria, Hungary, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The numbers from 2010 are striking: Geert Wilders' anti-Islam Party for Freedom received 15.5 per cent of the vote in the Netherlands and the extreme nationalist party Jobbik received 16.7 per cent of the vote in Hungary. Sweden was for many years seen as being immune to populist, anti-immigrant parties, but in 2010 the Sweden Democrats became the only anti-immigrant party represented in the Swedish parliament. And in April 2011, Finland became the next country to usher in surprising election results, with the anti-European True Finns emerging from the political margins to garner 19 per cent of the vote.

It is, however, important to stress that support for these parties has often been volatile. In 2002, support for the Austrian Freedom Party fell in to just over half its record 27 per cent achieved in the 1999 elections. The Dutch populist List Pim Fortuyn's support dropped from 17 per cent of the vote to a third of this in the 2003 Dutch elections. The French Front National, often understood to be a prototype radical right party, fell from its record 15.3 per cent in 1997 to a mere 4.3 percent of the vote in 2007. Over the past decade, radical right parties have done quite well in several circumstances but their growth should not be exaggerated. Their story has been one of both failure and success, and experts have been unable to predict with any

accuracy the electoral fortunes of radical right parties (Art 2011). Their successes and failures have been puzzling.

Until the late 1990s research into the success of the radical right was dominated by demand-side analyses, concerned with how societal changes and favourable opportunity structures create niches for these parties. The earliest experts argued that their emergence is a consequence of the socio-economic and socio-cultural transition of Western European democracies from industrial to post-industrial economies (Betz 1993). As invoked in Matthew Goodwin's paper (2012), this transition has been understood to leave the 'losers' of post-industrialisation processes anxious, insecure and resentful due to new levels of unemployment, housing shortages and shifting gender dynamics. Many have argued that increases in immigrant populations and asylum seekers can lead to increased feelings of insecurity and resentment among the post-industrial 'losers,' or 'those who are afraid to lose out in the future' (Rydgren 2003; Betz 1993; Gingrich 2006: 41). Such catalysts of discontent are understood to create favourable conditions for radical right parties. It has been argued that increased immigration allows the core issues of these parties, including the defence of national culture and order, to become more politically salient (Widfeldt 2000).

While these approaches provide insight into a number of successes of European radical right-wing parties, the frequency of outliers indicates that demand-side approaches are insufficient. If increased immigration is fundamentally important, how can we explain the lack of long-term success for radical right parties in high-immigration countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (Art 2011)? Immigration is a key issue, but there is no simple correlation between this and the success of the radical right (Hainsworth 2008; Norris 2005; Golder 2003).

One inhibiting factor for growth can be the structure of electoral systems, which, regardless of widespread immigration concerns, can disadvantage small political parties. For example, the first-past-the-post electoral system in the UK favours majorities and makes it difficult for small parties to gain seats in the House of Commons. Mainstream parties may also co-opt the issue areas of the radical right, adopting similar rhetoric and policy proposals to appeal to their voter-bases and dissolve the competition. However, Sweden is a prime example of how these favourable opportunity structures did not necessarily result in radical right successes; its absence until 2010 was 'remarkable,' given that the proportional representation system allows parties to be represented in parliament once they gain four percent of the vote, and given that mainstream parties had refrained from politicising immigration (Gingrich 2006: 34). Sweden had long been understood to be an exception in demand-side theories of the radical right's successes and failures, as there was significant evidence of an existing niche for a radical right party to exploit: widespread popular xenophobia, high levels of discontent with political elites and flourishing anti-EU sentiments (Rydgren 2002, 2010).

We must abandon the idea that parties are the reflection of mass-level sentiments. In order to succeed, radical right parties must be able to seize the moment. Even if favourable opportunity structures arise, radical right parties might fail to create strategies that enhance their power (Carter 2005; Norris 2005; Brug et al. 2005). Experts are increasingly calling for internalist or party-centric examinations of the radical right (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2003; Hainsworth 2008). Radical right parties are 'neither bystanders, nor simply recipients' of opportunities that present themselves. Rather, they are agents in the narrative about their success or failure (Hainsworth 2008: 128).

Radical right parties themselves face a number of barriers to success; for example, they have often struggled with organisational confusion (Svåsand 1998: 82). Incompetent leadership, internal splits and disorganised behaviour have undermined their ability to perform at the level of other political parties. Enlisting socially and politically sound members and leaders has been a persistent challenge for these parties, particularly those originating from extremist subcultures and histories. Furthermore, it has been argued that it is nearly impossible for parties to make credible appeals to voters on the immigration issue unless they have legacies that can be used to fend off accusations of racism and extremism (Ivarsflaten 2006). Their success is often reliant upon not only their ability to form sound organisational structures, but also to distinguish themselves from violent histories and pasts.

Figure 2 (overleaf) indicates electorally persistent radical right parties in Europe—those that received at least 5 per cent of the vote in three successive national parliamentary elections over the past quarter-century (Art 2011). Few of the 44 parties that have attempted to enter politics on anti-immigration, anti-Islam, radical right and populist grounds can be considered a 'success', even if we measure that by electoral breakthrough (Ivarsflaten 2006). If we measure it in relation to electoral persistence, even fewer parties fit this bill. Only the eight parties listed below meet this specific requirement.

Figure 2: Electoral fortunes of electorally persistent radical right parties in Europe (national parliamentary election results)



Sources: Art 2011: 241; Author's own collection of data. Refer to Appendix A for original data.

Indicators of 'success'

The headlines preceding and following major national elections indicate the tendency of the media to take any minor victory of the radical right as a sign that these parties are sweeping to power across Europe. As a prime example, headlines following the Sweden Democrats' election results alluded to the far right conquering the final stronghold of liberal democracy and tolerance (*The Guardian* 2010a), with the same newspaper declaring, 'Sweden joins Europe-wide backlash against immigration' (*The Guardian* 2010b). However, since the 2010 election, the Sweden Democrats have not reshaped the face of Swedish democracy; civil society resistance against racism has strengthened significantly and immigration policies have only liberalised further. The 'success' of the radical right is dependent upon more than simply passing a vote threshold and entering Parliament. In order to assess the impact of radical right parties on the European political landscape, there is a need to identify new measures of radical right success, which go beyond simply the occasional electoral victory.

The relevance of radical right parties has tended to be measured predominantly in electoral terms, but there are many ways of conceiving of success and failure, particularly when it comes to political parties whose mere presence can often have a range of effects not traditionally measured by political researchers. Some experts are drawing more attention to the influence peripheral parties may have in shaping Western

European polities (Williams 2006). Theories on political party strategy have failed to address how parties may operate under the recognition that they may never be a ruling party. Such parties have other goals and may seek alternative channels of influence. This section outlines a number of potential indicators that could be used, that are based on a wider understanding of what might constitute achievement for radical right parties.

Electoral breakthrough

There is no common definition of what constitutes an electoral breakthrough—some refer to winning enough votes to enter parliament (Mudde 2007), others present municipal election results (Art 2011). Electoral breakthrough certainly does in many cases give radical right parties an opportunity to expand and strengthen their organisations and to distribute literature and propaganda more widely, due to increased financial support from the state to parties passing the threshold. However, if we use electoral breakthrough as a primary indicator of 'success,' we risk overemphasising single election results and flash parties. The wave of recent electoral breakthroughs for the radical right, for example in Sweden and Finland, undoubtedly has a symbolic effect on nations and on Europe at large. But the lasting effect of these electoral results remains to be seen.

Electoral persistence

Electoral persistence does not necessarily overlap with other possible measures of success, such as participation in government. For example, the French Front National has persisted electorally despite being denied representation in the National Assembly. Flemish Interest remains one of the largest parties in Flanders but has been effectively barred from government participation at every level. On the other hand, the List Pim Fortuyn did not persist electorally but arguably reshaped the public debate over immigration and integration in the Netherlands (Art 2011). Electorally persistent parties do, however, tend to succeed on the other measures of success, and Art (2011) argues that it thus makes sense to focus on this variable.

Government participation

For a number of radical right parties, representation in local government is the first and only experience of participation in government. At the local level, these parties can find themselves wielding more power than would be possible at the national level. However, the reach and influence of local governments is often limited, and radical right parties resort to using local-level representation to implement cultural policies, for example renaming streets and increasing national symbols in cities (Mudde 2007). However, local-level representation and policy change can have important symbolic effects on cities and towns.

