

# Policy Briefing

## FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM: TRENDS AND METHODS FOR RESPONSE AND PREVENTION

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### Defining the problem

Far-right extremism is a diverse phenomenon. It is composed of movements and parties with different ideological tendencies, mobilising against different conceptions of ‘the enemy’, and using different methods to achieve their goals. For some, this involves the use of violence. A key challenge facing many European countries is one of definition. Across Europe, there is no consensus on what constitutes far-right extremism, and security agencies record violence from the extreme right in different ways. This has inhibited our ability to assess threat levels and compare trends across countries. Meanwhile, the media and public debate on the threat posed by the ‘rise of the far right’ remains confused in many ways.

Only through a proper understanding of both violent and non-violent far-right movements and parties can policy makers work out where the problem lies, and therefore what to do about it. In other words, should we draw the

line at the use of violence, or the spreading of intolerance? Are we concerned about the proliferation of radical right ideologies and narratives in mainstream politics and their impact on wider community relations, or about the potential for violence? And in terms of responses, can we separate the two?

To set the context for these questions, the section below describes the spectrum of far-right extremism in Europe.

### POLITICAL PARTIES

There is some confusion over the nature of radical right parties and how they relate to extra-parliamentary movements, as well as the incidents of intolerance and violence that have occurred across Europe in recent years. Despite historical and contextual differences between these various parties, they tend to share an agenda of radical change to national policies on themes reaching across immigration, religion and national culture. In many European countries, the radical changes these political parties seek are grounded in a

critique of liberal democracy, rather than outright opposition to it. It is important to note that many radical right political parties are non-violent and operate within the rules of democracy; most actively seek to disassociate themselves from historical or perceived ties to their extreme and violent counterparts.

However, the relationship between illegal, antidemocratic and violent manifestations of the extreme right and radical right parties is complex and varies across Europe. Parties like the Danish People's Party (*Danske Folkeparti*) can claim no connection to illegal far-right actors. It began as an anti-tax protest party, but experienced divisions throughout the 1980s and increasingly came to focus on themes of immigration and national identity. However, parties like Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang*) in Belgium originated from Flemish Block (*Vlaams Blok*), a militant far-right secessionist party founded in 1978, which adopted a new name and re-organised itself after a 2004 trial which condemned the party for racism. And in Germany, the government has spent a decade debating the case for banning the National Democratic Party (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – Die Volksunion*, NPD), which was established in 1964 out of an alliance of various far-right groupings including overt neo-Nazis. This ongoing case hinges on the fact that the NPD is un-constitutional, particularly given its affinity with historical Nazism and potential links with the National Socialist Underground

(*Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund*, NSU) and other violent cases.

The relationship between the electoral success of these parties and violence is not straightforward. In the Netherlands, the success of the Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) and the polarising effect it has on society has not translated into heightened levels of extreme far-right activity. On the contrary, extremist nationalist and neo-Nazi movements have declined in size and intensity of activities. Some experts believe that successful radical right parties channel much of the frustrations of violent or extremist movements into the democratic system.<sup>i</sup> Another argument sometimes made is that as radical right opinions become mainstreamed, extremist elements lose their counter-cultural appeal.

Meanwhile, far-right political parties continue to deny any relationship with perpetrators of violence and hate crime. In 2006, a young member of a family of known Flemish Block militants who shot a child and two women from ethnic minority backgrounds was motivated by racist beliefs; however, Flemish Interest denied any direct or indirect connection to the shootings.<sup>ii</sup> In the UK, though most radical right political parties profess to be non-violent, the most prominent cases of convicted far-right extremist perpetrators have been linked in various ways to far-right parties. This includes former British National Party (BNP) member David

Copeland, the ‘London nail-bomber,’ and former BNP candidate Robert Cottage, who was arrested in 2006 for stockpiling weapons.

#### HATE SPEECH AND INTOLERANCE

The role of hate speech or violent discourse in propagating violence is similarly complex. In November 2012, two Members of Parliament for the anti-immigrant radical right party the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*) were forced to step down after several scandals involving racist abuse. Later that month, a Hungarian Jobbik (*Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom*) MP called for a list to be drawn up of Jewish politicians and members of government who pose a ‘national security risk’. In Finland, a True Finns (*Perussuomalaiset*) parliamentarian was sentenced under hate speech laws and declared guilty of breaching religious peace, due to statements where he connected Islam with paedophilia.<sup>iii</sup> In Norway, Anders Behring Breivik legitimated his acts of violence with an amalgam of statements pulled from far-right politicians, as well as prominent anti-Islam activists. We clearly need a better understanding of whether and how rhetoric serves as an enabler for far-right violence, and what the implications are for those developing policy responses.

One major challenge in this domain is the fact that far-right extremist attitudes are far from confined to the margins of society, but can increasingly be found in the mainstream. One study from 2006 to 2010, commissioned by

the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, found that far-right extremist views were widespread in Germany, among all social strata, regions and age groups.<sup>iv</sup> The study examined six themes: attitudes towards dictatorship, national chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, social Darwinism and Nazism.<sup>v</sup> The study warned that far-right extremism is not simply a youth problem, and that young people do not make up the largest group of far-right extremists. These attitudes are found in people with low self-esteem, a mistrustful attitude, and those who are disaffected with politics. Other research has reinforced the fact that far-right extremist activists are in many cases ‘perfectly normal people,’ who are ‘socially integrated, connected in one way or another to mainstream groups and ideas’.<sup>vi</sup>

#### EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY MOVEMENTS

Concerns have emerged recently about far-right movements seeking to mobilise public support or affect change through extra-parliamentary and sometimes violent methods. Some of these movements are derived from or directly inspired by fascist and Nazi histories. They include the pan-European Blood and Honour group; the British group Combat 18 and its splinter group the Racial Volunteer Force; the Danish National Socialist Movement (*Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Bevægelse*); the former French *Elsass Korps* in Alsace (which dissolved in 2005); as well as a group of movements that have recently

shaken Germany, including the neo-Nazi group *Kameradschaft Aachener Land* and the NSU.

Other forms of extra-parliamentary movements have emerged in recent years, distancing themselves from the overt racism and neo-Nazism of the ‘old’ extreme right, and instead operating on opposition to what they perceive to be the ‘Islamization’ of European countries. The English Defence League (EDL) in the UK has been at the forefront of this scene, along with a string of movements under the ‘Stop the Islamization of Europe’ umbrella. Although these groups do not tend to advocate violence, they have organised provocative rallies and promoted confrontation with opponents, which has often ended in conflict and arrests.

