PART 10

COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
(STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES)

REVISED AND UPDATED VERSION

2007
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

Copyright
This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.

Authority
This publication is issued under the overall direction of the CGS. It is an MOD Approved Code of Practice (ACOP). Where issues of health and safety are concerned it takes into account the provisions of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974.

Status
The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act.

Distribution
As directed by DGTS who is the sponsor of this publication.

Changes
Suggestions for additions/deletions and changes can be made by sending them to LWC for consideration and incorporation in the next edition.
If you wish for peace, understand war, particularly the guerrilla and subversive forms of war.

B H Liddell Hart, 1961
PREFACE

1. In AC 71819 *ADP Land Operations* (2005) insurgency and its characteristics are placed into the overall spectrum of conflict and are outlined in general terms. The requirement for a counter insurgency strategy are then described together with the appropriate guidelines and planning requirements for subsequent operations. This publication follows closely the thrust, direction and sequence of the outline given in *ADP Land Operations*, enlarging and developing the points made for application at the strategic and operational levels of conflict.

2. Part A defines what insurgency is, the historical development of revolutions and insurgencies into the twentieth century and some of their associated characteristics. It then analyses the conduct of an insurgency; how it functions and operates, and the sort of tactics that may be used to prosecute the aims of an insurgency. It concludes with an outline of the position of insurgency in today’s world.

3. Part B deals with the issues of countering insurgency at the strategic and operational level. The first five chapters cover aspects of the law, the principles of counter insurgency, a concept of overall operations and the coordination of a plan of action by a government at the strategic level. The remaining six chapters cover the operational and tactical aspects of such a campaign.

4. In the past many terms have been used to describe those opposing the established authorities, terms such as guerrilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident, rebel, partisan, native and enemy all spring to mind. In order to keep consistency throughout this publication the term insurgent has been used to describe those taking part in any activity designed to undermine or to overthrow the established authorities in whatever form.

5. To help the reader further, some definitions for various terms used in a counter insurgency context as well as a bibliography for the general reader are recorded at Annex A at the end of the publication.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

6. Acknowledgements are due to Professor B O’Neill for providing the feature of analytical research into insurgencies, to Doctor G Dyer for some aspects of the historical analysis of insurgencies post 1945, and to Dr R Clutterbuck for providing some information and material used in Part A taken from his book *Terrorism in an Unstable World*.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART A</th>
<th>AN INTRODUCTION TO INSURGENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE CONCEPT OF INSURGENCY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>A Definition for Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Origins and Causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>The Characteristics of Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Analysing an Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>Insurgent Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>The Potential Backlash Against an Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A</td>
<td>Insurgency – A Historical Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-A-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B</td>
<td>The Dangers of Islamism – Real and Apparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2-B-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 3</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE CONDUCT OF INSURGENCY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Abiding Features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>The Context of an Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Factors Affecting an Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Vulnerable Points Within an Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A</td>
<td>Strategic Deception – The North Vietnamese Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3-A-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4</strong></td>
<td><strong>TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN INSURGENCY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-4-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-4-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Destructive Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-4-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Constructive Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-4-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Insurgent Tactics in a Rural Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-4-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>Insurgent Tactics in an Urban Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-4-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>Insurgent Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-4-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-5-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-5-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Society and Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-5-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Recent Trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-5-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-5-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART B COUNTER INSURGENCY

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER 1 ASPECTS OF THE LAW

Section 1 The Legal Background
Section 2 Rules of Engagement (ROE)
Section 3 The Status of Forces
Section 4 Operational Law Branch and Legal Adviser

CHAPTER 2 THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE TO COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Section 1 The British Experience
Section 2 The Attrition Theory
Section 3 The Manoeuvrist Approach
Section 4 Success in Operations
Section 5 The Core Functions for Counter Insurgency
Section 6 Information Operations
Section 7 Integrating Operations
Annex A Application of Doctrine in Counter Insurgency – Attacking an Insurgent’s Will
Annex B Illustrative Diagram of the Components that Contribute to Information Operations

CHAPTER 3 THE PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Section 1 Principles
Section 2 Political Primacy and Political Aim
Section 3 Coordinated Government Machinery
Section 4 Intelligence and Information
Section 5 Separating the Insurgent from his Support
Section 6 Neutralising the Insurgent
Section 7 Longer Term Post – Insurgency Planning
Section 8 Factors Bearing on the Principles for Counter Insurgency
Annex A Illustrative Net Assessment of an Insurgency

CHAPTER 4 A STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Section 1 The Pattern of a Counter Insurgency Campaign
Section 2 Threshold Circumstances
Section 3 Military Commitment
Section 4 Military Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Section 5 Scenarios for Military Involvement
Section 6 Withdrawal of Military Forces
CHAPTER 5  COORDINATION  B-5-1
Section 1  The System of Coordination  B-5-1
Section 2  The Application of Principles  B-5-4

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER 6  INTELLIGENCE  B-6-1
Section 1  The Pre Eminence of Intelligence  B-6-1
Section 2  Direction  B-6-2
Section 3  Collection  B-6-9
Section 4  Processing  B-6-14
Section 5  Dissemination  B-6-16
Section 6  Training  B-6-16
Section 7  Difficulties Facing an Intelligence Organisation  B-6-17
Annex A  Glossary of Abbreviations Used  B-6-A-1
Annex B  The Inter Relationship of Functions Within C2W  B-6-B-1
Annex C  Intelligence Support for C2W in a Counter Insurgency Campaign  B-6-C-1
Annex D  Key Information/Intelligence Requirements for C2W  B-6-D-1

CHAPTER 7  MILITARY OPERATIONS  B-7-1
Section 1  A Concept of Military Operations  B-7-1
Section 2  Defensive Tactics  B-7-7
Section 3  Gaining the Tactical Initiative  B-7-11
Section 4  OPSEC in Counter Insurgency Operations  B-7-17
Section 5  EW in Counter Insurgency Operations  B-7-18
Section 6  Deception  B-7-23
Section 7  Special Forces in Counter Insurgency Operations  B-7-24
Section 8  Air Power in Support of Counter Insurgency Operations  B-7-24
Section 9  An Information Campaign  B-7-25
Section 10  Personnel  B-7-26
Annex A  Forward Operational Bases  B-7-A-1
Annex B  Non Lethal Weapons  B-7-B-1
Annex C  ESM and Surveillance  B-7-C-1
Annex D  ECM  B-7-D-1
Annex E  The Use of Special Forces in Counter Insurgency  B-7-E-1

CHAPTER 8  LOGISTIC PLANNING FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY  B-8-1
Section 1  Principles and Planning  B-8-1
Section 2  Replenishment and Resources  B-8-5
Section 3  Maintenance of Essential Services  B-8-8
CHAPTER 9  CONTACT WITH THE MEDIA

Section 1  The Roles of the Commander and the Chief PINFO Office B-9-1
Section 2  Media Reporting, Clearance, Attribution and Embargoes B-9-1
Section 3  Handling the Media B-9-2
Section 4  Guidance on Reporting to the Media B-9-4

CHAPTER 10  CIVIL MILITARY OPERATION (CIMIC)

Section 1  The Place of CIMIC in Military Operations B-10-1
Section 2  The Purpose of CIMIC B-10-1
Section 3  The Civil Context B-10-2
Section 4  Civilians and Civil Organisations B-10-3

ANNEX A TO PARTS A & B [At End of Publication]

Glossary of Some Terms Used in Counter Insurgency Studies ix-xv
PART A

AN INTRODUCTION TO INSURGENCY
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. The experience of numerous “small wars” has provided the British army with a unique insight into countering insurgency in many of its forms. Service in Northern Ireland has given the present generation of commanders their main firsthand source of basic experience at the tactical level, although this could constrain military thinking on the subject because of the national context and the local political connotations of this campaign. There are of course many lessons to be learned because of the similarities between the campaign in Northern Ireland, and those counter insurgency campaigns which are conducted elsewhere. But there are also significant differences. Tactics such as jungle patrolling and convoy anti-ambush drills – which from the perspective of Northern Ireland seem to be relics of a colonial past – may still be very relevant in different operational settings such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

2. Despite their long experience in counter insurgency, the British have not developed any set methods of dealing with the problem of insurgency; indeed it is probably unwise to attempt this because every situation is different. There are, however, many other approaches to this type of campaign. Not only is the threat changing, but so too is the environment in which an insurgent has to be confronted.

THE REVISION OF DOCTRINE FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

3. The current doctrine recorded in the July 2001 edition of AFM Vol 1 Pt 10 was prepared in the mid 1990s but only published in 2001. Since 2000 British troops have been involved in actions to prevent insurgency in Sierra Leone, stability operations to support the legitimate authorities in East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo and since 2003 two different types of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of these campaigns, and evidence that the more traditional type of insurgency has translated into a much wider act of terrorism and insurgency on an international scale, some form of revision has become necessary.

4. There are currently no plans to alter the six guiding principles for counter insurgency. These have been developed over many years since the Second World War and have stood the test of time and experience. Similarly the very British precepts of minimum force, operating within the law, transparency and gaining the support of the people do not need to change. Indeed, operations since 2003 have reinforced these precepts significantly.

5. This publication is intended to take the Army’s major doctrinal principles and precepts and place them in this new operational environment for countering insurgency and thus to allow commanders to take some account of these new developments before a complete and formal revision of military doctrine, operational and tactical practices can be prepared for publication which will take account of lessons learned and observations obtained in Ops TELIC and HERRICK.

6. The layout and sequence of this revised publication follows closely the format of the 2001 version.
CHAPTER 2
THE CONCEPT OF INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 – A DEFINITION FOR INSURGENCY

1. Insurgency is, for the purposes of this publication, defined as the actions of a minority group who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people (normally within a state) to accept such a change. It is an organised armed political struggle, the goals of which may be many and diverse. Some insurgencies aim for a straightforward seizure of power through complete revolutionary takeover; others attempt to break away from state control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious bounds and yet others seek to destroy the state by violent action designed to disrupt the normal functions of control.

2. In some instances, an insurgency may strive to extract wide ranging political concessions which are unattainable through less violent means. Insurgencies tend to arise when state authorities are unable or unwilling to redress the demands of significant social groups. Insurgencies could therefore be coalitions of disparate forces sometimes united by a common enmity towards a government, and a willingness to use violence to challenge its legitimacy.

3. Until recently it would be true to say that only an insurgency which was capable of attracting widespread popular support posed a real threat to a state authority. Arms proliferation, and in particular the availability of weapons of mass destruction, together with the possibility of exaggeration through the media of an insurgent's aspirations and prospects may well necessitate a reassessment of the threat posed by insurgent groups in the future. While the overall authority of the state may not initially be at risk, a state's ability to handle the potential disruption imposed by these new issues could have a destabilising effect on any government. There is a growing view, particularly amongst academics, that the definition of insurgency may have to change. This is in view of the changes in the goals and aspirations of insurgents since the 1990s which now have an international dimension linked closely with some aspects of extreme forms of religious behaviour.

SECTION 2 - ORIGINS AND CAUSES

4. The Seeds of Insurgency. The causes of insurgency lie in unfulfilled aspirations and what are perceived as legitimate grievances which may justify rebellion, or in other types of economic or social grievances, which may be manipulated by insurgents who are generally working to a different agenda for their own reasons. The causes may include:

   a. Nationalist, ethnic, tribal and cultural separatist movements based on strong feelings of identity which are antipathetic to the dominant majority in a state.

   b. Religion, either as a manifestation of a separate identity or motivated by religious fundamentalism.

---

1 This definition of insurgency was provided by the War Studies Department of RMA Sandhurst.
c. Neo-colonialism; the control of key sectors of the economy by foreign business interests, or the presence of allied troops and their bases under the terms of an intervention or an unpopular treaty which offends national sentiment.

d. Maladministration, corruption, discrimination and repression (normally the precursor for a failed state).

e. Economic failure. Extremes of wealth and poverty, especially in countries where the upper and lower classes are of different ethnic origins.

f. Unfulfilled expectations, particularly amongst the middle class and the intelligentsia of the population. It is here that expectations of an improved way of life are usually greatest.

5. Exploitation of Causes. Any of the causes of insurgency may be fostered and exploited by:

a. Party/Clan rivalries, which may revolve around domestic political, economic or religious issues, exacerbated by the competition of ambitious personalities for power.

b. Political theorists, for example, Old Guard Communists, Maoists, anarchists, and right wing irredentists. By the same token religious extremism may also be utilised to exploit grievances.

c. Nationalist and separatist parties. Such parties may be motivated by extreme right or left wing ideologies or come from the middle, moderate portion of the political spectrum.

6. Examples from History. History over the ages shows that there are many examples of insurgency and in all habitable areas of the world. All will have lessons which continue to be relevant today, but these are too numerous to record here. In the first Annex to this Chapter certain well known and notable examples of insurgency from the seventeenth century onwards to the date of publication have been recorded or mentioned. In the second and subsequent Annexes there are brief summaries of the more important concepts and theories about revolution and insurgency that have been manifest since the start of the twentieth century. These give an insight into how insurgency has changed and developed during this time.

SECTION 3 - THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY

CHARACTERISTICS

7. Each insurgency will be unique, although there may be similarities between them. Insurgencies are more likely to occur in states where there are inherent social divisions, based on racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences, leading to a lack of national cohesion. Insurgencies may thrive in states that are economically weak and lack efficient, stable or popular governments. Additional factors such as religious animosity, corruption and external agitation may help to create a climate in which politically inspired violence can erupt.
8. Various models or patterns of insurgency have been postulated, but whichever model is examined, the key point to note is that the insurgents’ aim is to force political change; any military action is secondary and subordinate - a means to an end. It is also worth stressing that few insurgencies fit neatly into any rigid classification. In the past, attempts have been made to categorise insurgencies according to particular characteristics; for example by their environment (rural or urban), or by ideological origin (Leninist or Maoist). As the Sandinistas showed in Nicaragua in the late 1970s, and as Sendero Luminoso demonstrated in Peru in the early 1990s, effective insurgents take those parts of previous campaigns which seem to have worked and adapt them to their own particular needs.

9. Examining the complete range of characteristics will enable the commander and his staff to build a more accurate picture of the insurgent and the thinking behind his overall campaign plan. Principles and techniques derived from previous experience may provide valuable guidance; however, the key to an appropriate response will be an objective military analysis. Such an analysis will identify the root cause or causes of the insurgency; the extent to which it enjoys support, both internally and externally; the basis on which the insurgent will appeal to his target population; his motivation and the depth of commitment; the likely weapons and tactics he will use and the operational environment in which he will seek to initiate, and then develop, his campaign.

10. Research indicates that during the Cold War period (1948-90) there are seven main forms of insurgency which were used as the basis for further examination. These are recorded in the following paragraphs because they are important as analytical tools for military commanders to examine when considering the type of insurgency they are facing. These seven forms of insurgency define insurgents by their aspirations rather than by their actual manifestation – and thus in more recent times (1990 onwards) may well be of limited use, although there is still value in using these analytical tools particularly where insurgency is confined to a single state and where only particular grievances within that state are perceived.

ANARCHIST

11. The most potentially dangerous form of insurrection is that of the anarchist group which sets out to eliminate all political structures and the social fabric associated with them. Various groups in Russia and elsewhere in Europe flourished at the turn of the twentieth century, but apart from assassination achieved little else. In more recent times cells such as the Black Cell and Black Help in Western Germany during the 1970s echoed this credo, but were not particularly significant. The purpose of an anarchist movement is to destroy the system. There are normally no plans to replace any form of government with any other system - hence the danger of this form of insurrection which could rapidly destabilise a nation state very quickly and leave a power vacuum.

12. Fortunately these normally very secretive and small groups do not have much public appeal and have not so far had any lasting success. Nevertheless their potential destructiveness to society cannot be overlooked. With the growing proliferation of all types of weapons and potential causes after 1989 these groupings cannot be underestimated or

---

2 Acknowledgements to Professor B O'Neill Director of Studies at the US National War College. See also 'Insurgency and Terrorism' – Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Also to the War Studies Dept at RMA Sandhurst and the Staff College for additional material.
consigned to history. One or two spectacular and successful attacks by groups of this type could still have a profound political effect on a state or region far beyond their intrinsic worth and could undoubtedly have a direct influence on international or global terrorism.

**EGALITARIAN**

13. An egalitarian insurgency seeks to impose a new system based on centrally controlled structures and institutions to provide equality in the distribution of all state resources. By mobilising the people (masses) and radically transforming the social infrastructure, these insurgencies rely on gaining support for changes from within the state.

14. This type of insurgency has been regularly used in the post Second World War era, and is characterised by the Malayan Communist Party, the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, the Fedayeens-i-Khalq, in Iran, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL) in Peru, and several other communist style groupings. A similar type of insurgency, but one which is not based on a Marxist Doctrine, can be seen in the Ba’athist groups that seized power in Syria and Iraq.

15. As with all of these egalitarian insurgencies, those which achieved success normally established repressive regimes with authoritarian forms of political control in order to retain the power they had gained.

**TRADITIONALIST**

16. Here the insurgency would seek to displace or overthrow the established system but revert back to national/original values that are rooted in the previous history of the region. This form of insurgency has always existed, but in recent years following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact large areas around the fringes of this former power bloc are now prone to such traditionalist forms of insurgency. Usually the insurgent group would attempt to establish a system centred on an autocratic rule supported by the army, religious leaders, and the traditional hierarchical system that prevailed in days gone by.

17. Insurgencies of this type can be seen in the Contra movement in Nicaragua, the mujahedin groups in Afghanistan and those who supported the return of the Imam to North Yemen in the 1960s.

18. A more extreme and violent form of traditionalist insurgency is manifest in those who seek to re-establish an older political and religious culture, based on values that are seen by many as feudal, and which run counter to the development of social norms of behaviour in the contemporary world. These can be defined as reactionary traditionalists; examples being the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Islamic Jihad in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hezbi-Islami (Party of Islam) in Afghanistan. These groupings would hope to establish Islamic political and social norms in accordance with either the Sunni or Shiite version of the Muslim faith. The same can equally be applied to other religious groups. Christians, Jews, Hindus and Buddhists all have their militant extremists.

19. The dangerous potential for this type of insurgency is that if it succeeds in one area, as in Iran, it is likely to act as a spur to other insurgencies elsewhere. External aid to other groupings then becomes a very real threat to the affected status. Furthermore the religious bias of an insurgency can affect and influence the views of individuals and these can be
used to manipulate more popular support. Here Western nations could also be at a potential disadvantage because of the contempt with which insurgents of this type have for non believers. See Annex B for details of Islamism.

PLURALIST

20. The final characteristic of the revolutionary types of insurgencies is the pluralist form where the goal of such insurgencies would be to establish a system in which the values of personal freedom, liberty, moderation and compromise are emphasised. The history of Western civilisations is marked by a number of such changes, but not generally in the post Second World War era, except in a diluted form in Poland (1980-82) and possibly the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Many insurgencies may seem to be pluralist in tone, but these invariably mask a more authoritarian intention.

SEPARATIST

21. In a sense the aim of separatist insurgency is more total than that of the revolutionary types. The separatists would seek to remove themselves, and the area they live, completely from the control of the remainder of the state. The Confederacy in the American Civil War is a classic example of separatist activity, but in modern times the example of Angola and Nigeria are also useful illustrations of this category of insurgency. The aspirations of Kurds for a 'Kurdistan' and the enclave of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabach are oblique examples of separatist ambitions.