Similarly, representation in parliament can have a symbolic impact on society even if the party is denied participation in the national government. The Sweden Democrats' entry into the Swedish parliament in 2010 prompted onlookers to claim that mainstream politics had changed in Sweden and that Sweden was perhaps no longer the

bastion of tolerance it had always claimed to be (*New York Times* 2010). The election of an allegedly 'racist' party into parliament was traumatic for the nation, as demonstrated in the overnight mobilisation of over 10,000 demonstrators in Stockholm on the day after the election in a 'mass protest against racism,' wielding signs stating 'No racists in parliament.'

Influence on policy

There have been very few instances where radical right parties have had chances to directly implement their policies. Their direct influence on government programmes has been fairly limited, largely due to *cordon sanitaire* and other agreements not to implement policies proposed by these parties. However, a number of studies have demonstrated that radical right parties may have an indirect impact on immigration policies, playing a crucial role in the introduction of increasingly harsh regimes (Mudde 2007; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). However, their impact is difficult to measure; such changes might have occurred regardless. It is increasingly the trend in Europe to restrict immigration and appeal to immigration-critical voters, as exemplified by French President Nicolas Sarkozy's implementation of a ban on the *niqab* in April 2011, and British Prime Minister David Cameron's speech on the failure of multiculturalism in February 2011.

Influence on mainstream parties

Radical right parties may also have an impact on the policy positions and approaches of mainstream political parties, which may attempt to acquiesce public opinion by accommodating or co-opting some of their demands. This could include the introduction of stricter asylum laws in an attempt to stem or respond to the growth of anti-immigration sentiment. However, as with policy impact, it is important to note that this may not be a direct result of a radical right party in all cases; the situation in countries like Spain and perhaps the UK indicate that this development is not limited to countries with a strong radical right presence. As mentioned above, such parties may also have the unintended effect of causing other parties to mirror their style of leadership, their political discourse and relationships with voters. There has been a recent surge of research on possible responses by mainstream political parties to the radical right, and these studies will continue to direct mainstream political actors towards possible response mechanisms which will not further stoke the flame of the radical right (for more information, see: Goodwin 2011c).

Influence on the European radical right

There are some radical right parties whose wavering electoral success, and perhaps even decline, over the past quarter century has not prevented them from serving as role models and strategic partners for other similar parties. The French Front National has been considered a prototype and a 'big-brother' figure to many, offering financial support and taking the lead on collaborative projects (Rydgren 2005; Mudde 2007). Despite its own declining support in recent years, the Front National is widely credited with developing an ideological 'master frame' which has allowed similar parties across Europe to gain support. Jean Marie Le Pen has

also taken the lead on several attempts to unite across Europe, creating the Euro-Nat, an association of European nationalist parties active in the late 1990s. The development of more effective party organisations and strategies within several budding European radical right parties can perhaps be attributed to Le Pen's financial and symbolic support in their early years.

Networking with other radical right parties is a risky enterprise and co-operation has sometimes proven to have a negative influence on participants; the blunders of any party in the network have the potential to become blotches on the others. For example, several parties have renounced their relationships with the BNP, whose disreputable background makes them an undesirable contact for others attempting to dissociate from extreme pasts. However, the Front National is today largely regarded as a 'successful' role model for the European radical right.

Media coverage

While few radical right parties will attain media coverage which directly lauds them, the media may shape the public agenda in ways that indirectly further their agenda, for example by politicising immigration or legitimising radical right discourses in the public sphere. In addition, the media can contribute to the 'noise' or sensation of the radical right by continually highlighting their impending success and rise in Europe. In most cases it would be wrong to characterise this being a direct result of radical right party strategies, and so is not a straightforward indicator of 'success'. But it offers an insight into the extent of these parties' potential 'grip'. However, in some cases media attention can be an indicator of radical right success; for example, the widely-read Austrian *Neue Kronen Zeitung* during much of the 1990s not only pushed the issues of the Austrian Freedom Party, but also presented the party as the voice of common sense on these issues (Art 2006).

The relationship between the media and the radical right is even more complicated in countries with highly nativist and populist media which are also hostile to the radical right. For example, influential German tabloid *Bild Zeitung* notoriously employs radical right discourse (Eatwell 2000), while also maintaining stark criticism of such parties in Germany (Art 2006: 165).

Impact on attitudes: rising social intolerance and political discontent

Some experts (Rydgren 2003) have argued that the presence of a radical right party may increase racism and xenophobia in society, both through influencing other political actors and shifting people's frame of thought such that any latent xenophobic beliefs can be strengthened and better articulated. There is some evidence to suggest that success of these parties may increase intolerance and political discontent, including Andersen & Evans' (2004) comparative study, which found a positive correlation between electoral successes of radical right parties and ethnic prejudice across seven West European countries. There is further evidence to suggest that the presence of these parties increases the salience of certain attitudes,

such as anti-immigration sentiment (Mudde 2007). The radical right may also have an impact on social norms surrounding prejudice and racism. Blinder et al. propose that the missing variable in understanding radical right performance is the anti-racism norm and how political parties '(de)mobilise it' (Blinder et al. 2010: 4).

Impact on extremism

There is no systematic empirical evidence of an effect radical right parties may have on extremist movements, but any impacts are not straightforward. In the Netherlands, for example, the success of the Party for Freedom and the polarising effect it has on society has not translated into heightened levels of extreme right-wing activity. On the contrary, extremist nationalist and neo-Nazi movements have declined in size and intensity of activities. Some experts believe that successful radical right parties channel much of the frustrations of violent or extremist movements into the democratic system (Minkenberg 2003; Koopmans 1996); another assumption could be that as radical right opinions become mainstreamed, extremist elements lose their counter-cultural appeal. Following this reasoning, one might sooner expect a rise of left-wing extremism, which, to a small extent, appears to be the case in the Netherlands.

There are many ways of conceiving of success and failure, and the above indicators demonstrate the breadth of impact the radical right can have on European societies. Conventional studies have tended to draw heavily upon parties that have succeeded in becoming electorally significant, and to ignore cases where these parties have yet to gain representation in parliaments and local councils. While electoral results offer a straightforward measure, analysing electoral results alone ignores the full range of possibilities for radical right impact on liberal democracies. Indicators such as influence on policy, mainstream parties, media and social attitudes—while it is more challenging to attribute change directly to the radical right—take us beyond the conventional measures of success and failure and illuminate the nature of influence these parties can have on their nations. Indicators like impact on the wider European radical right family and on extremism highlight the need to pay heed to the roles that individual radical right parties can play within wider movements and ideologies—both of the democratic and anti-democratic persuasions.

The challenge for policy makers

Defending liberal democracy against the radical right is challenging precisely because of the new game of politics that the radical right has been playing. They offer strong arguments and promises to citizens, exploiting the anxieties of those who feel threatened by socio-economic changes and resent recent immigration (Guibernau 2010). However, their reformed democracy comes with the exclusion of subsets of the population considered to be 'different'—even citizens—in order to avoid cultural decay. Their reformed democracy also comes at the cost of current and mainstream politicians and policy makers, whose relationship with the electorate is at stake as the radical right succeeds.

Across Europe, there are populations feeling increasingly disengaged from, and disillusioned by, mainstream politics. Recent research by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Beider 2011) on white working class perspectives on cohesion in the UK signals that members of these communities often feel they are not being heard by policy makers. Guibernau (2010) argues that mainstream parties and policy makers have underestimated the extent to which the framing and style of the radical right resonates with the European public, and have done little to understand why this type of politics is striking a chord with the electorate. The perceived impact of immigration should not be ignored, and there is a need for policy makers to address the concerns of these communities (Beider 2011). People will not move towards the radical right everywhere that these concerns are felt, but in some cases they might disengage entirely from politics. It is important that policy makers address these parties where they are gaining ground, but also that they do not assume that the radical right will necessarily always thrive in these areas. It is possible to gain back those voters who have not turned to the radical right for ideological reasons but are simply unsatisfied with policy and politics as they are.

Another challenge for policy makers is the diverse forms the radical right takes today. The emergence of the EDL and other radical right movements operating within democratic structures complicates the possible measures which policy makers can take to address the rise of the radical right. An example of the difficulties posed by this diversity is apparent in the German state's legal distinction between political parties and other political organisations. Non-party organisations can simply be banned by the federal or state Minister of Interior, while political parties require a much more demanding procedure to do so, meaning that very few parties are banned (Mudde 2004). However, distinguishing even between non-party organisations and party organisations is becoming increasingly challenging—in a UK example, the EDL, which remains a street-based movement, may field candidates for the first time in local elections. Banning and legal sanctions are, of course, not the only method for tackling the challenge of the radical right in Europe through policy; policy initiatives have been designed at the European, federal, municipal levels in various states (for more information see: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009).

