THE GLEIWITZ INCIDENT

Nazi Plot or Allied Cover Up

By
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“In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”
Winston Churchill

Steven Books 2010.

Front Cover. Polish mobilisation - Polish poster announcing the successful mobilisation of Poland’s armed forces. Poland declared general mobilisation on 30 August, two days before the German invasion. According to the British magazine The War Illustrated (23 September 1939), it was estimated that when the war started Poland had 2,800,000 men under arms.

ISBN 9781 90491189 0

Published by Steven Books.
Please address all correspondence to League Enterprises (SB), 27, Old Gloucester Street London WC1N 3XX
stevenbooks.co.uk
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It is now commonplace for accounts about the beginning of the Second World War – by professional historians and others - to mention the alleged “false flag” attack on the German radio station at Gleiwitz on the night of 31 August 1939. There are many variations of the story, but generally it is said that a Nazi-organised gang, masquerading as Poles, raided the station, broadcast a provocative message over the radio, created a bit of mayhem and left at least one dead victim on the spot as evidence of Polish aggression. A summary of many variations to the story appears as Appendix I.

Other border incidents on the same night are also blamed on the Nazis. The whole exercise is usually labelled “Operation Himmler”, though sometimes it is referred to as “Operation Tannenberg,” and one account calls it “Operation Jam.” On the following day the Germans invaded Poland; and, during his address to the Reichstag on that day, Hitler is accused of using the border incidents, particularly the Gleiwitz attack, as a pretext for invasion.

A careful look at the detail and evidence, however, throws up many questions and difficulties that indicate the issue is not so black and white as it has been made to appear.

The background

The German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 marked a tragic new phase in relations between the two countries - relations poisoned for twenty years with problems created by the Treaty of Versailles imposed by the victorious Allies in 1919. Under the Treaty, Germany was cut in two by the transfer of large swathes of territory, including the Polish Corridor, to Poland. This left well over a million more Germans under Polish rule (in addition to the German minorities in the former Russian and Austrian parts of Poland). In many areas they formed the majority of
the population. Germany was further diminished in the East by the
creation of the “Free City” of Danzig, almost wholly German but
included within the Polish Customs frontier and subject to Polish control
of its river and railway systems, foreign relations and diplomatic protec-
tion services.

After a century and a half of Prussian, Austrian and Russian domina-
tion, the Poles revelled in their newly won independence after 1918,
quickly asserting their nationality and culture. Despite provisions in the
Treaty for protecting minority rights, the Germans in Poland were subject-
ed to expulsion, discrimination, violence, boycotts, and the undermining
of their economic organisations, schools and churches. Their plight is
rarely acknowledged or even mentioned today.

Long before Hitler became Chancellor, Germans were leaving or being
driven out in large numbers; The Polish Press Bureau reported that the
German population of Pomorze province declined from 437,412 (44%)
in 1910 to 177,842 (18.7%) in 1921 and 109,645 (10.1%) in 1931.
Pomorze was the northern province carved out of the ceded German
lands. Adding insult to injury, the Bureau referred to the Germans as
“aliens.”

Another source shows that in Poznania province, the German minority
dropped from 27.1% in 1910, to 18.7% in 1921 and 11.4% in 1931; and
in Polish Upper Silesia, ceded to Poland after a plebiscite in 1921, the
German minority declined from 44% in 1921 to 6% in 1931.

This was not just a German problem; other minorities in Poland also
suffered. In 1934 Poland effectively repudiated the Minorities Protec-
tion Treaty that she was obliged to enter into under Article 93 of the
Treaty of Versailles.

After the death of the outstanding Polish leader Marshal Pilsudski in
1935, Poland was governed by a military junta, which faced waves of
major strikes by peasants and workers between 1935 and 1938. Possibly
as part of a quest for popularity, the junta resorted to an adventurous and
aggressive foreign policy.

Its first victim was its much smaller neighbour Lithuania. Poland and
Lithuania had been in dispute since 1920, when the Poles seized the
Lithuanian capital of Vilna and later annexed it. Lithuania refused to
have any diplomatic or economic relations with Poland until Vilna was
returned; and even railroad links were rejected lest they might imply
recognition of the frontier. In March 1938, Poland mobilised 50,000 troops on the border, reinforced by armoured vehicles and one hundred aircraft; and the Polish Fleet was menacingly stationed off the Baltic Sea shore of Lithuania. A 48-hour non-negotiable ultimatum was given to Lithuania and was accepted under obvious duress. This led to the recognition of Polish sovereignty over Vilna, the restoration of diplomatic relations, the opening of the frontier for rail and postal traffic and the facilitating of trade, even extending to the floating of Polish timber down the Niemen River.

In October and November 1938 Poland seized or forced a weakened Czechoslovakia to cede, without international agreement, the Czech province of Teschen and three areas of Slovak territory, including the winter sports resort of Javorina. By 1939 an unstable Poland, ruled by an aggressive military clique, was to collide with a resurgent Germany which had already taken over the Sudetenland, Austria, Bohemia and Moravia.

From late 1938, and particularly following the British “guarantee” to Poland in March 1939, the screw on the German minority was tightened ever further. Whilst the difficulties of the German minority increased, tensions were also rising in Danzig, a city long coveted by Poland, but as late as 25 March 1939 Hitler had a Directive issued to Brauchitsch, German commander-in-chief, stating:

“The Führer does not wish to solve the Danzig question by force, He does not wish to drive Poland into the arms of Britain by this.”

When British Prime Minister Chamberlain proclaimed, on behalf of Britain and France, his famous guarantee to Poland on 31 March, however, the situation deteriorated dramatically. As the prospect of meaningful negotiation receded, the Germans abrogated the German-Polish Treaty of Non-Aggression and drew up plans to resolve matters by force; and Britain and France engaged in lengthy supposedly unsuccessful negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the position of the German minority in Poland became critical, with leaders of their communities in agreement that most remaining Germans would have to leave. In August 1939 there were already 70,000 German refugees from Poland housed in holding camps along the border. The Nazi-Soviet Pact and, two days later, the Anglo-Polish Treaty in
August 1939 completed the jigsaw of the twenty-year truce and set the stage for the coming war and the Gleiwitz incident.

**The Naujocks affidavit**

For an event that is so important as well as notorious and, apparently, incontrovertible as the Gleiwitz incident, there seems to be surprisingly little hard evidence. As the *Wikipedia* entry states, much of what is known about the raid comes from the sworn affidavit, in Allied captivity, of SS Major Alfred Naujocks, who commanded the group of SS men allegedly taking part in it.⁷

Naujocks was a member of the SD, the domestic and foreign security arm of the SS. His most notable action in World War II was probably the capture of two British agents at Venlo in Holland in November 1939, whilst they were conspiring, with the help of the Dutch secret service, to overthrow the German government. He deserted to American forces on 19 October 1944 and was interrogated by the British secret service in Camp 020 at Latchmere House, Surrey. Subsequently he “escaped” and was never taken into custody again.

In his affidavit, Naujocks relates how, “on or about 10 August 1939,” SD Chief Reinhard Heydrich personally ordered him “to simulate an attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz, near the Polish border, and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles.” He was directed to go to Gleiwitz with “five or six” SD men and wait to receive a code word indicating that the attack should go ahead. During the raid a Polish-speaking German would make a provocative broadcast inciting Poles to attack Germans.

Naujocks says that he waited in Gleiwitz but, between 25 and 31 August, he went to see Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo, at nearby Oppeln. In his presence Müller and Dr Mehlhorn of the SS discussed plans for another border incident, at the scene of which 12 or 13 condemned criminals dressed in Polish uniforms would be left dead to show they had been killed while attacking. After the attack the press and other persons were to be taken to the scene but Naujocks does not state where. At this time Müller said that he would make one of the criminals available for the Gleiwitz action. The code name for these criminals was “Konserven”, meaning “Canned Goods.” As regards Gleiwitz Naujocks states:
“At noon on the 31st of August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack, report to Müller for "Canned Goods."’ I did this and gave Müller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive, but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds, but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.”

Naujocks and his men then seized the radio station, broadcast for three to four minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots and left. The full version of Naujocks’s affidavit appears in Appendix II. The affidavit does not say how the raiders were dressed, but states that the victim “was in civilian clothes.”

Wikipedia asserts that the attackers were dressed in Polish Army uniforms and that the victim was “dressed to look like a saboteur.” The Wikipedia article is worth noting, as it is very similar to many other accounts on the internet, though no one seems to have offered any enlightenment as to how to dress someone to look like a saboteur. It may be thought, however, that saboteurs would try to blend into their surroundings and look as much like other people as possible.

Interestingly, the leading British historian Michael Burleigh reveals that the SS men attacking the radio station were “sporting Polish-style moustaches and sideburns.” This would seem to provide promising material for the Monty Python’s Flying Circus show.

Nevertheless, the question arises as to why, according to Wikipedia, the victim at Gleiwitz just happened to be the only “raider” not dressed in a Polish uniform.

“The man who started the war”

Naujocks’s story is elaborated in The Man Who Started the War, which chronicles his wartime activities in some detail. In his Foreword to the book, Naujocks says that he spent two years telling his story to the author, journalist Gunther Peis.

Despite this, the book includes at least three very significant variations to Naujocks’s Nuremberg affidavit, which so many historians and other
writers seem to rely on. In particular, the book states (twice) that the victim left at the radio station was, or would be, dressed in a Polish uniform, whereas the affidavit states that he was in civilian clothes. Again, the book says (three times) that the raid took place at 7.30 pm, not 8.00 pm as stated in the affidavit and, indeed, in most other accounts that mention a time. Peis also writes that Heydrich told Naujocks about the raid on 5 August 1939 but, in his affidavit, Naujocks said he received his orders for the raid from Heydrich “on or about 10 August.” Also, unlike Naujocks’s affidavit, Peis makes it clear that the raiders dressed in Polish uniforms. Nevertheless, Naujocks says that he read the manuscript and the book “is his story.”

There is no explanation for the differences, even though Peis says he interviewed many ex-SS and SD men, examined thousands of official and unofficial documents and cross-checked Naujocks’s story with other versions of incidents. [It should be said, however, that the book deals with many other incidents besides the Gleiwitz raid.]

It is difficult to see any reason for these variations. The Peis version of events does not appear to show Naujocks in any better light. Nor does any interference from the authorities or publishers seem likely as the Naujocks affidavit would still be considered a crucial document by later writers. Perhaps, at the last minute, Peis realised that it just didn’t make sense for the victim alone not to be in Polish uniform, but that would not explain the other differences.

Another possible explanation is that the discrepancies were deliberate

Is Naujocks’s affidavit genuine?

The “original transcript” held in US archives is a typewritten document, in German signed by Naujocks and attested by Lt John B Martin, USNR. An examination of a copy of this transcript, and of another signed by Naujocks at the same time, reveals some obvious grammatical oddities and inconsistencies. The typewriter itself appears to be American or British, as it did not seem to have any umlaut characters that are essential in the German language. Presumably, the documents were typed in Germany, but another puzzling feature is that, although the Gleiwitz affidavit is dated 20 November 1945, its attestation by Lt Martin, under the signature of Naujocks, reads,

“Subscribed and sworn to before me at NURNBERG/Germany this 19th day of November 1945.”