22. Now that the hegemony of large power blocs has lost its appeal many such movements are manifesting themselves more openly. However, Africa has been blighted by secessionist wars for many years following the ending of colonialism in many parts of that continent. In effect separatist activity around the world has been endemic since the early 1960s and most continents continue to have their share of this type of insurgency. The form of political system that would be adopted by the insurgents, if they succeeded, varies enormously from the more traditional to the outright socialist extreme. Nevertheless these insurgencies can be classed as separatist because this is the goal that they all seek, regardless of their size or whether they are motivated by regional, ethnic, social or religious reasons. Independence wars can be regarded as separatist in their form because the primary aim of the insurgents is independence. The Vietnamese and Algerian wars fall easily into this category, as did the insurgency in Dhofar during the late 1960s. The secessionist campaigns in Eritrea and Biafra are African examples. The Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka is another example in the Indian Sub Continent.

REFORMIST

23. This form of insurgency is a toned down version of the separatist type, in that insurgent groups would be fighting for political, economic or social reforms and possibly some form of autonomy for themselves, without altering the overall political status quo. The Kurds in Iran and Iraq are suitable examples, as is the smaller more recent example in Mexico during 1994 where Indians in the South of Mexico sought improvements to their way of life.
24. This final form of insurgency differs from the other six in that insurgents are orientated towards maintaining the political *status quo* in that nation because of the relative political, social and economic advantages that can be gained from it. These insurgents then take on the non ruling groups and the government where necessary, in order to frustrate any moves towards change.

25. Classic examples of this are the Afrikaner Resistance Movement in South Africa, and the para military groupings of protestant extraction in Northern Ireland. Right wing varieties of 'death squads' in a number of Latin American countries could also fall into this category.

**SECTION 4 – ANALYSING AN INSURGENCY**

26. **General.** It is not difficult to place the various forms of insurgency into one of the seven categories listed above - although care should be taken to avoid a too rigid approach to the analysis of an insurgency, particularly in the early stages of any insurgency. This is because there can be many pitfalls to trap the unwary analyst in dealing with insurgents and their claims. A few are given in subsequent paragraphs.

27. **Aims for an Insurgency.** Some insurgent movements change their aims during the process of an insurgency. New leaders take over, original aims may be seen as either unambitious or overambitious and as the insurgency develops so may the aims change. What started out in Northern Ireland as an IRA requirement to defend Catholic areas turned quickly into an insurgency against the established authority and resulted in a split by a breakaway group (Provisionals) from the old IRA (Officials). The change in the Dhofar insurgency during the early 1970s from a separatist movement to an egalitarian one, resulted from a Marxist takeover in the leadership during the insurgency.

28. **Rival Aims.** The identification of the aim for an insurgency assumes a unity of leadership and control within the insurgents. More often this is not the case and it is not difficult to see why. Insurgents may vary in their outlook, background and intellectual capability; they probably work in secret or in conditions where open discussion is not always possible, and events can occur which affect significantly the role of individual insurgent leaders. Arrest and imprisonment can set back the course of the insurgents group. In these complicated circumstances it is easy for rival groups within the insurgency to have differing aims and priorities and it may not be possible to identify immediately the overall aim of an insurgent group. Careful study of the group, any material it produces and its actions on the ground may help to define the main thrust of an insurgency.

29. **Written Material and Rhetoric.** Where an insurgency does produce material, or provide speakers whose views are reported, these can be analysed. However this is normally only appropriate when the insurgency is large and seeks a wider audience for its views. Smaller, more clandestine groupings, generally avoid this option, but are then probably less of a real threat to the established authorities. Furthermore such material if produced can often be misleading and obscure. N17 the small terrorist organisation which operated in Greece from 1973 to 1998 published many articles in the newspapers after terrorist incidents attempting to justify their actions. Taken as a whole these publications show that the organisation seems to have a small middle class/intellectual support, very little appeal to any non committed group, and no particular programme to speak of. It has
remained a small terrorist group outside the political arena, but yet an embarrassing left wing thorn in the side of the government which had to spend valuable resources to counter its terrorist activities.

30. **The Implications of Analysis.** While the roots of some insurgencies are more difficult to identify - partly because of their own internal arrangements, most insurgencies can be identified once their aims are reasonably clear and comprehensible. The process of identifying the basis of an insurgency can also lead to the implications that normally follow such analysis. These could be that:

a. Different aims put different demands on insurgents, - particularly with respect to resources. If an insurgent's aim is not amenable to compromise then it normally results in much stiffer opposition from the established authorities. In turn this implies that insurgencies should go for greater support, more funding and a longer term commitment to have any chance of success. Those whose aims are not the collapse of the established authority, such as reformists and preservationist types of insurgency, may be able to convince the authorities that concession is possible without recourse to a protracted insurgency.

b. A clear analysis of an insurgency can also help to discover the roles of outside or external parties to the insurgency. In the 1960s the tendency of the United States to intervene in insurrections was in part the result of thinking to equate insurgency with the revolutionary aspirations of egalitarian movements and the connotation of external support from China or the USSR. Calculations about intervention that gloss over the ultimate aims of an insurgency can be ill-informed and costly.

31. To help such analysis Figure 1 describes in diagrammatic form how an insurgency could develop. From this it may be possible to work out the aims, objectives and courses of action for an insurgency.

**SECTION 5 - INSURGENT STRATEGIES**

**GENERAL**

32. It should be noted that more often than not insurgent leaders are well informed, astute and will probably study the lessons of previous campaigns of insurgency. They will often seek to emulate the most successful elements of an established model, which they hope will provide the 'means' to achieve their chosen 'ends'. Before looking at the strategies in more detail, it is worth remembering that insurgents also make mistakes too: until the mid 1970s the Palestinian Popular Democratic Front set itself an end state that is not achievable (the destruction of Israel) and adopted a totally inappropriate Maoist strategy as their means to this end.

33. The most popular insurgent strategies continue to provide inspiration and guidance for diverse groups around the world. It should also be remembered that the originators of each believed that they had discovered a product that worked. An analysis of an insurgent's strategic approach has practical application, including, for example the production of a doctrinal overlay. The four broad types are briefly summarised in the subsequent paragraphs.
GRIEVANCES BECOME POLITICAL ISSUES

MOBILISING PUBLIC SUPPORT

ORGANISE OPEN AND CLANDESTINE OPPOSITION

DEMAND ON STATE AUTHORITIES

OPPOSITION ACCEPTS WITHOUT VIOLENCE

PERCEIVED LACK OF REASONABLE (POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL OPPORTUNITIES)

PUBLICISING GRIEVANCES

YES

NO

INSURGENCY

Figure 1. An Example of How an Insurgency May Develop
CONSPIRATORIAL STRATEGY

34. The oldest and least complicated of the strategies which was used by the Bolsheviks in 1917. It is designed to operate in an urban environment, ideally the capital city, which is seen as the decisive arena. Small cells of potential leaders attempt to release and channel the energy of a disaffected society, generating a ‘spontaneous’ uprising by means of bold armed action.

35. Typically, key points will be seized and a decapitating strike made against the governing regime. Modern exponents will seek both to seize control of, and exploit media coverage. The coup is generally organised by a relatively small group which may be a clique in the armed forces. The insurgents have to be highly secretive, disciplined, and capable of quick assembly (or dispersion).

PROTRACTED POPULAR WAR

36. The overall strategy was designed by Mao and has been adopted with varying degrees of success by numerous insurgent groups since. Mao envisaged three ‘phases’ - strategic defensive (organisation), strategic equilibrium (guerrilla warfare) and strategic offensive (open battle), leading to seizure of political power. Although it has often been linked with a Marxist ideology, the strategy is based upon the assumption that the cause will attract ever increasing numbers of supporters. It will involve a mix of political activity, terrorism and guerrilla tactics, but with the former always predominating.

37. The strategy is most applicable in rural, peasant-based environments in situations where government control is weak or non existent, and where the insurgent can establish his base areas, build a parallel political and military structure and gradually expand the area of influence to challenge government authority. As the title suggests, the strategy takes time to reach fruition. The requirement for favourable terrain (space in which to hide and trade for time) may restrict the use of this strategy in the future, although it may still prove effective in underdeveloped regions or states with poor armed forces. It could also be argued that city and urban 'sprawl' will provide the same sort of 'space' that is needed to foster an insurrection of this type.

URBAN INSURGENCY

38. In its pure form this strategy involves the application of organised crime and terrorism in a systematic and ruthless manner. The intention, according to Carlos Marighela, one of its main proponents, is to force a repressive military response that in turn will alienate the volatile mass of the urban poor and move them to revolt. The media will be used to generate an air of panic. Violence is therefore a catalyst for political change. The strategy and tactics of this form of insurgency have been adopted by numerous groups.

39. The urban insurgent is no new phenomenon, but the very complexity of modern life and the ease with which it can be disrupted has undoubtedly encouraged the growth of urban guerrilla philosophies and tactics. Lenin developed the art of creating a revolutionary situation. He appreciated the importance of destroying the credibility of the government's will and ability to govern, thus creating what has been aptly called a 'climate
of collapse', where the people, faced with the real threat of a collapse of urban life and livelihood, will rally to whatever organisation seems best able to restore order out of chaos.

40. The urban insurgent has adopted tactics designed to erode the morale of the politicians, the administrators and the judiciary, the police and the army, with the aim of inducing a climate of collapse. At this stage, the insurgency anticipates either that the government will capitulate or be provoked into adopting repressive measures and, above all, causing bloodshed. Against such repression, the urban insurgent, purposes to appear like a knight in shining armour as the peoples' protector.

41. The chief weapon of the urban insurgent is indiscriminate terror, by which he can induce the situation of general insecurity, nervousness and fear pictured above. He has the advantage of surprise, and exploits this by concentrating on pinprick attacks like assassinations, ambushes, kidnapping, sabotage, and raids on banks, prisons and army and police installations. He has been pictured as:

"Familiar with the avenues, streets, alleys, the ins and outs of the urban centres, their paths and short-cuts, their empty lots, their underground passages, their pipes and sewers, the urban guerrilla crosses through irregular and difficult terrain unfamiliar to the police, where they can be surprised in a fatal ambush or trapped at any moment."

[Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla by Carlos Marighela].

42. The urban insurgent cannot, like his rural counterpart, establish bases and recruit armies. He is an individual, a member of a relatively small group, relying on the cover afforded by the teeming people of the city and on terror to avoid betrayal, but he relies above all on publicity to make his cause known and achieve a favourable public response. Good publicity is as vital to the insurgent as a hostile public reaction can be damaging.

43. Similarly, the deliberate promotion of adverse publicity against government agencies, including the security forces, if deployed, is essential and complementary. The opportunities for mass publicity have not only advertised and contributed to the growth of this type of insurgency they have also given it an international aspect. The growing trend towards the use of civil liberties and 'human rights' by political groups also tends to lower the tolerance of the general public for effective counter measures. This is shown not only by the way in which new techniques quickly become widely adopted, but also through the advent of the international travelling insurgent, usually well educated and often well-heeled, who may appear in any country and any setting where the circumstances seem to him - or her - ripe for exploitation.

ISOLATED TERRORISM

44. No less dangerous or destabilising for the government is the potential for isolated terrorism often committed by small groups of militant insurgents. Modern society is vulnerable to terrorist tactics not only because of its complexity, but also because of its high technology. Thus, while on the one hand whole modern cities can be reduced to chaos by lack of electrical power or the health hazards of untended sewers, on the other hand the terrorist can exploit the vulnerability of jet aircraft, fast trains and crowded motorways to make extravagant demands linked to the threat of causing spectacular disasters. With the
sort of publicity which modern communication has made inevitable, one such act of terrorism can make an impact on the world at large.

45. Evidence from the 1970s and 1980s shows that terrorists knew this - and experience also shows that no modern democratic and open society can protect itself completely against such a threat. With this in mind a small group who hold extremist views (of whatever type) can conduct isolated acts of terrorism or assassination in the hope that their demands can be met. This may not amount to full scale insurrection, or indeed anything approaching it, but it could easily result in the government becoming involved in large scale counter terrorist operations to find and neutralise the group or face the embarrassing consequences.

SECTION 6 – THE POTENTIAL BACKLASH AGAINST AN INSURGENCY

VIOLENT REACTION BY COMMUNITIES

46. Once insurgency is established in a state or region there is always the possibility of a violent reaction within the community, particularly in response to terrorist acts. This sort of backlash could be provoked by insurgency movements, sometimes deliberately but is often a spontaneous reaction by parts of the community. It may be a simple gut reaction by one community against another believed to be causing outrages or harbouring terrorists sympathetic towards them. On the other hand it may be a more premeditated attempt by an enraged section of society to take the law into its own hands against the perpetrators because it has no confidence in the security forces’ ability to bring them to justice.

EXTREMIST REACTIONS AND DEATH SQUADS

47. Reaction to such terrorism can also lead to sectarian strife, anarchic and chaotic situations, which while providing useful propaganda and cover for insurgents, can also be the reason for ‘death squads’, extreme reaction and the possibility of a coup d’état by disaffected groups within the state including the armed forces. Operations in Algeria, both in the 1950s and recently in Iraq are all classic examples of extremist reaction.

48. Furthermore this reaction once started can also escalate to a sectarian or civil war situation which will provide good propaganda for the insurgents. The Loyalist terrorist operations in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s and later is a good example of action outside the law which can destabilise society as a whole.

CONCLUSION

49. It should be stressed that these examples of strategies are not watertight categories into which new threats should be fitted. In practice insurgencies use similar tools, but in different proportions and with different results. The success of the individual strategy selected will be determined by a range of factors, all of which should be considered in any assessment of an insurgency. These are dealt with in more detail later in this publication. Since 1990 newer and more precise methods of analysing an ‘insurgency’ are coming into prominence – partly because defining insurgencies by their aspirations is becoming less accurate although not necessarily irrelevant.
1. **Nationalism and Repression.** After the battle of Waterloo in 1815 when Napoleon was banished to St Helena, the concern of the victorious coalition powers, quickly joined by a France guided by Talleyrand’s diplomacy, was to restore peace and stability to a continent torn by over two decades of conflict. This was achieved under their sponsorship at the Congress of Vienna. In a series of treaties signed in 1814 and 1815 Austrian influence was restored over much of Germany, Italy remained divided, some of it under Austrian and French rule, and the independence of Belgium and Poland was extinguished. Only Belgium succeeded in winning its freedom in 1830. The remaining nationalist revolutions came to grief in 1848 and 1849. For the next sixty years the breechloading rifle, the railway and the telegraph gave established governments the advantage over nationalist as well as socialist revolutionaries. New continental empires and states were created by war rather than revolution, although Garibaldi, as the inheritor of the enthusiasms of the French Revolution, mobilised popular armed support to help Mazzini, Cavour and Victor Emmanuel weld the Italian states into a single nation. French victories at Magenta at Solferino saw the end of Austrian influence in Italy. The new inventions, and the efficient machinery of the Prussian state and army, enabled von Bismarck and von Moltke to apply Napoleon’s legacy of military proficiency to fight three short, sharp and successful wars to create the Second Reich.

2. **Revolution and Repression.** Despite the attractiveness of the theme liberté, égalité et fraternité as a motif for revolution, nationalism was to furnish a more potent stimulant than individual emancipation on the Continent during the latter half of the Nineteenth Century. While dissatisfied national minorities schemed to dismember the Austro-Hungarian Empire an ill-assorted collection of revolutionaries and idealists plotted to overthrow the Tsarist regime in Russia. In that instance they were unable to make much headway against the state secret police. In a France, humiliated by Prussia in the 1870-71 War, the Second Empire was overthrown, but the emergent Third Republic managed to defeat the Paris Commune, the first Marxist revolution, in a struggle which was far bloodier than the French Revolution eighty years earlier. The Commune was a rare example of revolutionaries fighting openly. The moderation they displayed, in refusing to seize the Bank of France for instance, was not reciprocated. The Commune was ruthlessly quelled. Similarly, a Tsarist government humbled by Japan was able to face down a widespread but uncoordinated revolt in 1905. The concessions yielded by the Tsar were virtually meaningless. As Trotsky put it, ‘A constitution is given, but the autocracy remains’. An even more disastrous defeat would be needed to provide the catalyst for a Communist revolution.

3. **The British Experience.** For the first six or seven years after Waterloo the Tory government which had won the war remained in power, impervious to the mounting social pressures of the agrarian and industrial revolutions, and to the demands for parliamentary reform. Violence there certainly was in those years but on a lesser scale than on the Continent. The dispersal of a crowd of 50,000 which had assembled at St Peter’s Field outside Manchester to listen to ‘Orator’ Hunt by a yeomanry charge, dubbed ‘Peterloo’, in
1819, killing twelve and injuring hundreds, and the Cato Street Conspiracy, an unsuccessful plot hatched in that street to murder the entire cabinet at a dinner party in Grosvenor Square a year later, were exceptional events in a slow, intermittent but persevering progress towards reform. Apart from the Irish Home Rule crisis of 1914, soon to be swallowed up in the larger trauma of the First World War, the nearest the country came to revolution or civil war was when the Whig Reform Bill of 1832, with the limited aim of enfranchising the middle class, was defeated once in the Commons and twice by the Lords. It was passed however when Lord Grey suggested to William IV that it might be necessary to create enough peers to carry it to avert civil war. The voteless continued to press for democracy through the People’s Charter but in contrast to the riots and revolutions of 1848 on the Continent, the Chartist march through London that year received scant support. Enthusiasm for empire building and a constant stream of emigrants to settle the temperate colonies, which were to achieve dominion status, eased the strain on the British Isles and provided a distraction from domestic social problems. Following the passage of the Reform Bill the last seven decades of the Nineteenth Century were to witness a steady extension of the vote and civil liberties, even to the extent of offering Marx and Engels an asylum where they could develop their revolutionary theories. In the closed society of the Tsarist police state the Bolsheviks, as well as anarchists and other extremists, learned to plot in secrecy and to develop a cellular party organisation structure to spread their Marxist philosophy and other ideas underground.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY UNTIL 1945

4. Marx, Lenin and Trotsky. The lesson that Karl Marx drew from the failure of the Commune, reinforced by the collapse of the 1905 Revolution, was that it was no use taking over an existing regime; it had to be destroyed and replaced by a revolutionary one. Lenin agreed but it was Trotsky who produced a strategy for revolutionary war, although he never claimed to be a military expert. He put his faith in arming and training a well indoctrinated urban proletariat able to strike a quick and mortal blow against regular forces which had been weakened by Marxist propaganda. He considered that a rustic rebellion would take too long to mobilise, would be hard to control and could be beaten by regulars loyal to the Tsar.

5. The Russian Revolution, 1917. Kerensky’s weak liberal government was overturned, not by a popular uprising, but by Lenin and Trotsky’s coup d’état of November 1917. It was the defeats, hardships and pressures of the First World War rather than Marxist theory which undermined the morale of the Imperial Army, the Tsar’s bulwark against revolution. Much of it was induced to desert to the Bolshevik cause enabling Trotsky to win the Civil War by conventional military means. The Revolution was consolidated by making peace with Germany and giving land to the peasants. Foreign support for the White Russians from the war weary allies was only half-hearted. The Comintern was formed in 1919 following a meeting of the Third Communist International in Moscow to promote revolution abroad. However, the Cominterns activities were temporarily shelved by Stalin in the late ’20s to preserve ‘socialism in one country’. Once that had been secured attention could be diverted to promoting subversive, proselytising activities, based on indigenous communist parties, front organisations and the urban proletariat, to foster world revolution. These efforts were to be pursued as opportunity offered, until the collapse of the USSR and of the central role that the Communist Party played in the state. Just as Stalin was prepared to sacrifice Communist parties abroad, when it suited the interests of the USSR, so he imposed a ruthless dictatorship at home,
which surpassed the most brutal excesses of any tsar with the murder of some 19 million people over the course of some 10 years. For all their protestations to the contrary, Communism and Fascism had much in common in terms of the tyrannies they created.