The varying indicators of success outlined above demonstrate that tackling the radical right is not simply a matter of preventing electoral successes or participation in governments. Eliminating the radical right's possibilities for one of these forms of 'success' does not mean they are being prevented from being successful in other ways. The radical right makes its imprint on society through creative methods—they are one of the most flexible political forces today. This flexibility is precisely why we can consider several elements of the radical right to be 'new', despite the fact that the radical right itself is decades old. These parties are constantly bending their politics and strategies to respond in innovative ways. The newer elements of the radical right family will also contribute to opening up new possible channels of 'success'.

There are no clear-cut guidelines on how to manage the challenges of the radical right gaining in political strength or succeeding along any particular one of these channels. This paper seeks to provide a general framework for addressing the challenges posed by these parties. These parties do in many cases represent some real grievances felt by specific portions of the population. It is true that the scope of these grievances is often exaggerated by the radical right, but some are nonetheless real and pressing for citizens. To entirely dismiss and stigmatise the radical right is to disregard these sections of the population as well. It is important for policy makers to address the concerns the radical right gives voice to, and develop new methods of communication with the electorate on these issues. The following measures are recommendations to be considered:

Take control of the debate before the radical right manages to do so

Mainstream parties often deal with controversial topics only when challenged by the radical right. In such cases, they leave space for the radical right to address these issues first, setting the tone of the political debate. The new radical right has distinguished itself by embracing and leading on topics such as immigration, Islam, European integration, social security and care for the elderly, forcing other parties into a reactive position (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). Mainstream parties should control the agenda before it becomes owned by the radical right, and should present alternative responses and solutions before the public debate is shifted in the radical right's direction.

Neither cooperate with nor ignore the radical right

Indeed, evidence has shown that the radical right may gain from *cordon sanitaire* and other methods of exclusion from political participation (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2004; Ramalingam 2012), but may also make political headway if cooperated with, as in the Danish case. Mainstream politicians and policy makers should find a balance between ignoring and cooperating with the radical right; they should neither become dependent upon the radical right nor allow it to claim it has been undemocratically excluded from mainstream politics. Ignoring these parties has also allowed them to position themselves as the sole political representatives willing to discuss issues of migration, religion and ethnic identity, and to voice the concerns of 'ordinary people'. Rather than suppressing the radical right, the primary aim should be to invalidate their claims and expose faulty logic and policy intentions.

Find a means of communicating immigration politics without stoking the flame of the radical right

There certainly are reasons to manage migration in a manner that takes into account both migrant and non-migrant communities. However, there is a real need to challenge false information and conspiracy theories at the local and national levels. Mainstream political actors need to contest the idea that immigration is responsible for a lack of jobs and housing, or that lower immigration will reduce crime rates. There need to be new methods of communications for mainstream political actors to counter misinformation and myths in a

productive manner. A recent example of new methods in action: the Swedish government has taken initial steps in developing a new section of its integration website devoted to debunking common myths about immigrants and ethnic minorities in Sweden (*Regeringskansliet* 2011).

Initiate a two-way process of engagement with communities

Politicians and elected officials need to engage with communities in a new way. Policy making needs to be transparent, with the intentions and outcomes of new and old policies made clear to communities. Policy making needs to be part of an ongoing conversation and process of engagement with local and national communities, recognising the real changes that take place within local communities and developing early responses. Open and honest discussions need to be encouraged about the grievances people have in Europe's communities, creating a dialogue in which people feel their views are being responded to. The radical right is particularly successful at engaging first-time or disillusioned voters; mainstream political actors need to develop more innovative and dynamic methods of communication to rebuild trust in mainstream politics.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that while the radical right is not a new phenomenon, today's radical right poses a number of new challenges to liberal democracy, as it develops new strategies, uses new tools, and moulds its politics in an opportunistic manner. However, the success of the radical right is not ubiquitous, and there is no reason to simply accept that these parties are winning in the debates and elections. The radical right is represented in only a minority of parliaments of EU member states (in only 44 per cent of these parliaments) (Mudde 2011). Furthermore, a number of the radical right parties represented in European parliaments reached their peak several years ago; few have been able to retain substantial support beyond a 10 to 15 year period (Mudde 2011).

Though the story of the radical right in Europe has been as much one of electoral failure as of success, there is a need to look beyond electoral results to determine the breadth of the impact these parties may have on European democracies. This paper has outlined several indicators for radical right success besides simply passing electoral thresholds and entering parliament, including levels of influence on policy, mainstream parties, the wider radical right family, media coverage, social attitudes and extremism at large. It furthermore outlines how these channels of success may impact European democracies and how mainstream politicians and policy makers may respond. Though the radical right certainly does not pose a threat to democracy, it poses a threat to liberal democracy and liberal democratic values. However, it is important to note that the grievances expressed by the radical right often accompany very real grievances in society, and any policy interventions must address these concerns.

What does the future hold?

Contrary to some widely held beliefs, the radical right is not a movement made of up older people and it will not fade away as generations

pass. In 2010, the Austrian Freedom Party was recorded to be the most popular party among Austrians under the age of 30. Nearly three-quarters of EDL members are under 30 (Goodwin 2011b). The recent political leadership in many radical right parties is young, well-educated and politically-minded, and they are the leaders who will define the future of the radical right.

Whether or not the radical right takes an anti-democratic form, there are no doubt serious tensions between the radical right and Western democracies. It is highly critical of key elements of liberal democracy, while they tend to treat the radical right as an unwelcome threat. Though these parties do not openly proclaim anti-democratic values, they are in some cases embedded in a wider culture of violence, propagating narratives that can promote anti-democratic and racist ideologies. Often parties with extremist or nationalist pre-existing foundations face a dilemma: to become accepted by the mainstream, they need to moderate, but to satisfy their hard-core members and to keep a distinct profile and purpose, they need to stay extreme.

However, the lines between violent and non-violent rhetoric, extreme and non-extreme, have become blurred in recent years, as hostile language towards immigrants and minority communities has become alarmingly mainstreamed. As Goodwin's paper (2012) indicates, there has been little sound research and evidence regarding the proposition that the ideologies advocated by these parties may sow the seeds (advertently or inadvertently) for anti-democratic and violent behaviour. However, the increasingly violent and inflammatory rhetoric of these parties undoubtedly has negative effects on local and national communities, at the least creating discomfort for ethnic minorities in their own communities.

Islamophobia and racism are emerging and gaining legitimacy in European societies, though it is difficult to assess whether they are the cause or result of the 'rise' of radical right parties. If the trend continues, these forces will pose a real threat to pluralistic democracies in Europe. The presence of these parties and the mainstreaming of their ideologies may contribute to increased polarisation and weakened social cohesion at the local and national levels. However, there are also converse examples to suggest that, in some cases, the presence of a radical right party may invoke a backlash from civil society, and a strengthening of social cohesion at the local or national level. This became evident in the Swedish context, following the aforementioned overnight mobilisation of over 10,000 demonstrators in Stockholm in a 'mass protest against racism' the day after the Sweden Democrats gained seats in Parliament. Some studies support this, suggesting that electoral successes of the radical right may provoke a potent backlash among those with liberal attitudes (Andersen & Evans 2004). However, there is always a question about which movement will have greater and longer-lasting impact on communities.

When these parties succeed in reaching people on the fringes of the mainstream and contribute to them adopting radical positions, they can

potentially shift the entire left-right continuum of public preference in their direction—a shift that can alter the meanings of 'moderate' and 'radical.' The precise impact these parties will have on traditional left-right party politics in Europe is difficult to assess. Some centre-right parties have suffered electorally from the rise of the radical right; however, in some cases, their left-wing rivals have suffered more. In other cases, when the European centre-right has accepted the radical right as a potential coalition partner, the former have profited politically. However in countries where a *cordon sanitaire* remains intact, the radical right can actually strengthen the coalition position of the left, as centre-right parties seek to limit the influence of the radical right (Mudde 2007).