Naujocks’s signature may well be genuine but it is possible, of course, that he would have signed anything put before him in his circumstances at that time.
mistakes by Naujocks, either out of sheer cussedness or devilment, or as subtle hints for future researchers to delve deeper into the affair.

**Canaris and Keitel**

Frequently cited as evidence for the “Nazi plot” are comments about the procurement of Polish uniforms attributed to Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr, the military intelligence service of the German High Command (OKW). Canaris was an anti-Nazi, who surrounded himself with other anti-Nazis; and both Canaris and his chief aide, General Oster, participated in plots against Hitler and probably provided information to their country’s foes. Eventually, they were both executed for treason.\(^{13}\)

Canaris apparently discussed with Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of the OKW, an order from Hitler to procure, for the SS, some Polish uniforms for “Operation Himmler.” A note of the discussion appears in an extract, dated 17 August 1939, that conveniently survived from Canaris’s “missing diaries.” It reads:

“I report to Keitel my conversation with Jost. Keitel says he cannot concern himself with the operation as the Fuhrer has not informed him of it and has only told him to procure Polish uniforms for Heydrich. He agrees I was right to inform the General Staff. He says that he does not think much of such operations, but there is nothing else for it, if the Fuhrer orders them. It is not up to me, he says, to ask the Fuhrer how he imagines such an operation is to be carried out.”\(^{14}\)

However, there is no mention of Gleiwitz, or even border raids, in the extract; and Keitel, being a stickler for tradition, may well have been declaiming “false flag” operations generally. He did not appear to have any prior knowledge of the Gleiwitz incident. At his trial before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Keitel agreed that Canaris had raised with him the question of the Polish uniforms without disclosing the purpose for which they were required; and he testified:

“This incident, this action came to my knowledge for the first time here through the testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was charged to carry out such things and I knew nothing of the raid on the radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard the testimonies given here before the Tribunal. Neither do I recall having heard at that time that such an incident had occurred.”\(^{15}\)
In any event, he clearly did not consider the matter important enough to mention in his own post-war Memoirs though he does make references to Canaris’s treachery.\textsuperscript{16}

One recent biographer states that apparently Canaris himself did not discover the purpose for which the Polish uniforms were required.\textsuperscript{17} This did not seem to stop him, however, from telling his subordinates what they were for. One of his heads of section, another anti-Nazi, Colonel Lahousen, testified at Nuremberg that his division of the Abwehr was given the task of procuring the uniforms, together with Polish identification cards and other items, in mid-August 1939, after Canaris had received the order from Wehrmacht Operations staff. When asked about the use of the uniforms and other equipment, Lahousen answered:

“The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the undertaking was sufficient guarantee for that.” \textsuperscript{18}

Lahousen and his fellow anti-Nazis in the Abwehr could be expected to have a negative view of SS operations as, apart from political differences, there was undoubtedly professional rivalry between the Abwehr and the SD in the intelligence field. When Lahousen was asked if he subsequently found out from Canaris what in fact happened, he said:

“The actual course of events was the following: When the first Wehrmacht communiqué spoke of the attack of Polish units on German territory, Pieckenbrock [another senior anti-Nazi in the Abwehr], holding the communiqué in his hand, and reading it aloud, observed that now we knew why the uniforms had been needed. On the same day or a few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed us that people from concentration camps had been disguised in these uniforms and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was mentioned. Although we were extremely interested particularly General Oster, to know the details of this action that is, where it had occurred and what actually happened – actually we could well imagine it, but we did not know how it was carried out – I cannot even today say exactly what happened.” \textsuperscript{18}

Thus, it would appear from Lahousen’s testimony that the Canaris allegation varied significantly from the account given in Naujock’s
affidavit. In particular, Naujocks states that he and other SD men carried out the attack, whereas Lahousen testifies that Canaris said “people from concentration camps,” carried it out. At least one of these versions must be wrong.

In light of this, it is puzzling, to say the least, that Sir Alan Bullock, should assert that “Naujocks’s story is confirmed” by Lahousen.\textsuperscript{19} Bullock, the author of the best-selling book \textit{Hitler, a Study in Tyranny}, was knighted for his services to history.

\textbf{Schellenberg}

Naujocks and Canaris are commonly used as evidence for the “Nazi plot” version of the Gleiwitz raid, but occasionally \textit{The Schellenberg Memoirs} are cited. Walter Schellenberg was a leading member of the SS, serving as Himmler’s personal aide from 1939 to 1942 and ending the war as chief of the SD. He had been involved with Naujocks in the seizure of British agents at Venlo in 1939. After the war, like Naujocks, he cooperated with the Allies, testifying against his former comrades, no doubt escaping the hangman’s noose in doing so. Nevertheless, he was put on trial and sentenced to six years imprisonment in 1949 but released due to ill health after two years. During his time in prison and on release he wrote voluminous memoirs that were edited and published in Germany after his death.

In his memoirs, Schellenberg recalls a visit from his friend Dr Mehlhorn on 26 August 1939. This was the same Mehlhorn mentioned in Naujocks’s affidavit. Mehlhorn told Schellenberg, with some trepidation, that Heydrich had put him in command of the attack on Gleiwitz, which would be carried out by “convicts from the concentration camps” dressed in Polish uniforms. The inmates were to be promised their freedom if they survived the attack. He wanted to get out of it and Schellenberg encouraged him to do so by making up some excuse or simply refusing. Mehlhorn did just that and Heydrich accepted his excuse or refusal and assigned him to other tasks.\textsuperscript{20} It will be noted that Schellenberg is supporting Lahousen’s testimony of Canaris saying that the raid was carried out by concentration camp inmates in Polish uniforms.

Schellenberg’s account raises a number of troubling points. For earlier in his memoirs he discloses that Mehlhorn, who had been a leading light in the administration of the SS, had been disgraced and dismissed after
being brought before a “Court of Honour” by Heydrich in 1937. It seems odd that Heydrich would have entrusted him with a task as important and secretive as the alleged Gleiwitz raid. Even odder that Heydrich would have let him walk away from the task at the last minute unless, of course, Heydrich was much more sensitive and understanding than he is usually portrayed.

Mehlhorn, who apparently provided some details of the incident to the German magazine Stern in 1952, was another leading SS man to escape Allied justice, despite his alleged role in the elimination of the Jewish ghetto of Lodz in 1944. Naujocks, of course, says that he was ordered to arrange the raid on Gleiwitz “on or about 10 August 1939,” some two weeks before Mehlhorn spoke to Schellenberg about it. Further, there seems to be nothing in either Naujocks’s affidavit or The Man Who Started the War to indicate that Mehlhorn was, at any time, in charge of the project. On the contrary, all the indications are that Naujocks took his instructions from Heydrich direct.

Sir Alan Bullock, in his introduction to The Schellenberg Memoirs, writes that, after release, Schellenberg was “deeply worried about finding the money to meet his expenses.” It follows then that he would be keen to get his memoirs published and would be inclined to ingratiate himself with potential publishers and the authorities in a country where Press freedom was, and still is in relation to the Hitler era, severely restricted.

Indeed, there have been doubts about the authenticity of the memoirs. This point seems to have been carefully considered by Bullock who, again in his introduction, says that he believes Schellenberg wrote the original draft and that the translation was made from it. However, he warns:

“It is not a translation of the complete manuscript, for length alone has made some abridgement necessary and other omissions and additions may well have been made since the original left Schellenberg’s hands in 1952.”

And he adds:

“Nor would it be wise to accept Schellenberg as a trustworthy witness where his evidence cannot be corroborated.”

Schellenberg died in 1952, at the surprisingly young age of 42, before the publication of his memoirs.
Speiss and Lichtenstein

Despite the notoriety of the raid, neither the Allied Occupation government nor the German authorities they later installed seemed particularly intent on pursuing the matter, or in recapturing Naujocks after he “escaped.” Eventually, however, it seems that prosecutors in Hamburg in 1963, and Dusseldorf in 1966, made an apparent effort to bring the murderers of the “canned goods” to trial. They are said to have traced and taken statements from “as many surviving participants and witnesses as could be found,” but “the culprits for the murders could not be identified.” Nevertheless, the inquiry is supposed to have added “much new information,” which was the basis of a book co-authored by the Dusseldorf prosecutor, Alfred Speiss,\(^{25}\)

The book, which was not published until 1979, is entitled *Das Unternehmen Tannenberg* (which translates as *Operation Tannenberg*) and is sometimes mentioned as a source in accounts of the raid.

It seems odd that “the culprits could not be identified,” especially in light of *The Man Who Started the War*, which was published in 1960 and reviewed by *The Times* (London) on 5 January 1961, not to mention the Nuremberg proceedings and the film *Der Fall Gleiwitz* produced by the state film company in communist East Germany in 1961, with the full cooperation of the communist authorities in Poland.

Of course, if the “surviving participants and witnesses” were still living in the area or, indeed, anywhere in Polish or East German territory,
they could, presumably, have come under the surveillance, not to men-
tion intimidation, of the communist state police forces. It could be that
the “participants and witnesses.” were actually provided by state propa-
gandists. Their soviet masters were, after all, the manufacturers of the
Katyn lie – covering up their massacre of thousands of Polish officers by
blaming the Germans. What is surprising, perhaps, is that the commu-
nist authorities were unable to find any credible fall guys for a show trial.

The victim or victims

In his affidavit, Naujocks mentions only one victim, who was delivered
to him unconscious though still alive, but he does not say whom this man
was. The Churchill biographer Martin Gilbert relates that the man was
the first victim of the war, an “unknown prisoner in one of Adolf Hitler’s
concentration camps, most probably a common criminal.” According to
Gilbert,

“.... he had been dressed in a Polish uniform, taken to the German frontier
town of Gleiwitz and shot on the evening of 31 August 1939 by the
Gestapo in a bizarre faked ‘Polish attack’ on the local radio station.”

Naujocks, of course, in his much-quoted affidavit, stated that the victim
was in civilian clothes; in Wikipedia’s words, “dressed to look like a
saboteur.”

The “unknown prisoner” is identified by the Gliwice [Gleiwitz] Museum as Franciszek Honiok, “a Polish Silesian ....brought here by a
Gestapo group as a ‘tin can’.” Wikipedia says that Honiok was a
Silesian German, known to be sympathetic to Poland, who was arrested
on the previous day. Professor Donald Watt gives further information
about Honiok, revealing that he had fought on the Polish side during the
mini civil war in Silesia in 1921. There is no mention in these accounts
of Honiok being a “common criminal” or concentration camp inmate.