6. **Mao Tse-tung and China.** The two great Asian Communist leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh, based their revolution on the peasantry. Mao Tse-tung’s policy was the opposite of the Russian version of Communist teaching, which had aimed to convert the urban proletariat to the revolutionary cause first, and then to secure the countryside. ‘When he realised that the Marxist model of proletarian war did not apply to China, an agrarian society with a weak industrial sector, he turned away from the cities and workers to the countryside and the peasantry as the main support for revolution. Guerrillas, weaker than their enemy, could not be effective or even survive without strong, well-organised popular support. Mobilising that support was a political rather than a military task, and the primacy of political over military concerns became a hallmark of Mao’s theorising about warfare. In this respect he diverged markedly from traditional Western military thought, with its fairly rigid distinctions between war and peace, and between political and military affairs’.

Faced with a formidable Kuomintang Army, Mao withdrew from south-east China by a circuitous westerly route to the caves of Yenan in the north-western province of Shansi. Of perhaps 86,000 men who set out on the Long March in October 1934 only about 4,000 reached their destination a year later. A myth was carefully created to turn a severe defeat into a legendary triumph. However, starting from his remote base Mao was able to begin the process of wearing down the Kuomintang forces in a prolonged guerrilla war. Gradually he expanded the territory under his control by a combination of terror and persuasion, allowing him to raise and train an army capable of engaging his enemy in the field. Fifteen years after he set out for Yenan he entered Peking.

**INSURGENCY SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

7. After 1945 there is a new common factor discernible in all the armed conflicts since the Second World War, and especially in the majority of those conflicts that are irregular in nature. Military power has become less effective in achieving decisive politically satisfactory results at every level of conflict. This is as true for enemies fighting with conventional weapons as for the nuclear-armed super powers, and it is equally true for governments and for insurgents in “small wars” that now account for most of the world's suffering.

8. The principal technique which the insurgent groups have used to attack the state authorities in the past 50 years has been guerrilla warfare; for a time, in the 1950s and early 1960s, it seemed a virtually infallible technique for overthrowing governments. But like the first of the modern methods for seizing state power, the urban uprisings of nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe which drew their inspiration from the French revolution in 1789, guerrilla warfare proved to be a technique that only flourished in a specific environment.

9. Guerrilla warfare as a form of resistance to foreign occupation or an unpopular domestic government has been around since the beginning of history. But it was not generally regarded as a potentially decisive military technique even as late as World War II,

---

when it was again widely employed against German and Japanese occupation forces, primarily because it lacked an adequate strategy for final victory.

10. So long as the guerrillas remained dispersed in the hills, forests, or swamps and indulged in only hit-and-run raiding against the government or the foreign occupiers, they could be tolerated, but they could never clear their opponents out of the urban centres of power. If they came down out of the hills and attempted to do so in open combat, they gave their opponents the target they had been hoping for, and the enemy's regular forces would smash them. Even the Yugoslavs, the most successful guerrilla fighters of World War II, could not have liberated their country unaided; the Germans finally pulled out mainly because the Red Army was sweeping through the Balkans toward them.

11. What changed after World War II was that the rural guerrilla technique spread into the European colonial empires, at a time when the imperial powers were in a gravely weakened economic condition. As in the occupied countries of Europe during the war, the insurgents in the European colonies after the war had no difficulty in mobilising many of their newly nationalistic fellow countrymen against the foreign occupiers - and as in the occupied countries of Europe, they had virtually no prospect of winning a military victory against the well-equipped regular forces of the imperial power, though they could turn themselves into an expensive nuisance. What was different, was that European powers had no such stake in retaining control of their colonies and had lost the legitimacy for their presence.

12. If the insurgents could make it very expensive for the colonial power to stay, and could go on doing so indefinitely, they didn't have to worry about gaining a military victory. The colonial power would eventually decide to cut its losses and withdraw. This was a reality that had already been demonstrated by the Irish war of Independence in 1919-21 and the Turkish war of National Resistance against attempted partition by the victorious Entente powers in 1919-22 (the struggle for which the new Soviet Union coined the phrase "national liberation war"). The demonstration was repeated many times in the two decades after 1945, in Indonesia, Kenya, Malaya, Vietnam, South Yemen, and many other places. In a few cases like Malaya, the British handed over to the Malayan Authorities. In the case of Algeria the colonial power won the military confrontation but could not overcome the political imperative for change in France, Algeria and elsewhere. In the majority of cases, the decolonisation process was achieved without a guerrilla war, once the message of their own vulnerability to this technique had been absorbed.

13. At the time, the apparently irresistible spread of rural guerrilla wars caused some alarm in the major Western powers. There was also an ideological element, however, in that almost all of these postwar insurgencies espoused some variant of the same Marxist ideology propounded by the West's main international rival, the Soviet Union. The insurgents tended to attribute their successes to ideology rather than to the particular environment in which they were operating. This led to a belief in the West that it was Soviet and/or Chinese expansionism, and not simply local resentment of foreign rule, that lay behind these guerrilla wars, and so to the creation of special counter insurgency forces, especially in the United States, and ultimately to the commitment of US troops to Vietnam during 1965.

14. The technique of rural insurgency only flourished as long as there were demoralised governments around to oppose. The world remains littered with rural guerrilla movements
today, hanging on in the more rugged parts of dozens of Third World countries, but as the exponents of a minority ideology or the representatives of a minority ethnic group, they have very little prospect of success against local governments that can credibly invoke nationalism on their own side. The era of successful rural insurgency was already in decline when the United States became involved in Vietnam.

15. It is far harder to win a guerrilla campaign against one's own government, not only because there is not the natural antipathy against foreign rule to attract recruits to the cause, but also because a locally based government cannot simply cut its losses and go home if the cost of fighting a counter insurgency campaign gets too high. As a consequence, when fighting against their own government, rural insurgents do have to face the question of how to win final military victory in open battle against the government's regular armed forces - and only three have achieved it: China in 1949, Cuba in 1959, and Nicaragua in 1979.

16. The war in Vietnam between 1965-73 obscured an important development elsewhere, however this was precisely the period in which rural guerrilla warfare showed how ineffective it was outside the specific late colonial environment in which it had flourished. There was never any serious attempt to practice it in any industrialised country, but in the middle and late 1960s the Cubans made a concerted effort to extend the technique to the independent states of Latin America. Rural insurgencies sprang up in almost all the states of South America, Marxist in orientation and enjoying tacit or even open Cuban support. Without exception, they failed disastrously. The epitome of this failure was "Che" Guevara's tragicomic attempt to start such a movement in Bolivia, which ended in his own death in 1967.

17. This is not to say that the technique can never work in independent underdeveloped countries, but it certainly does require that the target government be iniquitous, incompetent, and politically isolated (as in Nicaragua). In most Latin American states, the insurgents had been eliminated or reduced to a merely marginal nuisance by 1970. The inescapable conclusion - which was accepted by most Latin American revolutionaries - was that rural guerrilla warfare was another insurgency technique that had failed.

18. This realisation drove numbers of these disappointed insurgents into random terrorism (or rather, "urban guerrilla warfare", as it is now known). In effect, the strategy of the Latin American originators of this doctrine, most notably the Montoneros of Argentina, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, and Brazilian revolutionaries like Carlos Marighella, was aimed at driving the target regimes into extreme repression.

19. By assassinations, bank robberies, kidnappings, hijackings, and such activity, all calculated to attract maximum publicity in the media and to embarrass the government to the greatest possible extent, the insurgents sought to provoke the displacement of democratic governments by tough military regimes, or to drive existing military regimes into even stricter and more unpopular security measures. If the regime resorted to counter terror, torture, "disappearances," and death squads, all the better, for the purpose was to discredit the government and alienate it from the population.

20. As with rural guerrilla warfare when it is attempted outside a colonial environment, the fatal flaw in any urban guerrilla strategy is that it lacks completeness. The theory is that when the guerrillas have succeeded in driving the government into a sufficiently repressive
posture, the populace will rise up in righteous wrath and destroy its oppressors. But even if the population should decide that it is the government and not the guerrillas that is responsible for its growing misery, there is no plan of how to eliminate the government.

21. In a number of Latin American countries, the insurgents did accomplish the first phase of their strategy: the creation of thoroughly nasty and brutally repressive military governments dedicated to destroying them. But what then happened was that these governments proceeded to do precisely that. In every Latin American country where they attempted to use this strategy, the vast majority of the urban guerrillas are now dead, captured, or in exile.

22. In the past few years another form of militant tendency has reappeared on the international scene; that of Islamic fundamentalism, or rather Islamism, to use its more correct appellation. Since communism has now collapsed, this form of militant opposition to secular governments and regimes has taken much of the limelight. Annex B provides some of the background to Islamism and some clues as to its strengths and weaknesses.

23. In summary, all the non governmental forms of organised violence which have emerged over the past couple of centuries do not change the basic reality. Insurgents of any political hue, no matter which specific techniques they use, are an inherently transient phenomenon although this may be changing. Insurgencies that are regional or global in context are now being regarded as long or longer term in nature because of the overall complexity of dealing with insurgencies with such, normally, ambitious aims.
THE DANGERS OF ISLAMISM - REAL AND APPARENT

1. In recent years fundamentalist terrorism and subversion have become a growing and significant threat to a wider area of the world than at any time since the Iranian Revolution in 1978. This type of activity threatens stability in several North African states, around the rim of the former Soviet Union, and even some parts of South East Asia.

2. Islamism, more commonly referred to in the Western World as Islamic fundamentalism, is the ideologised and political version of Islam. One of its pervasive characteristics is the sharpness of its verbal criticism of Western secular practices which in the more recent past has been translated into terrorist action against states, institutions and individuals in the West. Beyond the religious distortions which Islamism has thrown up this recent turmoil is really about how people think and live - and not simply about boundaries or economic interests. This is why it affects a whole group of nation states in a swathe across the Middle East and North Africa and its consequences and implications are of global significance.

3. The blanket labeling of Islam as a fundamentalist threat is dangerous, because it plays into the purposes of the Islamists themselves. This is because, first, such stereotype thinking tacitly accepts the assertion of Islamists that they and their followers represent the true Islam, and second, it lends credence to the Islamist insistence that there is a kind of irreconcilable hostility between Islam and "the West" which inevitably makes them arch-enemies.

4. That is not really the case. The Islamists constitute only a small group within the Islamic world. Under some circumstances, however, they can mobilise a sizeable following, as was illustrated by the revolutionary years in Iran and the more recent elections in Algeria. Such circumstances usually involve dissatisfaction with a nation's regime and the political, economic and social conditions under its rule at that time. Such dissatisfaction may be more or less justified, but in almost every instance it is at least based on genuine problems or abuses. Whether an Islamist group, if they possessed power, could really govern better than any secular state is another question. All the current signs are that they could not retain power for long as witnessed recently in Somalia.

5. Despite its anti-Western rhetoric, in political practice Islamism is directed primarily against the existing state authorities which the fundamentalists hope to topple and supplant. The arguments they use to that end, however, are largely anti-Western in nature. Just as the late Shah of Iran was labeled a "lackey of the Americans," an existing secular government is stamped as a "Lackey of the West". As such, it is often characterised by Islamic extremists as not a truly Muslim government, but rather as a "jahiliya" regime.

6. The term jahiliya - the "time of ignorance" - is used in Islam to designate the era before the appearance of the Prophet Mohammed. This is symptomatic of the Islamist tendency to see themselves as the only true Muslims and thus to claim that they represent the real Islam.

---

1 Based loosely on an Article in Swiss Review of World Affairs Sep 92 by Arnold Hottinger.
7. In doing so Muslims are articulating deep-seated resentments prevalent throughout the Third World today, especially among Europe’s closest neighbours. These resentments are linked to the superimposition of Western power - military, economic, cultural, technological and ideological - which non-European peoples have experienced since the beginning of the 19th century and continue to experience today.

8. Many Muslims have found those Western influences acceptable as long as there was hope that they would ultimately bring their country prosperity and prestige. But doubts about this have steadily increased with the years: in the Arab world following the Six Day War (1967), and in Iran quite suddenly when the economic boom collapsed in 1978. It came to seem progressively more improbable that the path of Westernisation, would really lift the societies of the Middle East to a level comparable to that of the West.

9. As long as such a discrepancy exists between the actual situation and the divinely given claim to superiority, there is bound to be a more or less diffuse malaise in the collective Muslim psyche, which intensifies when prospects for real change appear slight or non existent.

10. The urgent desire for a change in existing conditions is thus motivated not only by the desire for a better life in this world, but also by the religiously based drive to make of the Muslim community once again the successful, divinely blessed community it once was, and should be according to the Muslims’ own view of the world.

11. Such a doctrine presents a danger primarily to more or less Westernised Muslim governments and elites. It aims first and foremost at taking power domestically, in an internal arena which its advocates regard as corrupted by the West. It should also be recognised that Islamist ideology as a political opposition force makes promises it could hardly keep if its advocates were to come to power. The inadequacy, and hence exploitability, of the Muslim countries is caused by objective facts which have been present for many years and which cannot be altered merely by adopting an ideological dogma that purports to be the "true" Islam.

12. Fundamentalists insist that their doctrine will change people and that these altered individuals will then be able to approach the world around them differently. So far, alas there is little sign of such internal change in Iran or Sudan - or in Pakistan, where attempts are also being made to introduce a fundamentalist - style Islamic state.

13. It will no doubt remain difficult to bring about a genuine change in "the hearts and minds of men" as long as the Islamists insist on equating Islam with the body of religious laws known as the Shari‘a, formulated by religious scholars in the Early Middle Ages in keeping with their understanding of Islamic texts and traditions. The attempt to live in accordance with this mediaeval code results in a strict formalism; that is, the formal fulfillment of finely detailed religious prescriptions and proscriptions from a time long past - a mode of existence hardly likely to alter the hearts and behaviour of people as to make them better suited to meet the challenge of modern life.

14. As soon as Islamists come to power, the unconditional acceptance of the Shari‘a as a legal guide turns into a weakness. In some cases they are forced to find formal excuses for circumventing religious law and merely fulfilling it pro forma. In other cases, religious law can constrain the life of individual families and entire societies, imprison their
intellectual horizons in rigid structures, thereby making it impossible for the Islamists and the people they rule to create a modern state.

15. As internal tensions in Islamist-ruled countries grow, the danger increases of government-sponsored terrorism or of some rash military action. Such actions are more likely to occur in the area immediately around the country concerned - eg the Gulf region for Iran and Egypt for Sudan. So far, these states lack the military means to become active over greater distances but this could change. Their leaders are aware of this limitation which is confirmed by the fact that Muslim and Islamist countries have failed to intervene in any significant way in the Bosnian conflict.

16. The fact that close to 12 million Muslim guest workers live - and will continue to live - in Europe and the United States, could also be a source of some danger. Only a very small percentage of these guest workers and immigrants are Islamists. But the number could increase rapidly if these workers are handled badly. Exposure to repeated injustice will drive them into the arms of the fundamentalists. In this sense, what applies to the Middle East also applies to Europe. The worse matters become for the Muslim population objectively, and the more hopeless their European existence seems to them subjectively, the more easily they will fall victim to the lure of Islamism. Most security services in the industrialised nations are not yet properly equipped to differentiate accurately between harmless foreign workers and members of potentially hostile islamic groups.

17. To the extent that Islamism constitutes a danger to any state, the best way to counter it is to understand the intellectual and organisational mechanisms in which the Islamists operate. Effective counter measures must begin at that point because ideas - even those that distort reality - can only be fought by other ideas. Helping to eliminate the existing abuses and inequities is the price that has to be paid for deflecting the danger of Islamism.
CHAPTER 3
THE STRATEGIC CONDUCT OF AN INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 - ABIDING FEATURES

1. **Basic Tenets.** All successful insurgents and those who have come near to success, have, consciously or not, subscribed to certain basic tenets. Like any other tenets, such as the principles of war, they should be applied rationally to suit the circumstances of the society and the political circumstances of the day. These tenets are:

   a. A cause.
   b. Leadership.
   c. Popular support.
   d. Organisation.

2. **Cause.** In the past the cause for which the leaders have normally persuaded the insurgents to risk their lives and the population to provide support, sometimes at risk to life, liberty and property, has been a valid one. It has usually been based on generally perceived grievances in the political, social and economic fields, and was sufficiently emotive to appeal to the imagination and fired supporters with enough enthusiasm to fight for this cause. Today the same situation prevails; if the cause appears to be reasonable and valid, then there will be grounds for revolt. However, with the recent rapid increase in the use of cheap, speedy and reliable communications and imagery an international dimension can readily be added to the ability to drum up a cause. Sectarian and religious issues can very easily be exploited to foster antagonism towards the ruling authorities and to deepen and reinforce existing grievances. Sometimes this is cause enough to embarrass the authorities into remedial action or suppression and hence become the basis for a potential insurgency.

3. **Leadership.** The cause is best publicised and personified by a charismatic leader who can inspire his followers, convert the uncommitted and at least command the respect, and certainly the fear, of those who support the authorities. He or she has to possess the sharpness of intellect to enable them to determine and define long term political and strategic aims and the nimbleness of wit and wisdom to adjust the immediate strategy and tactics to achieve them. This also requires considerable military skills. Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and Tito all exercised fine political judgement in when to attack and when to bide their time. An insurgent leader needs a hard and ruthless streak behind the facade of cheerful *bonhomie* he or she has to wear for political and propaganda purposes. There may well be rivalries for leadership which need to be dealt with firmly to survive and a leader has to have the strength of character to impose decisions taken, especially when the insurgency is in its early stages. There have been instances where the leader of an insurgency does not appear to have the qualities of leadership normally associated with such individuals. This may be because the leader is not generally known within the country or because there is a lack of understanding and appreciation of his or her motivations. As a rule of thumb the connection between cause and leadership is a dynamic one. If the cause is sound, the leader need not be so charismatic, if the cause seems weak or divisive then
the leader needs to be strong and effective. It should also be recognised that any analysis
of cause could, by its nature be subjective, perceived through 'western eyes' and hence not
always very helpful, particularly in the early formative period of an insurgency when not
much is known about their aims.

4. **Popular Support.** The cause and the leader have to appeal to as wide an audience
as possible. The insurgent's political plans will endeavour to enlist the support of as much
of the population as possible irrespective of age, sex or class. Neutrals are neither
recognised nor tolerated by insurgents. They have to be persuaded or coerced to join the
cause. Some may have to be murdered to persuade the waverers. Popular support is not
only important from a political point of view but is essential to the provision of logistic
support, to the development of an intelligence network and to the creation of a protective
security screen around the insurgents' clandestine organisation. In recent times aspects of
this popular support may not be necessary as a result of the brutal and potentially horrific
application of the propaganda of the deed (see 9/11).