The extra-parliamentary scene is constantly shifting and in some countries these movements only pose a marginal threat, as they struggle with organisational capacity and internal divisions. In other countries, extra-parliamentary movements can be directly linked to increased incidences of violence. For example, the Swedish Resistance Movement (*Svenska Motståndsrörelsen*) today accounts for most of the hate crime connected to organised groups in Sweden.<sup>vii</sup>

## HATE CRIME AND RACIST VIOLENCE

Statistics on hate crime and racist violence are not a clear indication of the strength of far-right sentiment in a country. Some experts

have drawn a line between racist violence and hate crime (said to be driven by a broader need to demonstrate power against a particular group, or motivated by bias toward a group based on particular characteristics, such as race, religion, or sexual orientation) and far-right extremist violence (considered to be driven by an ideological worldview).<sup>viii</sup> There has also been some evidence to suggest that perpetrators of hate crime may be more motivated by ‘thrill-seeking,’ opportunistic or criminal motivations rather than ideological factors.<sup>ix</sup> However, the reality is we know very little about the distinctions between hate crime and far-right extremist violence, and what might motivate an individual to move from engaging in ‘sporadic acts of violence’ to terrorist activity.<sup>x</sup>

In many countries, it is also hard to assess whether racially-motivated crimes and their perpetrators are linked to extremist organisations. For example, in Sweden, no more than between 1 per cent (in 2010) and 4 per cent (2008) of reported hate crimes can be linked directly to any extreme right group.<sup>xi</sup>

The question therefore remains as to what elements of extreme right environments governments should be most concerned about. The answer will undoubtedly vary across Europe, as will the most appropriate response mechanisms.

## The nature of the threat

Europol's most recent EU Terrorism Situation and Trend report notes that the threat of violent far-right extremism has 'reached new levels in Europe and should not be underestimated', defining far-right terrorist groups as those that 'seek to change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist right-wing model'.<sup>xiii</sup> Based on this definition, Europol argues that the threat of terrorism is most likely to emanate from lone actors, but that organised underground groups also have the capability and intention to carry out attacks.

There have been several cases of planned and foiled violent attacks by far-right actors across Europe over the last decade, including:

- In 2006, 17 members of the movement Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty were charged in Belgium with planning terror attacks against the National Bank and plotting an 'army-led coup' to create a fascist Flemish state.<sup>xiii</sup> That same year, a follower of this movement, Hans van Themsche, killed two people in a racially-motivated shooting spree in Antwerp.
- In 2007, a former electoral candidate for the BNP in the UK was imprisoned for stockpiling chemical explosives due to his fears about 'the evils of uncontrolled immigration.'
- In 2009 in Germany, the young neo-Nazi group *Autonome Nationalisten* attacked a group of far-left protesters and police, setting cars on fire and injuring dozens.
- In 2010, three members of the violent banned neo-Nazi group Nomad 88 in France went on a shooting spree to 'purge' the suburbs of immigrants, and were sentenced to prison in 2010. Nine other members of the group were also sentenced for offences including arms possession.
- In July 2011, a man named Anders Behring Breivik detonated a bomb in Oslo and carried out a shooting attack on the island of Utøya, killing a total of 77 people.
- In November 2011, an arson attack, classified by Europol as a 'right-wing terror attack' was carried out in Terrassa (Spain) on the facilities of a publishing company and an anti-capitalist cooperative society, with no casualties.<sup>xiv</sup>
- In 2011, five people were arrested in Germany for involvement in far-right terrorism, and all arrests were linked to the far-right extremist terror group NSU, which carried out politically-motivated murders between 2001 and 2007.

- In 2011, two Senegalese street vendors were murdered in Italy by a member of the far-right group *Casa Pound*.

Large-scale attacks or foiled attempts remain rare, but deserve serious attention. For example, in November 2012, Polish authorities arrested a radical nationalist plotting a bomb-attack on Polish parliament, who was apparently inspired by Anders Breivik. Although these cases are often treated as one-off attacks, some experts believe it is a myth that most far-right terrorism is the action of isolated individuals. A recent report on so-called ‘lone wolves’ notes that those involved in apparent one-person actions have in most cases had long-standing involvement with organised extremist groups.<sup>xv</sup>

Beyond organised violence and terrorism, there have been heightened levels of other forms of activity from violent far-right extremist groups in Europe recently, notably xenophobic violent offences and far-right parades or marches. Violent attacks, however, tend to be the result of accidental encounters or reciprocal provocation in most cases, rather than planned attacks by these groups.<sup>xvi</sup>

Europol confirms that many members of the extreme right-wing scene have access to or harbour ambitions to acquire weapons, ammunition, or explosives.<sup>xvii</sup> Though most groups with a far-right orientation do not openly endorse violence, there is reason to be

concerned about the articulation of narratives that can legitimate the act of violence under certain conditions. Recent research has drawn out the ‘motivational vocabularies’ that inspire far-right commitment, and that tend to amplify feelings of threat, urgency and survivalism: a struggle for racial and cultural survival.<sup>xviii</sup>

It is important not to overstate or exaggerate this threat. In countries like Norway, far-right violence and hate crimes have decreased since the mid-1990s.<sup>xix</sup> The Defence League model has largely failed to catch on in Scandinavia, with fewer than 15 or so activists showing up to these marches. According to the Dutch intelligence service, the AIVD, there are no more than 300 active followers of ‘right-wing extremism and the extreme right’ in the Netherlands.<sup>xx</sup> The relatively weak threat from far-right extremism in some countries, particularly relative to other forms of extremism, is often attributed to their inability to form a coherent social movement, a lack of public support, and the effects of law enforcement or legal restrictions.