Watt also states that “Two other corpses were in fact found at Gleiwitz.”
They were “never identified” but Watt says that they seem to have come
from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Richard Evans, who was
principal expert witness in the famous Irving/Lipstadt libel trial 2000,
also states that, besides Honiok, two corpses of Sachsenhausen inmates
were dumped at the radio station to be photographed by the German
media.
In 1989, however, *Time* magazine stated that only one victim was left at the radio station and that he came from Oranienburg concentration camp, as did twelve other inmates who were poisoned and shot and dumped near Hochlinde [presumably Hochlinden – scene of one of the related incidents in “Operation Himmler”].

The *Encyclopedia of the Third Reich* also mentions that the victim at Gleiwitz was a criminal from a concentration camp, stating that after the raid Naujocks “and his commandos” fled,

“... leaving the blood-soaked body (in civilian clothes) of the unfortunate concentration camp inmate shot by them at the site of the raid.”

More confusion is added by the *Penguin History of the Second World War*, which mentions the death of a policeman:

“Germany invaded Poland on 1 September. As a prelude a small SS party entered the German radio station at Gleiwitz and announced in poor Polish that it had been seized by Poles. This futile episode, in the course of which a German policeman who had not been privy to the escapade was killed, was Germany’s attempt to give some colour of justification to the attack which began the Second World War.”

Many accounts do not say how many people were killed in the Gleiwitz raid, but at least two accounts state that there were as many as 12 victims [see Appendix I].

**The raiders**

Thomas J Dodd, one of the chief US prosecutors at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, although presumably aware of Naujocks’s testimony, referred to

“…. the simulated Polish attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz, where concentration camp prisoners were dressed in Polish uniforms, murdered, and left as evidence of a Polish raid, so as to afford Hitler a justification for the attack on Poland.”

These assertions, clearly at odds with Naujocks’s affidavit, were made while summarising evidence against alleged criminal German organisations towards the end of the trial.

*The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II* has a similar version, stating that the radio station was “attacked by a dozen men in Polish
uniforms, all of whom were shot dead,” adding that the dead men were, in fact,

“German concentration camp prisoners, acting under duress by the SS on orders from the summit.”  

These accounts support Canaris’s reported allegation that the raiders were concentration camp inmates dressed in Polish uniforms - as do two separate articles in one popular work, Purnell’s History of the 20th Century, though, unfortunately, the two contributors seem to disagree about how the inmates died. In Volume 4 M. R. D. Foot writes:

“.... an attack by men in Polish uniform on the wireless station at Gleiwitz, some miles inside the German frontier – was carried out by German concentration camp prisoners, all subsequently shot by their warders in the Waffen-SS, as the SS field divisions were collectively known.”

However, in Volume 5, John Man, in an article on the main Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, states:

“For the first time the world learned of the ruse to “justify” Hitler’s invasion of Poland: a dozen condemned criminals dressed in Polish uniforms were given fatal injections and left dead at the German Gleiwitz radio station as ‘proof’ of Polish aggression.”

A contrary account appears in The Oxford Companion to World War II, published by the prestigious Oxford University Press in England. According to this account, Naujocks stormed the radio station with eight men, “all dressed in the uniform of the Polish regular army.” It adds that, before they left, “as evidence of Polish brutality against the civilian population,” they killed a concentration camp inmate they had specially brought with them for this purpose.

In a further variation, the website of Gliwice Museum states that the raid was carried out “by a couple of armed members of the SS-troops in civil clothes...” [author’s italics].

Wikipedia relates that the raiders were “a small group of German operatives.”

The radio station staff

Difficulties in trying to understand what happened at Gleiwitz are not at all helped by the assertion of Richard Evans that the staff of the radio
station were replaced “by another detachment from the SS.” This seems to be very significant, but why don’t other historians mention it? In fact most accounts say or seem to imply that the station was taken by force, which would surely not be necessary if the station had already been taken over by SS men. Peis’s book describes some physical violence employed. When the first employee was encountered at the station:

“He [Naujocks] didn’t have time to shout before Heinrich was on him. Alfred noticed he was rather brutal with him, banging his head twice against the wall; it was effective.”

Some accounts actually name staff of the station on duty at the time. Dennis Whitehead mentions the chief telegraphist called Nawroth, Kotz the machinist and a night watchman, Foitzik, who is said to have been knocked unconscious and nearly killed. Foitzik, however, is described as an engineer by Leo Kessler.

A tangled web?

Thus, a number of questions soon arise from this modest survey of differing accounts by a puzzled amateur without the resources available to professional historians and major publishers. Was there just one victim, or three, or 12? Was he or were they dressed in Polish uniforms or civilian clothes (or, perhaps, dressed to look like saboteurs, or disguised with Polish moustaches)? Or was the victim, or one of the victims, a

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**Poland’s Strong Man**

Marshal Smigly-Rydz, Generalissimo of the Polish armed forces and a key man in Poland’s ruling junta. *The Times* (London) 7 August 1939, reported that Smigly-Rydz had declared, to a rally of cheering Polish Legionaries, that ‘Danzig was Polish and would remain Polish.’ Next day, however, the same paper claimed that the sentiment was expressed not by the Marshal but shouted by listening Legionaries ‘in a moment of exhilaration.’
policeman who was not told about the attack? Did SS men or concentration camp inmates carry out the attack? Were there a “couple,” five or six attackers, or nine, or twelve? Was the sole victim (if that scenario is correct) a criminal or not? Was the victim or were the victims killed by fatal injections or shot dead? Was the raid part of “Operation Himmler”, or “Operation Tannenberg?” Were the staff of the radio station replaced by SS men?

In view of all the variations in the accounts, even on the most basic issue as to whether the raiders were SS men or concentration camps inmates, clearly something is completely wrong in at least some of the stories about the Gleiwitz raid. Further study of the affair gives rise to even more questions.

Related incidents

A number of border incidents occurred on the night of 31 August/1 September 1939. Wikipedia refers to 21 incidents on that night and blames them all on the Germans. The most serious – and the one always mentioned – is the Gleiwitz raid. Two other incidents – at Pitschen and Hochlinden - are sometimes mentioned, though usually given less emphasis.

As regards the incident at Pitschen, where a forestry station was attacked, Professor Watt relates that “no bodies were left or readied.”42 This apparent omission to utilise the “canned goods” occurred, according to another account, because the location was “so remote,” though it also mentions that the forestry station was “just three kilometres” from the town and a caption to an accompanying illustration states that the site was “only a short drive” from Pitschen.43

According to Watt, at a place called Hohnlinden (presumably referring to Hochlinden), SS men dressed in Polish uniforms demolished an unoccupied customs house and its contents. They were then arrested by other SS men playing the part of frontier guards and were driven through Hochlinden in “open trucks.” Six concentration camp inmates were shot nearby and their corpses photographed as evidence of another Polish atrocity; but, after the photography, the victims’ faces were systematically beaten to make them unrecognisable and the disfigured corpses buried in a nearby forest.44 Whitehead reveals that the ‘Polish prisoners’ were not seen by any of the local villagers.45 This may be because the attack
took place in the early hours of the morning.

The question arises, of course, as to the point in making the faces of the victims unrecognisable after they had been photographed. Why did the Germans photograph them, presumably for propaganda purposes, if they didn’t want anyone to know who they were?

It is said that the bodies of the alleged victims were later exhumed, following a complaint by the local mayor, and reburied elsewhere. Despite this local concern, however, no one recorded where the bodies were reburied and the location has now been lost!46

Another interesting point is that the Hochlinden attack is said to have began at 4 a.m. on the morning of 1 September, just 45 minutes before the German invasion of Poland.46 It may be thought that this incident would have been staged much earlier if it had been meant to provide a pretext for war!

How did Naujocks get away with it?

The key evidence of German responsibility for the Gleiwitz raid still seems to be the affidavit of Naujocks presented to the Nuremberg Trial of major war criminals. Naujocks’s admission of his leading role in the affair surely constituted a serious criminal act. But why wasn’t he prosecuted for it? At the very least, he was an accessory to murder. Further, reading between the lines of his famous affidavit, it seems to follow that the victim must have been killed or finished off by Naujocks, or on his orders, before the raiders left the scene. Surely Naujocks would not have left him alive! He testified that he saw the victim alive at the scene, but does not relate how he died.

Also, Naujocks is alleged to have been involved in other murderous enterprises during the war. According to an entry in Wikipedia, he became an economic administrator in Belgium, where he was involved in the deaths of “several Belgian Underground members”; and in 1944 he participated in “sabotage and terrorist actions against the Danish population,” including the alleged murder of the priest Kaj Munk.47

So, how did he get away with it? He was imprisoned for some time by the Americans and British but is reported to have “escaped” in 1946. Yet, he assumed a career, apparently quite openly, as a businessman in Hamburg and sold his story to the press as “the man who started World War II.”48 In his later years, he is said to have worn a black patch and
told people that he was the “German James Bond.” According to Peis, during his interrogation by the British he was told that Danes, Poles, Czechs, French, Dutch and Russians all wanted to talk to him and that, if he couldn’t help the British, he would have to be passed on to one of his other enemies. At one time five countries were planning to bring capital charges against him. According to one account, he was convicted in Denmark but never served a sentence.

It is not a question of alleged Nazi war criminals being let off the hook. Even in 2008 it was reported that they were still being hunted all over the world and the German government’s Central Office for the investigation of Nazi crimes was currently pursuing 20 to 40 geriatric alleged offenders. Naujocks, however, appeared to go about his business unhindered until his death, despite his notoriety.

There is also a question about when Naujocks died. At the time of writing, the Wikipedia article on Naujocks gives his date of death as 4 April 1966. Some websites say he is alleged to have died in 1960, and mention that other sources state 1966 or 1968 as the year of his demise. If he did die in 1966 he would only have been 54 years old, which may seem somewhat surprising as Peis stated that he “wears his years wirily and well.”

After The Battle magazine also states that Naujocks died on 4 April 1966, placing him in Hamburg and mentioning that he had been living there under his own name since 1962. Subsequently, however, the Daily Telegraph asserted that Naujocks died in 1960.

It seems unlikely that he died in 1960, as it is said that an interview with Naujocks about the raid appeared in the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel on 13 November 1963. More significantly, the Hamburger Abendblatt reported, on 12 February 1966, an announcement by Czech judicial authorities that they were going to request the German public prosecution authorities to prosecute Naujocks for murdering a German emigrant, Rudolf Formis, near Prague in 1935. The article said that Naujocks was "living in Hamburg" at the time, so presumably the Czech authorities believed that he was still alive then. A few weeks later, of course, if some assertions are correct, he would definitely be dead.

It is not known what action was taken on the Czech request, but questions arise as to whether it was compatible with any immunity from prosecution that may have been guaranteed by the Americans and/or
British after the war; and whether the Czech authorities would have been aware of any such immunity before they made the request?

In any event, it does seem odd that there should be any doubt at all about when such a notorious character, apparently living quite openly, died.