5. **Organisation.** To be successful any insurgency has to have some organisation in
order to be able to function properly - and to respond appropriately to the many aspects of
an insurgency. At the outset of any insurgency organisation may not be the first priority and
with few hard core members there may be less need for detailed organisations. As the
insurgency develops however, organisation into groups/cells/companies etc - will be vital,
both to protect members and equipment and also to expand sufficiently to take more
adherents to the cause. Once a sufficient level of popular support has been achieved,
organisation will be vital to coordinate all the various activities of an insurgency and to start
the process of providing a credible alternative to the established authorities. Once again a
looser and more flexible organisation and control seems to be more useful in modern
insurgency – both for security and for international awareness.

**SECTION 2 - THE CONTEXT OF AN INSURGENCY**

6. **Suiting the Strategy to the Circumstances.** Insurgency is essentially an empirical
art. Existing experience is adapted to suit particular situations. Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and
Ho Chi Minh propounded strategies based on Hegel and Marx which they applied with
realistic flexibility and pragmatism to seize power in Russia, China and Vietnam. In Italy
the Red Brigades were inspired by Marxist philosophy in their attempt to create a
'revolutionary proletariat' to overthrow the legitimate government. Since the Marxists took
some trouble to rationalise their system of revolutionary war they are worth studying. Many
insurgents copied their ideas, but few met with much success. In the latter part of this
century these ideas have become less fashionable with the demise of communism;
although there is still much an insurgent can learn about the tactics of an insurgency by an
examination of previous anti-imperialist campaigns. It is also relevant to understand why
some insurgencies have failed, in order to appreciate the art of suiting a strategy to the
circumstances of the day.

7. **A Revolutionary Situation.** In the context of massive discontent and a weak and
discredited government which cannot rely on the loyalty of its security forces a skilled
insurgent leader who has prepared the way with a seemingly valid cause, a party with a
cellular organisation, and a capability to apply ruthless methods to put plans into effect may
achieve results relatively quickly: Lenin in 1917 and Hitler in 1933 both seized power in
putsches. On a smaller scale, King Farouk of Egypt's regime was ripe for General Neguib
and Colonel Nassers' coup d'état in the wake of the 'Black Saturday' riots in Cairo in early 1952.

8. **War of Attrition.** Against a government which commands a wide measure of support and can rely on the majority of its security forces the insurgent has to look to a protracted war of attrition, perhaps on the communist model, appropriately modified to the political and geographical environment. Political policy and military action are closely coordinated to support each other. The aim of the attritional approach is gradually to erode the will of the government's supporters at home to continue the struggle and to persuade public opinion amongst its foreign allies that the cause is hopeless, and a waste of life and resources. Once such a mood sets in, artful propaganda and large scale anti-war demonstrations can be expected to force allied governments to weaken their support.

9. **Support for an Insurgency.** At the strategic and operational level, experience has shown that deception has often been a major weapon in the armoury of an insurgency - particularly those that emanate from a totalitarian base; this would include religious zealots in a wider interpretation of the term totalitarian. The capacity of a population in a modern democracy to support a counter insurgency for long is at best precarious. The mixture of propaganda and compulsion which a totalitarian form of insurgency can offer, in order to extract vital support, is normally not available to a democratic state. Thus when military operations, government controls, and restrictions drag on for long periods popular support is bound to decline. It has been quoted that "unless it is severely provoked, or unless the war succeeds fast, democracy cannot choose this method as an instrument of policy."

10. **Deception.** For a totalitarian regime conducting or supporting insurrection in other states, the ideological and propaganda effort required can be established easily in order to gain the sympathy and support of the outside world while at the same time deceiving others of the true nature of their involvement with insurgency. By the same token deception can be used to project a false picture of the origins and character of the insurrection and to create a myth of systematic war crimes by the state authorities.

**SECTION 3 - FACTORS AFFECTING AN INSURGENCY**

11. **General.** The factors which affect an insurgency can be as important as the cause of the insurgency itself and will contribute significantly to the end results if carefully applied. The factors are:-

   a. **Protracted War.**

   b. **Choice of Terrain.**

   c. **Intelligence.**

   d. **Establishment of an Alternative Society.**

   e. **External Support.**

   f. **Concurrent Activity.**
12. **Protracted War.** Although a weak government may fall quite quickly to a well organised rebellion, or even overnight to a *coup d'état*, a strong government may only be defeated by protracted operations against it. Time is on the side of the insurgent. Insurgents will need to be indoctrinated to expect a long war and to display patience and endurance. The struggle will generally take place in two environments, the town and the countryside although insurgent activity could well occur in both town and countryside once it has become firmly established. The emphasis to be placed on each will depend on the size and nature of the territory and where the insurgents’ strength initially lies.

a. **Rural.** The rural scene lends itself to the gradual occupation of a country, for example Mao Tse-tung factors in China and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. The insurgency leader has to be prepared to play a long game, withdrawing when necessary to avoid an unnecessary defeat to keep his forces in being. He should have enough flexibility of mind to reconsider his immediate strategy while keeping his longer term aims constantly in mind.

b. **Urban.** The urban guerrilla’s inability to occupy territory can be partially overcome by establishing ‘no-go’ areas in cities or in relatively safe zones domiciled by his fellow countrymen, co-religionists or other sympathisers. He relies more on war-wearyness, economic privation and the inability of the authorities to suppress terrorism than on winning an overall military victory to achieve his aims. There have been exceptions to this theory, but they are rare; Cuba is one such example between 1958-60.

13. **Choice of Terrain.** While insurgents can operate anywhere, either on their own account or in support of a protracted insurgency, a force which wishes to survive and perhaps develop into an army capable of formal conventional operations has to make the best strategic use of space or of the cover provided by thick jungle or high mountains to force the security forces to fight as far away as possible from their bases. ‘...... without the ability to seize and hold territory or to win quick victory, space and time became weapons rather than goals’. Proximity to the border of a friendly country will offer the insurgents a source of supply and sanctuary. While Mao Tse-tung initially relied on the vast tracts of western China, Castro used the Sierra Maestra of south-eastern Cuba. In the smaller territories of Cyprus and Palestine; in the former, EOKA used the towns as well as the Troodos Mountains to hide in, and, in the latter, both Arab and Zionist guerrilla groups used the Judean and Samarian hills as well as the urban labyrinths of Jerusalem and the towns on the coastal plain.

14. **Space to Operate.** In another sense a terrorist may make use of the neutral or friendly support of an urban population to act as his ‘space or cover’ to carry out his operations; - a fish swimming in the friendly water to paraphrase Mao Tse Tung loosely. This form of activity may lead to the mobilisation of the urban population in favour of the insurgency. It could in the short term lead to the creation of no go areas, however, these then tend to focus the attention of the authorities on to that particular area and in turn could limit the space and cover needed for terrorist activity.

15. **Intelligence.** The best source of insurgent intelligence is the sympathiser who works in some kind of government employment, especially in a job connected directly with the security forces. The police are a particular target for insurgent infiltration. Information from double agents provides not only good target intelligence but timely warning of security
force counter action. The media may also contribute to the insurgent’s information
gathering organisation, either inadvertently, through naivety or intentionally.

16. **Establishment of an Alternative Society.** The insurgents will aim to impose an
alternative society. Their motives may be:

a. **Nationalist.** An emotive call to patriotism to replace a government which is
not considered to be ruling in the country’s best interests. The insurgents may wish
to avoid a social upheaval. Equally, such a cause may disguise the insurgents’ real
aims of enforcing a change in social as well as in foreign policy once the rebels have
seized power.

b. **Religious.** The remoulding of society in accordance with more
fundamentalist, or as some authorities prefer, radical religious lines, for example,
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution in Iran. During the Seventeenth Century English
Civil War extreme Puritans and Levellers within the Parliamentarian ranks sought to
impose a strict religious observance on this country.

c. **Political.** To utilise a philosophy diametrically opposed to that in use by
existing government. This involves a clash between the left and right wings of the
political spectrum. First, propaganda will be used to promote desirable changes and
then society will be reconstituted in areas occupied by the insurgents. Government
officials will be forced to flee or be subjected to the summary justice of ‘people’s
courts’. Although Marxism still has its adherents, the eclipse of the Communist Party
in the former USSR has detracted from its appeal. Communist governments have
not only fallen in Eastern Europe but also in Central America, where the Sandinistas
have been voted out of office. However Sendero Luminoso is still operating in Peru,
even after the capture of its leader in September 1992 and the Khmer Rouge are
still at large in Cambodia.

d. **Power for its Own Sake.** The acquisition of power and control within a
region has historically been a motive for removing the existing state or regional
authorities. Usually based on tribal groupings, an authority is toppled in order for
that group to obtain power and then operate the levels of government to its own
advantage. Saddam Hussein in Iraq is a modern example of this form of motive as
are the current leaders in what remains of Rwanda. There are also many examples
from the past; China in the days of the Warlords and Ethiopia, Somalia and Sierra
Leone in modern day Africa.

e. **Criminals and Mafias.** Criminality exists in all states, whether they are well
governed or not. What differentiates some from others is the degree and extent of
criminality. In some states the prevalence of crime, corruption and criminal
groupings is so long standing that these can seriously destabilise the cohesion of the
state. While the defeat of criminals and mafia style groups is, properly, the
responsibility of the government and the police forces, this type of counter criminal
activity may well form part of any future counter insurgency campaign and suitable
plans may be needed to cater for this additional requirement.

17. **External Support.** Revolutions seldom succeed without the help of a sympathetic
power in terms of diplomatic support, the supply of weapons and training assistance. There
are some notable exceptions; for example, the Chinese Communist victory over the Kuomintang owed little or nothing to the USSR. An insurgent movement has to appeal to popular sentiment abroad and try to raise sympathy for its cause in the forum of the United Nations and such regional organisations as the Arab League and the Organisation of African States. Some foreign governments may be counted upon to give the insurgents open or clandestine support. Others, more hostile to the insurgents, has to be constrained from helping the legitimate government by appealing over their heads to the people. Encouraging political parties, friendly trade unions and other pressure groups to organise demonstrations, strikes and petitions, and the media to promote the rebel cause are just some of the ways of applying pressure.

18. **Concurrent Activity.** The insurgent leadership will aim to wage insurgency on political, economic, propaganda and military fronts simultaneously. While foreign support is enlisted for the insurgency every effort is made to discredit the government at home and abroad. The military struggle will be conducted in the towns and the countryside. Isolated acts of terrorism will be used where the insurgency is weakest. All activity is designed to overturn and embarrass the state to the point where the collapse of authority and control occurs.

**SECTION 4 - VULNERABLE POINTS WITHIN AN INSURGENCY**

**GENERAL**

19. There are usually many potential weak points within an insurgency that are vulnerable to some form of attack and disruption by those who plan to oppose them. These, of course, will vary from one insurrection to another, but some general pointers are given in the following paragraphs. These potential weaknesses are particularly apparent in the early days of any insurgent activity.

**SECRETLY**

20. Any group who plan to use force and violence to prosecute their aims requires to adopt a secretive and conspiratorial approach to their planning and actions. This, in the first instance, can give some form of glamour and attractiveness to those who may join, but it can soon become counter productive once an insurgency starts. Too much secrecy can affect the freedom of action, so necessary for an insurgency, lower confidence in other similar insurgent groups and could lead to serious misunderstanding within the organisation. There is a balance to be struck between a too secretive and clandestine approach to insurgency actions, and the need to avoid undue attention by the authorities, or rival groups.

21. One of the ways to avoid the worst effects of this is to split the organisation into military and political groups, as in the case of Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA. This could overcome the problems of the more public (political) aspects of an insurgency, and the more clandestine (military) aspects. Even this has potential disadvantages in propaganda terms, and there could easily be many more potential weak points which are described in subsequent paragraphs which would not stand public scrutiny or concerted pressure from a state authority. However excessive secrecy within an organisation can hinder the discussion of ideas, plans and projects.
GAINING SUPPORT

22. This follows from the adoption of the most appropriate cause on which to base the insurgency. If the cause is good and has appeal the insurgency should thrive, - if not it will wither rapidly. Various groupings within the country may have different views and outlooks requiring different techniques to gain their support - and indeed possible compromises on the overall aim. Indifference, sloth and neutral attitudes also have to be overcome, perhaps by use of the weapon of intimidation. In summary the actual business of gaining popular support, for the cause can be a difficult and sensitive period in the early life of an insurgency. Publicity, whether good or bad, can materially improve the prospect of gaining popular support.

SECURE OPERATING BASE

23. A serious difficulty can be experienced in the choice of a secure base from which to operate an insurgency. If the base is too far away from the centres of normal activity it is potentially secure, but out of touch with the people and vulnerable to isolation. Too close to the centres of activity make the insurgency open to observation and perhaps infiltration, and closer also to the machinery of state control.

24. Proximity to border regions can often prove useful in that a temporary, or perhaps permanent bases can be set up beyond the authority of the state, and yet safe enough to avoid the unwanted suspicious of neighbouring authority.

25. Timely resolute action to locate an insurgency base can cause serious disruption to an insurgency movement, even if this activity is not entirely successful.

FUNDING

26. All insurgencies require funding to a greater or lesser extent. Weapons, ammunition, and expertise have to be paid for and unless the insurgency is backed by a friendly nation or individuals who can provide support not a great deal will happen. Taking part in criminal activities, bank raids and protection could help and these could attract publicity albeit unwelcome, for, the cause. All these activities are generally intermittent in their application and effect.

27. Controlling the rackets and the transportation of drugs has proved a more enduring source of income but brings the movement into contact with unreliable and vulnerable groups who could attract undue attention from the authorities. Furthermore the big providers of funding may also have their political price which could distort and affect the overall aim of an insurgency.

28. Lack of sufficient funds could limit the scope of an insurgency and inhibit its prospects of success - a weakness that the state authorities could utilise to their advantage if it is recognised. Financial control and regulation to limit the movement and exchange of goods and funds could be applied - particularly if an insurgency is being funded from beyond the state borders.
SETTING THE PACE

29. Given that insurgents, if they have planned properly, can control the start of operations, and have some measure of control over subsequent activity, it is surprising to note that in many insurgencies have failed to capitalise on opportunities, or have allowed the pace of events and scope of activities to be dictated by the state authorities. Momentum is lost, the strategic initiative returns to the state and the insurgent organisation exposed at a vulnerable and premature point. Sometimes an insurgency can overlook the fact that the state authorities can also recognise their own strengths and weaknesses and make moves to improve the position at the same time as the insurgency is starting. This can complicate insurgent planning. The control of the pace and timing of insurgency operations is vital to the success of any campaign. The difficulty for the insurgent is that he may not have the information needed, or the political/military capability to make the appropriate decisions at the right time as an insurgency escalates. All of this requires training and experience and the insurgent leadership may have to accept some reverses in the overall campaign before sufficient experience is gained to judge both the timing and pace of events to gain most advantage.

INFORMERS

30. While informers have sometimes been infiltrated into criminal or insurgent cells, it is far more common to achieve success by ‘turning’ someone who is already in the organisation or is an auxiliary who has contact with them (eg the couriers, cut-outs or suppliers, who are the links between clandestine cells and their accomplices among the public). ‘Turning’ is the intelligence term for persuading such a person to become an informer. This may be best achieved by spotting a participant whose heart is not in it or who, for personal or family reasons wants to ‘get off the hook’. Pressure to turn may be exercised by arousing fear of prosecution or by offering rewards, perhaps large enough to enable informers to go far away, with their families, to start a new life with a new identity. An essential feature is that informers are made confident that they and their families will be protected against retribution. There is nothing more demoralising to insurgents than the fear that people inside their movement or trusted supporters among the public are giving information to the state authorities. They will try to stifle it by ruthless exemplary punishments, but this could increase the desire of any waverers to get off the hook: to avoid being caught between state surveillance and insurgent reprisal. Informers and those who ‘turn’ have always been singularly dangerous to any insurgent movement.

THE PROBLEM OF CHANGING AIMS

31. This is not so much of a problem at the start of an insurgency but has a potentially damaging effect once an insurgency has been in operation for some time. Actions and events during the earlier part of an insurgency may change the outlook of some groups within the insurgency and cause some disquiet about the overall aim. A series of successes by the state authorities, or some errors made by insurgent groups, could cause some to question the cause or even challenge the leadership of the insurgency.

32. A seemingly generous compromise offered by the state to the insurgents could also cause division within an insurgency. At any event the insurgent leaders may have to apply ruthless measures to ensure that unity and secrecy are preserved. Changing aims, even as a result of a considered and agreed line of action can cause potential trouble for all
insurgents. Here secrecy and lack of discussion can cause further misunderstanding and suspicion which could lead to defections, punishments and loss of confidence in the insurgency as a whole.

CONCLUSIONS

33. These seven features of vulnerability are usually regarded as critical for a classic insurgency. Other more modern and up to date developments will arise to add to the problems of organising and maintaining an insurgency but without an overall grip on these listed potential vulnerabilities an insurgency could well falter and split apart into rival groupings.
1. Although only one factor among many, North Vietnamese deceptions made an important contribution to their eventual triumph. They included: the downplaying of the communist character of the North Vietnamese regime and its revolutionary goals and the promotion in its place of a nationalist liberation myth; the concealment of northern leadership and invasion of the South; the creation of belief in a possible compromise settlement; the denial of communist atrocities and the propagation in their place of unfounded allegations of American genocide or systematic violations of the rules of war - 'guilt transfer' to American shoulders of all the blame for the horrors of conflict.

2. Unlike the experiences of more recent major examples, where deception operations have usually been aimed covertly at the opposing leadership to distort their vision of reality and thus undermine their judgement, the North Vietnamese more often addressed deception overtly to mass audiences. In South Vietnam, the principal instrument as well as victim was the National Liberation Front. In the West, especially in America, deception began with the political left and quickly spread to the liberal establishment who, in due course, gained influence over mainstream opinion.

3. The choice of target illustrated how well the communists understood the vulnerabilities of a democracy engaged in a protracted conflict of apparent peripheral importance: the 'essential domino' - American public opinion - was recognised as the key to victory in the field because once this domino was knocked down, the United States Government was powerless to continue the fight.

4. The 'transmission belts' for these deceptive messages were ubiquitous, but the main ones were diplomatic, the global propaganda network controlled by the International Department, CPSU, the fronts set up in South Vietnam and in the West to promote North Vietnam's interests and, through them, and through professional agents of influence such as the international news media. The New York Times's acceptance of Indochina Resource Centre material was a classic, if relatively unimportant and routine, example of a transmission belt in action.

5. The character of counter insurgency warfare, the 'imperialist' connotation of American involvement and the war's protracted and highly political nature, rather easily stimulated traditional liberal guilt over the use of force, particularly in the Third World. As the conflict wore on without prospect of early victory, this latent guilt may have created a susceptibility to the themes of American genocide and lawlessness. Certainly, once the anti-war movement was in motion, even activists who were not communist sympathisers, might have felt subconsciously that the greater good of ending the war justified the lesser evil of uncritical acceptance of horror stories of doubtful veracity which might nevertheless be politically effective.

6. Taken as a whole, Hanoi's deception operations were relatively easy because they delivered messages their intended victims wanted to hear. But the complex organisation and immense perseverance necessary to penetrate the targets were remarkable: this strategic deception may have been unique for the sheer scale and audacity of its effort and the resultant effect on the prosecution of the campaign by the Americans.