However, other countries have recorded higher numbers of far-right extremist supporters in recent years. In France, a 2005 report of the *Renseignements Généraux* (the former intelligence service of the French police) estimated that there were between 2,500 and 3,500 far-right activists in France, divided into five sub-families: skinheads (1,000 to 1,500), identity movements (700 to



800), ultra-nationalists (120 to 320), neo-Nazis (170) and politically-motivated soccer hooligans (figure not given).<sup>xxi</sup> In Germany, the Federal German Intelligence (*Verfassungsschutz*) estimated the number of far-right extremists to be 25,000, including 5,600 neo-Nazis.<sup>xxii</sup>

## RACIST VIOLENCE AND HATE CRIME

Racist violence has been on the rise in several countries, such as Denmark, where the available statistics show a significant increase in criminal acts inspired by extremist ideologies throughout 2009 and 2010 (306 and 334 acts respectively) compared to 2008 (175 acts).<sup>xxiii</sup> Racism against minorities remains the largest number of those incidents that could be specified. A Dutch sociologist, Ineke van der Valk, documented 117 attacks on Dutch mosques from 2005 to 2010. However, other experts estimate this number is much higher, suggesting that there may be five attacks on mosques each month in the Netherlands.<sup>xxiv</sup>

States differ in the data they record and publish on bias motivations, which results in gaps in data collection, and means that official data collection mechanisms on hate crime across Europe may fail to capture the real situation on the ground. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights has classified official data collection mechanisms pertaining to hate crime, and placed them into three categories, based on scope and transparency:

limited data; good data; and comprehensive data (see Table 1).

However, it remains difficult to link racially-motivated crime to organised movements. The EU-Midis European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (2012) uses data from in-depth interviews with 23,500 ethnic minorities and immigrants, providing an alternative and comprehensive evidence base on victimisation of minorities. Interestingly, though many respondents noted that racist or religiously offensive language was used in assaults or threats, the victims identified the perpetrators as someone they knew or recognised, rather than members of far-right extremist gangs.

According to this survey, the ten most targeted groups for crime with a perceived 'racist motive' are: Roma in the Czech Republic; Somalis in Finland; Somalis in Denmark; Africans in Malta; Roma in Greece; Roma in Poland; Sub-Saharan Africans in Ireland, North Africans in Italy, Roma in Hungary; and Roma in the Slovak Republic.

In many countries, anti-Muslim violence in particular has been on the rise. One report places an estimate of between 100 and 200 hate crimes per year against mosques, Islamic institutions and Muslim organisations in the UK since 9/11 as 'not unreasonable and probably highly conservative'.<sup>xxv</sup>

**Table 1: Classification of official data collection mechanisms pertaining to hate crime, by EU member state**

Limited data	Good data	Comprehensive data
<i>Few incidents and a narrow range of bias motivations are recorded</i>	<i>A range of bias motivations are recorded</i>	<i>A range of bias motivations, types of crimes and characteristics of incidents are recorded</i>
<i>Data are not usually published</i>	<i>Data are generally published</i>	<i>Data are always published</i>
Bulgaria Cyprus Estonia Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Luxembourg Malta Portugal Slovenia Spain  Romania*	Austria Belgium Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Lithuania Poland Slovakia	Finland Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom

Notes: \*No evidence on hate crime data collection was found for Romania  
Information as of September 2012.

Source: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2012). *Making hate crime visible in the European Union: acknowledging victims' rights*. Vienna, Austria.

## Recent trends

We are seeing a number of new trends emerge across Europe in respect to far-right extremist groups and movements. This section gives a brief overview of these.

### USE OF THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA

The Internet serves different functions for far-right extremist groups, which frequently communicate and operate through social media, semi-public and password-protected forums. Spaces such as ‘*Stormfront*’, founded by a former Ku Klux Klan leader in the 1990s, or the password-protected forum [www.legion88.com](http://www.legion88.com), have served as means of communication, recruitment, mobilisation and propaganda over the last decade. In more



recent years, the far right's use of social media has expanded. The extreme right capitalises on relationship-building mechanisms online, and the emergence of new social media and other such tools has become far more important than static websites, particularly to build a sense of comradeship as well as ownership over the movement.

There are several trends which can be noted regarding extreme right-wing use of the Internet, including that extreme right websites have become more sophisticated, and are often hosted outside their target jurisdictions to avoid legal sanctions. Rather than mirroring established media news outlets to gain credibility, extreme right websites heavily target youth, reflecting a young lifestyle and employing recognisable styles, slogans, and symbols.

In Scandinavia in particular, the Internet is where the far right has flourished in recent years. Norway has been an important base for the spreading of far-right propaganda online, including for example by the anti-Islam blogger "Fjordman", who has become a globally respected voice in far-right extremist milieus.<sup>xxvi</sup>

#### PROFESSIONALISATION AND MERCHANDISING

Increased use of the Internet has been accompanied by a significant professionalisation of these movements in terms of communications strategies, branding

and merchandising. The websites they operate are becoming increasingly slick, which is helping them to gain credibility and appeal to wider audiences, and generate new and major sources of funding.

It has also been critical for the flourishing of White Power merchandising, with neo-Nazi paraphernalia and far-right Internet shops on the rise. This is not a new trend, as profits from White Power music, concerts and related merchandise enabled parties like the National Front in Britain to pursue traditional political activities in the 1970s.<sup>xxvii</sup> However, the advent of the Internet has vastly expanded the market niche and profitability of White Power music, and has made it an important source of international income for extreme right movements. In 2011, Swedish authorities reported that the White Power Music movement is strong and active on a number of levels, and often ties extreme right groups together across national borders.<sup>xxviii</sup> This was exemplified by a recent international meeting called 'White Christmas', organised by Portuguese far-right movements on the outskirts of Lisbon in December 2011, in an attempt to gain strength via the international far-right music scene.<sup>xxix</sup>

#### NEW FORMS OF MOBILISATION

Recent years have seen new forms of both online and offline mobilisation by these movements. The EDL provides the best example of the growing trend of grass-roots

street protest movements, defined not by rigid membership structures but by a fluid ‘march and grow’ strategy. The EDL emerged in Luton in the spring of 2009 from a series of loosely defined movements. It operates outside of the political system, deploying mass mobilisation, or the threat of mobilisation, as its major means of influence. Ranging from lower-level violence to professedly ‘peaceful’ marches and protests, these activities serve to polarise communities and generate fear and tension, often resulting in ‘copy-cat’ threats or violence, even from counter-movements. The EDL has furthermore spawned a number of attempted spin-off movements across Europe, namely in Scandinavia, including the Danish Defence League, the Swedish Defence League, and the Finnish Defence League, most of whom have been unable to galvanise the support of more than a handful of supporters on various demonstrations.