The delayed invasion

Another problem with the Gleiwitz “Nazi plot” story is that the German invasion of Poland was delayed. There seems no doubt that the invasion was originally planned to start at dawn on 26 August 1939. Exactly why the invasion was called off may not be clear but, at 6.00 pm on 25 August, Hitler was told by the Italian Ambassador, Attolico, that Italy was not ready for war; and on the same day news came of the signing of the Anglo-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Hitler summoned Keitel and told him, “Stop everything at once, fetch Brauschitsch [the commander-in-chief] immediately. I need time for negotiations.” The new orders went out shortly after 7.00 pm.\textsuperscript{55} Professor Watt says that the recall orders went out at 7.30 pm.\textsuperscript{56}

It will be recalled that, in his affidavit, Naujocks stated that he received the code word for the Gleiwitz operation at noon on 31 August, for the attack to take place at 8.00 pm that evening. The invasion of Poland had been re-set to start at dawn on the next day, the same time of day set for the aborted invasion on 26 August. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that Naujocks would have been given the same amount of time to prepare his attack on 25 August as he was on 31 August. Yet Naujocks makes no mention at all of receiving the code word or instructions to attack on 25 August, let alone being given eight hours to prepare the attack on that day. Nor is there any reference to this in Peis’s account. If the attack on 26 August had not been called off, presumably Naujocks would have received the same, or very similar, instructions on that day that he received on 31 August. In other words, Naujocks would have received the code word six hours before Hitler met Attolico and seven and a half hours before Hitler stayed the attack. The Gleiwitz operation would surely have been underway when the decision to stop the invasion was made.

Peis states that Naujocks and his men spent two days in Gleiwitz from 10 August, to familiarise themselves with the scene, and that they re-
turned to Gleiwitz on 28 August.\textsuperscript{57} Nothing is said about them being at Gleiwitz between these times.

Likewise, other accounts generally make no reference to the postponement, but Whitehead remarks that “\textit{Naujocks and his men at Gleiwitz had not even left their hotel}” when their action was cancelled on 25 August.\textsuperscript{58} This would seem to be cutting it very fine if Hitler came to his decision at 7.30 p.m., even if Naujocks had been the first man informed, especially so if Peis is right in saying that, on the actual raid, Naujocks and his men went first to a wood outside Gleiwitz to change into their Polish uniforms before the assault on the radio station.\textsuperscript{59} It would have been impossible, of course, if Peis was right in stating that the raid was timed for 7.30 pm, unless the timing was changed after 25 August.

Further, it seems that the invasion was postponed a second time in a last minute bid for peace. Keitel testified at Nuremberg that he visited Hitler on 30 August and learned the attack was postponed yet again, this time for just 24 hours, to 1 September, as Hitler was expecting a Polish government negotiator to arrive. No reference has been found in any of the accounts about the effects of this postponement on the raid.\textsuperscript{15}

Also, presumably, the purported Gleiwitz victim, Honiok, would surely have been arrested on 24 or 29 August in time for the earlier planned invasions, instead of 30 August, but there seems to be no suggestion anywhere that he was.

### Changing the guard

It is interesting to note changes to the security arrangements at the radio station. Whitehead relates that, since 20 August, the German postal authorities had a detail of 13 men guarding the station; on 28 August this was replaced by seven men from the Gleiwitz Schutzpolizei (the ordinary police). On 31 August, the Schutzpolizei commander was instructed to withdraw his men; they were replaced by four members of the Sicherheitspolizei (security police) at 4 pm who kept mostly to the guardroom. One of these security policemen was in the radio station when the raid took place but did not resist and was handcuffed and taken down to the cellar with the other staff.\textsuperscript{60} Peter Wilson, European correspondent of \textit{The Australian}, reported in 2009 that, at 6.00 pm on 31 August, the Berlin office of Heinrich Himmler, \textit{“the overseer of the Gestapo and police forces,”} called the police station in Gleiwitz and ordered it to reduce the
security at the radio station. The number of guards was then reduced from six to two, according to the current director of the radio station’s museum.⁶¹ [No explanation has been found for the apparent discrepancy between the director’s statement of six guards at 6.00 pm as against four in the other account.]

As Gleiwitz was near the border some additional security measures might be expected at a time of rising tensions, but here we seem to have (apart from the minor discrepancy mentioned above) the progressive reduction of guards at the radio station. If correct, this could be taken to mean that security was deliberately slackened to make the raid easier, but it could be argued that fewer guards could be spared at the radio as tensions worsened.

More to the point, perhaps, is that there does not seem to be any mention anywhere about the guard being reduced in time for the original raid supposedly planned for 25 August.

**The problem of German news reports**

A significant feature of the alleged false flag attack in many accounts is the use of Polish uniforms, though some accounts say the raiders wore civilian clothes. The use of uniforms would incriminate the Polish state directly, assuming the ruse worked. It is troublesome, therefore, to see that the report issued by the German News Agency, within hours on the night of the raid, makes no mention of the attackers wearing Polish uniforms. The report, which quotes a message received from Breslau, simply refers to a Polish attack and Poles.⁶² On the assumption, which seems to be generally accepted, that the Nazis controlled all news media, it seems distinctly odd that, on such an important story as this, an apparently vital element of propaganda should be omitted.

It seems even more incredible that the Nazi Party’s official daily paper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, on the following day, should also publish the story without mentioning the Polish uniforms. Its story headed: “Raiders attack Radio Gleiwitz,” reported:

“A troop of Polish insurgents rushed last night, shortly before eight o’clock, the building of Gleiwitz Radio. At that time there was only the usual skeleton staff on duty; it is obvious that the Polish hoodlums must have had an exceptional knowledge of the lay-out of the place.”
The report then goes on to describe the occupation of the station, the attack on the staff and the provocative broadcast. It ends by saying that, when police arrived,

"The rebels opened fire against them, but after a few minutes were all taken prisoner. During the struggle, one Pole was killed."

So this is the top Nazi propaganda organ referring to "Polish insurgents," "Polish hoodlums," and "rebels," but nowhere is there mention of Polish uniforms. Could this version of the affair possibly be correct?

**Silence during the war**

Reports of the Gleiwitz raid appeared in the world’s press on 1 September, particularly in neutral countries. Nicholas Bethell mentions *The New York Times* report, adding,

"The American reporter was being careful about committing himself, but obviously the manufactured invasion convinced some people."

*The Times* (London), which had published the German News Agency
report, referred to the story again on 2 September, in a report from its Warsaw correspondent: this ended with a short paragraph noting the official Polish denial that Poles had attacked Gleiwitz, Pitschen and Hohenlinden - the German version of the Gleiwitz raid being described as “a tissue of lies” and an excuse for invasion.\(^{65}\)

However, *The Times* seems to have made no further reference to the Gleiwitz raid during the war. As we have seen, John Man wrote that, at the Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal,

“For the first time the world learned of the ruse to ‘justify’ Hitler’s invasion of Poland....”\(^{37}\)

The website of the present day Gliwice Museum also mentions that the “truth” about what it calls the “Gleiwitz provocation” was not discovered until the Nuremberg trial.\(^{28}\) Professor Watt remarks that,

“... no one was very proud of the whole episode. No photographs were published, no articles written for the press. The whole matter was buried, until the Nuremberg trials in 1946 resurrected the matter.”\(^{66}\)

Why would the Allies not be “very proud” of the episode – assuming they were innocent? Indeed, it seems strange that both sides should bury the incident during the war itself. One might have expected the Germans to exploit the matter more vigorously, whether it arose from their own skulduggery or it was a genuine Polish raid. Of course, they would not do so if, assuming they were responsible, it was so badly bungled that their version could not possibly be sustainable - in which case the Allies would surely have been even keener to exploit the issue during the war.

On the other hand, if it had been a Polish provocation, then clearly the Allies would wish to bury it, at least until they were in a position to impose their version of the incident. For, if the Poles were responsible, it would rather undermine the Allied contention that Germany started the war and had been responsible for all the other border provocations. But, why, if that was the case, would the Germans bury the incident if, indeed, they did? Could it be that, after the initial flurry of publicity, the authorities got feedback that the German people were critical of the lack of security and apparent incompetence or complacency that the incident seem to show? Both sides were very sensitive to public opinion, as evidenced by their huge propaganda machines.\(^{67}\)
Ethnic cleansing and fear

If, during the war, the Allies had exploited the Gleiwitz raid as an example of German frightfulness, then the Germans (if innocent) would have been able to invite neutral observers and experts to the area to investigate the Allied accusation for themselves and interview local police and residents who knew, or had heard about, what had happened.

After the war the situation was rather different. Gleiwitz was part of the huge area of Germany (about one-quarter) that the Allies handed over to Poland, which proceeded to expel all Germans from the region, many of the expellees not surviving the ordeal. This was probably the greatest act of ethnic cleansing in all history and Middle Germany became the new East Germany.

The Poles made no bones about what they intended to do in their new lands, the four main political parties issuing a proclamation declaring,

"Today all efforts should be directed towards organising the economic life of the lands retrieved from the Germans. Hands and brains are needed to wipe all German traces from the face of our country."\(^{68}\)

The extent of the "wipe out" of German traces in Gleiwitz is indicated on its museum’s website which, in referring to the town’s famous Steel-works Necropolis, states that "the action of de-germanisation" included the removal or destruction of German grave signs and "the elements of grave decoration."\(^{69}\)

Accordingly, it seems unlikely that, after 1945, there would have been many Germans left in the Gleiwitz area who were genuinely able to recall local knowledge of the raid or what was said about it at the time, or anyone brave enough to contradict the official version of the incident.

Joyce on Gleiwitz

William Joyce (‘Lord Haw Haw’), in his book Twilight over England published by Internationaler Verlag in Berlin in 1940, presumably complying with any censorship requirements, wrote:

"On the night of the 31st, a band of Polish desperadoes actually occupied the German Broadcasting Station at Gleiwitz." \(^{96}\)

It will be noted that not only did he mention Gleiwitz but he referred to ‘Polish desperadoes’ rather than Polish soldiers or uniforms.
Further, judging by the reports from Gleiwitz of the correspondents of the *Daily Telegraph*, London (Bob Graham)\(^\text{53}\) and *The Australian* (Peter Wilson), both published on 29 August 2009,\(^\text{61}\) it seems that even the Poles and Russian occupiers did not want to talk about it.