There is a widespread belief that economic downturn and hardship is the primary factor responsible for the recent rise in popularity of the radical right in Europe. However, the radical right has also made significant progress during times of prosperity, succeeding in affluent countries like Norway, Denmark and Switzerland. Not all of their voters may be considered part of the working class; support can also be found amongst well-educated and middle class people (Guibernau 2010). Goodwin's recent study (2011a) suggests that the dominant motive of voters is not based on economic concerns, but rather cultural anxiety over the impact of immigration on national identity and the scale and rate of change.

Priorities moving forward

Regardless of mainstream political parties' positions on immigration and Muslim communities, the radical right poses a challenge to the ability of policy makers and politicians to manage and lead their societies. Radical right parties mobilise discontent, thus undermining mainstream policy making. They are anti-establishment, and are changing the structures of party appeal. The radical right and its supporters are not just the 'losers' of modern global trends. Large percentages of European populations harbour concern about immigration, anxiety about Muslims' abilities to integrate, and disillusionment with mainstream politicians. The financial crisis and euro-crisis certainly colour the scene, but these sentiments also presaged the recent crises.

The radical right can be characterised not only by a prevailing anti-immigrant narrative and emphasis on protecting national values, but also by a resistance to the political establishment and a desire to reform the democratic system. These parties strongly denounce the corruption affecting democratic systems in the West. The future of radical right parties will rely as much on these parties' own strategic abilities and organisational capacity as on the behaviour and policies of the mainstream parties. We must not ignore the reality that the success of the radical right may, in many cases, be dependent upon the behaviour and politics of mainstream parties; the radical right has tended to grow when mainstream parties have disregarded issues that a significant part of the population cares about, including corruption, European integration and immigration (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009).

This is not to say that mainstream parties and policy makers should accommodate the radical

right or collaborate with these parties to win over their voters. They should instead strive to clarify and inform the public about government measures and policy making and promote a new political discourse that stands by liberal democratic values while maintaining a realistic approach to immigration and relating to public concerns. A progressive way forward will involve hearing the voices of those who have been dissuaded and disillusioned, and reclaiming these groups through a two-way process of both learning and informing. The first priority in countering the rise of the radical right must be to bridge the growing gap between the electorate and the elected which these parties seek to exploit.

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Appendix

Electoral fortunes of electorally persistent radical right parties in Europe (national parliamentary election results)

	AFP	FI	DPP	FN	NA	NL	NPP	SPP
1985		1.4					3.7	
1986	9.7			9.7				
1987		1.9						
1988				9.7				
1989							13.0	
1990	16.6							
1991		6.6						11.9
1992						8.7		
1993				13.8			6.3	
1994	22.5				13.5	8.4		
1995	22.0	7.8						14.9
1996					15.7	10.1		
1997				15.0			15.3	
1998			7.4					
1999	26.9	9.9						22.5
2000								
2001			12.0		12.0	3.9	14.6	
2002	10.0			11.3				
2003		11.6						26.6
2004								
2005			13.2				22.1	
2006	11.0				12.3	4.1		
2007		12.0	13.8	4.3				28.9
2008	17.5					8.3		
2009							22.9	
2010		7.8						
2011			12.3					26.6

Sources: Art 2011: 241; Author's collection of data.

Key: AFP (Austrian Freedom Party, Austria); FI (Flemish Interest. Belgium); DPP (Danish People's Party, Denmark); FN (Front National, France); NA (National Alliance, Italy); NL (Northern League, Italy); NPP (Norwegian Progress Party, Norway); SPP (Swiss People's Party, Switzerland).

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RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST VIOLENCE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

Introduction & key findings

What do we know about right-wing extremist violence and terrorism? Following recent events in Germany, Italy and Norway, this particular form of violent extremism has attracted renewed attention. Certainly, extreme right-wing violence is not a new phenomenon in post-war Europe. In earlier decades, West European states and their security services were similarly forced to grapple with this specific challenge. In 1980, for example, France, Germany and Italy launched investigations following a series of bombings by neo-fascist groups. Whereas in the 1970s violent Marxist-Leninist groups had received the bulk of attention – such as the Red Brigades in Italy or Red Army Faction in Germany – by the end of the decade attention was shifting to their right-wing counterparts, such as the Armed Revolutionary Nucleus and Black Order in Italy, or the German Action Group.[i] Then, in the early 1990s, attention to the drivers of extreme right-wing violence was reinvigorated following an escalation in levels of 'anti-foreigner' violence in Germany.

In the aftermath of the more recent atrocities in Norway, this exploratory report sets out to examine the state of the current evidence on right-wing extremist violence and terrorism. As will become apparent, this evidence base is limited and so it is difficult to speak convincingly to questions concerning the underlying causes of this form of extremism, or the conditions that render some citizens particularly susceptible. In the following sections the report considers issues relating to definitions, theories, the profile and motivations of perpetrators and, lastly, questions that might help to guide future research and policy in this area.

Our starting point is the observation that, for much of the past decade, Western states have focused mainly on tackling al-Qaeda or 'AQ'-inspired terrorism.[ii] Particularly since 2001, security services have been tasked with developing a rigorous understanding of this specific form of violent extremism, and the processes that lead some individuals toward violent radicalisation. Combined with wider concerns about a possible 'circle of tacit support' for AQ within settled Muslim communities, this led to an upsurge of interest and investment in two questions: (1) what social, psychological, contextual or physical factors render some citizens susceptible to AQ-inspired terrorism; and (2) what factors at the individual, community or national level may prevent violent radicalisation and help citizens to disengage from violent Islamist groups?

These questions marked a logical response to the evolving priorities of national security. In most Western states, religious-based extremism became a dominant security threat. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, 79 of the 115 terrorist offenders in custody in 2011 were associated with this type of violent extremism.[iii] However, at the same time this heavy preoccupation with one form of extremism sat uneasily alongside evidence concerning the need to adopt a more holistic perspective to tackling extremist ideas and groups.[iv] It is within this context that there emerged calls to investigate a form of violent extremism that has remained under-researched, and which is poorly understood.

In several European states, recent years have seen prominent acts of violence by individuals and groups that are connected, in various ways, to right-wing extremist ideas, networks and milieus. While security and anti-fascist organisations have documented each of these cases, some prominent examples include the following:

- In 2011 in Italy, the murder of two Senegalese street vendors by a member of the extreme right group, *Casa Pound*;
- In 2011 in Germany, the discovery of National Socialist Underground (NSU; *Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund*), a neo-Nazi cell linked to the murder of nine immigrants, a policewoman and a bombing in Cologne in 2004;
- In 2011 in Norway, a bombing and shooting attack by 32 year-old Anders Behring Breivik, which resulted in the deaths of over 80 of his fellow citizens and attracted worldwide attention;
- In 2010 in Germany, the confiscation of several improvised explosive and incendiary devices from activists linked to a neo-Nazi group, *Kameradschaft Aachener Land* (KAL);
- In 2007 in the UK, the imprisonment of an activist and former election candidate for the British National Party (BNP), who had stockpiled chemical explosives as a result of his fears about 'the evils of uncontrolled immigration' and a forthcoming race war[v]; and
- In 2007 in Russia, the execution of two members of a minority ethnic group under a Swastika flag (one of whom was beheaded) and, more generally, approximately 600 racially motivated attacks and 80 murders.[vi]

Importantly, while the exact relationship between such cases and the wider social and economic context remains unclear, these have coincided with a significant increase in the salience of immigration and economic issues. Put simply, large numbers of citizens across modern Europe are deeply concerned about rising ethnic and cultural diversity, and its impact on economic resources and ways of life. It has also been within this context that various security agencies have issued warnings concerning the potential for violence from right-wing extremist groups. In 2009, for example, London Metropolitan Police voiced anxiety over the possibility of right-wing extremists undertaking a 'spectacular' attack.[vii] This

particular warning followed a raid by counter-terrorism officers that uncovered a network of over two dozen activists who, it was reported in the media, had access to 300 weapons and 80 bombs. As one journalist observed, the arms haul was the most significant since campaigns by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1990s. In the same year, the US Department for Homeland Security pointed to an economic downturn, the election of the first African-American president and the fact that returning military veterans were struggling to reintegrate into society as factors that 'could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks'.[viii]