Another perhaps more menacing example is ‘the Immortals’ neo-Nazi group in Germany, which has no central leadership, and organises exclusively through Twitter and other social media to stage unregistered rallies, wearing black clothing and white face masks. It uses YouTube to disseminate footage of the gatherings, and the movement and its methods have been transported to countries like Sweden.

#### TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS

Groups like the aforementioned EDL are starting to present themselves as part of a growing transnational movement, building on the success of counter-Jihad equivalents initiated in the United States and attempting to capitalise on the anti-Islam ‘hook’. For example, the EDL crossed national borders in attempts to initiate a pan-European anti-Islam movement in May 2012, taking to the streets with Danish and other counterparts in Aarhus, Denmark. In August 2012, there was another attempt by the EDL to launch a Worldwide Counter-Jihad Alliance in Stockholm, which brought together prominent Islamophobic figures like Pamela Gellar and Robert Spencer from the United States, as well as the leader of Stop the Islamization of Europe, Anders Gravers. According to a report, 190 groups have been identified globally as promoting anti-Islam agendas, and they are increasingly forging alliances and strengthening their capacities.<sup>xxx</sup> A strategy of international mobilisation allows them to present themselves as part of a more respectable and increasingly mainstreamed school of ideology and action.

European states thus need a better understanding of the evolving nature of far-right extremism, and require flexible responses to adequately address this phenomenon.

## Preventing and Countering Far-Right Extremism

This paper sets out four types of responses that have typically been deployed in tackling far-right extremism. These have been applied in different ways, and prioritised differently across Europe.

### UPSTREAM PREVENTATIVE MEASURES

European states have implemented a range of upstream measures to prevent radicalisation and extremism by reducing vulnerability among specific groups and increasing community resilience. These measures often have long-term aims of promoting a democratic culture, tolerance, and improved opportunities and life chances. Preventative measures taken by states include the development of school curricula on racism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; intercultural and inter-religious learning; and citizenship, identity, democracy and tolerance education.

The target groups for upstream preventative work range from at-risk young people through to core occupational groups coming into contact with potential far-right extremists. Specific measures taken include the development of courses and trainings for elected officials, police officers, lawyers, prison and probation officers, and for future school teachers.

Training programmes to inform these relevant stakeholders about far-right extremism—and sensitise them to it—have been implemented to varying degrees across Europe, but in order to have a longer-term effect they may need to be implemented systematically and regularly. For example, increasing the number of police officers with an immigrant background can be a valuable way of building a resilient police force.

Projects within this category also target wider communities, aiming to build a strong civil society. This includes grassroots integration and inclusion initiatives, and measures to enhance educational attainment and opportunities, provide stronger role models, promote democratic consciousness and political participation, and mobilise communities against the far right, racism, and racist violence.

### REACTIVE MEASURES AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS

Existing activity by far-right extremist groups and individuals requires a series of response mechanisms. These include actions taken by local authorities to police marches. Enlisting community volunteers has been particularly helpful in the UK, where during EDL marches the local council in Luton deployed 100 volunteers to serve as community mediators, helping to disseminate information, pick up on and respond to community concerns in real time, and quash rumours

before they could spread. Some countries have implemented diversionary activities for young people on days when far-right marches and demonstrations are scheduled, as well as alternative platforms for dialogue and discussion on related issues.

In the case of violent or threatening behaviour from the far right, key response measures include the systematic recording of hate crimes and the provision of support for victims, including compensation and rehabilitation. Such provisions can help to strengthen victims, demonstrate the gravity of the act, and raise awareness about the problem of far-right extremism. Making cases more visible to the public, and ensuring that far-right behaviour is seen as a pertinent public safety threat, can help communities contribute to solving the problem. Reactive measures furthermore include implementing more severe penalties and ensuring that there is more systematic punishment for hate crimes.

## REPRESSION

Some countries have taken a more repressive approach to the far right, aiming to prohibit these movements or parties from organising and disseminating their propaganda. Such measures include the banning of publications, pictures or any material with racist or xenophobic content, both offline and online. It also includes prohibiting public incitement to violence or hatred, and materials that condone genocide and crimes against

humanity or promote Holocaust denial. Some countries have removed state support for far-right organisations, or implemented legislation that allows the state to deny access to or ban one from working in the civil service if affiliated with far-right militants.

Banning organisations outright, banning any public activity organised by particular groups, or criminalising the reconstruction of a prohibited party, has also been tried by some European countries. In France, local or state authorities can ban any public activity organised by a group on the ground that it is a 'threat to public order', a measure which has been taken against events such as skinhead concerts.

This approach has seen varied outcomes across Europe. In Germany, repression has not led to a reduction of far-right extremism. Rather, there has been a stronger European and international alignment of the extreme right, including relocation of some activities abroad.<sup>xxxi</sup> Repressive measures also tend to be circumvented by far-right groups, through changing organisation names, or forming new organisations entirely. This is particularly relevant in the online sphere, where far-right groups tend to move to foreign-based hosts when legal action against them is threatened in any particular country. In France, a lengthy court case led to Yahoo agreeing to take technical steps in 2006 so that the sale of Nazi paraphernalia through its auction pages would be impossible from France. However, the

impact of this ruling was negligible, as far-right groups simply migrated to foreign servers to merchandise.

More encouragingly, banning EDL marches in certain boroughs in the UK has seen many positive outcomes. Local authorities and the Metropolitan Police have lobbied for Home Secretary Theresa May to ban EDL marches on numerous occasions in various parts of London. Most recently, a ban in October 2012 prevented all marches in Waltham Forest, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Newham for 30 days. These bans have saved local authority resources in terms of policing costs, while also sparing local communities the anxiety, fear and conflict caused by EDL marches.

## INTERVENTION

Intervention is a key way of approaching this threat, although it is often left out of national strategies and action plans against violent far-right extremism. Intervention includes de-radicalisation programmes that generally aim to re-integrate individuals that have become radicalised back into society, or at least to dissuade them from violence. These programmes also aim to reverse the radicalisation process for those partly or already radicalised, and may be distinguished from disengagement activities, which aim to help individuals leave violent movements. De-radicalisation seeks to change views, while disengagement aims to alter behaviour. This work is often carried out by front-line

workers, including former far-right extremists. In some countries, like Sweden, this work is actively supported and promoted by the government.