Both correspondents reported the comments of Pawel Honiok, who is the nephew of the alleged victim of the raid, Franciszek Honiok. Pawel was then 79 years old and lived just an hour’s drive away from Gleiwitz. He is quoted by Wilson as saying:

>“Nobody ever wanted to talk about what happened, it’s always been secret. The Germans were in control of us until 1945, and then the Russians took over and they had no interest in digging up the truth about what had happened back at the start of the war. Even my own family (was) too afraid to talk about it when I was a child and it was more than 25 years before we started to hear anything at all about what happened to him (Franciszek).”\(^\text{61}\)

Almost exactly the same words are quoted by Graham, though he refers to “many, many years,” rather than “more than 25 years.” Graham, however, reports some further remarks of Pawel:

>“No one ever mentioned what had taken place because it was a time to be silent and secret. As time passed nothing really changed - until now. As a young boy, I can remember my family sitting in a room, quietly speaking about what had happened to Franz. But I was not allowed to sit in and listen, this was for the adults, not the younger ones. The only thing I know was it was rumoured his body was buried in the mountains. But there is no memorial. It was as if Poland was ashamed of the way his body was used to start the war. They never even accepted he was a victim of the war because he was killed on the evening of August 31 and, officially, the war did not begin until September 1.”\(^\text{53}\)

Graham also quotes the present director of the radio station, Andrzej Jarczewski, as saying:

>“There are some who remember but have wanted to forget because they believe it brings a stain to the reputation of Poland. But the truth is it is not a moment to forget but to remember and to learn about the real events that started it all.”\(^\text{53}\)
Why should it have been a secret and people afraid to talk about the raid after the war, long after the defeat of Germany, long after the expulsion of the local Germans, long after the dissolution of the Gestapo and SS? What were they afraid of? Why did the Russians have no interest in digging up the truth? How could it possibly be a stain on Poland’s reputation if Poles were not responsible for it? And why is there no memorial for Franciszek Honiok, who was surely a martyr or hero?

### Ethnic cleansing of Gleiwitz

Professor Norman Davies, a leading British historian and authority on European and Polish history, states:

“In one area, in the treatment of Poland’s German minority, the Polish Communist security services must have earned special admiration from their Soviet mentors. Particularly in Silesia, German civilians were being rounded up and maltreated long before the programme of compulsory expulsion approved at Potsdam was organized. Ex-Nazi prisons and camps were filled with innocents. The jail at Glawice and the old Oflag at Lambinowice witnessed thousands upon thousands of deaths. In Wroclaw, the Communist militia preyed on the dwindling German community without mercy. The expulsion itself was marred by rape, robbery, and murder.” [Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Volume II, Oxford University Press 2005, page 416]

### The Polish uniforms

One matter on which there does seem to be general agreement is the requisition of Polish uniforms for the SS. Only one such requisition before the war is mentioned. David Irving revealed, however, that Hitler “piously” insisted on a clear distinction between ‘illegals’ and regular German army units and, when Field Marshall Manstein “asked permission to operate three assault groups in Polish uniforms during Army Group South’s attack” on Poland, Hitler turned him down. He did, however, agree to the use of Polish uniforms by the SS in precisely the same area, and he ordered the Abwehr to release 150 Polish uniforms to Heydrich for this purpose.⁷⁰

Michael Mueller has confirmed this in his biography of Canaris, his source being an entry in Lahousen’s diary for 17 August 1939, which is worth quoting in full. Lahousen, a dedicated anti-Nazi, who testified against his fellow-countrymen at Nuremberg, noted:
“To my question of why the request of General Manstein regarding deployment of three assault battalions with Polish uniforms was refused while in the same area an operation of SS-Reichsführer Himmler will be carried out, he replied that it was at the order of the Führer, who wishes under all circumstances to keep the Wehrmacht distant from all operations having a pronounced illegal character.”

The accounts of both Irving and Mueller conform to the conventional view of German responsibility for the Gleiwitz raid. If, however, the Polish uniforms were to be used in “the same area” as Manstein wanted to use them, presumably for operational rather than propaganda reasons, is it not possible that the SD could also use them for the same or similar purpose? Given Hitler’s supposed opportunism and ruthlessness, it seems odd that he would forgo an operational opportunity, especially if there was a way of carrying it through without besmirching the Wehrmacht’s reputation. The area of offensive operations for Manstein would, presumably, be Poland - not Germany.

**German parachutists**

There is evidence that the Polish uniforms were used for other purposes at the beginning of the war. Just a few days into the war there was a report in *The Times* (London) that a number of German parachutists dropped behind the lines in Polish uniforms had been captured and executed after court martials.

Shortly afterwards, in the same month, the British war magazine, *The War Illustrated*, reported:

![Image of German parachutists captured](image)
“In the early days of the fighting in Poland a number of Nazi parachutists were alleged to be dressed in Polish uniforms in order to facilitate their work of sabotage, and on capture they were treated with the short shrift usually given to saboteurs.”

Who were these parachutists? Presumably, they could not be members of the regular forces, unless Hitler was being deliberately defied. It will be recalled, however, that it was Colonel Jost, head of the SD’s foreign espionage service, who had approached Canaris about the uniforms.

The Germans were not the only people to use enemy uniforms. For example, in his study of the British Commandos, Charles Messenger revealed:

“One small unit raised at the same time in the Middle East [1942] was the Special Interrogation Group. This was made up of Palestinian German linguists who were members of No 51 ME Commando. They, too, were designed to operate behind enemy lines, but wearing German uniforms and being equipped with Afrika Korps vehicles and weapons.”

Clearly Western cinema and TV audiences would not find anything objectionable in such tactics, in light of their enthusiasm for such blockbuster movies as The Dirty Dozen, Where Eagles Dare and The Guns of Navarone, in which the heroes are Allied troops in German uniforms mowing down or blowing up their hapless enemies.

A report in The War Illustrated on 23 September 1939. The caption of the lower picture states: “The photograph shows a company of machine-gunners fully equipped parachuting from a squadron of aeroplanes and ready to go into action immediately they land. In the early days of fighting in Poland a number of these Nazi parachutists were alleged to be dressed in Polish uniforms in order to facilitate their work of sabotage, and on capture they were treated with the short shrift usually given to saboteurs.”
Hitler’s War Speech

“The following morning, a raging Hitler used the incident at Gliwice [Gleiwitz] as his justification for declaring war on Poland. Addressing a cheering Reichstag, he claimed that the violation of German territory by ‘Polish Army hooligans had finally exhausted our patience’.” – Daily Telegraph (London)

Hitler is sometimes accused of using the raid on Gleiwitz and other border incidents as a pretext for attacking Poland. He set out the reasons for the conflict in his speech to the Reichstag on the first day of the war. The full text of his speech appears in Appendix III and readers can form their own judgement.

However, it will be observed that, in this speech, Hitler does not actually mention Gleiwitz or its radio station but, about halfway through the speech, he refers to recent border incidents and, towards the end of it, he reports that “for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our territory.”

Hitler, of course, blames the border incidents on the Poles, saying that there were 14 during the previous night “of which three were quite serious.” But surely he would have used a rather stronger expression than “quite serious” if he was using one or more of the incidents as a pretext for war. He is not renowned for understating his case.

There seems to be no mention of “Polish regular soldiers” in either the German News Agency report on the night of 31 August, or in the Völkischer Beobachter next day. They would surely not have left such an important detail out of their reports, even if they were more independent of the Nazi propaganda machine than is generally assumed. So it seems highly probable that Hitler was not referring, even obliquely, to the Gleiwitz attack when he mentioned “Polish regular soldiers.”

Arguably, Hitler had already put forward his justification for war, whether plausible or not, at the beginning of his speech: Poland’s mobilisation and unwillingness to negotiate; the “increased terror and pressure” against the German minority in the Polish Corridor; and the “slow strangling” of the Free City of Danzig.

Interestingly, The Times (Britain’s most authoritative daily newspaper), on its main news page of 2 September 1939, published a report on Hitler’s speech in which it quoted what were, presumably in its view, the
main points of it. Clearly The Times did not consider the border incidents to be significant enough to include in these extracted quotes. The full text of the speech was printed elsewhere in The Times but the fact remains that Hitler’s references to border raids were not mentioned in its news report. Strangely, it seems that the incidents only became important after the utter defeat of Germany.

Managing The News
A report in the popular British magazine The War Illustrated, 23 September 1939
It will be seen that a series of dots appear in four places to show parts have been omitted. However, there is no indication that the first part of the speech - well over half of the whole - has been left out (though a very small part has been re-inserted, out of place elsewhere). Readers may like to compare this with the full version and decide for themselves whether this was a fair and honest treatment of the subject.
An Allied cover-up?

If the Gleiwitz raid was not a “Nazi plot,” it follows that it must have been a Polish provocation. This view is rarely expressed, even in “revisionist” publications. It was, however, a view that seemed to have been accepted by some people at the time. As already mentioned, Nicholas Bethell, in his detailed account of the German-Polish War, wrote that “obviously the manufactured invasion convinced some people.”

So, was the ‘Nazi plot’ actually an Allied cover-up for a Polish provocation, encouraged by the British and French guarantee and promises of help (which, in the event, was not forthcoming)?

A Polish provocation could hardly come as a surprise to Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary. On the 31st March 1939 the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, on behalf of the British and French governments, announced their guarantee to Poland “in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces.”

Professor Watt states that, on the day before this announcement, the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard, suggested to Halifax that the guarantee to Poland ‘be watered down slightly, lest the Poles be nerved to some rash adventure against Danzig.’ Halifax, however, rejected the advice, expressing the view that the German technique of aggression was “so varied and insidious” that Poland, in self-defence, could well be driven to commit “a technical act of provocation.”

Could the Gleiwitz incident have been conceived as a “technical act of provocation?”

The guarantee immediately led to a deterioration in the international situation, which must have been aggravated by Chamberlain’s announcement, on 10 July, that the guarantee would cover events in Danzig.

The Anglo-Polish Treaty of August 1939, widened the guarantee further, promising support for resistance to any action which clearly threatened, “directly or indirectly,” the independence of Poland; or any attempt to undermine the independence of Poland “by processes of economic penetration or in any other way.”

Did this raise the possibility that the Polish junta could invoke the guarantee as a result of any action by Germany, whether provoked or not, that was claimed to be a threat to, or undermine, Poland’s independence?
A technical problem at the radio station

Some accounts refer to the difficulty faced by the raiders when they tried to broadcast their provocative message. As Professor Watt explains,

“The SS radio expert then tried to make the microphone work. A comedy then ensued. The SS planners responsible for the choice of the Gleiwitz station as a suitable stage for their “incident” had not realised that it was essentially a relay station for Breslau radio. The only independent broadcasting carried out from Gleiwitz was emergency weather reporting.”

Eventually the weather microphone was found and made to work, but the question does arise as who would be more likely to have problems with such technical difficulties – the security services or insurgents.

The fact is that the Breslau station had an international audience, who would have been aware that its broadcasts were relayed through Gleiwitz. As early as 1927 The Times (London), in an article on the best Continental transmissions, mentioned that Gleiwitz relayed Breslau as it transmitted on a stronger part of the wave band.

Further, throughout the 1930s, up to October 1937, The Times (London) regularly published lists, with wavelengths, of Continental
radio stations, which always specified that Breslau radio was relayed by Gleiwitz. It has to be asked, therefore, how likely it was that the German security services did not know what radio enthusiasts in Britain knew.

**Gleiwitz - an old battlegound**

The significance and importance of Gleiwitz to both Germany and Poland is almost never mentioned, despite the tens of thousands of books published about the Nazis and the World War II.