Other warnings have focused instead on the evolving nature of contemporary right-wing extremism. In 2010 in Germany, for example, an annual report on the current state of this movement concluded that while membership of more organised extreme right parties had begun to decline, affiliations to non-electoral neo-Nazi groups were on the rise.[ix] In addition, these groups were demonstrating a greater potential for aggression; a willingness to engage in violence against their opponents and the police and to cause damage to the property of other parties and their members. Seen at a broader level, these warnings have even led one academic to identify 'neo-nationalist violence' or 'some form of right-wing backlash against Third World immigrants' as leading contenders for movements that may propel the next wave of terrorism.[x]

Clearly, it is important not to exaggerate the current threat level from right-wing extremist violence. Despite relatively persistent warnings and sporadic outbursts of violence, Western states have not experienced a sustained campaign of violence or terrorism from extreme right-wing groups and networks. This is perhaps best underscored by Europol data for 2010, which mapped the challenge posed by different forms of violent extremisms. Overall, it revealed there were a total of three Islamist terrorist attacks, 179 arrests of individuals for Islamist terrorist offences and 89 arrests of individuals for preparing attacks against EU states. Meanwhile, it noted there had been 160 attacks by violent separatists in countries such as France, Northern Ireland and Spain and 349 arrests of individuals who had engaged in this activity. In marked contrast, EU member states did not experience a single act of right-wing extremist terrorism.[xi]

The comparatively weak challenge from right-wing extremist terrorism was attributed to several factors: poor internal cohesion; low coordination; a lack of public support; and effective law enforcement. Even in states that have historically experienced disproportionately high levels of activity, recent years have seen a similar picture emerging. Despite increases in memberships of non-electoral neo-Nazi groups and networks, the conclusion of one recent report in Germany was that 'right-wing politically motivated crime' was in decline. While authorities continued to voice concern over an increasingly confrontational neo-Nazi scene, the overall number of *criminal* offences with a right-wing extremist background declined by 15 per

cent, while *violent* crimes fell by 14.5 per cent. In fact, these violent crimes comprised only 4.8 per cent of all crimes that were associated with right-wing extremism (the vast majority were related not to violence but rather illegal propaganda activities).[xii]

However, while extreme right-wing *terrorism* remains less significant than other forms of terrorist activity, there remain concerns over extreme right-wing *violence,* and good reasons to explore the state of current evidence on both these forms of violent extremism. In particular, there are two key reasons. First, while noting the lack of a sustained challenge from right-wing extremist terrorists, security agencies such as Europol also underscore how changes in the broader social and economic context necessitate a closer examination. In particular, online social media and the development of online pan-European networks -both of which proved important in cases such as Anders Breivik- are 'adding a new dimension to the threat right-wing extremism may present in the future'. At the same time, it was noted how non-electoral right-wing extremist groups are generally becoming increasingly professional, and may pose a more significant challenge should the salience of immigration issues remain high.

A second reason concerns the distinction between right-wing extremist *terrorism* and right-wing extremist *violence*. Whereas the former may be less frequent than terrorist activity by religious-based or separatist groups, the latter appears more prominent. The lack of a sustained right-wing extremist terrorist campaign has led some to question whether such groups pose a tangible and significant threat to national security. Yet, across several European states, continued right-wing extremist violence at the local level (e.g. violence against immigrants and minority communities) does have a direct impact on community safety and intergroup relations. Nonetheless, in both of these cases the underlying causes and perpetrators remain poorly understood.

Key findings

- There is a distinct lack of reliable, systematic and comparative research on right-wing extremist violence. Since the 1980s, social scientists have developed a large and increasingly comparative body of research on the profile and motivations of citizens who vote for or join right-wing extremist parties. These studies tell us much about the 'types' of citizens who are responsive to the appeals of right-wing extremist ideology. In contrast, there is a shortage of research on non-electoral forms of right-wing extremism, or as one academic points out: 'there are no comprehensive and systematic comparative studies of the non-party or movement sector of the radical right in Western Europe'.[xiii]

- As a result, and in contrast to a rapidly growing evidence base on religious-based terrorism and processes of radicalisation, little is known about right-wing extremist terrorism and violence, including its underlying causes, levels and perpetrators. This owes much to a lack of data, and to the fact that only a few studies examine

processes of recruitment and disengagement.[xiv] Therefore, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to speak convincingly to questions concerning the profile and motives of perpetrators, the factors that render citizens susceptible or resilient to this form of violent extremism and the relationship between non-violent and overtly violent forms of right-wing extremism. In short, right-wing extremist violence is under-researched and poorly understood.

- Current responses to this challenge are also weakened by a lack of consensus over an accepted and commonly adopted definition. Across Europe, this form of extremism is often defined in different ways, while clarity is further muddied by a tendency for security agencies to record acts of violence in different ways. This makes it difficult to accurately compare overall trends in levels of violence at the European level, to assess the current 'threat level' and identify any geographical variations that exist.

- Keeping its limitations in mind, the existing evidence suggests that perpetrators of right-wing extremist violence tend to be young men, who have average or low levels of education and lack an articulate or developed ideological worldview. While there will inevitably be exceptions, it appears that most recruits do not develop a strong ideological commitment until *after* they join a movement, and acts of violence against minorities are less a by-product of an over-arching ideology than other social and psychological factors.

- Moving forward, this report identifies two key questions that should guide future research, work and policy in this area. The first concerns the relationship between the organised electoral extreme right-wing scene, and acts of violence and terrorism within non-electoral milieus. The second concerns the extent to which insights from the literatures on religious-based forms of extremism might inform our understanding of right-wing extremist violence and terrorism.

Definitions & typologies

The contemporary extreme right-wing scene in Europe is large and diverse. Rather than static in nature, it hosts a variety of organisational 'sub-types': organised political parties that contest elections and recruit dues-paying members; grassroots social movements that avoid elections and hold confrontational rallies; cross-national networks of various forms, whether transnational political party groupings or intellectual 'circles'; youth-based gangs that generally subscribe to right-wing extremist ideologies but are non-aligned; music labels and groups that espouse white supremacist ideas; and smaller groups or cells that pursue their goals through openly violent or terrorist activities.[xv]

Clearly, not all of these organisational sub-types engage in violence or terrorist activity, and nor are their members necessarily prone to violence. However, the broader right-wing extremist

milieu in Europe does contain organisations that either explicitly advocate 'direct action' methods, or are accepting of violence as a political strategy. To make sense of this fluid and fragmented subculture, it is useful to draw a four-fold distinction between the most prominent organisational types:

(1) Organised political parties that regularly contest elections, have dues-paying memberships and pursue the goals of elected public office and shaping public policies. Though individual members may be linked with violence or criminality, at a broad level these parties seek to operate within established constitutional and legal frameworks.

(2) Grassroots social movements that seek to mobilise public support outside conventional channels of political participation. Social movements often attempt to identify with, and forge links to, a larger network of movements that share a similar ideology and/or collective identity. One example is the English Defence League (EDL) in the UK, which was formed in 2009 and pursues a strategy of 'march and grow', whereby provocative rallies and demonstrations are used to entice confrontation with opponents, attract media publicity and recruit new followers. One survey of EDL sympathisers suggested that the movement has mainly recruited young working class men who are more likely than average to experience unemployment and are concerned not solely about Islam but a wider set of immigration issues.[xvi]

(3) Smaller groups, social and cultural milieus or networks that tend to act in isolation and independently from parties and social movements. Rather than being organised around rigid structures and mass memberships, this third type tend to adopt more extreme ideological positions and exhibit a greater propensity for violence. Examples include groups such as the Racial Volunteer Force (RVF) and White Unity.