1 Professor G Lewy Deception and Revolutionary Warfare in Vietnam.
CHAPTER 4
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 - BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

1. General. The essentially violent and destructive nature of insurgencies has been described in preceding chapters. Any insurgency does, however, usually move on two concurrent complementary paths, one destructive and the other constructive. Destructive actions are clearly aimed at overthrowing the established order and creating a climate of collapse in the state’s authority. The constructive effort, meanwhile, goes towards creating an organisation which can replace the established authorities at a suitable moment. Even when the insurgency appears to renounce positive organisation and formalised political structures there will usually be some political group with the foresight to anticipate the impending vacuum and make some plans to fill it. It is this anticipatory action that marks out the separation between a terrorist organisation and a more full blooded insurgency. It is inconceivable to think that the Red Army Faction in Germany during the 1970s (sometimes described as the Baader-Meinhof Group) could be described as an insurgency. Beyond terrorism on a small and focused scale they had no further plans to take over from the authorities. After Op MOTORMAN (Northern Ireland 1972) the IRA ceased to be an insurgency whose aims were to get the British out of Northern Ireland. They did, however, remain a serious terrorist threat for many more years that needed to be countered with resolute action by the Government and Armed Forces.

2. Destructive Activity. This type of insurgent activity splits into four main types:
   a. Subversion.
   b. Sabotage of the economic framework, where this suits the insurgency.
   c. Terrorism and guerilla activity.
   d. Larger scale operations.

3. Constructive Activity. Where an insurgency is planned in the context of a protracted war, - or where, in the more classic case of total revolution in a large state, the whole apparatus of state control needs changing. An insurgency movement would seek to educate and improve the position of those in less well developed areas, both urban and rural, in order to show the practical benefits of joining the insurgency. There will also be a need to:
   a. Create and develop areas for subversive activity.
   b. Form cadres for training (of all types).
   c. Organise alternative police and military units to take over in due course.
   d. Create administrative machinery to supplant the bureaucracy of the state.
SECTION 2 – DESTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY

SUBVERSION

4. Subversive activity is designed to undermine the political, economic and military strength of a state, short of the use of force. However, even non-violent activities may be exploited to the stage of provoking violent counter measures which can be denounced as an over-reaction by the security forces, and used to discredit the authorities.

5. Subversion is more effective in an undemocratic country and in a society where there are genuine grievances, wide disparities between rich and poor, and where ethnic, cultural and religious divisions exist in an atmosphere of intolerance. A democratic society could have less to fear, although the propagandist may exploit its freedoms of speech and association, together with a flourishing uncensored mass media to gain the maximum publicity for his cause.

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY

6. This can take many forms, some of which constitute legitimate political or industrial activity where the intention to undermine the strength of a state is not present. Examples of subversive activity include:

   a. **Activity in the Political Field.** An insurgency may be expected to attempt to penetrate existing political parties and organisations at all levels, and to develop front organisations. Meetings, rallies or processions may be staged, the aims and nature of which may well be legal but which nevertheless can have the appearance of challenging and defying the authority of government. Tactics of this kind may be accompanied by pressure on the threatened government to reduce the use of its armed forces in counter insurgency operations.

   b. **Penetration of the Machinery of Government.** An insurgency will seek to win supporters from inside the organs of state control, in order to use them to either find out about future plans, or to wreck and hinder future planning at suitable times. Examples of this are leaked correspondence, knowledge of ministerial movements, police and military organisations and plans, protective arrangements and any other economic and financial information. These are all useful for an insurgency to exploit as appropriate - particularly in the early days of an insurrection.

   c. **Propaganda.** Propaganda is publishing information or misinformation detrimental to the government or the security forces. Also originating and spreading rumours designed to undermine trust and confidence in the government, and possibly, with stores of atrocities, sowing the seeds of hate against the forces of law and order and capitalising on security forces’ errors.

   d. **Passive Resistance.** Passive resistance is achieved by activities such as:

      (1) Forcing or encouraging withdrawal of labour from public utilities and services.

      (2) Obstruction of the law.
(3) Sit-ins in public places.

(4) Fomenting dissatisfaction amongst different social groupings such as workers, peasants and students, by inciting them to demonstrate and strike.

DISRUPTION

7. Disruption can involve:

a. The organisation of marches and demonstrations to foment riots to cause disruption in order to provoke the authorities into some form of physical overreaction.

b. The intimidation of local and provincial leaders, magistrates, civil and military personnel, businessmen and leaders of the local community.

c. Raising money by blackmail and intimidating methods involving the control of rackets, protection and associated illegal activity.

SABOTAGE

8. Sabotage is disruptive activity designed to further the interests of the insurgency. It may be active, in which case individuals and bodies of people place themselves outside the law, and set out to disrupt important services, functions or industrial processes by violent means; or it may be passive in which case damage is engineered by omission or neglect:

a. **Active Sabotage.** Targets may be selected at random for their political or economic impact, or they may fit into a wider tactical plan with the aim of increasing general confusion and tying down security forces in the static defence of installations. In such circumstances, communications sites and stores depots are a favourite target, because they are generally widely dispersed and thus make large demands on manpower to guard them; because their disruption hampers the authorities, and because the results of the damage caused can be readily perceived by the public without causing exceptional hardship to themselves. Other suitable targets are bridges, roads, railways, telephone lines, military supply dumps, sewers, power lines, water supplies and transport. Targets whose destruction might cause mass unemployment and thereby lose the goodwill of the people are in general avoided.

b. **Passive Sabotage.** Passive sabotage is generally aimed at causing disorder and disruption by deliberate error, contrived accident, absenteeism or strikes. The target can be industry, public services, supplies or the security forces. Although isolated instances of passive sabotage can be effective, for example an important telephone exchange could be made inoperative, it is more usual for action to be planned on a wide scale across the region through political front organisations.

SABOTAGE OF IT FACILITIES

9. Although not yet known to have been utilised before, the prevalence of computers in business and the growing number of IT systems controlled by computers (power stations, emergency services), has enhanced the potential for active or passive sabotage in this
area. This can be easily done by the insertion of suitable computer viruses into a network to cause delay, loss of data, corruption, and sometimes complete dysfunction. While this may require careful planning to work effectively, the destructive dividend for an insurgency of this potential has grown enormous in states where the computer has become part of every day life.

TERRORISM

10. **General.** Terrorism is a technique, - 'killing one to frighten ten thousand' - is used by revolutionaries, insurgents and by political activists of the left or right for their own purposes. Terrorism may be defined as 'the use of indiscriminate violence to intimidate the general majority of people in a state to accept the political changes advocated by the insurgents. Terror is one of the insurgents' main weapons to preserve their security by frightening individuals from passing information to the security forces. Religion may also be used to control individual behaviour through fear of ostracism or as an instrument of terror to justify murder in this world and eternal damnation in the next. Terror can be used tactically to provide publicity for the insurgent movement, induce or sense of insecurity and discredit the authorities. The last two aims may be achieved by over-stretching the security forces so that they are manifestly unable to provide effective protection for prominent citizens, the public and property, and by provoking the government and its security forces to over-react in response to some outrageous act of terrorism.

11. **Intimidation.** Intimidation, as a means of existing social and political pressure can take many forms but is normally used in one of three separate ways: to extort support from the uncommitted, to demoralise those who are loyal to the state authorities and to maintain discipline within the ranks of the insurgency movement.

12. **Terrorism Against Loyal and Uncommitted Citizens.** The target may be an individual or a group, and the victims are often citizens to whom the ordinary inhabitants of the state look for leadership and example, such as politicians, professional men, and industrial, commercial and union leaders. This terrorism may take the form of beatings, kidnappings, blackmail, mutilation, assassination, arson or bombing. Threats of terrorism may be used to coerce individuals into obeying insurgent instructions.

13. **Terrorism to Enforce Obedience and Discipline.** Absolute loyalty is an inflexible principle for insurgencies, and terror is used to ensure obedience. In the case of the individual, it is made clear that even though a person has been forcibly drafted into the movement, their defection is punishable by death or mutilation, and even if they should escape to an area free from insurgency control, retribution could be expected from their family. In areas which are under insurgency control, terrorism may be directed against sections of the population who, because of race, class, origins, wealth or employment, are judged to be pro-government. Insurgent leaders usually endeavour to involve the local inhabitants in acts of terrorism, thus ensuring their association with the uprising and to have good personal reasons to ensure its success.

14. **Interfactional Strife.** Terrorism used in interfactional strife is an extension of that already discussed, the aim being to drive members of an opposing faction out of a particular area, thus more closely identifying those who remain with the movement. This can be a double edged weapon in that it may result in a backlash from the opposing faction that could have a deleterious effect on the conduct of the insurgency at a time when more
support is needed. It can also be exploited by the state authorities in propaganda terms. At any event the weapon of interfactional strife if carried too far can quickly result in the loss of control by an insurgency group and thus allow the authorities the opportunity to regain the initiative on the backs of an outraged community.

15. **Proxy Operations.** Countries wishing to press a cause but without incurring the risk of war use terrorist groups whose links with the government are difficult to prove. Iran and Syria back Hezbollah and Amal respectively. Some states use assassination squads to liquidate exiles opposed to their regimes who have fled abroad, for example from Libya.

**LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS**

16. Large scale insurgent operations do not normally occur in the early stage of any insurgency while steps are being taken to enhance, and educate or terrorise, the population into supporting the insurgency. The acquisition of ‘safe’ areas of territory is usually the hallmark of a developing insurgency – as was the case in Nepal recently. Once this stage has been reached, urban and rural larger scale and coordinated operations can begin. These could be constrained by the lack of resources (weapons, money and logistic support) and may well depend on how successful some of these operations are. In more recent times it is becoming more apparent that large scale insurgent operations may not be so necessary as in the past. With the use of modern technology insurgents are more able to hit high value government targets with few resources but much planning. The attack on No 10 Downing Street, although it failed, had an effect beneficial for the IRA quite disproportionate to its actual prosecution.

**SECTION 3 – CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY**

**GENERAL**

17. **Early Signs.** An indicator of an incipient insurgency may be attempts to raise funds. In the early stages, this will probably be covert and criminal, eg armed bank robberies or control of drug runners. Subsequently, the political organisation within the insurgency will take on the task of extracting aid from well intentioned, charitable and philanthropic organisations, and from sympathisers abroad. The more violent methods may continue, the extorting of ransom from individuals (kidnapping), or from governments (hijacking), and perhaps the enforced levying of taxes on intimidated sections of the population although this would run counter to the aim of constructive activity. See also Chapter 2 for aspects of fund raising which could give rise to vulnerabilities within the insurgency.

18. **Politics and Organised Crime.** There are some criminal organisations whose main aim is the control of a profitable, illegal trade, such as the narcotics traffic, for example, the Colombian Cali drug cartel. Use can be made of money laundered from terrorist sponsored rackets, ‘front’ firms and even stock markets to finance an insurrection in pursuit of their political ends. Some organisations may become so powerful politically that they may be in a position to threaten a weak government or at least to oblige it to tolerate its illegal activities. The Mafia appears to exercise a pervasive influence in Sicily and Southern Italy where politicians, judges and senior policemen who thwart its crimes and bring the Mafia members of ‘Cosa Nostra’ to justice are ruthlessly murdered or intimidated. The "Tongs" play a similar role with the overseas Chinese communities.
ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

19. **Weapons.** Many insurgents favour basic weapons whose essentials have not changed very much since the 1970s. The features of compactness, lethality and simple operating procedures have attracted insurgents the world over. In recent times weapons and bombs have been miniaturised, explosives are harder to detect and more lethal in their composition and timing devices constructed to extend the range of potential targets. These are designed to defeat detection and aid insurgent security. Hand held missiles, small enough to conceal in a small space can be utilised to bring accurate fire on armoured vehicles aircraft and helicopters. The main categories are likely to be:

a. **Personal Weapons.** Principally pistols, carbines, rifles and weapons with a high rate of fire. Sniper rifles utilising armour piercing ammunition are also very popular - particularly in rural areas. Significant developments are the use of the controlled burst - a setting between single shots and automatic fire where the weapon fires a short but controlled burst of ammunition before the 'kick' effect comes into action. Weapons made completely from non metallic material are being developed to avoid detection at airports etc - although there are serious technical snags to overcome before production can start.

b. **Ammunition.** Most insurgent groups use 9mm ammunition for shorter range weapons and calibres around 7.62 mm for rifles and machine guns. However caseless ammunition, if developed, would aid the insurgent enormously - a lighter weight and no evidence left for forensic teams to analyse.

c. **Sighting Devices.** Night vision equipment-infrared (IR), image intensification (IT) and thermal imagery (TI) will have an increasing influence on the number of weapons that can be used in defence or attack. The same applies for laser sights which could enable an insurgent to fire a weapon from a suitecase without appearing to be holding a gun.

d. **Mortars.** Improvised mortars are easy to make but are usually inaccurate and unreliable. Most require some form of 'flat bed' for transportation. Acquisition of military mortars and ammunition would significantly increase the range and lethality of such weapons.

e. **Anti-Armour Weapons.** Both recoilless weapons and armour piercing rifles may be used, and there is likely to be an increased emphasis on rockets, probably fired from non-metallic launchers.

f. **Portable Ground to Air Missiles.** The hand-held 'suitcase' type of air defence weapon with a heat-seeking or simple guidance system is particularly suitable for insurgency use. Even the acknowledged possession of air defence weapons by an insurgent group is likely to hinder and obstruct the full use of helicopters by the state authorities.

g. **Mines.** This term covers military mines, as opposed to home made devices which are covered in the next sub para. Military mines, both anti personnel and anti tank mines, are frequently utilised by insurgent groups to destroy roads, bridges, railway lines and other suitable targets. Mines are easy to acquire, difficult to detect
and sometimes difficult to dismantle. They can seriously hamper the efforts of the counter insurgency forces and terrify the local population. Once a campaign has ended the clearance of minefields becomes a priority target for any government.

h. **Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).** Explosive devices of many types, both commercial and improvised, are usually available to insurgency forces. Methods of initiation are nowadays highly varied and include the suicide bomber. The effectiveness of these as instruments of terror is well known and expertise in their manufacture and handling is often of a high order, while complicated fusing and anti-lifting devices are often available from international arms sources.

i. **Hoaxes.** These are used more widely than real IEDs to disrupt commercial and social life and to stretch army and police resources. The insurgent has merely to plant sufficient real IEDs in order to ensure that the security forces and the public cannot afford to ignore any warning.

j. **Lures.** Any incident, bomb or hoax can be used as a bait, particularly to kill security force EOD specialists.

20. **Chemical and Radiological Devices.** In theory, a nuclear, chemical or biological device could be made by a well financed insurgency group for delivery, perhaps by ship to a port with the threat of triggering the device if demands are not met by a particular deadline. However, in addition to the difficulty of manufacture and delivery of such a weapon, any resultant detonation, whether intended or not, could be so disastrous for an insurgent cause that many governments would find it difficult to believe the threat and act accordingly. Threats involving these weapons are also far less credible, and thus less effective, as a bargaining counter. Nevertheless, a modified form of chemical attack is entirely feasible given the proliferation of information and technical knowledge available. Further points are:

a. **Nuclear.** Of increasing state concern is the deliberate or accidental, release of much lower quantities of radioactive material than would be produced by a military nuclear device in any incident. This could enhance the credibility given to an insurgent group if such a device were used, or threatened by them.

b. **Biological.** Biological weapons (BW) are becoming increasingly usable in military terms and have the potential for effect at the strategic level. Many of the less developed countries depend on mono cultures, such as rice, maize or wheat, as the mainstay of the economy. These are potentially vulnerable to BW attack. BW could cause as many casualties as a nuclear explosion, while avoiding the latter's collateral damage. The very high toxicity of some biological agents lend themselves to covert use. A BW attack may also be extremely difficult for the targeted government to attribute.

c. **Chemical.** Chemical weapons (CW) are easier for an insurgent to acquire than nuclear and biological weapons but the scope for use of CW will be much smaller in terms of the area affected but the casualties caused could be massive. CW may have considerable psychological effects, which may have a significant effect if the targeted government is sufficiently weak. CW generally offers more casualties-for-cost than does high explosive. The use of Sarin in Tokyo during 1995
only serves to highlight the potential use of such lethal chemical agents, and there is 
some evidence that ricin and other easily obtained fertilizers and chemicals are 
being experimented with by cells of terrorists in the UK and USA in the recent past.

SECTION 4 - INSURGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT

GENERAL

21. Since the dissolution of the USSR the opportunity for insurgency in rural and 
undeveloped areas has increased enormously - and although the classic Maoist style of 
isurgency involving the peasants is not now generally applicable, insurgencies in rural and 
remote areas could easily flare up again. The allocation of land, water or other scarce 
mineral resources continues to provide a real or perceived grievance, particularly in areas 
where there is a burgeoning population such as Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan, 
Bangladesh and parts of the Caucasus area.

22. While the political organisation of an insurgency concentrates on mobilising popular 
support for the cause, openly in areas distant from government control, more covertly in 
areas where the government still exercises effective authority, bases will be established in 
remote areas. From these, minor actions, which may be mistaken for banditry, are 
lunched over as wide an area as possible to disperse police resources. Amongst other 
indications that a campaign is about to begin area:

   a. The preparation of isolated villages for defence, including the discreet 
clearance of fields of fire, under the pretext of protection against banditry.

   b. The hoarding of supplies and the preparation of caches outside villages for 
the future use of insurgents.

   c. The training and arming of village 'self-defence' groups and small 'military 
style' units.

   d. An increase in the scale and degree of local intimidation and coercion 
particularly in the production of goods and services.

23. All these activities could easily apply in present day Afghanistan where Taliban 
forces are bidding to dominate rural areas and control the drugs trade.

TACTICS

24. General. In its early stages, an insurgency in rural areas has to rely on small bands 
of men assembling for a limited enterprise, probably of sabotage against some fairly remote 
and inadequately guarded bridge, pylon or railway line. As the movement grows to the 
stage where it can command significant support from the local population, so its objectives 
will become more ambitious and larger bodies of men will be necessary to achieve these. 
The relative strength of insurgent bands will always place them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis 
the security forces and they will seek to avoid a pitched battle; their tactics are therefore 
based on mobility and surprise, generally using ambushes, explosives and IEDs.
25. **Mobility.** Mobility may be achieved on foot, by using vehicles (technicals), trucks and bicycles where these are inconspicuous, or by using animal transport in less undeveloped countries etc. The principle is to assemble a force and its weapons, carry out an operation, and then disperse. The greater the scope of the operation and the consequent size of the force, the more thorough will be the preparation. Planning may need to cover such matters as the concentration of heavy weapons and munitions, liaison with other groups through whose area a force may have to move etc.

26. **The Use of Terrain.** Rural populations are vulnerable to terrorism and intimidation - and very quickly a feeling of insecurity can spread around a region, which makes both individuals and communities feel isolated and cut off. Savage treatment given to a local government official, or his family, has a serious unsettling effect around the whole region. Recent experience suggests that this type of intimidation could be on the increase in many rural areas. Bosnia, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir and Afghanistan can be cited as examples of places where this type of terrorism is rampant.

27. **The Achievement of Surprise.** Some of the methods used are:

   a. Diversionary action designed to attract security forces elsewhere.

   b. Deception which may be initiated by feeding false information through sympathisers already infiltrated into the government intelligence machine: it would be sensible to support this by a diversionary tactic to protect the informant and give credence to the deception.

   c. Attacks in areas thought to be safe by the authorities: probably mounted from a distance and relying on a swift approach march.

   d. Insurgent bands may sometimes merge into the population in an area adjacent to a selected target, then assemble quickly, strike and disperse.