Poles and Germans coveted Gleiwitz but it had been German for two centuries and, in the Silesian plebiscite of 1921, the people of Gleiwitz voted to remain in Germany. In the civil war in Silesia that followed the plebiscite, Polish insurgents besieged Gleiwitz and attempted to starve it into submission.79

In 1930 Gleiwitz was again the centre of dispute between Germany and Poland because its radio station was broadcasting to the German minority in Poland. This led to what has been described as “a fierce counterblast from Polish Stations.” For a time it seemed that an actual conflict might result. This was, of course, long before Hitler came to power. A treaty in which both sides agreed to end contentious broadcasting aimed at the inhabitants of the other country settled the dispute.80

So Gleiwitz would seem to be a possible target for a provocation, with its position near the frontier and history of mutual antagonism; and Honiok, the Polish German national who fought for the Poles in the Silesian civil war, would not be an unsurprising participant for an attack on the radio station.

**Operation Tannenbergr**

In view of the emotional background to Polish-German relations, the appearance and use of the term “Operation Tannenberg” may have some significance. Although the term “Operation Himmler” is usually used, the “Tannenberg” assertion cannot be ignored, particularly as it provided the name for the book co-written by the Herr Speiss, who headed the German investigations in the 1960s. Professor Watt suggests a reason for this name, writing that, if leaked, the codename Tannenberg would misdirect attention to East Prussia.81

Tannenberg, in East Prussia, was the scene of a German victory over the invading Russian army in 1914. It was also the scene of a famous and decisive victory by Poland over the German Teutonic Knights in 1410
and, undoubtably, one of the most important battles in Polish history. As the Gleiwitz raid and other border incidents took place after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and were supposedly planned whilst delicate negotiations for the pact were proceeding, it seems unlikely that the Germans would have used the name “Tannenberg.” It would not be the time for gloating about a victory over their new, if temporary, partner who, if it came out, might well regard it as a gratuitous insult to be reminded of the 1914 defeat. It seems much more likely that the Poles would have evoked their victory in 1410 for an offensive operation or provocation against Germany.

The emotional importance of these old battles should not be underestimated. In November 1938 a Polish postage stamp was issued which depicted King Jagiello of Poland (the victor at Tannenberg) and his Queen with the double sword symbol that represents the battle. This stamp was designed for the Polish Post Offices in Danzig, a stronghold of the Teutonic Knights. In January 1939, presumably as a counter-provocation, the Danzig postal authorities issued stamps commemorating the Teutonic Knights and a victory over the Poles in 1577.

In any event a look at the map would suggest that one of the Germans’ first aims in an invasion would be to link up with East Prussia, closing down the Polish Corridor and shutting Poland off from her only sea port at Gdynia and from Danzig. This is exactly what happened: Kluge’s 4th Army Group closed the Corridor before Britain and France even got round to declaring war. More significantly, perhaps, a third of the Polish army was already in the area at the start of the war, presumably to counter this move, unless it was poised to march on Berlin. The Germans’ priority, if any in this regard, would surely have been to misdirect attention away from East Prussia rather than towards it.

Questions that must be answered

Despite the catalogue of variations found in accounts of the Gleiwitz incident, it may well be, of course, that the Gleiwitz raid was carried out by the Germans. However, if the historical record is to be clarified and scepticism dispelled, some consensus is really needed among historians on the following issues:

Was the raid part of “Operation Himmler” or “Operation Tannenberg”?
Was it concentration camp inmates or SS men who carried out the raid? How many took part in the raid? Were they dressed in Polish uniforms or otherwise disguised as Poles, or not? How many raiders or other victims died? Did they include a policeman? Why wasn’t Naujocks prosecuted for his part in the affair? When did Naujocks die? Did the Czechs request his prosecution in 1966 and, if so, was any action taken? Was Naujocks given the go-ahead for the raid on 25 August 1939 and, if so, why does there not seem to be any mention of it in his affidavit or Peis’s book? If Naujocks was not given the go-ahead on 25 August 1939, why wasn’t he? Why wasn’t Honiok arrested in time for a raid on 25 August 1939? Was Honiok dressed in a Polish uniform and, if not, why not? Why were no bodies left at the Pitschen incident? Why were the alleged victims at Hohnlinden disfigured to make them unrecognisable after they had been photographed, presumably for propaganda purposes? Why did the Allies bury the incident during the war? What was the source of the Polish uniforms used by German parachutists in the first days of the war, and who were these parachutists? Why didn’t the reports of the raid by the German News Agency and Völkischer Beobachter mention Polish uniforms or Polish regular soldiers?

**Historians at odds**

There can be no doubt about one very disturbing aspect of the Gleiwitz affair: the extreme variation in the accounts given by reputable and trusted professional historians. This is disappointing in a way to the history enthusiast, but also stimulating. As a warning that conventional history cannot always be taken as completely correct or indisputable, regardless of how prestigious the author or publisher may be, it may encourage more people to think about history rather than just read about it. It raises the question, of course, as to how many other stories about the Second World War, and other wars, will fall apart if studied in depth by open-minded independent researchers?
Clearly, many, perhaps all, of the published accounts of the Gleiwitz affair are wrong, either in whole or part. How can this happen? Professional historians who have got it wrong are not likely to be deliberately misleading their readers – and there is no reason to suppose that they or anyone else has been doing so. Almost certainly they are writing in good faith in accordance with information they have gleaned from apparently reliable sources. The variations in the stories are so wide, however, that it is difficult not to escape the conclusion that some of these stories, at least, have their origins in unsuspected disinformation. Possible sources for such disinformation would seem to include Naujocks, as well as German, Allied and communist propagandists, and Canaris and some of his anti-Nazi clique. Perhaps all, or at least more than one, have had a hand in creating the confusion that bedevils this episode.

ENDNOTE: The attack on Treuburg

Everyone knows that German forces invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. It is not so well known that Polish forces apparently invaded Germany on the same day. Bethell, in his book on the German-Polish war, reveals:

“On 1 September 1939 the Poles managed to invade and occupy a few points in East Prussia, the Podlaska cavalry advancing to near Jansbork, the Suwalska cavalry into Marggrabowa.”

Marggrabowa, like Gleiwitz, seems to have some emotional significance for both Germany and Poland. The League of Nations plebiscite in the town in 1920 resulted in 28,625 people voting to remain in Germany and only two people voting for Poland. It was a stunning result and it seems likely that even Polish speakers opted for Germany. In recognition of its loyalty, the name of the town was changed in 1928 to Treuburg, which is the German combination of “faithful” and “castle.”

Although the town was well and truly part of Germany it would appear that some Poles, at least, could not accept the new name and were probably not reconciled to the humiliating defeat in the plebiscite. It is significant, perhaps, that Bethell, who gives a Polish source for his information, uses the old name for the town, presumably copying his source in this regard.
Like Gleiwitz, Treuburg might have been a possible target for a provocation. There seems to be no obvious strategic or tactical reason for attacking Treuburg. The town lies in the far east of East Prussia and the main German attack from East Prussia seems to have come from the centre and west of the province.\(^8^4\)

Treburb lay some five miles from the border and it seems possible, indeed likely, that some pre-planning was required. The question arises, therefore, as to whether the attack on Treuburg was planned not as a purposeful military operation, but as a further and more serious provocation that went ahead anyway even though the war had started, perhaps before the attackers were aware of the German invasion.\(^8^5\)

Significantly Bethell, quoting his Polish source, says “the German population panicked easily” during the attack.\(^8^3\) This could indicate that the civilian population may have been deliberately targeted.

One cannot help but wonder whether, if the Germans had delayed their invasion for another day, history books today would be regaling their readers with stories of a “Nazi false flag attack” on Treuburg.

**APPENDIX I**

**SUMMARY OF VARIATIONS**

Some of the variations found by the author during his researches.

**Abbreviations**

ETR = Encyclopedia of the Third Reich  
HEW = Historical Encyclopedia of World War Two  
Oxford = Oxford Encyclopedia of World War II  
Penguin = Penguin History of the Second World War  
Reader’s Digest = The World at Arms: The Reader’s Digest Illustrated History of World War II

**Name of operation**

*Operation Himmler:* Canaris/Lahousen,\(^1^8\) ETR,\(^3^2\) Kessler,\(^8^6\) Peis,\(^8^7\) Roberts,\(^8^8\) Russell,\(^8^9\) Toland,\(^9^0\) Wikipedia.\(^7\)  
*Operation Tannenberg:* Watt,\(^8^1\) Whitehead,\(^9^1\) Speis and Lichtenstein.\(^2^5\)  
*Operation Jam:* Mueller\(^1^7\)
The raiders


German operatives: Wikipedia.7

Concentration camp inmates: Canaris/Lahousen,18 Foot,36 HEW,35 Man,37 Schellenberg.102

Dress of the raiders


Civilian clothes: Evans,30 Gliwice Museum,28 Whitehead,40 Wilson (The Australian).61

“rough civilian clothes”: Kessler.86
“dressed as Poles”: Bethell.64
“disguised as Polish soldiers or guerillas: Toland.90
Masquerading as Polish insurgents: Irving.96
“disguised as Polish auxiliaries and soldiers.”: Mueller.17

Number of raiders

Two: Gliwice Museum.28
Five or six: Russell.89
Six: Time-Life.106
Six or seven: Naujocks.8
Seven: Graham (Daily Telegraph),53 Peis,98 ETR,32 Whitehead,103 Wilson (The Australian).61
Nine: Oxford.38
Twelve: Greenway (Boston Globe),94 HEW,35
“small SS party”: Penguin.33
“Small group”: Wikipedia.7
The victim(s)


Condemned criminals: Bullock, Man, Naujocks, Russell.

“common criminal”: Gilbert.

Jewish camp inmate: Peis.

Local convicts: Davies (The Times).


Honiok and other(s): Burleigh, Evans, Watt, Whitehead.

German policeman: Penguin.

Dress of victim(s)

Polish uniforms: Bullock, Canaris/Lahousen, Chronicle, Dodd, Graham (Daily Telegraph), Dodd, Foot, Gilbert, HEW, Man, Peis, Reader’s Digest, Roberts, Schellenberg.

Civilian clothes: ETR, Naujocks, Shirer, Whitehead.

“dressed as Poles”: Bethell.

“dressed to look like a saboteur”: Wikipedia.

Number of victims


Two: Burleigh, Whitehead.

Three: Evans, Watt.

Twelve: HEW, Man.

“a squad”: Bethell.

More than one: Canaris/Lahousen, Davies (The Times), Dodd, Foot, Greenway (Boston Globe), Kessler, Reader’s Digest, Schellenberg, Toland.
APPENDIX II

Affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks dated 20 November 1945, presented as evidence to the Nuremberg Major War Crimes Tribunal on 20 December 1945

“I, Alfred Helmut Naujocks, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

1. I was a member of the SS from 1931 to 19 October 1944 and a member of the SD from its creation in 1934 to January 1941. I served as a member of the Waffen-SS from February 1941 until the middle of 1942. Later I served in the Economics Department of the Military Administration of Belgium from September 1942 to September 1944. I surrendered to the Allies on 19 October 1944.