(4) Individual 'lone wolves' that lack formal links to established groups, and tend to act in isolation (though may receive logistical support from others). Following a definition set out by the Council of the European Union (2002), the term 'lone wolf' is considered to apply to individuals who (a) operate individually; (b) are not members of an organised terrorist group or network; (c) act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy; and (d) adopt tactics and methods that are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or direction.[xvii] Lone wolves thus pose a challenge to traditional approaches that saw violent extremism as phenomena rooted in group dynamics and collective identities. Indeed, studies have emphasised how the importance of charismatic leaders, socialisation experiences and the formation of collective identities appear to have little relevance in terms of understanding what drives some individuals to engage in lone acts of terrorism.[xviii]

To be clear, the focus of this report is on openly violent forms of right-wing extremism, namely

individuals, groups or networks that are (i) inspired by right-wing extremist ideology and (ii) employ violence and/or terrorism as a tactic through which they pursue various goals. The defining features of this ideology are heavily contested.[xix] It is also important to note that right-wing extremist groups in Europe exhibit considerable ideological variation: while some remain committed to 'classical' biological forms of racism, others have adopted the 'ethno-pluralist' doctrine that downplays race in favour of stressing the cultural differences that exist between groups.[xx] However, broadly speaking, these groups share two core ideological features. Following Carter (2005), right-wing extremism can be defined as *a particular form of political ideology defined by two anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements*.[xxi]

In terms of the first, right-wing extremists are *extremist* on the basis that they reject or undermine the values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state. Whereas political parties within this scene tend to accept democracy as a form of government (even if they are critical of its functioning), openly violent or violence-prone groups often reject the democratic state outright, and seek to overthrow established institutions and established norms. In terms of the second core element, such groups are right-wing on the basis that they reject the principle of fundamental human equality. Whereas right-wing extremist political parties also tend to reject this principle (and hence advocate exclusionary policies toward immigrants and minority groups) violent groups underscore their rejection of this principle through 'direct action methods'. Their violent actions either target minority groups, or (as in the case of Breivik) those deemed responsible for encouraging multiculturalism and rising ethnic diversity.

It is important to note, however, that attempts to understand and tackle right-wing extremist terrorism and violence are hampered by several factors. The first challenge concerns what is meant by these terms. There have been numerous attempts to define and categorise different types of political violence. In the case of the extreme right-wing, however, this task is often complicated by a tendency for perpetrators to pass through several different groups or belief systems. As noted in one study of right-wing violence in North America: 'a researcher would be hard pressed to point to a single individual in the constellation of right-wing movements who has not already passed through several ideological way-stations, and who no doubt has stops yet to make during his or her life.'[xxii] Others have also pointed to important distinctions between the type of violence that is being examined. In an attempt to clarify this dilemma, some such as Heitmeyer have drawn a distinction between *racist violence* and *right-wing extremist violence*: whereas the former refers to 'the non-specific demonstration of power in a particular situation ("Pakistani bashing", for example)', right-wing extremist violence is driven more strongly by ideological factors, and functions 'with a view to sustainable demonstrations of power in public social spaces or in social and political institutions'.[xxiii]

Similar to the above definition of racist violence, others have defined *hate crime* as acts that are not

necessarily motivated by a wider ideological worldview, but rather are 'motivated by bias toward individuals or groups based on particular status characteristics such as race, religion, ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender'.[xxiv] Laryš and Mareš (2011) similarly distinguish between: (a) *ad hoc* hate crimes that are situational acts of violence committed after very little planning or preparation; (b) locally ethnically-motivated conflicts that are rooted in deeper interethnic tensions and relationships; and (c) organised violence that can be subsequently divided into three sub-types of action: (1) violence undertaken by paramilitary branches of extremist organisations; (2) street-based violence undertaken by established youth gangs; and (3) openly terrorist activity undertaken by individual members or cells of right-wing extremists.[xxv] Such distinctions raise an important dilemma for researchers and public policy makers working in the areas of terrorism and extremism. Whereas acts of *terrorism* that are associated with, and motivated by, extreme right-wing ideology are considered less of a threat to national security than other forms of violent extremism, right-wing extremist *violence* has a clear potential to exert a direct and considerable impact on community safety and intergroup relations. Furthermore, we actually know little about the lines that separate one from the other: for example, at one point does a group or individual move from engaging in sporadic acts of right-wing violence to planning terrorist activity?

A second challenge concerns the distinction between what Bjørgo (2009) terms *bounded* and *unbounded* groups. Racist violent groups are often unbounded, meaning that their boundaries are 'relatively fuzzy', meaning it is never clearly defined who is inside and who is outside'.[xxvi] While the upper hierarchies of such groups are often bounded, whereby members can only enter once they have passed some form of initiation or are supported by other members, lower levels are often unbounded. Therefore, unlike right-wing political parties that have defined membership structures, the borders of violent right-wing extremist groups are often characterised by fluidity; supporters drift in and drift out, often moving from one group to another and never being subjected to formal membership duties.

A third challenge concerns data collection. The task of measuring and comparing levels of extreme right-wing violence and terrorism across different states and over time is often hampered by the fact that different agencies vary in terms of how they report and categorise these acts, and the extent to which the underlying motives or the memberships of perpetrators are recorded. Cases in Germany, for example, are not recorded in the same way as similar acts in the United States, making it difficult if not impossible to obtain a comparative picture.

Theories, profiles and motivations: what do we know?

The existing evidence base on right-wing extremist violence is weakened by a lack of reliable and comparative data. While our understanding of other forms of violent extremism is similarly limited, we know less about the underlying causes and individual perpetrators of extreme right-wing violence. To date, there are only a handful of studies of this

phenomenon and many suffer from serious limitations. Some are influenced by the political or anti-fascist orientations of their authors, thereby compromising objectivity.[xxvii] Because of the problems of data collection that have already been discussed, others have remained narrowly focused on individual countries or regions, such as Canada[xxviii], Germany[xxix], Scandinavia[xxx] and the United States.[xxxi] These studies provide valuable insights, but the extent to which their findings generalise across other cases or Europe more widely is unknown.

As a result, at the individual-level there is little comparable data on the social profile (i.e. age, education, social class, income, etc.) and motivations (i.e. attitudes, values, beliefs, etc.) of individual perpetrators. Because of the difficulty of gaining access to perpetrators and groups, researchers are often forced to either rely on a very small number of non-representative qualitative interviews or, alternatively, use extreme right-wing party activists or voters as a proxy for citizens who are susceptible to right-wing violence.

Given the paucity of research, attempts to explain this behaviour have often been forced to draw insights from the literature on extreme right-wing parties and social movements. This introduces obvious problems, not least the risk of using theories that have been developed to explain one type of political mobilisation to make inferences about another. Furthermore, attempts to explain the underlying causes of this violent extremism are also hampered by the fact that few studies explore the factors that 'push and pull' some citizens over the 'tipping point', from *voting* for an extremist party to engaging in acts of *violence*. Nonetheless, keeping these caveats in mind, three of these theories provide a useful starting point. These variously emphasise the role of wider structural changes in society, actual or perceived conflicts between groups and, lastly, political opportunity structures.

Structural explanations

Structural explanations emphasise the impact of wider and typically destabilising socio-economic change at the individual level, such as the onset of a post-industrial globalised economy or the weakening of civil society.[xxxii] It is argued that such changes have led to increasingly fragmented and individualised societies, and render those who are most affected (i.e. young working class men, the unemployed and poorly educated) particularly susceptible to exclusionary behaviour such as violence.[xxxiii] In countries such as Russia, for example, it has been noted that perpetrators of right-wing extremist violence tended to be young men who came from deprived housing estates within periphery cities that had under-developed infrastructures, and families that previously constituted the Soviet 'middle class' but whose financial situation has since worsened. Due to a lack of resources and poor integration, the argument is that it is these 'losers of modernisation' who are most responsive to groups that advocate punishing minorities, either to express frustration or because the latter are perceived to have gained preferential treatment from authorities.[xxxiv]

The literature on extreme right party supporters do tend to share a distinct social profile: they

tend to be young or old men; come from the working classes or lower middle classes; have none or only few formal qualifications; and are pessimistic about their economic prospects. They also tend to reside in similar socio-economic contexts: urban areas; where average education levels are low; and where deprivation rates are high.[xxxv] Turning to ethnic diversity, there is also evidence that support for right-wing extremism is strongest not within more ethnically diverse areas, but rather is concentrated in mainly white areas that border more ethnically diverse communities.[xxxvi] However, there is also a consensus that, by themselves, these background social and demographic factors do not provide a convincing account as to why some citizens shift behind right-wing extremist parties at elections. Rather, the evidence suggests that citizens are motivated foremost by their hostility toward immigration, multiculturalism and rising ethnic diversity.