Intervention measures include social and economic assistance for individuals so they have a means of supporting themselves in the absence of their former radicalised network or group, as well as social and economic support for the individual's 'receiving group' (their family and social network). It may involve psychological support and counselling, mentoring and role modelling, and religious or ideological counselling.

Intervention also includes attempts to engage directly with potential offenders to deter them from carrying out particular actions. For example, this method has been tested in Germany by Soko Rex, which communicated directly with potential offenders before far-right events to highlight to them the consequences of additional criminal offences. Engagement and communication directly with movements has been tested by some civil society organisations, namely Exit Germany, which develops creative ways to interact with German far-right groups so that individuals in these movements are given the support they need to leave.

## Case Studies

The following case studies provide a brief overview of a number of projects aimed at countering far-right extremism. They are illustrative and are only for background purposes. They can also be accessed via [www.counterextremism.org](http://www.counterextremism.org)

### EXIT, Sweden

**Aims/objectives:**

To help individuals leave white supremacy groups, and to provide them with economic and social support structures to make their new lives sustainable.

**Target audience:**

Set up to target former Neo-Nazis, but new sister programme targets those seeking to leave organised criminal groups.

**Description/activities:**

EXIT was established in 1998, and is based on the notion that individuals join white supremacist movements not because of ideology, but due to social reasons and the search for status, identity, support and power. Individuals normally enter these movements when they feel excluded or unaccepted by society or have experienced a deep sense of insult. The majority of EXIT staff are former members of white supremacist groups, although they are complemented by others, including a physician and psychotherapists.

The project has a number of activities:

- (1) Work with individuals to help them leave behind these groups and forge sustainable new lives;
- (2) Work with the families of Neo-Nazis to support young people involved with white supremacists;
- (3) Education for those frontline workers who engage with young people to enable them to spot vulnerable young people and provide help and support.

EXIT's work with individuals is based on long-term cognitive treatment, helping individuals to disengage with white supremacist groups and reintegrate into society. It only works with those who have voluntarily come to the programme as it is important that the individual wants to change. Staff engage them in a

number of ways, through direct discussions, taking them out for a coffee or to do an activity together, in order to build a good interpersonal relationship. Staff do not talk directly about ideology or try to challenge the ideas of the white supremacist movement, partly because the programme is based on the idea that young people enter these movements for other reasons, but also because the movements school their members with all the relevant counter-arguments so this can be a futile approach to take and simply put the young person into a defensive mode. This work is always conducted confidentially, as former members and their families are often threatened by the movements.

In the early days, staff are on hand 24 hours a day, as the young person may need help at any moment and often won't have anyone else to turn to as they probably broke ties with family and friends when they entered the movement.

They can be offered a range of different types of support: counselling; specialist help from a psychologist or psychiatrist; help re-establishing contact with friends and family; training in social skills; learning how to manage set-backs, how to trust others, and deal with conflict in non-violent way; safe-housing; and help finding a new job and re-establishing their new life. The nature and length of support offered is tailored to the individual, but on average individuals will be involved in the programme for six-nine months, although the longest involvement has been eight years.

EXIT also coaches the relatives of Neo-Nazis, helping them to develop parenting skills and work through what the family has experienced; they can convene meetings between the family and a range of service providers, should the family request that; and they can assist with police contact and protection where the family has been threatened by the group.

EXIT also conducts educational work with professionals working with young people (schools, social services, and police, for example) helping them to understand how the movement is organised, how to reach and influence individuals in these movements, and provides counselling in how to conduct case work. It conducts 200 school visits per year. The programme believes its approach is relevant to individuals in other kinds of coercive movements, and has just started a sister project for individuals exiting organised crime groups.

Key points about the project:

- (1) It only works with individuals who have referred themselves so are motivated to change;
- (2) It is mainly staffed by individuals with direct personal experience of white supremacist movements;



- (3) It is based within a youth centre, Fryshuset, which provides social support and leisure facilities for young people. This means it is not isolated, has the backing and support of a larger organisation, and is integrated within a wider youth project;
- (4) Focuses on the emotional and social causes rather than ideology;
- (5) It recognises the importance of re-establishing support structures and social networks;
- (6) Has become well-known and so is seen as an enemy by the white supremacist movement – this helps to raise its profile among EXIT's target audience;

## Cultures Interactive, Germany

### Aims/objectives:

This project engages at-risk youth from disadvantaged communities susceptible to right-wing narratives through interactive mentoring and creative engagement.

### Target audience

School-aged youth in East-German communities and inner city districts, social workers and teachers. The initiative has also worked with adolescents in Poland and the Czech Republic.

### Description/activities:

Cultures Interactive combines a sequential preventative approach to countering the threat from far-right violent extremism among school-aged youth. The engagement process begins by bringing credible representatives from urban youth subcultural milieus to deliver workshops in activities like skateboarding, rap, breakdance, mixing, graffiti art and cartoon/comic design. These workshops create pathways to engage young people proactively on a variety of topics such as identity, civil rights, poverty, discrimination and drug-abuse, and are designed to foster relationships between participants and intervention leaders, while building 'cultural' and 'emotional' intelligence through peer-learning.

This outreach initiative is followed by a second element described as a 'civic education' approach, which combines information discussions related to extreme right-wing discourses, National Socialism, contemporary neo-Nazi organisations and the general value of human rights and fundamental freedoms in modern society. These are discussed through the medium of role-playing activities, which aim to enhance the participant's capacity to critically engage, evaluate and debate with others while understanding the value of conflict resolution. It does so through a process of 'narrative interaction', allowing for the

participant to explore such issues through the medium of their own lived experiences. The initiative therefore extends beyond traditional pedagogical ‘re-education’ attempts.

The third and final component of the Cultures Interactive approach consists of a dynamic ‘psycho-therapy’ stage which gives young people the opportunity to discuss their experiences in a ‘self-awareness group’. The initiative, called ‘We-Amongst-Ourselves-Group’, provides participants with the opportunity to share experiences while connecting with like-minded individuals. The programme also offers training to social workers and educational personnel, and supports the construction of community networks between youth populations and community representatives and authorities such as the police, local government, media and key community associations.