2. On or about 10 August 1939 the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack on the radio station near Gleiwitz, near the Polish border, and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles. Heydrich said: “Actual proof of these attacks of the Poles is needed for the foreign press, as well as for German propaganda purposes.” I was directed to go to Gleiwitz with five or six SD men and wait there until I received a code word from Heydrich indicating that the attack should take place. My instructions were to seize the radio station and to hold it long enough to permit a Polish-speaking German, who would be put at my disposal, to broadcast a speech in Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech should state that the time had come for the conflict between the Germans and the Poles and that the Poles should get together and strike down any Germans from whom they met resistance. Heydrich also told me at this time that he expected an attack on Poland by Germany in a few days.

3. I went to Gleiwitz and waited there a fortnight. Then I requested permission of Heydrich to return to Berlin but was told to stay in Gleiwitz.
Between the 25th and 31st of August I went to see Heinrich Müller head of the Gestapo, who was then nearby at Oppeln. In my presence Müller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops ... Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to be used. Müller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground at the scene of the incident to show that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the assault members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared. 4. Müller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make one of those criminals available to me for the action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals was ‘Canned Goods.’

5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon on the 31st of August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that evening. Heydrich said, “In order to carry out this attack, report to Müller for ‘Canned Goods.’” I did this and gave Müller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive, but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds, but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.

6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech of 3 to 4 minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots, and left.” And then "sworn to and subscribed to before Lieutenant Martin".

APPENDIX III

Address by Herr Hitler, Chancellor of the Reich, before the Reichstag, September 1, 1939.

“For months we have been suffering under the torture of a problem which the Versailles Diktat created - a problem which has deteriorated until it
becomes intolerable for us. Danzig was and is a German city. The Corridor was and is German. Both these territories owe their cultural development exclusively to the German people. Danzig was separated from us, the Corridor was annexed by Poland. As in other German territories of the East, all German minorities living there have been ill-treated in the most distressing manner. More than 1,000,000 people of German blood had in the years 1919-1920 to leave their homeland.

As always, I attempted to bring about, by the peaceful method of making proposals for revision, an alteration of this intolerable position. It is a lie when the outside world says that we only tried to carry through our revisions by pressure. Fifteen years before the National Socialist Party came to power there was the opportunity of carrying out these revisions by peaceful settlements and understanding. On my own initiative I have, not once but several times, made proposals for the revision of intolerable conditions. All these proposals, as you know, have been rejected - proposals for limitation of armaments and even, if necessary, disarmament, proposals for limitation of war-making, proposals for the elimination of certain methods of modern warfare. You know the proposals that I have made to fulfil the necessity of restoring German sovereignty over German territories. You know the endless attempts I made for a peaceful clarification and understanding of the problem of Austria, and later of the problem of the Sudetenland, Bohemia, and Moravia. It was all in vain.

It is impossible to demand that an impossible position should be cleared up by peaceful revision and at the same time constantly reject peaceful revision. It is also impossible to say that he who undertakes to carry out these revisions for himself transgresses a law, since the Versailles Diktat is not law to us. A signature was forced out of us with pistols at our head and with the threat of hunger for millions of people. And then this document, with our signature, obtained by force, was proclaimed as a solemn law.

In the same way, I have also tried to solve the problem of Danzig, the Corridor, etc., by proposing a peaceful discussion. That the problems had to be solved was clear. It is quite understandable to us that the time when the problem was to be solved had little interest for the Western Powers. But that time is not a matter of indifference to us. Moreover, it was not and could not be a matter of indifference to those who suffer most.

In my talks with Polish statesmen I discussed the ideas which you
recognize from my last speech to the Reichstag. No one could say that this was in any way an inadmissible procedure or undue pressure. I then naturally formulated at last the German proposals, and I must once more repeat that there is nothing more modest or loyal than these proposals. I should like to say this to the world. I alone was in the position to make such proposal, for I know very well that in doing so I brought myself into opposition to millions of Germans. These proposals have been refused. Not only were they answered first with mobilization, but with increased terror and pressure against our German compatriots and with a slow strangling of the Free City of Danzig - economically, politically, and in recent weeks by military and transport means.

Poland has directed its attacks against the Free City of Danzig. Moreover, Poland was not prepared to settle the Corridor question in a reasonable way which would be equitable to both parties, and she did not think of keeping her obligations to minorities.

I must here state something definitely; German has kept these obligations; the minorities who live in Germany are not persecuted. No Frenchman can stand up and say that any Frenchman living in the Saar territory is oppressed, tortured, or deprived of his rights. Nobody can say this.

For four months I have calmly watched developments, although I never ceased to give warnings. In the last few days I have increased these warnings. I informed the Polish Ambassador three weeks ago that if Poland continued to send to Danzig notes in the form of ultimata, and if on the Polish side an end was not put to Customs measures destined to ruin Danzig’s trade, then the Reich could not remain inactive. I left no doubt that people who wanted to compare the Germany of to-day with the former Germany would be deceiving themselves.

An attempt was made to justify the oppression of the Germans by claiming that they had committed acts of provocation. I do not know in what these provocations on the part of women and children consist, if they themselves are maltreated, in some cases killed. One thing I do know - that no great Power can with honour long stand by passively and watch such events.

I made one more final effort to accept a proposal for mediation on the part of the British Government. They proposed, not that they themselves should carry on the negotiations, but rather that Poland and Germany should come into direct contact and once more pursue negotiations.

I must declare that I accepted this proposal, and I worked out a basis
for these negotiations which are known to you. For two whole days I sat in my Government and waited to see whether it was convenient for the Polish Government to send a plenipotentiary or not. Last night they did not send us a plenipotentiary, but instead informed us through their Ambassador that they were still considering whether and to what extent they were in a position to go into the British proposals. The Polish Government also said that they would inform Britain of their decision.

Deputies, if the German Government and its Leader patiently endured such treatment Germany would deserve only to disappear from the political stage. But I am wrongly judged if my love of peace and my patience are mistaken for weakness or even cowardice. I, therefore, decided last night and informed the British Government that in these circumstances I can no longer find any willingness on the part of the Polish Government to conduct serious negotiations with us.

These proposals for mediation have failed because in the meanwhile there, first of all, came as an answer the sudden Polish general mobilization, followed by more Polish atrocities. These were again repeated last night. Recently in one night there were as many as twenty-one frontier incidents: last night there were fourteen, of which three were quite serious. I have, therefore, resolved to speak to Poland in the same language that Poland for months past has used toward us. This attitude on the part of the Reich will not change.

The other European States understand in part our attitude. I should like here above all to thank Italy, which throughout has supported us, but you will understand that for the carrying on of this struggle we do not intend to appeal to foreign help. We will carry out this task ourselves. The neutral States have assured us of their neutrality, just as we had already guaranteed it to them.

When statesmen in the West declare that this affects their interests, I can only regret such a declaration. It cannot for a moment make me hesitate to fulfil my duty. What more is wanted? I have solemnly assured them, and I repeat it, that we ask nothing of those Western States and never will ask anything. I have declared that the frontier between France and Germany is a final one. I have repeatedly offered friendship and, if necessary, the closest co-operation to Britain, but this cannot be offered from one side only. It must find response on the other side. Germany has no interests in the West, and our western wall is for all time the frontier of the Reich on the west. Moreover, we have no aims of any kind there
for the future. With this assurance we are in solemn earnest, and as long as others do not violate their neutrality we will likewise take every care to respect it.

I am happy particularly to be able to tell you of one event. You know that Russia and Germany are governed by two different doctrines. There was only one question that had to be cleared up. Germany has no intention of exporting its doctrine. Given the fact that Soviet Russia has no intention of exporting its doctrine to Germany, I no longer see any reason why we should still oppose one another. On both sides we are clear on that. Any struggle between our people would only be of advantage to others. We have, therefore, resolved to conclude a pact which rules out for ever any use of violence between us. It imposes the obligation on us to consult together in certain European questions. It makes possible for us economic co-operation, and above all it assures that the powers of both these powerful States are not wasted against one another. Every attempt of the West to bring about any change in this will fail.

At the same time I should like here to declare that this political decision means a tremendous departure for the future, and that it is a final one. Russia and Germany fought against one another in the World War. That shall and will not happen a second time. In Moscow, too, this pact was greeted exactly as you greet it. I can only endorse word for word the speech of Russian Foreign Commissar, Molotov.

I am determined to solve (1) the Danzig question; (2) the question of the Corridor; and (3) to see to it that a change is made in the relationship between Germany and Poland that shall ensure a peaceful co-existence. In this I am resolved to continue to fight until either the present Polish government is willing to continue to bring about this change or until another Polish Government is ready to do so. I am resolved to remove from the German frontiers the element of uncertainty, the everlasting atmosphere of conditions resembling civil war. I will see to it that in the East there is, on the frontier, a peace precisely similar to that on our other frontiers.

In this I will take the necessary measures to see that they do not contradict the proposals I have already made known in the Reichstag itself to the rest of the world, that is to say, I will not war against women and children. I have ordered my air force to restrict itself to attacks on military objectives. If, however, the enemy thinks he can from that draw carte blanche on his side to fight by the other methods he will receive an
answer that will deprive him of hearing and sight.

This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our territory. Since 5.45 a.m. we have been returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met by bombs. Whoever fights with poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever departs from the rules of humane warfare can only expect that we shall do the same. I will continue this struggle, no matter against whom, until the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured.

For six years now I have been working on the building up of the German defences. Over 90 millions have in that time been spent on the building up of these defence forces. They are now the best equipped and are above all comparison with what they were in 1914. My trust in them is unshakable. When I called up these forces and when I now ask sacrifices of the German people and if necessary every sacrifice, then I have a right to do so, for I also am to-day absolutely ready, just as we were formerly, to make every possible sacrifice.

I am asking of no German man more than I myself was ready throughout four years at any time to do. There will be no hardships for Germans to which I myself will not submit. My whole life henceforth belongs more than ever to my people. I am from now on just first soldier of the German Reich. I have once more put on that coat that was the most sacred and dear to me. I will not take it off again until victory is secured, or I will not survive the outcome.

Should anything happen to me in the struggle then my first successor is Party Comrade Goring; should anything happen to Party Comrade Goring my next successor is Party Comrade Hess. You would then be under obligation to give to them as Führer the same blind loyalty and obedience as to myself. Should anything happen to Party Comrade Hess, then by law the Senate will be called, and will choose from its midst the most worthy - that is to say the bravest - successor.

As a National Socialist and as German soldier I enter upon this struggle with a stout heart. My whole life has been nothing but one long struggle for my people, for its restoration, and for Germany. There was only one watchword for that struggle: faith in this people. One word I have never learned: that is, surrender.