The limitations of this structuralist approach are further revealed in the literature on right-wing extremist party members and activists, individuals who are more strongly committed to the extreme right-wing scene.[xxxvii] Perhaps the most comprehensive of these studies was based on 150 interviews with extreme right-wing activists across five West European states. Far from being notably marginalised or distinct in society, the study concluded that, on the whole, activists appeared as 'perfectly normal people' who were 'socially integrated, connected in one way or another to mainstream groups and ideas'.[xxxviii] Similarly, in countries such as Germany, research on citizens who have engaged in extreme right-wing violence suggests that most were relatively 'normal' young people, with average backgrounds.[xxxix] This is supported by the observation that, in the 1990s, many of the areas that were considered 'hot spots' for extremist violence had lower than average unemployment rates, while more recent studies similarly find no relationship between levels of unemployment and levels of violence.[xl] Similarly, other studies of movements such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) have rejected earlier suggestions that their most active followers were somehow more marginalised and isolated in wider society than other citizens.[xli]

Group conflict explanations

A second approach puts stronger emphasis on the role of group conflicts in pushing citizens toward violence. This group conflict perspective draws on older theoretical frameworks such as 'realistic group conflict theory', which traced exclusionary behaviour to actual or perceived conflict between different groups over economic resources and political power. One example is earlier research in the United States that traced the lynching of African-Americans not to arbitrary violence, but rather to feelings among whites that this group posed a threat to their economic and political resources.[xlii] Seen from this perspective, right-wing extremist violence is a by-product of a perception that minority groups such as immigrants or asylum-seekers pose a threat to economic resources, such as jobs, social housing or regeneration grants. It suggests that citizens engage in violence foremost as part of an instrumental strategy to

defend themselves, their wider group and their resources from others.

Importantly, these actual or perceived group conflicts may stem from different types of concerns: feelings of economic threat, security threat and cultural threat. Seen from an *economic* threat perspective, violence will be mainly a response to feelings that immigrants, minorities or other groups threaten access to material resources, such as jobs, social housing or welfare benefits. Seen from a *security* threat perspective, violence will be more a response to feelings that these groups threaten social order, cohesion and established norms in society. Seen from a *cultural* threat perspective, violence will stem mainly from feelings that such groups pose a more diffuse threat to values, national identities and ways of life. Clearly, these economic, security and cultural concerns may not be mutually exclusive, but it appears plausible that not all will assume the same level of importance in driving some citizens toward violence.

To what extent is this approach supported by evidence? Several studies point to the importance of these group conflicts, whether actual or perceived. Examining an escalation in right-wing extremist violence in Germany in the post-unification era, McLaren (1999) found that rising unemployment only had an impact when it combined with an increase in the size of a minority group, against whom violence could be directed.[xliii] Research in Sweden has suggested that the perpetrators of violence were, in most cases, located at the intersection between a 'white power' subculture, and subcultures of hostility toward refugees in the community.[xliv] Another study of levels of racially motivated violence in New York provided evidence that levels of violence tended to be higher in areas that experienced sudden demographic change, with the implication being that violence marked an attempt to halt this perceived threat to the local neighbourhood and ethnic community.[xlv]

Further evidence can be gained from qualitative studies, most of which are based on interviews with right-wing extremist activists and members. Based on extensive 'life history' interviews with activists, Goodwin (2011) suggests that their dominant motive was not a sense of economic or security threat, but rather feelings that their national identity, culture and wider group were under threat from immigration, settled Muslim communities and rising ethnic diversity.[xlvi] While most activists distanced themselves from violence, many saw themselves as being engaged in a 'survivalist' struggle, that required urgent and radical action to 'save' the collective (white) group from the perceived threat of racial extinction. Similar findings emerge in the comparative study by Klandermans and Mayer (2005).

The discursive opportunities approach

A third discursive opportunities approach puts stronger emphasis on the political and cultural context in which extreme right-wing violence takes place. Its starting observation is that more extreme political actions such as riots, protests and ethnic-related violence are often influenced by, or seek to imitate, similar actions elsewhere (via so-called 'diffusion processes'). In their study of right-wing violence in Germany, Koopmans and Olzak argue 'discursive

opportunities' are particularly important to understanding cycles of violence, which they define as 'opportunities and constraints that become publicly visible and can thereby affect mobilisation'. The assumption is that right-wing extremist activists learn about strategies and tactics 'in a trial-and-error fashion', though mainly through the mass media where they can (a) gain information about the results of actions undertaken by others, (b) adopt and replicate successful tactics and (c) assess media coverage and political responses as a measure of their success or failure. When actions and tactics were publicised in the media, this provided a model to others who shared similar ideological goals.

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Evidence on perpetrators

Clearly, each of the approaches above may have something to say about recruitment to violent right-wing extremist groups, and what leads citizens to engage in violent or terrorist activity. Indeed, one specialist on this topic has identified a range of factors that might drive some citizens toward violent right-wing groups (see Figure 1). As Bjørgo (2009) notes, rather than being driven by one particular factor, young people may turn towards these groups as part of a search to fulfil various social and/or psychological needs.

Figure 1: Factors that might drive citizens towards violent right-wing groups

Factor	Rationale
Ideology and Politics	Group meets feelings of political alienation from mainstream culture, or capitalise on a sudden 'conversion experience'
Provocation and Anger	Group provides opportunity for individual to respond to perceived provocation from immigrants and/or anti-fascist left-wing groups, or express anger at perceived threats to resources and interests (e.g. jobs or social housing)
Protection	Group provides protection from actual or perceived enemies in community or school
Drifting	Group becomes one of many that enables the individual to explore their curiosity and sense of excitement, rather than genuine ideological conviction
Thrill Seeking	Group enables the individual to fulfil their psychological need for excitement, by exposing them to potentially dangerous situations

Violence, Weapons and Uniforms	Group provides a militaristic environment that is appealing to certain individuals
Substitute Families and Father Figures	Group provides older activists who serve as substitute father figures for young men
Friends and Community	Group provides friendship and acceptance
Status and Identity	Group enables the individual to obtain a positive identity and status, which they may lack in other spheres of their life

Young people appear especially important to understanding right-wing extremist violence. The limited evidence base on this form of violent extremism reveals that most perpetrators tend to be young men. For example, based on police data on 148 offenders of 'anti-foreigner offences', one study in Germany revealed that most were men (only 3.7 per cent were female), were youths or adolescents (90 per cent were under 20 years old), had very low or average levels of education, were more likely than average to experience unemployment and to have a past of criminal behaviour.[xlviii] Subsequent analysis of the attitudes of these offenders towards violence suggested they could be divided into four 'types':

- *Hangers-on* who lacked an understanding of right-wing extremist ideology, were not overtly anti-foreigner but were driven more by group influences such as the desire to conform;
- *Criminal youth* who were older, had a long history of criminality, a pre-existing inclination towards violence but who also lacked a broader right-wing extremist worldview;
- *Xenophobe*s who were overtly anti-foreigner, concerned mainly about perceived threats from immigrants and minority groups but who also lacked a broader right-wing extremist ideology; and lastly
- *Ideologically-committed right-wing extremists* who were active within extreme right groups and movements and who viewed anti-foreigner violence as a by-product of a wider ideological worldview (as opposed to an 'end' in its own right).

Also focused on Germany, research by Watts (2001) suggested that perpetrators of 'hate violence' in the 1990s tended to be young men (two thirds were 20 years or younger) and were less likely than perpetrators in earlier decades to be overtly associated with neo-Nazism, and to be ideologically sophisticated.[xlix] This particular study indicated that skinhead-based groups comprised the largest single category of

perpetrators, with neo-Nazi groups coming a distant second. In addition, at least one third of the attacks were committed by youths with no direct association with these groups. In conclusion, it was argued these findings reflected a broader shift away from 'traditional' and membership-based violence that was orchestrated by neo-Nazi groups, towards more youthful and non-aligned forms of violence. Rather than driven by racial or overtly ideological motivations, a combination of 'thrill-seeking', opportunistic or criminal motivations appeared more important.

Such findings are mirrored in other studies in Germany that reveal how perpetrators of violence against minority groups tended not to be driven by a coherent ideological and right-wing extremist worldview. Most of those who were examined by Willems (1995) did not associate themselves with explicitly neo-Nazi groups. Instead, they aligned themselves with broader subcultures, informal groups or cliques that lacked a specific ideological focus. Heitmeyer and Müller (1995) likewise found that only one out of every four youths were associated with neo-Nazi as opposed to more informal skinhead groups. Similarly, in Scandinavia Bjørgo's (1993) examination of groups that carried out terrorist-type activities revealed that while at the highest organisational level there were formal political organisations, at the lowest level were 'youth gangs and groups of friends with no formal structure, no ideology and no political orientation above a general hostility towards "foreigners"'. In fact, based on an examination of 168 terrorist-type actions against immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, it is noted how '[t]he majority of the solved actions were perpetrated by unorganised, generally apolitical youth gangs who were often feared and despised in their local communities for their arbitrary violence and criminality'.[1] When seen as a whole, these findings suggest that acts of right-wing extremist violence are often committed by youths and youth gangs who lack an articulate political ideology and wider connections to groups and political parties.