Key points about the project:

- (1) Emphasis is placed on ‘hard-to-reach’ groups who are not catered for by existing intervention initiatives;
- (2) Project focuses on combining classical civic education courses with dynamic peer-learning activities to engage school-aged youth;
- (3) It differs from conventional methods of ‘re-education’ which are considered too ‘informational’ in their approach;
- (4) The initiative uses a multidimensional approach to preventative work through youth engagement, practitioner capacity-building and evaluative research;
- (5) Global in scope.

## Rewind, UK

### **Aims/objectives:**

To provide generic anti-racism awareness sessions for young people and staff, and to provide support to those vulnerable to recruitment to far-right groups, and help to those in influencing positions, such as teachers.

### **Target audience:**

Professionals, community groups, young people and children in relation to anti-racism work; and young people at risk of recruitment to far-right groups.

**Description/activities:**

Rewind conducts bespoke intervention work with white young people and adults who are at risk of becoming involved or who are already involved in far-right activity and ideology. In some cases, this is delivered one-to-one. Rewind also runs sessions for small groups of around 12 people which are conducted over a period of a few months. These individuals tend to be very racist, and staff/volunteers work to build their trust and cement relationships. Rewind staff focus on listening and letting the young people open up and share their views, challenging them without judging them.

They also run Peer Education training courses where participants learn delivery techniques and in-depth knowledge around issues of 'race', racism, identity, belonging and extremism. In these sessions they use a range of resources, including: DVDs, PowerPoint presentations, discussion-based debate and the sharing of personal stories of those involved with Rewind to provide a safe space for discussion without judgment. They are also able to conduct a DNA test to provide participants with their genetic lineage for up to 20,000 years. This helps to undermine the idea of 'race' purity. As well as challenging the ideas of the far right, sessions like this have also been shown to increase self-esteem and self-confidence, which can sometimes be underlying issues behind the behaviour patterns of participants.

Rewind organises educational field visits to places such as Liverpool International Slavery Museum, Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre, and Auschwitz and other death camps in Poland. They have also developed early years' interventions for nurseries and primary schools, and are involved in training staff at a number of football clubs. The project is based in Sandwell, West Midlands, but works nationally. Satellites of the project have been established in six other areas of the UK, and the project has also worked outside the UK in Austria, the Netherlands, France and Poland.

**Key points about the project:**

- (1) Some of those working with Rewind are former members of far-right extremist groups, so have first-hand knowledge and understanding of the issues and can relate to the young people Rewind works with;
- (2) It focuses on listening and non-judgement which helps young people to open up and engage in the project's work – young people need safe spaces that are blame-free;
- (3) It is housed within the Sandwell primary care trust (West Midlands), but works nationally/internationally;
- (4) Rewind relies heavily on project funding rather than core funding, which raises issues of on-going sustainability – it might be better for it to be mainstreamed;
- (5) It takes a holistic approach involving all those who can help.

## RecoRa Institute, UK

### **Aims/objectives:**

To embed expertise on recognising and responding to ideologically-based violence within and across government agencies and community based organisations.

### **Target audience:**

Principally concerned with young people vulnerable to radicalisation, but also working on training related convicted terrorists and gang violence.

### **Description/activities:**

The RecoRa programme emerged from an EU-funded project 'Recognising and Responding to Radicalisation' which explored the factors that inhibit frontline workers from proactively engaging in work to prevent violent extremism, and the approaches most likely to enable street level workers to engage with Government and security agencies in order to support vulnerable young people. The project worked across six cities (Amsterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, Rotterdam, Essen and Birmingham) and the final report offered new insights and recommendations for improving policy and practice.

These included the recommendation to develop a training programme, which was subsequently tested with teachers, neighbourhood police officers, youth workers, elected officials, policy makers and senior managers. These modules were used to develop the series of training programmes collectively called The RecoRa Programme, and The RecoRa Institute – a pan-European partnership – has been launched to continue this work. Within the UK, the development of the RecoRa Programme was led by the Government Office for the West Midlands, supported by the then Department for Children, Schools and Families.

The RecoRa Institute uses training as a tool to build collaborative partnerships within and across government agencies, and with community-based organisations. Their overall aim is to embed expertise on recognising and responding to the processes that encourage individuals to support or engage in violence justified by ideology. Their objective is to reduce the reliance such bodies invest in external experts in order to enhance the speed and depth of mainstreaming violence reduction practice. The RecoRa programme has two key features: a process for embedding expertise utilising the training programmes and tools developed; and a set of direct interventions aimed at disengaging young people from the radicalisation process. Its activities include training programmes for strategic managers, policy makers, frontline workers and community activists, including 2-5 day courses, master classes, modules,

and residential courses. Modules covered include information about the radicalisation process and the groups/networks involved, safeguarding children and young people, developing a solution matrix, outcome management, designing interventions, managing convicted terrorists, recognising and responding to the narratives of the new extreme right, and mentoring young people.

The Institute has a process for embedding expertise which supports local municipalities, police and security services, and not-for-profit community groups, to cascade The RecoRa Programme throughout their organisation. This is enabled through ‘graduating’ key staff that are provided with secure online access to the RecoRa materials. This ‘graduate site’ is used to encourage on-going professional development, to provide resources so that staff can train others in what they have learned, and to build a network for mutual support and sharing good practice. Organisations, who become associate members through a licence, receive on-going support through their graduate member of staff and receive mentoring to cascade the learning within their organisation – creating a Europe-wide network of cities and agencies linked together through their graduates. In some areas, RecoRa is developing and coordinating regional networks. The RecoRa Institute also supports local areas to develop direct interventions aimed at disengaging cohorts of young people from the radicalisation process.

**Key points about the project:**

- (1) It is part of government, but independent of it;
- (2) It positions itself at the interface of government, community, policy and research in order to draw on all that these different worlds have to offer;
- (3) The graduate network seeks to ensure mutual support and ongoing learning among professionals working on these issues;
- (4) It enables systemic change through a focus on small changes, as this is the level at which change is sustainable;
- (5) It works through individuals rather than organisations as personal commitment is essential to the success of the work.
- (6) It focuses on building shared narratives and therefore trains mixed audiences rather than specific disciplines.

## Special Commission on Right-wing Extremism, Germany

### **Aims/objectives:**

The project is designed to proactively tackle radical right-wing and xenophobic violence through prevention and prosecution.

### **Target audience:**

The general public and specific far-right constituencies in Saxony.