28. **Ambush.** The most widely used insurgent tactic, the ambush, is particularly effective against road movement, especially when the ground makes it difficult for military forces to move off the road and take cover. Insurgents favour two main types of ambush:

   a. **Hit and Run Ambush.** Usually undertaken by locally based insurgents it relies on the devastating effect of a well directed opening volley and surprise to cause sufficient casualties and disorganisation to delay the security force's response in order to cover the withdrawal. As the aim is confined to causing casualties, inducing a general sense of insecurity, damaging morale and grabbing any weapons which can be picked up without risk the insurgents do not usually deploy a rear stop. This type of ambush can be deployed anywhere in city, town, or countryside. Insurgent strengths can vary from two to three armed persons or up to fifteen or twenty persons depending on the circumstances.

   b. **Annihilation Ambush.** Small scale annihilation ambushes may be sprung by the insurgents against medium sized security force targets and large scale ambushes against large formations as the insurgency gains strength. They may be mounted against even larger forces during any subsequent more conventional war phase. The latter ambush may cover a 1 to 5 kilometre stretch of road. The
principles for both sizes of ambush are the same. The ambush force consists of front and rear blocking parties, an attack force deployed in appropriate positions on the road and a fire support group.

SECTION 5 - INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

29. In the last two decades of the 20th century there have been many examples of insurgency in urban environments. The long running insurgency of the PIRA in the reasonably small but populated area of Northern Ireland is a sufficient example to show that insurgency tactics in urban areas can thrive.

30. A state may either be too small or lack sufficiently inaccessible terrain such as mountains, forests and swamps to sustain a rural insurgency on a large enough scale to defeat the authorities. However, urban civilization in Western Europe, parts of Asia and South America is vulnerable to provide relatively small insurgent forces with the opportunity to create an atmosphere of serious alarm and insecurity sufficient to discredit a government. Urban insurgents do not normally plan to occupy and control territory although they may seize small areas for a limited time to establish a presence. It is frequently possible to control an area without occupying it. Nevertheless, insurgents could well receive support from these enclaves where their political supporters form a majority of the population as witnessed in the Sadr City area of Baghdad and Basra.

31. Lacking the ability as sometimes the need to occupy territory on a significant scale insurgents will aim to make the government's position untenable. They will rely on engendering a state of war-weariness, frustration and anger against government emergency measures to bring about a climate of collapse so that people will rally to any organisation or strong man who offers stability. Action may include:

a. Disrupting routine city life.

b. Damaging parts of the economy and obliging the government to pay compensation on a scale it cannot afford.

c. Discrediting the security forces by alienating the public and provoking the police and Army into over-reacting. This is more likely and more dangerous in the economy of a one-crop state.

d. Undermining the morale of politicians, civil service, judiciary and the security forces.

e. Eliminating informers.

f. Assassinating public figures.

g. Establishing 'no-go' areas to demonstrate the government's impotence, such as those temporarily established by PIRA during 1972 in Belfast and Londonderry.
h. Persuading sympathetic foreign states to bring pressure to bear on the government.

**URBAN TACTICS**

32. Cities and towns provide great scope for insurgencies. The concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small area provides cover for the insurgents (Mao's fish). Moreover, the needs of a great city, related to the complexity of urban living whereby interruption of power supplies, non-collection of rubbish, cutting off water etc. can soon bring a community almost to its knees. However, the insurgent may only find support in certain areas of the towns or cities.

33. The urban insurgent therefore, lives in a community which is friendly to him, or at the least is too frightened to withhold its support, close to his leaders and fellow insurgents, and with the tools of terrorism at hand. A local communication system can be engineered fairly easily and women and children can be used both to operate this and to provide cover for other activities.

34. The urban insurgent can operate more boldly than his rural counterpart for these reasons, and his tactics reflect this. The sniper complements the more conventional ambush and often replaces it, and explosive devices can be used in a wide variety of ways either as instruments of communal terror or more selectively against individuals or groups. There is ample scope for the propaganda ambush whereby incidents, marches, protests, sniping etc are deliberately staged to achieve propaganda objectives detrimental to the security forces.

35. The concentration of population in the city is important to an insurgent for two further reasons:

   a. The ready availability of large numbers of people means that a crowd can be assembled and demonstrations engineered, with comparative ease; these can then be manipulated. The presence of women and children will normally be an embarrassment to the security forces, particularly if the demonstration is stage managed to cause over reaction by the security forces against such group. It could be argued that the presence of women and children allows for the peaceful democratic process to operate.

   b. Publicity is easily achieved in a city as no major incident can be concealed even if it is not widely reported on television and in the press. Terrorist successes can therefore be readily exploited both to increase the impact of terror and to discredit the security forces, their methods and the quality of the protection which they can provide.

36. Within an urban environment an insurgent can plan and execute a large variety of tasks designed to publicise the cause and embarrass the state authorities. Hostage taking became fashionable in Beirut during the 1980s and is now widely used all over the world. Kidnapping of civic and local leaders is another ploy carried out by Hezbollah against the Israeli authorities and which has been countered by abductions and arrest of leaders or clerks associated with the insurgents.
ETHNIC CLEANSING

37. Ethnic Cleansing is an insidious form of terror which has been operated in various forms over many centuries. Both in Europe and the Middle East there are many examples of this type of activity throughout history when a majority of the surrounding population wish to frighten and intimidate people into leaving their homes and territory and moving elsewhere. In terms of creating human misery, ethnic cleansing is one of the most loathsome of all forms of terrorism and is normally the basis for future unrest and potential insurgency in the area. The roots of the Civil War in Greece and the growth of communism in the region grew out of the deliberate shift of populations between Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the First World War. Furthermore the usual lack of any subsequent administration to provide long term accommodation and work for the uprooted refugees causes discontent and anger. Palestinian refugees fall into the same category as well as refugees from Iraq and in the Darfur region of the Sudan.

SECTION 6 - INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

38. There has been such a development of voice and text communications in the Western world that the older, more traditional methods for insurgents to communicate have been largely overtaken and replaced. Mobile phones, text messages and the use of the internet have become the communication of choice for insurgents, and because of this instant communication between cells and groups of insurgents is now a fact of life. There is still relevance in recording a few of the more traditional methods because most current insurgents now plan to avoid using mobile phones where possible to avoid technical detection by Western armies who have had some success in utilising technology to locate and attack insurgents.

PASSING INFORMATION

39. **General.** In some states the security forces can readily gain control of most public communications systems such as radio stations, telephone exchanges and post offices, and thus an insurgency organisation may have considerable problems in disseminating information and issuing orders, particularly as a movement initially depends on only a few trained leaders whose identity and whereabouts would be kept secret. Two ways of overcoming the problem are the cell system and dead letter boxes.

40. **The Cell System.** An insurgency is often split up into numerous cells, each with a leader and containing only a few, say three to five, members know only each other and their own leader, while the leader knows only one person outside the cell, who in turn knows only one member of the district or regional organisation and so on up the scale. There is virtually no lateral communication in this organisation. Variations of the cell system may be devised for greater security by using couriers and dead letter boxes: for example a 'cut out' courier may be used to collect from one dead letter box and deliver to another. Thus messages can be carried over a risky link in the system by a man or woman who has no information except that they collect a sealed package from one place and leave it in another.
41. **Dead Letter Boxes.** A dead letter box is simply a hiding place for letters deposited by one person and collected by another. Some general principles which govern selection of such places, and at the same time are a guide to the security forces when they search for them are:

   a. The dead letter box is usually sited in an area where a courier has good reason to go.

   b. It must be possible to deposit or retrieve messages quickly.

   c. The location must be simple to described, accessible and easy to find.

   d. There must be a simple but effective system for indicating that there is a message to be collected.

42. **Political Literature.** Political manifestos, magazines, posters and circulars may be used to convey instructions to cells. At first sight these documents may appear to be no more than vague aims without dates or times. However, an analysis of incidents in insurgent campaigns shows that they can provide an indication of trends and intentions since in some respects they equate to operation orders issued by the central organisation. Insurgent and terrorist activities depend more upon opportunity than timing, and therefore there is no programme. Such literature can list targets, allocate resources, and lay down the period in which certain aims are to be achieved. The importance of such documents when captured should not be underrated. Most of these activities have been replaced by much more use of television channels and the internet to spread the message.

43. **Television.** Almost every insurgent group has used television directly to promote their cause, or indirectly by means of ensuring that incidents are newsworthy enough to ensure that they are reported on television. It is no coincidence that the steep rise in terrorist and insurgent action has taken place at the same time as the growth in television. The distribution of video tapes can also enormously enhance an insurgent cause, particularly when television channels are closely controlled or even censored.

44. **Internet.** Modern insurgent groups make extensive use of the cyberspace (the internet) as an efficient and a relatively secure method of communication. The internet is not only used as a means of communication between various members of an insurgent group (or other insurgent groups) but is also used as part of their information operations. The use of cyberspace will continue to increase and a detailed examination will be included in the re-write of this AFM in 2007.
CHAPTER 5

CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 - DEVELOPMENTS

1. A quick review of the international scene on any given day will confirm that while many states are not at war they are also not at peace. Yet so familiar is the shadow of political violence and terrorism that most people are only shocked from complacency by a particularly dramatic, and thus newsworthy, outrage. At a time of continuing defence cuts in the West, insurgency is on the increase both elsewhere and in the West. A host of groups and some states are using it to alter the political landscape in their region. Over the last two decades the number of international terrorist incidents has risen from 200 per year to over 800. Insurgency, which has traditionally posed a degree of threat to individual governments and states now has an international dimension combined with religious overtones. This remains, and is estimated to continue to be the most prevalent form of conflict and source of human suffering for some time to come.

2. Yet, despite the continuing utility of insurgent tactics and their perceived successes, by the end of the 20th century the sense of military impotence in the West generated by failures in Vietnam and elsewhere had waned after the Gulf War of 1991. Terrorism in some more liberal states, whilst proving surprisingly resilient, was largely under control. Governments and people in the West were reaching the pragmatic conclusion that insurgents, like the poor, would always be with them, but that they posed little real direct danger to well established democratic governments. Indeed, some have been tempted to suggest that the study of ‘Counter Revolutionary Warfare’ (as it was previously labelled) belonged to a bygone era and was largely irrelevant, although half recognising that insurgent tactics have been changing over the last decade, and that society had become more prone and vulnerably to these changes.

SECTION 2 - SOCIETY AND INSURGENCY

3. In society the technological revolution continued unabated and by the end of the century only some 20% of workers will be actively involved in production processes whilst the remainder were involved in service industries of one sort or another and working much shorter hours. The river of information which began to be available in every house and workplace has become a flood. Access to television, cable programmes, and satellites mostly in pictorial form provides greater chances for individuals and groups to manipulate the emotions of the public at large. The opportunities for propaganda by official sources, commercial interests and determined minority groups is, and will be, almost unbounded.

4. The large networks of electronic data-processing and communications are already shaping the future of this new society, and already these interdependent service industries, are vulnerable to attack from hackers, fraudsters and extortionists. Computer centres could become objects of sabotage or attack; software is open to disruption, manipulation or espionage, and the complete duplication of assets and resources is often prohibitively expensive. Cable and radio communication can be intercepted and although there are antidotes for this, such as the use of codes, secure transmissions and fibre optic cables, the risk of losing overall security can still be high.
5. Electronic transfer of cash is now common place and there will be less money being held or disbursed around the market place. Opportunities for theft and robbery could decline, to be replaced by computer fraud and extortion by threat of kidnap, murder and destruction of software or computer components. Disposal of funds by laundering them through legitimate deposits, or by purchasing drugs or arms is an expanding business.

6. In recent years there has been a spate of car bombs placed by terrorists within city centres or at well known institutions with the direct aim of disrupting financial and commercial centres of business. Arrests and convictions are the best deterrent to this new extension of terrorist activity but the publicity surrounding bomb attacks, and the growing use of an economic form of insurgency to achieve quick political results is bound to be attractive to insurgents world wide. In addition the use of people by insurgents for the purpose of a hijack, hostage taking, or kidnap for intimidation in a world of instant communication can radically alter the propaganda prospects of a minority group seeking attention for their cause.

SECTION 3 - RECENT TRENDS

7. Contemporary events have conspired to make nation states more aware of this growing problem. The end of the Cold War may have removed the threat of global nuclear war, but it has created a security environment in which the risks of insurgent conflict are potentially greater and more diverse than ever. Prior to 1989 the international order was ideologically divided, but reasonably stable. It was an order which allowed competition on the fringes, but gave little or no scope for manoeuvre at the centre. Europe, the potential battleground if the Cold War had turned hot, with its colonial empires gone, experienced a period of peace unprecedented in modern history. But despite the misplaced optimism of the early 1990s no viable 'New World Order' has yet emerged. Instead, new causes, methods, opportunities and sponsors for politically inspired violence abound, both in Europe and elsewhere.

8. In parallel, technological advances and the lowering of national border controls within Europe have created many more vulnerabilities which the insurgent can exploit as has been shown in Section 2. Developing communications mean that the media and individual groups (even those elements of it which are potentially 'friendly' to a state authority) can bring the impact of insurgency into homes worldwide and live, providing the insurgent with a free international public platform. Insurgency has become dramatic entertainment. Because viewers rapidly become jaded, insurgents are driven to seek ever greater 'spectacular' success to make news: Lockerbie, the Brighton bombing, the World Trade Centre and obviously 9/11 and 7/7 attacks are cases in point. As a result, both civil and military policymakers can be subjected to enormous pressures from national and international public opinion, whose knowledge is inevitably based only on the circumstantial evidence that the media bestows.

9. Although America and Russia have reduced their sponsorship of insurgent 'clients', there are numerous other sources of support. Some governments conduct campaigns of undeclared proxy insurgent style warfare as a deliberate arm of foreign policy; the Syrian and Iranian examples spring to mind. Putting political motives to one side, there is a commercial aspect: a thriving international arms market provides certain states with lucrative profits and much needed hard currency. The easy availability of modern weapons has increased the range, accuracy and lethality of insurgent attacks.
10. It is a relatively cheap form of warfare and also one which can be lucrative for those involved. Under the cover of terrorism, protection rackets and smuggling have become shadow industries in many states. Organised crime in Russia and its potential links with the illegal export of nuclear material to terrorist groups poses the greatest single threat to the security of other states. The drugs industry in Latin America has formed a complex triangular relationship with both government forces and insurgents in Peru and Bolivia. This is now mirrored in Afghanistan. Over a protracted period of time the contesting sides in an insurgency may even form a bizarre adversarial partnership; insurgent leaders get rich or achieve a status which would otherwise be denied them as common criminals, whilst counter insurgency commanders see their own organisations grow in size, importance and influence within the state. Narcotics clearly post a threat to British national interests and those of weaker friendly states. The Government is already involved in this undeclared war in many ways and narco-diplomacy could well involve the greater use of the Armed Forces in the future.

11. Perhaps of more immediate concern, the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its sphere of influence has led to the release of long-suppressed ethnic and religious tensions. In the Balkans nationalism has erupted into civil war, the brutality of which has shocked the liberal democracies. To the south, the spread of radical fundamentalism in Algeria, Turkey and Egypt contributes to regional instability and adds to a potential tide of exiles and refugees; migrants moving from Eastern Europe, the Near East and North Africa who, some predict, are beginning to become a serious immigration problem for Western Europe.

12. The shadowy links between certain terrorist groups and states could indicate some kind of international form of international insurgency, fought by those who do not necessarily share cultural perceptions of rationality and ‘fair play’. Compounding the problem, the spectre of mass migration has already contributed to a political resurgence of the racist Right. Vigilantes and death squads, long a hazardous feature of political life in other regions, have reappeared in parts of Europe. Arms proliferation, the potential availability of PGMs, and in particular the prospect of the use of weapons of mass destruction of one type or another necessitate a close and continuous assessment of the risk posed by insurgents wherever they operate.

SECTION 4 - CONCLUSIONS

13. Up to now, and in the appropriate circumstances, the UK government has wished to have its Armed Forces available for use in the international arena. This clearly leads to involvement in different types of conflict and probably contact with a variety of disparate groups of protagonists. Such contact may not necessarily involve direct confrontation, but could occur whilst operating under international mandates or during an intervention in regions where insurgency and civil disorder are rife. The Army, in conjunction with the other two Services and coalition allies, has been called upon to provide advice, support or overt assistance to a state threatened by some form of insurgency and this will no doubt continue in the next few years.

14. In other situations some of the principles and tactics of counter insurgency could also be applicable. For instance, in a period of fragile peace after a war (when the civil administration in a defeated or liberated country has broken down), or in a peace support operation (when armed factions interrupt humanitarian relief or attack peacekeepers),
troops may need to employ selectively the relevant COIN tactics and techniques. While this is a sensitive political area, it is a practical aspect of modern soldering that merits objective consideration. In the field, neat doctrinal distinctions and definitions will become blurred. To be ready to confront insurgency and its impact in any and all of its new and complex forms at short notice and in a wide variety of environments, demands a clear overall understanding of the relevant issues. This also requires some useful analytical tools to measure the situation and provide some practical counter measures. Only by monitoring events and carefully analysing possible new trends will commanders and staff officers be able to direct their thought to meet the likely demands of any future crisis. It is in this modern milieu that the military planner has to consider the part that the Army plays within the overall strategy to counter the improved ability of an insurgent to act on a global or regional scale in the glare of an international audience.
PART B
COUNTER INSURGENCY
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
CHAPTER 1
ASPECTS OF THE LAW
SECTION 1 - THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

1. The two Parts of this publication deal with insurgency and countering insurgency in generic military terms. The principles, both strategic and operational covered in this second Part could apply to any situation involved with counter insurgency, whether it occurs in the UK or abroad.

2. However the legal framework in which these military operations take place could differ significantly from place to place, and commanders at all levels will have to be aware of the precise legal conditions that pertain for any military operations contemplated. The position is this:

   a. In whatever capacity troops are employed they must always operate within the law.

   b. If the conflict is international then the international Law of Armed Conflict\(^1\) (LOAC) must be observed and followed.

   c. If the operations fall short of international armed conflict, then the domestic (ie internal) law of the state in which the operations occur, together with any provisions of international law\(^1\) that bind any parties to that operation, must be followed.

   d. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, adopted in 1977 and ratified in 1995 is intended to apply to internal armed conflicts but its application is specifically excluded in situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and acts of a similar nature.

3. The full range of operations in which troops could be involved is shown below. This has been extracted from Volume II of the Manual of Military Law (with slight amendment), to illustrate these important and salient features of the law and its application in conflict.

\(^1\) International treaties aimed at protecting human rights and Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
4. In this Part of the publication military principles, operational procedures and practices are explained, but it has to be clearly understood that some or all of these techniques and practices may not be legally available for use in any particular situation; this depends entirely on the legal status of the troops involved and the overall rules and constraints under which they are operating. It would be plainly illegal for troops when responding to a domestic riot at the request of the local police to establish ambush positions with a view to killing those attempting to leave the area. An ambush of this type would be feasible and legally supportable in a situation of international armed conflict.

SECTION 2 - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS

5. It is thus vital for a commander to know what law applies in a given set of circumstances and what it is that triggers any changes in the law to be applied. The answer to this type of question relates directly to the sort of Rules of Engagement (ROE) that would be issued by the Ministry of Defence.

6. JSP398 is the Joint Service Manual which provides the ground rules and procedures for the incorporation and application of particular ROE to suit the prevailing circumstances.

7. UK Government ministers provide political direction and guidance to commanders by means of ROE which govern the application of force. It follows that such rules which are approved by ministers may only be changed by ministerial authority. Commanders will in turn wish to issue ROE to their subordinates. These ROE will be cast within the discretion allowed in the rules approved by Ministers.