Conclusions & next steps

The aim of this report was to explore the state of existing evidence on extreme right-wing violence, to identify key findings and avenues for future research. Due to a scarcity of research on the topic, it has been difficult to speak authoritatively to questions about this form of violent extremism, as existing studies provide little in the way of systematic data on the underlying causes, levels of violence across Europe and over time and the motives that drive individual perpetrators. These problems owe much to the way in which there remains considerable confusion over how best to define, categorise and record this particular form of violent extremism. To help guide future policy in this area, this report suggests there are two potentially fruitful avenues.

The first is the relationship between non-violent and violent forms of right-wing extremism. We know much about the factors that encourage (non-violent) public support for right-wing extremist political parties, including the profile and attitudes of supporters and how these parties 'frame' particular grievances or issues in a

way that galvanises support. Clearly, not every supporter of these parties is violent, or even prone to violence. This is evident in states such as the UK, where surveys suggest that although large numbers of citizens are potentially responsive to these types of political parties, their support is conditional upon these parties rejecting violence.[li] Yet, in contrast, we know little about the factors that drive some individuals (e.g. Anders Breivik) to exit these established radical right-wing parties (e.g. the Norwegian Progress Party) and engage in violence. In addition, we know little about why supporters with a similar profile and attitude set choose to stay within these parties and reject violence. This 'tipping point' is poorly understood and requires further research.

The second avenue is the extent to which perpetrators of different types of violent extremism share a similar social profile, and are motivated in similar ways. Religious and politically motivated violence differ in obvious respects, yet at the same time the literatures on these different types of violent extremism emphasise the role of grievances, ideology, perceived threats and group dynamics. For example, one recent review of empirical evidence suggests that AQ-inspired extremism and right-wing extremist violence have both been 'found to be driven by a sense of shared values between individuals and the groups they choose to join, by a desire to rectify perceived social injustice and by the personal and social benefits of participating in political activities.[lii] The reality, however, is that such comparisons are hampered by a lack of research that compares and contrasts these processes of recruitment and disengagement. Though it is often assumed that common factors apply to processes of radicalisation and recruitment to different types of violent extremism, systematic empirical research is lacking. Future research and policy that explores the extent to which this assumption rings true would be well positioned to make an important contribution to the existing evidence base.

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[i] Hoffman (1984) notes how, in Germany, whereas only 616 incidents of neo-Nazi violence or vandalism were committed in 1977, by 1980 this figure had tripled. B. Hoffman (1984) *Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe Since 1980*, RAND paper series.

[ii] While AQ was initially seen as the dominant threat, regional terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) or Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have also been included under the threat of 'violent Islamist terrorism'.

[iii] HM Government (2011) *Prevent Strategy*, London: Stationary Office, p.13.

[iv] For further discussion of this point see Eatwell and Goodwin, *The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain.*

[v] 'Ex-BNP man jailed over chemicals', BBC July 31 2007.

[vi] M. Laryš and M. Mareš (2011) 'Right-wing extremist violence in the Russian Federation', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63(1): 129-154.

[vii] While the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police confirmed that the dominant security threat remained AQ-inspired terrorism, he was quoted as stating that "my people are knocking over right-wing extremists quite regularly". N. Firth, Far right extremists 'are plotting spectacular terrorist attack in UK', police warn, *Daily Mail* July 7 2009. In 2011, and appearing before the Select Committee on Violent Radicalisation, the Chief Constable elaborated: "Actually the threat is there at both ends of the spectrum, but they are different in structural terms and in terms of their connectivity to a wider cause."

[viii] Department for Homeland Security, *Right-wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fuelling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment*, p.2.

[ix] The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimated that membership of non-electoral neo-Nazi groups had risen from 5,000 in 2009 to 5,600 in 2010. In contrast, it is estimated that memberships of extreme right-wing political parties declined from approximately 30,000 in 2008 to 25,000 in 2010.

[x] L. Weinberg (2012) *The End of Terrorism*, Routledge, p.125.

[xi] Europol (2011) *TE-Sat 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, European Police Office.

[xii] It is worth noting that, generally, it was observed how politically motivated crime in Germany was in decline, falling from 33,917 offences in 2009 to 27,180 in 2010. The 2010 Report on the Protection of the Constitution. Available to view online at: http://www.verfassungsschutz.de (accessed December 7 2011).

[xiii] M. Minkenberg (2003) 'The West European radical right as a collective actor: Modelling the impact of cultural and structural variables on party formation and movement mobilization', *Comparative European Politics*, 1, pp.149-170.

[xiv] The most notable examples are cited throughout this report, and below.

[xv] For earlier attempts to provide a typology of these organisational types see T. Bjørgo (1997) *Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators and Responses*, Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, pp.53-71; also M.J. Goodwin (2011) *New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party*, London: Routledge, pp. 5-9.

[xvi] Demos (2011) *Inside the EDL: Populist Politics in a Digital Age*, London: Demos.

[xvii] Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement (2007) *Lone-Wolf Terrorism*. Available to view online: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf (accessed January 10 2012).

[xviii] See for example J. Horgan (2005) *The Psychology of Terrorism*, London and New York: Routledge; J.J.F. Forest (ed.) (2006) *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Cases*, Westport and London: Praegar.

[xix] For a recent overview of this literature see C. Mudde (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and J. Rydgren (2007) 'The sociology of the radical right', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33, pp.241-262.

[xx] For further discussion of this point see J. Rydgren (2005) 'Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family', *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(3), pp.413-437

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[xxii] J. Kaplan (1995) 'Right-Wing Violence in North America', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 7(1), 44-95, p.46.

[xxiii] W. Heitmeyer 'Right-wing extremist violence', in *International Handbook of Violence Research*, p.400.

[xxiv] V. Jenness and R. Grattat (2001) *Making hate a crime: From social movement to law enforcement*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, p.77; see also E. Bleick and R.K. Hart (2008) 'Quantifying hate: The evolution of German approaches to measuring 'hate crime'', *German Politics*, 17(1), pp.63-80.

[xxv] Laryš and Mareš (2011) 'Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Federation', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63(1), pp.129-154.

[xxvi] T. Bjørgo (2009) 'Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right', in T. Bjørgo and J. Horgan (Eds.) *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, London: Routledge, p.30.

[xxvii] For example, G. Gable and P. Jackson (2011) *Lone Wolves: Myth or Reality?* Ilford: Searchlight.

[xxviii] J. Ross (1992) 'Contemporary radical right-wing violence in Canada', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(3), pp.72-10.1

[xxix] See, for example, H-U. Otto and R. Merten (1993) *Right-wing extremist violence in unified Germany: Youth in the midst of radical social change*, Opladen: Leske and Budrich; K. Schönwälder (1995) 'Right-wing extremism and racist violence in Germany', *West European Politics*, 18(2), pp.448-456; S. Shapiro (2000) 'Barking or biting? Media and parliamentary investigation of right-wing extremism in the Bundeswehr', *German Politics* 9(2), pp.217-249; U. Backes (2007) 'Extreme right and left-wing violence in Germany', *Politische Studien*, 58(1), pp.31-43; G. Krell, H. Nicklas and A. Ostermann (1996) 'Immigration, asylum and anti-foreigner violence in Germany', *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(2), pp.153-170.

[xxx] See, for example, T. Bjørgo (1993) 'Militant neo-Nazism in Sweden', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 5(3), pp.28-57; T. Bjørgo and N.J. Lavik (1998) 'Racist and right-wing violence in Scandinavia', *Internasjonal Politikk*, 56(2), pp.299-302.

[xxxi] See, for example, J. Kaplan (1995) 'Right-wing violence in North America', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 7(1), pp.44-95; C. Hewitt (2000) 'The political context of terrorism in America: Ignoring extremists or pandering to them?' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 12(3-4), pp.325-344; G. Michael (2003) *Confronting right-wing extremism and terrorism in the USA*, London: Routledge.

[xxxii] For these earlier accounts see, for example, T. Bjørgo (ed.)(1995) *Terror from the extreme right*, London: Frank Cass; for an account that relates to public support for right-wing extremism more generally see H.G. Betz (1994) *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*, New York: St Martin's Press.

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[xxxiv] Minkenberg, 'The West European radical right as a collective actor'.

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