### **Description/activities:**

Established by the state criminal police in Saxony, Soko Rex (Special Commission on Right-wing Extremism) takes a two-track prevention/repression approach that combines deterrence policies designed to limit the appeal of extreme right-wing discourses with the prosecution of acts of criminality and violence perpetrated on behalf of far-right ideologies. The preventative work provided by Soko Rex ranges from public outreach initiatives through the local media, to awareness-raising seminars and workshops, notably for young people. It also engages directly with right-wing constituencies to inform them of the potential consequences associated with far-right militant activism and violence.

Beyond upstream preventative work, Soko Rex performs intelligence-gathering on extreme right-wing individuals and movements, and remains a key player in prosecuting acts of violent extremism perpetrated by the far-right. This includes the investigation of crimes, notably taking over efforts from local police authorities when acts are suspected to be motivated by extreme right-wing ideologies and agents are empowered to perform arrests. Parallels have been drawn between Soko Rex and the Mobile Task Force against Extremism and Xenophobia (MEGA) units deployed in the state of Brandenburg – consisting of either plain-clothed or uniformed police - who engage in conversations with young people considered to be at risk of being influenced by neo-Nazi discourses on the streets.

### **Key points about the project:**

- (1) Combines both prevention and prosecution in tackling the extreme right in Saxony;
- (2) Performs hard-end intelligence gathering and arrests of individuals suspected of involvement in extreme far-right circles, taking over from local police authorities.

## Violence Prevention Network, Germany

### **Aims/objectives:**

This project works with individuals in prison convicted of violent crimes linked to far-right extremism to help them to reject their past, move away from extremism, and forge new lives.

### **Target audience:**

Set up to target far-right extremists, but has recently been extended to work with religiously radicalised individuals.

### **Description/activities:**

The Violence Prevention Network runs a project working with individuals in prison who have been convicted of violent crimes linked to far-right and – more recently – religious extremism. It has been running for over 10 years. The Violence Prevention Network is funded by the Federal Agency for Civil Education, which is part of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, but the project is run on an entirely independent basis.

The project has three elements:

- (1) A 23 week programme in the prison with a small group of prisoners;
- (2) One year of dedicated support once the individual has been released from prison;
- (3) Support for the individual's family before and after release.

The work with individuals is conducted on a voluntary basis; those taking part are free to leave at any time. Individuals are brought together into small groups of approximately eight people for a 23 week programme, which amounts to an average of 0.5-1 day per week. The unique approach of the training programme is the fact that it brings together social work with civic education in order to disentangle the individual's sense of anger and hatred from their political view of the world, and helps in tackling both the factors driving their anger and also re-educating them in the ways of democratic society and alternative ways of expressing their concerns. The programme talks about a 'hierarchy of needs' – first is self-responsibility and leaving violence, and second is leaving the ideology. Both are important, but if you attack the ideology first, you leave the individual with nothing and no sense of meaning or worth. In a very few cases the training was in danger of failing because it was too quick to focus on ideology.

The training covers a number of discussion points, with the aim of helping participants to reflect on their crime, understand what motivated them to engage in violence linked to extremism, help them identify



alternative responses, and offer civic education to help reintegrate them into the ways of democratic culture. They also receive help in alternative ways of handling conflict without resorting to violence. This involves discussions, role playing, social work, and other activities. Counsellors also work with the individual to prepare them for life outside of the prison and institutional structures.

Individuals receive dedicated support for one year after their release, although in many cases there is contact longer than this. The individual has the name, address and phone number of their mentor (the same person they have dealt with in prison to provide continuity); they meet every month with their mentor, more often if they need to; their mentor helps to find them accommodation and employment, (although the latter is becoming more difficult in the current economic climate); and the mentor arranges 3-4 meetings with the individual's family.

The programme also works with the individual's family and social networks to help prepare them for the individual's release, and to better understand the context into which the individual will return. In many cases, this will be a violent setting; either in the family, or wider social scene. This is especially the case in cities and towns, rather than rural areas. It is important to be realistic about this, and build the programme and support around the individual to deal with it, as it can be dangerous to teach people simply to avoid conflict and violence if they are daily realities for them in the outside world.

The project is seen as successful. After initial problems getting participants, the programme is now well-established with a good track record; only five per cent of those who have been through it return to prison, and the drop-out rate from training is just two per cent. However, the project has not been formally evaluated since project staff are keen to spend their funding on delivering the service and the Federal government has not offered additional funding for evaluation. It is limited to those who are held within the youth justice system, but staff would like to extend it to young adults, too. It has recently been extended to those who are religiously radicalised.

**Key points about the project:**

- (1) It is a voluntary project so individuals are motivated to take part;
- (2) It only works with individuals convicted of violent crimes linked to radicalisation;
- (3) The programme is scheduled to start as close to the individual's release date as possible;
- (4) It is seen as being independent from 'authority', which is vital for its credibility and in gaining the trust of individuals involved;
- (5) Programme workers take the individuals and their ideas seriously;

- (6) Contact is consistent and long-term – individuals work with the same person inside and outside of prison so have a trusted relationship;
- (7) It is vital to work with families, although this can be the most challenging aspect of the programme.

## Rotterdamse Anti Discriminatie Actie Raad (RADAR), The Netherlands

### **Aims/objectives:**

This initiative aims to promote equality in the Rotterdam area through active reporting and monitoring of discrimination, training initiatives and grass-roots research.

### **Target audience:**

Rotterdam and surrounding areas.

### **Description/activities:**

Rotterdamse Anti Discriminatie Actie Raad (RADAR) combines a variety of services to promote equality, inclusion and non-discrimination in the Rotterdam area and its surrounding municipalities. The initiative provides information, advice and support services to those directly affected by discrimination. It compiles a series of practical guides and documents related to various forms of discrimination, while informing citizens of their rights and responsibilities. The initiative also offers individuals the opportunity to self-report incidents of racial discrimination through its complaints system (both towards individuals and groups).

RADAR proactively employs such data to signal trends in discrimination within the municipalities covered through forward-looking exploratory research and opinion pieces. This includes the development of ‘fact cards’ on discrimination in Rotterdam and the surrounding areas, which chart the types of discrimination, its geographical spread, the socio-economic environments in which it takes place, and demographic information about those who have contacted RADAR’s complaints service. These figures are also compared and contrasted to regional police figures, and feed into national-level reporting on discrimination. RADAR also conducts proactive advocacy work at a local and regional policy-level.