8. ROE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that such application of force is carefully controlled; ROE are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions. In passing orders to subordinates a commander at any level must always act within the ROE received but is not bound to use the full extent of the permission granted.
9. ROE are usually written in the form of prohibitions or permissions. When they are issued as prohibitions, they will be orders to commanders not to take certain designated actions: when they are issued as permissions, they will be guidance to commanders that certain designated actions may be taken if the commanders judge them necessary or desirable in order to carry out their assigned tasks. The ROE are thus issued as a set of parameters to inform commanders of the limits of constraint imposed or of freedom permitted when carrying out their assigned tasks. The conformity of any action with any set of ROE in force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commander's responsibility to use only that degree of force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.

POLITICAL POLICY INDICATORS (PPI)

10. **Political Policy.** ROE authorising messages from the MOD will contain guidance on Government policy to assist commanders to plan and react responsibly as a situation develops. This guidance will comprise a Political Policy Indicator (PPI) and an amplifying narrative which would describe Government intentions. The three PPIs are as follows:

   a. **ALFA.** De-escalation. (Play down the issue as much as possible).
   
   b. **BRAVO.** Maintenance of the Status Quo.
   
   c. **CHARLIE.** Risk of escalation acceptable. (Take the initiative within the rules in force even if this involves escalating the level of confrontation).

11. **Procedures.** There are rules and procedures concerning the application of ROE as a situation develops. These are listed in JSP 398. ROE are applied to all arms of the three Services and to all environments (air, land, sea and subsurface). When UK forces are called upon to operate in conjunction with forces of other nations operating under different ROE, MOD would attempt to harmonise the different sets of rules. Subject to British ministerial approval, national forces under command or control of UN or other international or multinational agencies may operate under ROE issued by that agency. In some circumstances national amplifying instructions may be issued. Otherwise UK national ROE will apply.

THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

12. Every theatre in which UK forces operate will have a particular ROE profile. However, within a large theatre it may be necessary to issue different profiles, covering smaller areas, to forces that are operating under significantly different circumstances. It may also be necessary to issue different ROE profiles to forces carrying out different roles. Nevertheless, in any given area of operation UK forces having a similar role would normally operate under identical ROE.

SECTION 3 - THE STATUS OF FORCES

LEGAL EXPRESSIONS

13. **General.** This Section does not attempt to define all the better known legal expressions that may be encountered during a counter insurgency campaign. There are,
however, legal expressions that are fundamental to any military understanding of the legal circumstances in which troops are deployed.

14. **Jurisdiction.** This term determines who has the legal power to try an individual in any particular circumstances. Where soldiers are employed abroad, this fundamental question should be resolved by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between governments or possibly by an Exchange of Letters between governments. In the unlikely situation where there is an absence of any agreement of this type, the local civil and criminal courts would have exclusive jurisdiction. The implications of this could be far reaching, particularly for British troops in areas where the rule of law has collapsed, or cannot be properly implemented.

15. **Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).** In amplification of para 14, a SOFA covers the terms of employment for troops overseas, their legal status, operational aims, use of weapons and other agreements or restraints upon their use. The document is usually endorsed at government level and its contents should be passed to the military commander as soon as it has been agreed - preferably before any troops reach the area of operations. MOUs or an Exchange of Letters are other lesser forms of the same document, and consequently are less legally binding in courts of law. It should be noted that any agreement by a state to allow British troops to be tried under their own legal codes does not automatically authorise British commanders to try soldiers in that state under British law (and hence the MML). This has to be agreed specifically.

16. **United Nations Operations.** The legal status of forces operating in support of the United Nations should be secured by a legal instrument with the host government. The type of agreement depends on the degree of accord between the states in dispute and with the United Nations. Contributing states also negotiate agreements with the United Nations Secretariat covering such subjects as the role planned for the troops, disciplinary and financial arrangements.

17. **Other Legal References.** Chapter 5 of Vol II of the MML covers many other terms that would have legal validity in any counter insurgency situations in the UK. It also cites suitable examples from case law to indicate to commanders and staff officers the authority and binding nature of the law and of its restraints and qualifications. Vol III of the MML provided similar expressions, definitions, and examples from case law of the legal position for troops abroad although this has now been superseded by JSP 383 *The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 2004* which covers legal aspects of international armed conflict. Of particular interest for land commanders are the last three chapters of the JSP (Chapters 14, 15 and 16) – those of the applicability of LOAC to Peace Support Operations, dealing with Internal Armed Conflict and the enforcement of the Law of Armed Conflict.

**SUMMARY**

18. The five preceding paragraphs are sufficient to show that it would be prudent for legal advice to be available to a commander and staff officers on a full time basis once operations to counter insurgency are set in hand. The law differs from state to state, the law changes to reflect developments in society, and the implications of international treaty obligations, human rights law and conventions on the use of some weapons all indicate that
a clear understanding of the current legal position and recent legal developments is
necessary.

19. A commander has to be aware of the legal background and the basis for any
planned military operations. He should also be aware of the contents of the SOFA, the
appropriate ROE for those under his command and have rapid access to legal advice.
Then the complexities of the law in regard to countering insurgency can be tackled more
effectively and can be integrated into the overall pattern of military operations conducted
under his command.

SECTION 4 - OPERATIONAL LAW BRANCH AND LEGAL ADVISER

OPERATIONAL LAW BRANCH

20. In the light of experience gained during the last few years an Operational Law
Branch has been established at the Land Warfare Centre in Warminster under one star
leadership to provide theatre and regional commanders with legal advice affecting
operations. This service is available for commanders and staff to use on any topic where
suitable legal advice can be provided (rapidly if this is necessary). Where troops are
deployed on operations the Operational Law Branch will provide a Legal Adviser for the
military commander who would deploy and join the headquarters staff to provide on the
spot legal advice concerning the conduct of operations and the application of the Law of
Armed Conflict and other legal protocols, treaties and instruments where appropriate.

21. The Operational Law Branch will have permanent links with military lawyers within
the MOD, PJHQ and the other Service HQs and can, where necessary, seek advice from
other Government Departments, particularly with regard to international law affecting states.
On operations where an interpretation is required, which affects powers of arrest,
interrogation and the handling of PW and detainees by British servicemen, legal advice
should be mandatory. In the course of a campaign as a result of progress towards stability
within the area of operations, or as a result of external factors and influence, definitive
negotiation with potential or actual adversaries may be contemplated. Legal advice should
be obtained before such negotiations occur.

22. Where operational circumstances permit, ‘reach back’ facilities may be put in place.
‘Reach back’ gives a deployed commander access to legal advice when an adviser is not
deployed with the commander, or can be used to reinforce the advice available to a
deployed legal adviser. Typically, a legal adviser at the Operational Law Branch will be
designated as the deployed commander’s point of contact for advice on emerging legal
issues. Where ‘reach back’ arrangements have been established, care has to be taken to
ensure that reliable secure communications remain available throughout an operation or
deployment. Reliance on ‘reach back’ arrangements does not preclude the subsequent
deployment of a legal adviser to a commander’s staff should the circumstances require it.
Legal Advisers work for their commander and not for other lawyers, so there is no legal
chain of command as such. However, as staff officers they will have ‘desk level’ links with
their counterparts in different areas of any military headquarters or formation.
THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF A LEGAL ADVISER

23. The Legal Adviser will be a member of the Command Group within a deployed headquarters. He should be readily available to both the commander and staff for legal advice on matters affecting military operations conducted by that headquarters. His duties are likely to cut across the usual staffing functions within a headquarters but his responsibilities for legal matters lie directly to the commander. He may well be required to act in a legal capacity at a joint service or a multinational headquarters. Thus he will need to have suitable security clearances and access to information commensurate with his responsibilities to the commander.

24. In a HQ the Legal Adviser will need to develop close working links with a Political Adviser and SO1 G3 Operations Support. A commander would anticipate that a Political Adviser and Legal Adviser work in harmony both to interpret political and legal direction, and to present information emanating from outside the Headquarters in a coherent manner. The Legal Adviser's link with the G3 operational staff is based on the requirement to ensure that all operations are undertaken in accordance with international law. The Legal Adviser and SO1 G3 Operations Support will typically be dealing with targeting, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Information Operations. Legal difficulties should ideally be resolved by the co-operation of staff officers and before they reach the commander. The Legal Adviser has to also ensure that he is present at operational planning meetings and that he makes himself available to the G2 Intelligence and G3 Operations staff. The Legal Adviser also needs to be aware of the legal implications associated with longer range planning and should be involved with G4 Logistics and G5 Plans staff to identify and resolve such issues.
CHAPTER 2

THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE TO COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 – THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

1. The experience of numerous 'small wars' has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of conflict. More recently service in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosova, Iraq and Afghanistan have added considerably to this experience and provides the present generation of officers with its main first-hand source of experience. This could also tend to constrain military thinking on the subject because of its national context. The procedures for dealing with the routine aspects of providing military assistance within UK are not considered further in this publication. Those aspects of military assistance to the Civil Power in UK will continue to be relevant and military commanders will need to be aware of this overall doctrine if called upon to assist in counter terrorist or counter insurgency incidents in UK.

2. The British have not developed a general antidote to the problem of insurgency. There have long been alternative, effective approaches; the French in Algeria during the 1840s produced novel tactics based on highly mobile columns, and in Indo-China a military-led community relations campaign predated Templer's 'Hearts and Minds' theories by several decades. Not only is the threat changing, but so too is the environment in which an insurgent has to be confronted. For example, in any future counter insurgency operation, military action will be conducted under the critical scrutiny of the law, the media, human rights organisations and other international bodies such as the European Court. Thus while military planning should draw upon the lessons of the past, doctrine has to evolve if it is to remain relevant.

SECTION 2 - THE ATTRITION THEORY

3. A straight forward attritional approach is one option. Such strategies have been adopted and some have worked. Absolute repression was used by the Germans in response to guerrilla attacks during the Second World War. Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and his campaign against the Marsh Arabs in Southern Iraq are contemporary examples of the use of attrition. In Uruguay the Tupamaros' campaign was crushed by a vicious right wing backlash, that not only destroyed the insurgency, but in the process led to the replacement of a vibrant civil democratic government by a military dictatorship. None of the attritional 'solutions' described above is appropriate in a liberal democracy and it is considered that a 'gloves off' approach to any insurgency problem has almost no role to play in modern counter insurgency operations.

4. Furthermore, the record of success for attrition in counter insurgency operations is generally a poor one. Undue focus on military action clouds the key political realities, which can result in a military-dominated campaign plan that misses the real focus of an insurgency. An inability to match the insurgent's concept with an appropriate government one-likelihood to trying to play chess while the enemy is actually playing poker - is conceptually flawed and will not achieve success. Having deployed conventionally trained troops and large amounts of firepower, the attritionalist commander generally feels
compelled to use them. The head of the US Mission to South Vietnam, General Harkins, claimed in September 1962 that what was required to defeat the Viet Cong within 3 years were "Three Ms"—men, money and materiel. The result of this approach, (normally to the delight of an insurgent) is an escalating and indiscriminate use of military firepower. The wider consequences of this approach, seen both in South Vietnam and elsewhere will often be an upward spiral of civilian alienation.

5. It would be wrong to deduce that any application of attrition is necessarily counter productive: in Malaya the British were able to achieve a force ratio of 20:1, and used their military superiority in numbers and firepower as a means to drive Chin Peng's communists into remote parts of the country, where they were then hunted down remorselessly. The important point to note in this example is the close political control which was exercised over military power throughout that campaign. Nevertheless an overall policy of attrition in counter insurgency operations has rarely, if ever, been policy for the UK's Armed Forces.

6. It is necessary to appreciate that although, at times, military forces and a policy of eliminating insurgents could have a crucial role to play in restoring and maintaining government control, military force is not an end in itself, but always a means to achieve a wider political purpose. This implies that the military commander will have a far from free hand, and indeed, in a well orchestrated military counter insurgency strategy, is unlikely to direct the overall campaign. Acceptance of this fact has deep implications for the part that military forces will be given (and should seek) to play in counter insurgency, and of any doctrinal approach to the situation.

SECTION 3 - THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

BACKGROUND

7. Insurgency can be seen as an ancient form of manoeuvre warfare. In Vietnam for example, it was being practised against foreign invaders 2000 years before Ho Chi Minh and Giap turned their attention to the French, Japanese and then the Americans. The insurgent uses politico-military skills to turn the government's apparent strengths against itself. This can involve a relatively low level of military activity, such as the Malaya campaign, or one which is virtually indistinguishable from war, as the French discovered at Dien Bien Phu. The military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan fall into the same category. It would therefore be an error to conclude that military operations in an insurgency are 'low intensity', and hence the phrase is no longer used.

APPLICABILITY TO COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

8. ADP Land Operations explains that, 'some elements of conventional warfighting wisdom may become irrelevant in counter insurgency and acknowledges that other forms of operation will be governed by tight political control. Nevertheless, because counter insurgency involves using a degree of military force, its conduct has some parallels with combat operations. The Army has an approach to operations which, with careful reflection and imagination, can be readily adapted. It places due emphasis on the intellectual and psychological aspects of operations, not simply the material. It emphasises the focus on people and ideas, not only on ground. Insurgent cohesion is identified and attacked by applying concentrated yet discrete force against critical vulnerabilities some of which have been described in Part A of this publication. Surprise, tempo and simultaneity are used to
overwhelm and unhinge an insurgent, bringing about a complete collapse of will, and ultimately help to create the conditions for his political defeat. As in warfighting, force is applied selectively, and its use is carefully measured and controlled: destruction is a means not an end. The doctrine eschews accepting battle for battle’s sake and aims to create the conditions for success with less force, more quickly, and at less cost. All of this is directly applicable in counter insurgency; a subtle approach to a subtle problem. Because the theory of manoeuvrist approach shares a common ancestry with some of the most successful insurgent strategies, the military planner educated in this doctrine is more likely to cope with the inherent complexities of counter insurgency.

LEVEL OF CONFLICT

9. There are, however, differences of emphasis and interpretation. First, counter insurgency operations do not readily lend themselves to neat division into discrete levels of conflict. An action at the lowest tactical level can have far reaching operational and even strategic consequences and vice versa. Indeed, if the test of whether there is a political dimension is rigidly applied, every patrol is potentially conducted at the 'operational' level because the conduct of an individual soldier, amplified by the media, can become an international issue.

10. In warfighting servicemen tend to expect that once broad political parameters have been established their commanders will be left to decide the best way to achieve operational and tactical goals: this is not necessarily the case in counter insurgency and this has important implications. While being prepared to work and offer advice at the highest levels, military commanders are unlikely to enjoy even tactical autonomy over matters that in would be considered a Service preserve. This is due to the relationship between 'success' and the centre of gravity in counter insurgency operations.

DEFINING SUCCESS

11. Success is defined by the state of affairs which needs to be achieved by the end of a campaign. Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, it may be that the desired aim of the Host Nation authorities falls short of victory in a strictly military context and setting. This desired aim may well differ from views expressed by British authorities who will then have to operate within the conditions set by the Host Nation. This is not to say that tactical defeats are acceptable, merely to acknowledge that there may be significant restrictions on the degree of military success which is both achievable and compatible with the overall political aim. In counter insurgency 'success' may equate to handing over an internal security problem to the local authorities, or simply not losing.

DURATION OF CAMPAIGN

12. If, for example, the intention of committing troops is to buy time in which to address particular grievances (which need not necessarily mean making concessions), then dramatic tactical military success may in fact be counter productive. Nor may it be possible to predict how long involvement may last, so the campaign may not be planned in the decisive, coherent fashion to which military commanders aspire. Counter insurgency operations are often protracted and as the nature of the task may evolve or even radically change long after troops are deployed, the political aim may likewise change over time. It is thus vital that the political authorities and commanders seek to identify where in the overall
spectr um of government activity the military contribution lies, what its relationship to the other aspects of policy is, and its relative importance at any particular stage of the counter insurgency military campaign. This will vary over time and even in different geographical areas at the same time. Troops have to be aware of the military role and commanders should select accurate measures against which to judge the effectiveness of military tactics; ground 'captured' has even less significance in counter insurgency than it does in warfighting.

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

13. In an insurgency the strategic centre of gravity will be the support of the mass of the people. Clearly, this is not open to 'attack' in the conventional sense (although insurgent strategies often incorporate the use of coercive force). The insurgency is an attempt to force political change, therefore it logically follows that the centre of gravity can only be reached by political action. The government response to an insurgency should take as its fundamental assumption that the true nature of the threat lies in the insurgent's political potential rather than his military power, although the latter may appear the more worrying in the short term. In Malaya, the centre of gravity was targeted not by jungle patrolling, but by the political decision to grant independence: the military contribution was invaluable, but not of itself decisive. The military campaign will focus upon the insurgents, but is only one part of a wider potential solution.

CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

14. The land environment in which the British Army is currently required to operate is arguably more complex than that for which the Army has traditionally trained. The adaptive foundation could, however, be complemented by training to cope with simultaneous and changing tactical challenges within the same geographic area. Throughout history the British Army has faced numerous and varied threats. British involvement in conflicts or recent emergencies ranging from Northern Ireland, Oman and the Falkland Islands bear witness to this fact and yet throughout the last years of the 20th century the perceived greatest threat, and the threat against which training was focused, was that posed by the Soviet Bloc. The risks of large scale armed conflict between nation states have reduced with the end of the Cold War, but they have not disappeared. The Army now faces a spectrum of threats ranging from conventional forces to international terrorists and from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to computer viruses. These threats may manifest themselves wherever there are British interests and be initiated from any region on earth. In today’s turbulent and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict and therefore the Army has to be prepared to meet the challenges of any type of operation, in a range of physical environments, and against all kinds of threats, simultaneously. This is the nature of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). More details concerning COE will be available in the next revise of this publication. These have been recorded in a Doctrinal Note produced by the Mission Support Group of the Land Warfare Centre and are available in Edition 9 of the Electronic Battle Box (2007-2008) and on the web based Battle Box.

DEVELOPING A COUNTER INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

15. The military plan should form one strand in a coordinated 'attack' upon the overall aims of the insurgents. This should be established by a strategic estimates conducted by a
government taking military and other advice. From this will flow further operational and tactical estimates and plans. While military forces may have a critical role to play at certain stages in the campaign, overall its contribution will be of less importance and should be kept in perspective. Depending upon the level of insurgent activity, for most soldiers it is likely to be an unglamorous, rather unsatisfactory environment in which to serve. At times there may be opportunities for flair and to instigate decisive action against insurgent groups, but at others troops will be confined to acting in a stabilising, holding role with the bulk of their effort going into strategically 'fixing' the insurgency. This by no means implies a passive or reactive posture, but an understanding of these realities and the reasons for them at all levels should help to prepare the soldier for occasional policy decisions which at first sight may defy military logic, as well as giving units involved in counter insurgency a realistic expectation of 'success'.

16. The aim should never be a spectacular, isolated success for one arm of government, but a sequence of successes that combine to work in complementary ways toward a single strategic goal. There will be multiple lines of operation (economic, legal, military etc), working through a series of decisive points, but they should all complement the campaign main effort - the primary line of operation - which must be political. The military commander will identify his military decisive points, which are then arranged onto lines of operation to achieve the desired military aim. The military plan will be based upon a number of operational objectives, understood and refined at each level, which assist the destruction of the insurgency by marginalisation and focused selective strikes, and also provide assistance to the work of other agencies. Resources, (the means to achieve the specified ends) should be allocated accordingly.