If, however, anyone thinks that we are facing a hard time, I should ask him to remember that once a Prussian King, with a ridiculously small State, opposed a stronger coalition, and in three wars finally came out successful because that State had that stout heart that we need in these
times. I would, therefore, like to assure all the world that a November 1918 will never be repeated in German history. Just as I myself am ready at any time to stake my life - anyone can take it for my people and for Germany - so I ask the same of all others.

Whoever, however, thinks he can oppose this national command, whether directly or indirectly, shall fall. We have nothing to do with traitors. We are all faithful to our old principle. It is quite unimportant whether we ourselves live, but it is essential that our people shall live, that Germany shall live. The sacrifice that is demanded of us is not greater than the sacrifice that many generations have made. If we form a community closely bound together by vows, ready for anything, resolved never to surrender, then our will will master every hardship and difficulty. And I would like to close with the declaration that I once made when I began the struggle for power in the Reich. I then said: "If our will is so strong that no hardship and suffering can subdue it, then our will and our German might shall prevail."

NOTES AND SOURCES

IMT = *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Proceedings*, Nuremberg, 42 Volumes 1947-1949

1 *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, 11 July 1933, page 871.
2 Richard Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles: The Germans in Western Poland 1918-1939*, The University Press of Kentucky 1993. Appendix B. Blanke’s figures for Pomorze province indicate a slightly smaller reduction of the German population than those given by the Polish Press Bureau – showing a reduction of the German minority from 42.5% in 1910 to 9.6% in 1931.
3 For example, see the report in the authoritative British daily, the *Manchester Guardian* (12 December 1931), from its special correspondent in Lemberg, Poland, which begins: “The oppression of the Ukrainian minority is growing worse every day. It would perhaps be wearisome to record the oppressive acts that are committed in ever-growing numbers – the closing down of co-operatives and schools, the dismissal of teachers, the wrecking of careers, the denial of political rights, the arrest, the savage sentences passed on innocent people, the continual bullying and intimidation. Such a record would be of almost impossible length.”

6 Blanke, pages 223-4.


8 IMT, 20 December 1945, Volume 4, pages 242-243, Document 2751-PS (Affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks, dated November 20, 1945). The affidavit was read into the record in Naujocks’s absence. Naujocks seems to have been very busy on 20 November 1945, as he gave two other affidavits on the same day: the first concerning alleged activities of the SD along the Czechoslovak border during September 1938 (Nuremberg document 3029-PS); and the other referring to the relationship between the SD and alleged pro-Nazi Slovak groups in March 1939 (Nuremberg document 3030-PS). These seem to have been given to American interrogators after he had been returned to their custody by his British hosts.


11 Peis, pages 13-14, 114-132.

12 Peis, page 223.

13 An indication of the possible nature and extent of Canaris’s treachery can be found, for example, in Ian Colvin’s *Chief of Intelligence* (Victor Gollanz Ltd, London 1951, pages 5-7); and *Friendly Fire: The Secret War between the Allies* by Lynn Prickett, Clive Prince and Stephen Prior with Robert Brydon (Mainstream Publishing Edinburgh 2005), page 112.

14 Cited in *The Canaris Conspiracy* by Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Heineman 1969, pages 55-56. SS Colonel Heinz Jost was Head of the SD Foreign Espionage Service.

15 IMT, 4 April 1946, Volume 10, pages 515-516.


18 IMT, 30 November 1945, Volume 2, pages 449-450.


21 Schellenberg, page 28. Mehlhorn was transferred to the German Foreign Office.
22 Dennis Whitehead, “The Gleiwitz Incident,” After the Battle magazine, No. 142, November 2008, pages 6 (caption to accompanying illustration) and 23.

23 Schellenberg, page 16.

24 Schellenberg, page 18.


26 The graves of the murdered Polish officers were discovered by the Wehrmacht in 1943 and Germany brought in an international commission to investigate. This established that the men had been killed before the Nazi-Soviet war broke out and, therefore, that they must have been victims of the soviets. At the main Nuremberg trial of Nazi leaders the Soviet prosecutor submitted a document drawn up by its Special Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Circumstances of the Shooting of Polish Officer Prisoners by the German-Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest (tribunal document number USSR-46). The Commission was headed by Nikolai Burdenko, the President of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, and a host of Soviet academicians and medico-legal experts were members of it or assisted in its work. Even the chairman of the soviet Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and a bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church took part. In the Commission’s own words:

“From all the material at the disposal of the Special Commission, namely evidence given by over 100 witnesses questioned, data supplied by medico-legal experts, documents and material evidence found in the graves in the Katyn Forest, the following conclusions emerge with irrefutable clarity: ……

[2.] In the Katyn Forest, in the autumn of 1941, the German occupation authorities carried out mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war ……

[7.] The conclusions drawn from the evidence given by witnesses, and from the findings of the medico-legal experts on the shooting of Polish war prisoners by the Germans in the autumn of 1941, are completely confirmed by the material evidence and documents excavated from the Katyn graves. ……”

In its death throes the Soviet regime finally admitted that the killings had been carried out by its secret police, the NKVD. This means, of course, that any evidence pointing to German guilt, including expert evidence and witness statements and other evidence in the Commission’s report or presented by the soviet prosecutor at Nuremberg must have been false; and the documentation and other material evidence mentioned by the Commission must have been forged or planted at the scene. The deception, probably routine business for the communist lie machine, may well have succeeded had it not been for the dogged perseverance of many Poles and individual sympathizers in the
West over many years, especially in view of the complicity of the British and American governments in the cover-up.

28  Gliwice Museum website - muzeum.gliwice.pl, retrieved 16 October 2009. Gliwice is the Polish name for Gleiwitz, which was ‘degermanised’ after the war.
31  “Blitzkrieg September 1, 1939: a new kind of warfare engulfs Poland,” *Time* magazine, 28 August 1989. Oranienburg concentration camp was replaced by Sachsenhausen camp in the same neighbourhood some years earlier. The headquarters administration for the camp system, remained on the site of the Oranienburg camp.
33  Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, *The Penguin History of the Second World War*, Penguin Books 1989, page 101. Calvocoressi was one of the prosecution team during the Nuremberg trial at which Naujocks’s affidavit was presented as evidence. Naujocks made no mention of a policeman getting killed. Nor is it referred to in other accounts seen by the author.
34  IMT, 29 August 1946, Vol 22, page 252.
39  Peis, page 127.
40  Whitehead, page 16.
42  Watt, page 533.
43  Whitehead, pages 21 and 22
44  Watt, pages 533-4. Although Watt refers to the place as Hohnlinden, other accounts refer to Hochlinden (presumably the same place). At Nuremberg it was referred to by
one of the counsel as Hohenlinden.
45 Whitehead, page 23.
46 Whitehead, page 22.
48 Professor Dr Louis L Snyder, “Naujocks, Alfred (1911- ),” Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, Blandford (Cassell imprint) 1989.
49 Kessler, page 200.
50 Peis, pages 23-24, 221.
51 Whitehead, page 13 (caption to accompanying illustration).
52 Laurie Goering, As Nazis age, leads still alive, Chicago Tribune website, chicagotribute.com, retrieved 25 October 2009.
53 “Was this the first victim of the war,” Bob Graham, Daily Telegraph, 29 August 2009.
55 Taylor, page 326.
56 Watt, page 495.
57 Peis, page 120.
58 Whitehead, page 12
59 Peis, page 126.
60 Whitehead, pages 14-15.
62 The report was published in The Times on 1 September 1939.
63 The quotations from Völkischer Beobachter are taken from the report as reproduced by Peis, page 132.
65 “Many Towns Bombed,” The Times [London], 2 September 1939.
66 Watt, page 533. Whitehead also writes (page 23) that the scene of crime pictures of the dead at Gleiwitz or Hochlinden were never published or used propagandistically – and have now disappeared.
67 Germany had its notorious Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment – its name at least indicating some honesty, as well as, perhaps, some naivety. Britain, however, also had a propaganda machine, euphemistically called the Ministry of Information. According to Philip Knightly [The First Casualty, Andre Deutsch 1975, page 218.], it was planned as early as 1936 and was brought into operation two days before the war. In four weeks its staff grew from twelve to 999.
68 “Poland’s Westward Move,” The Times [London], 14 July 1945.
69 The Steelworks Necropolis, Gliwice Museum website. In recent years it appears
that the cemetery has been cleaned up and it was the subject of a temporary exhibition by the Museum in 2008.


71 Mueller, page 149. Lahousen’s question seems to have been addressed to Colonel Jost.

72 *The Times* (London), 6 September 1939.

73 *The War Illustrated*, 23 September 1939, page 55.


75 Hitler used the expression ‘ganz schwere.’ Some accounts on the internet have translated this as “very serious,” including the Wikipedia story. However, *The Times* (London) on 2 September 1939 and The Avalon Project of Yale Law School, part of Yale University on its website (avalon.law.yale.edu), both translate it as “quite serious.”

76 Watt, page 185. Watt’s source for this surprising comment is *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 3rd series*, Volume IV, 584, 31.iii.39.

77 Watt, pages 532-3.


79 *The Times*, 11 and 23 May 1921.


81 Watt, pages 485-6.


Of course, it cannot be ruled out entirely that a march on Berlin was not contemplated, certainly by some Poles. Bethell relates [*The War Hitler Won*, page 32] that in 1939 Polish “Military leaders made rousing speeches, a few even speaking of a march on Berlin.”

83 Bethell, page 30.

84 In a report of the first day’s action in *The Times* of 2 September 1939, the only East Prussian town mentioned as a source of attack was Deutsch Eylau, a town in the south western corner of the province. Information about initial German attacks is given in their Warsaw correspondent’s report, presumably obtained from official Polish government sources. There was no mention, however, of an attack on Treuburg or Marggrabowa on the far eastern border of the province.

85 As there was no declaration of war and limited penetrations of the frontier at first, it took some time for some people to realize that the war had actually started. Professor
Watt [How War Came, page 537] notes that only at 2.00 pm on the day of invasion was Colonel Beck, Poland’s Foreign Minister, admitting that the German actions were not just isolated incidents but acts of war. By this time, presumably, the attack of Treuburg would have been well under way.

86 Kessler, page 21-22.
87 Peis, page 115.
89 Lord Russell of Liverpool, The Scourge of the Swastika, Chivers Press edition 1985, pages 11-12. [First published by Cassell & Co 1954. Russell was Britain’s Assistant Judge Advocate General, who served as senior legal adviser at the war crimes trials after the Second World War.
92 Terry Charman, Outbreak 1939, Virgin Books 2009 (also carries logo of the Imperial War Museum, where Charman is Senior Historian), pages 69-70.
93 Norman Davies, “Between Swastika and Star … the Carving of Europe; Legacy of War,” The Times, 4 September 1989.
95 Max Hastings, “Polish premier’s attack on Germans show the wounds still fester,” Daily Mail, 23 June 2007.
96 Irving, page 233.
98 Peis, page 118.
99 Peis, page 122.
100 Peis, page 130.
102 Schellenberg, page 69.
103 Whitehead, page 5.
104 Whitehead, pages 13, 20.
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