The project is further designed as an awareness raising initiative, providing frontline education while promoting best practises in the field of non-discrimination. It does so partly through maintaining a database of research publications teaching materials and interactive games that relate to non-

discrimination and equality, and which are designed for a vast audience including educational institutions, youth practitioners, the police and governmental personnel. Combined with this, RADAR runs a series of workshops and seminars on various themes that are related to the social impacts of stereotyping, bullying, exclusion, and the recognition of early signs of discrimination at school, in the workplace and on the streets. It delivers bespoke workshops through a variety of interactive mediums, including peer-learning exercises, role-playing, group discussion, interactive media and more.

**Key points about the project:**

- (1) Offers a wide range of services that relate to non-discrimination and exclusion, from upstream prevention to downstream reporting of cases;
- (2) Provides an independent reporting and counselling service designed to systematise the collection of data on discrimination and exclusion;
- (3) Combines this with a series of seminars and educational workshops tailored to a broad audience in order to raise sensitivities and awareness;
- (4) Focuses primarily on Rotterdam and surrounding municipalities in the Netherlands.

## SOS Racism, France

**Aims/objectives:**

The initiative aims to combat racism, anti-Semitism and discrimination through targeted campaigning and interventions.

**Target audience:**

National-level campaigning strategy, with most interventions taking place in schools and universities.

**Description/activities:**

SOS Racism aims to combat racism, anti-Semitism and discrimination through methods of grass-roots activism. The initiative provides integrated support to those affected by racism and exclusion through documenting relevant legislation informing victims of their rights, while providing avenues through which those directly and indirectly affected by racist abuse are able to report incidents (including racist content posted online) to relevant authorities. The anti-discrimination component of SOS Racism is divided into two core strands: downstream local judicial services and support structures, and upstream services related to prevention, investigation and research. The initiative is known for widely publicising incidents of racial

discrimination and prejudice through the media, and it has campaigned extensively for minority rights and judicial assistance of migrant communities within the French political and legal arenas.

The organisation is also responsible for the development of an innovative ‘testing’ technique. Originally designed to assess the existence of racial discrimination at the entrance to nightclubs, it has now been extended to determine the prevalence of other forms of institutional racism in the job market and housing sector. The test consists of demonstrating double-standards in the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, which has subsequently led to a number of legal prosecutions for racial discrimination. This technique has since been extended to other countries, notably through the first ‘Europe-wide testing against racial discriminations’.

SOS Racism also delivers educational programmes to raise awareness of racist stereotyping and exclusion, primarily in schools and universities. It offers educational institutions the opportunity to request interventions on specific themes or to select workshops from existing modules designed to raise sensibilities among school-aged youth and young adults on various topics such as anti-Semitism, racial discrimination and religious prejudice. SOS Racism combines this with targeted campaigning projects and other broader cultural activities, such as open-air concerts and interactive media projects. The initiative fosters a series of more targeted campaigns against the politically organised far-right in France, particularly against the Front National of Marine Le Pen, and the anti-Islam *Identitarian Mouvement*.

**Key points about the project:**

- (1) Operates very broadly at a national level and integrates a variety of campaigning and educational tools to achieve its goals;
- (2) Provides a one-stop-shop consultancy service for those seeking advice and practical guidance on issues of racial discrimination;
- (3) Known for its targeted interventions and campaigning strategies that focus on core issue areas.
- (4) Combines this with the delivery of interventions in schools and universities;
- (5) Is known for popularising and systematising the technique known as ‘testing’, designed to assess the existence of institutional racism.

## Conclusions

European states must take into account the particular circumstances of far-right extremism as they identify and assess the threat, and develop methods of countering this phenomenon. This paper sets out some of the key definitional issues facing European countries, noting that different states define the ‘threat’ in varying ways, and considering how the cumulative phenomenon of far-right extremism is developing and taking shape across Europe.

Questions remain as to where responsibility for tackling the far right lies, and which actors are best placed to carry out different elements of counter-strategies against the far right. The fight against the far right in many countries will be determined by the will of the government, the strength of grassroots anti-racist organisations, and the existence of effective partnerships between government and civil society.

For partnerships to be effective there must be commitment on all sides to making it work, and a commitment by government actors to ensure that their presence is not counter-productive. For example, practitioners working in the field of intervention (and particularly de-radicalisation and disengagement work) often face the challenges of short-term, unpredictable funding cycles and the fact that inconsistent support for individuals can be more harmful than no support at all. This work is undoubtedly

sensitive, and long-term support is required to ensure that projects are effective.

For both government and civil society work to be useful, there also needs to be stronger awareness within the sector about what does and doesn’t work. From a government perspective, inconsistent implementation of the legislation has in some cases led to counter-productive results. For example, some experts argue that the ongoing ‘quarrel’ about the ban of the NPD in Germany has lent legitimacy to the party.<sup>xxxii</sup> Some strategies implemented by civil society actors with good intentions against the far right, have ultimately caused more harm than good. Examples of this include combative or militant anti-fascist movements that go to extremes to prevent activity by far-right movements. Confrontations between anti-fascist groups and their right-wing opponents have become increasingly violent in recent years.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Europol notes that in Germany, criminal offences by anti-fascist groups are generally committed during far-right meetings and parades, while in Sweden, many of these actions have focused on representatives of the Sweden Democrats party.<sup>xxxiv</sup>

A lack of information-sharing at the policy, practitioner and academic levels has inhibited the development of effective responses. For instance, it is generally accepted by researchers and academics that there is a lack of reliable data and research on the perpetrators of far-right violence, and on the differences between racist violence, hate crime, far-right extremist violence

and terrorism. More lessons should be drawn from successful disengagement and de-radicalisation programmes currently in place across Scandinavia and in Germany (e.g. Exit Sweden and Exit Germany) to improve understanding of what motivates individuals to leave extreme right movements, and under what circumstances this can occur. It is vital that information gathered by the police and state security services is shared with frontline workers, but also that the data collected on a daily basis by practitioners is used to shape responses at the policy level.

Finally, there is an increased need to address far-right extremism at the European level. This paper demonstrates that far-right movements and groups are becoming more diverse, flexible, and are increasingly working beyond country borders to achieve their goals. These developments must be met with counter-measures that are equally diverse, flexible, and implemented at the European level.

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