17. The strategic campaign plan should be directed in such a way as to sequence and coordinate the various agencies' individual lines of operation according to the overall strategic requirements at the time. The intent is to overlap the operational plans of each with the others. These concepts translate directly to counter insurgency, but contrary to the military aim in warfighting, the overall campaign director has a far more complex range of events and options to weave into a coherent plan: a 'campaign' in the broadest sense.

SECTION 4 - SUCCESS IN OPERATIONS

DESTROYING THE INSURGENTS

18. In counter insurgency physical destruction of the enemy still has an important role to play. A degree of attrition will be necessary, but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve the success. Commanders should seek 'soft' methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation or subversion for example. Minimum necessary force is a well proven counter insurgency lesson. In an era of intense media interest and one in which legality (both domestically and in the international arena) will become ever more important, sound judgement and close control will need to be exercised over the degree of physical destruction which it is possible, necessary, or desirable to inflict. For example, the killing of a teenage gunman could be justifiable in military terms but its possible impact on his community could jeopardise a potentially far more significant though less spectacular Hearts and Minds operation.

19. Success does not necessarily go to the side which possesses the best weapons or even uses them most effectively. Seeking to destroy the enemy by physical attrition will
also expose members of the government force to greater risk of casualties, and as the Tet offensive in Vietnam during 1968 demonstrated, campaigns can be lost despite military success. In that instance the American strategic centre of gravity, public opinion in the USA, became vulnerable once the perceived costs of involvement escalated. This does not mean that risk should be avoided or the tactical initiative handed to the enemy, merely that the wider implications of any course of action should be carefully weighed.

ATTACKING THE INSURGENTS' WILL

20. Attacking the insurgent's will, the strength from which he draws his cohesion, is likely to be more productive, particularly in the early stages of a counter insurgency campaign before the insurgency has consolidated. A sophisticated attack on the adversary's will strikes at the centre of his philosophy. This should be undertaken as part of a deliberate 'Hearts and Minds' campaign. This is a somewhat dated term but encapsulates what is needed. It should incorporate G5 action, psychological operations, effective use of the media, and troop information. These are separate functions, but they have a common theme and are best utilised in a complementary manner. In practice the scope for such action will depend upon the way in which a particular campaign is orchestrated at the highest level and the freedom of action which is delegated to military commanders. Given the political authority an approach that attacks the enemy's will demands imagination, and a responsive decision making organisation which has the ability to seize fleeting opportunities. See Annex A to this Chapter for more details of how this can be done.

ATTACKING COHESION

21. Manoeuvre warfare theory indicates that it is preferable to shatter the enemy's moral and physical cohesion rather than seek his wholesale destruction. The means of attacking cohesion in counter insurgency are readily adapted from warfighting: firepower (which in the warfighting context is severely constrained, but in counter insurgency can be broadened to include evidence gathering, arrest and legal action); surprise (achieved for example through developing information gathering technology which is exploited by either covert action or rapid concentration of overt force into a given area).

TEMPO

22. It has been said that low tempo appears to be a characteristic of many counter insurgency campaigns. This is to misunderstand tempo, which is judged not by the 'pace' of operations, but the speed of action and reaction relative to the insurgent. It is true that slow pace is a direct result of the protracted nature of some, though not all, forms of insurgent strategy. However, even in a Maoist style campaign where the insurgent may not be able to move beyond low level guerrilla activity for a considerable time, the situation can still change radically. Diplomatic agreement to curtail external support for example, will test the ability to achieve high tempo. Commanders have to be ready and able to adapt quickly to sudden developments, some of which may be outside their control. Certainly the accomplished insurgent commander will rely on an ability to exploit tempo; moving up where possible, and down when necessary, the classic revolutionary phases of an insurgency at such a speed as to make the security force's responses inappropriate and counter productive.
23. At the tactical level tempo is just as applicable. Here a commander can seek to establish his own tempo to seize the initiative in the local area of operations and force an insurgent group into a reactive role. An incident which in conventional war would pass almost unremarked, such as the death of a civilian in cross fire, will attract considerable media attention. Troops and commanders at all levels should have the mental agility to adapt to rapid, even inexplicable changes, in the mood of the population for example, quicker than the insurgent. High tempo can be enhanced through physical mobility, timely and accurate contact intelligence, coordinated C3, and flexible support procedures.

SIMULTANEITY

24. All effective insurgent strategies emphasise simultaneity by creating parallel political and social challenges as well as military ones. In Vietnam Giap's regular and guerrilla troops worked with political cadres in a complementary fashion to exploit the fragile nature of the Saigon government. If the use of simultaneity is productive for the insurgent, then it is equally applicable for the authorities. Tactically it can be achieved through the restrained and carefully considered use of a mix of agencies, and by grouping for independent action, such as joint military-police patrols with compatible communications working to a single headquarters. Operationally it is achieved through the development of a harmonised campaign plan along multiple lines of operation, as described above.

MISSION COMMAND

25. Following from the points raised in para 9 above it has been argued that Mission Command cannot be properly applied in counter insurgency but this is a misunderstanding of what mission command involves. Clearly, political considerations will permeate down to the lowest tactical level. This will inevitably constrain the freedom of action of junior military commanders, which could have the effect of restricting initiative at the lower levels. Paradoxically this makes mission command even more important.

26. Certain matters will need to be promulgated in great detail. Relationships between agencies have to be spelled out, demarcation lines established and precise SOPs written, particularly in joint operations with other agencies or allies. Sensitive relationships with the media, the Security Forces of neighbouring states and the public have to be carefully defined. However, because contact with the insurgent could be rare it is essential to seize fleeting opportunities. In certain operational environments there may also be considerable freedom of action, for example in remote areas junior commanders will have no option but to use their initiative.

27. But fundamentally the spirit of mission command does apply in counter insurgency because in a politically charged atmosphere it is even more important that soldiers understand both their task and the purpose behind it. Subordinates well versed in mission command are able to work within constraints, and thus avoid the many pitfalls which await the unwary. It will be important for directives and orders to express the concept of operations in such a way that everyone understands not just the aim, but the atmosphere which is to be created.

28. Counter insurgency places heavy demands and calls for particular skills and professional qualities, both in commanders at all levels and the troops they lead. It requires the ability to adapt and utilise an unconventional yet highly disciplined approach to
soldering. One of the factors to mission command working in counter insurgency lies in the selection and education of commanders and preparing troops prior to and throughout operations. Relevant and realistic training should focus not simply upon military skills, but upon those aspects which troops will find most demanding or fruitful, including legal rights and obligations, languages, media awareness and cultural orientation. In counter insurgency simply being able to hold a reasonable conversation with a civilian is a military ‘skill’ that may need to be developed in training.

29. There are clearly risks in employing delegated decision making. Troops need clear and comprehensive orders, orders which link the commander’s intent with SOPs. This approach adds an extra safeguard to minimise the risk of a commander jeopardising the political aim. Most junior commanders and soldiers will not need to know the details of how the strategy is constructed, but through Mission Command they will have a feel for what is expected of the Army, what the constraints are and why.

SECTION 5 – THE CORE FUNCTIONS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

30. Doctrine is intended to guide, and thus help to view the overall government campaign and the military element of it through the functions of; ‘find’, ‘fix’ and ‘strike’. The role of various agencies and the part they are to play will be expressed in the overall campaign director's concept of operations. The intelligence services, elements of the Army (both covert and overt) and other government agencies 'find' the enemy by gathering all available information on him. The uniformed services, the Police and the spending departments of government - combined with diplomatic efforts and an active Hearts and Minds campaign (including Information Operations) - 'fix' the insurgent. Locally raised forces can also help to 'fix' and have been employed in numerous counter insurgency campaigns to good effect. Special Forces overt military and police units PSYOPS and the legal system spearhead the campaign to 'strike', which is also carried on through socio-economic 'operations', such as reorganising local government, creating jobs and improving social services.

SECTION 6 - INFORMATION OPERATIONS

GENERAL

31. In counter insurgency the strategic application of Information Operations is primarily concerned with gaining a command advantage at national level, and the preparation and implementation of a strategic information plan. In the former case, this would involve the protection of government and alliance command centres and the disruption of any equivalent command arrangements within an insurgent organisation; in the latter case, the implementation of the strategic information plan covers the acquisition and control for the information available to an insurgent organisation by all appropriate means. The targets of this information war may include political, economic, commercial and public media sources as well as military resources.

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W)

32. The military part of Information Operations is Command and Control Warfare (C2W) which is defined as the integrated use of all military capabilities including Operations Security (OPSEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Deception, Electronic Warfare
(EW) and Physical Destruction, supported by All Source Intelligence and Communications and Information Systems (CIS), to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against similar actions. These five disciplines can stand alone, but are most effective when integrated to form an over-arching C2W strategy. Any C2W cell should be within the G3/J3 operations structure, but its function involves a complex inter-relation of all staff areas. There is potential for mutual interference between the different components of C2W operations: this underscores the need for close coordination and monitoring at all command levels.

PREPARING A STRATEGIC INFORMATION PLAN

33. It is recognised that different counter insurgency campaigns will have differing calls on the use of Information Operations and C2W as the campaign progresses. However, experience shows that little attention has previously been given to the preparation of an overall strategic information plan in counter insurgency situations.

34. Despite the potential difficulties and frustrations involved, a commander could reap handsome military dividends if a sound and properly supported strategic information plan is prepared and subsequent C2W planning is conducted as an integral part of the operational and tactical plans that would be necessary in any counter insurgency campaign. This could equally apply to other campaigns and operations.

35. An illustrative diagram that describes the functions that operate within the scope of Information Operations, both in peace and war, is shown at Annex B.

SECTION 7 - INTEGRATING OPERATIONS

SHAPING OPERATIONS

36. In counter insurgency just as in warfighting, the core functions will be executed within the now familiar operational framework. But in counter insurgency the concept needs a broader interpretation. Shaping operations at the strategic and operational levels will often tend to be political, diplomatic and psychological in nature. Military involvement may be through covert action by special units. At a tactical level, overt shaping operations, such as cross border cooperation and surveillance of areas where known insurgents live and work, will contribute to ‘fixing’. Militarily, shaping operations could be decisive at the strategic and operational level, but rarely so at the tactical level. Until the insurgent is found he has the initiative and it is impossible to conduct any further shaping or subsequent decisive operations against him. The finding function is a prerequisite to starting any subsequent operations - despite it being often very difficult to identify an insurgent when he can blend himself into society. This prerequisite should also endure throughout the campaign - once lost the insurgent has the initiative back again. A police or military unit (covert or overt) tasked with conducting shaping operations may be given a variety of surveillance tasks and/or disruptive tasks, such as infiltrating the financial dealings of an insurgency, or conducting overt checks to break up or expose an insurgents’ patterns of behaviour and lines of communications.
DECISIVE OPERATIONS

37. Decisive operations normally take place at the tactical level in counter insurgency operations. Those operations involving fixing tasks should normally be aimed to reassure the general public and foster improved community relations. Where it involves striking against the insurgency, it is essential that the shaping operation has already found and fixed the insurgent group and thus initiative is ensured. However often decisive operations are reactive to an insurgent groups' activities and there is no time for a pre-planned shaping operation. On these occasions the fixing has to be carried out as part of the decisive operation - the key to success is to wrest the initiative from the insurgent as quickly as possible in order that the force can manoeuvre to a position from which it can then strike.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

38. Sustaining operations in counter insurgency will attract a higher priority than they generally do in offensive operations in war, and may need a commensurately greater priority in terms of operational planning, staff effort and resources. The aim is not simply physical protection of the force, but also securing political and public support, from which all government freedom of action flows. The insurgent commander may have identified non-military targets, such as VIPs or economic assets as government vulnerabilities and have selected them as decisive points in his campaign. That being the case, government forces are likely to become more heavily committed to protective duties than they would wish. While the aim will always be to secure and hold the initiative by means of aggressive action, significant numbers of troops are likely to be needed until locally recruited militias can be organised to take their place and technological aids put in place. This has important implications for training, force structuring and the timing of offensive operations in the military campaign plan. Counter insurgency campaigns are often long, protracted affairs and the establishment of secure operating bases, lines of communication, maintaining public support and recruiting local militia are necessary to enable the security forces to sustain a long-term operation. Hence the value of sustaining operations to the overall campaign plan.

SUMMARY

39. Over and above the integration of shaping decisive and sustaining operations there is a discrete and undefined balance between the application of deterrence, reassurance and attrition. Maintaining a firm and clear political and military deterrent to insurgents and their activities helps to reassure public opinion and local support for government policies and plans, while attrition, when properly focused and directed, can remove hard core activists and reduce the ability of insurgents to act coherently.
ATTACKING AN INSURGENT’S WILL

1. **General.** There are many ways in which it is possible to attack and seize the initiative from an insurgent group. Experience has shown that a combination of activities simultaneously applied has the best chance of success. These can be categorised in three ways which are covered in the next three paragraphs.

2. **Preemption.** The aim here, as in war, is to identify and exploit the fleeting opportunity in order to maximise surprise. Faced with an elusive insurgent, considerable emphasis should be placed upon preemption. He or she must be constantly destabilised by a proactive political and information campaign to deny the points and potential points of grievance: for example, the announcement of a timetable for independence robbed the Malayan Communist Party of its main political plank. Military success in preemptive operations will depend on a responsive intelligence system, linked with a rapid decision making process in such a way that the detection of an opportunity can be translated into a successful contact. A surveillance capability, perhaps along the lines developed in Northern Ireland, will help facilitate successful preemptive operations. In COIN it is frequently the case that one success leads to opportunities for another: an arrest may lead to the discovery of an arms cache and so on. Special Forces and Quick Reaction Forces must be available, properly positioned and able to exploit unplanned opportunities to strike at the insurgency. There should be scope to develop new tactics, such as the novel use of parachute troops by the Rhodesian Army during their counter insurgency campaign in the 1970s. The degree of preemptive action attempted by the security forces will in part be governed by an assessment of its overall impact, and is therefore likely to be controlled at a relatively high level. The potential to achieve spectacular military successes, like the American operation to capture the Achille Lauro hijackers or Israeli air strikes against guerrilla bases for example, will need to be balanced against political (including media and legal) implications.

3. **Dislocation.** The emphasis here is on denying the insurgents the opportunity to make best use of his resources. It will include deterrence and security measures designed to protect vulnerable targets; search operations; overt surveillance of potential mounting areas for insurgent attacks or meeting places; and a proactive Public Information (PINFO) stance. Effective rear operations, although frustrating and unpopular with troops, deny the insurgent the spectacular success on which his political appeal often rests. The results of a determined effort to dislocate the insurgent may not be spectacular and may not even be apparent to troops on the ground, but over time will rob the insurgent of the initiative. Both imagination, to design new tactics, and a high degree of discipline, in order to remain unpredictable, are required.

4. **Disruption.** The intention is to attack the insurgent selectively, targeting his most important assets and so throwing him into confusion. Well executed overt military operations will help to disrupt the insurgent by threatening his deployment and escape routes, locating his arms caches and restricting his movements. Even the threat of aggressive covert operations can be effective. Disruption calls for tactical awareness and
cunning. Troops should also appreciate that rare opportunities may be better exploited by other agencies (a minor arms find for example could, if left undisturbed, become a fruitful ambush site for Special Forces). Speed and alertness will be essential to get inside the insurgent's decision cycle. Reserves must be available and the commander must have the ability to shift the main effort rapidly. Mission command clearly has a key role to play. At the lowest tactical level thorough training and briefing must ensure that everyone - helicopter crews or drivers of ration trucks as much as soldiers on guard duty - recognise, report and where necessary act on combat indicators. Contingency plans, based on thorough preparation and assessment, will allow the security forces to exploit advantages, such as relatively greater mobility and better communications, once the insurgent shows his hand.
CHAPTER 3
THE PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

‘The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of force.’

General Sir Frank Kitson

SECTION 1 - PRINCIPLES

A MATTER OF BALANCE

1. There has never been a purely military solution to revolution; political, social, economic and military measures all have a part to play in restoring the authority of a legitimate government. The security forces act in support of the civil authority in a milieu in which there is less certainty than in conventional war. The problem is that, working on insufficient information, at least in the early stages, decisions have to be made affecting every aspect of political, economic and social life in the country. These decisions have repercussions for the nation or region far beyond the area, both in the diplomatic field and in the all important sphere of public opinion.

2. Theories, strategies and tactics come and go depending upon circumstances or merely intellectual fashion (the five main British COIN manuals published since 1949 have included several different lists of principles). What remains a constant is the fact that insurgency and counter insurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support, both at home and in the theatre of operations. If the strategic focal point is public opinion, both domestic and international, most initial military tactical efforts will be focused on breaking the link between the insurgent and the people. If the insurgent can be isolated, it is then theoretically a relatively simple matter to eliminate him and his cause.

3. Unfortunately, governments and armies have often been wrongfooted at the outbreak of insurgency. Meanwhile the broad mass of the people may wait to see which side appears to have the best prospects. That which can organise first, developing a tailor made strategy which is both effective and attractive will be at a significant advantage. Hence the value of principles upon which a successful COIN strategy can be based. Their practical application is much more difficult, and the critical tool for use, is an objective and thorough estimate. Taking two dramatically different outcomes of the same concept illustrates the dangers of trying to ‘template’ particular ideas and theories without taking due account of the operational environment. In Malaya the strategic hamlets policy worked well, because in addition to separating the Chinese squatter population from the insurgents, it also satisfied one of the ‘squatters’ basic demands, namely providing them with their own land - which in turn gave them a stake in the future of Malaya. In Vietnam the same tactic, insensitively applied due to cultural misperception, simply alienated the peasants and drove
them into the arms of the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese owned family farms, and many were Animists, in that they worshipped the very land that they were being taken from. The policy backfired, increasing the regime’s unpopularity and boosting support for the Viet Cong.

4. Principles offer the civil authorities and the heads of all government agencies, including the military commander, both a startpoint and useful signposts. They also help guard against panic-driven or flawed attempts to initiate a military ‘solution’. ADP Land Operations provides general guidelines derived from experience and the work of General Kitson and Sir Robert Thompson. While the relative weight given to each will vary for each type of campaign, British doctrine adheres strictly to the additional mandatory guidelines of minimum necessary force and legitimacy. Note therefore that some of the techniques which were successfully applied in previous campaigns, such as certain interrogation methods, or the relative ease with which the legal system was adapted, are simply no longer viable: in today’s world they would be unacceptable either domestically or internationally.

THE PRINCIPLES

5. The six COIN principles are arranged into a logical sequence which provides the authorities with a general guide on which to base and review its COIN strategy. Like all principles they should be applied pragmatically and with common sense to suit the circumstances peculiar to each campaign. It may not be possible, or appropriate to apply all the principles, - and in some situations it may be observed that the detailed application of these principles may overlap, or even temporarily run counter to the overall aim of the campaign. The principles are:

a. Political Primacy and Political Aim.

b. Coordinated Government Machinery.

c. Intelligence and Information.

d. Separating the Insurgent from his Support.

e. Neutralising the Insurgent.

f. Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning.

SECTION 2 - POLITICAL PRIMACY AND POLITICAL AIM

Formulating the Aim

6. General. Once it has been assessed that an insurgency has or could be developed, the authorities should move rapidly to provide an analysis of the type of insurgency it faces and its subsequent implications; then it should decide how to stop, neutralise or reverse the consequences of such an insurgency. At the same time the authorities and their agencies have to respond positively to any violence and intimidation generated by an insurgency. It is in the latter response that a force commander can play an effective part by advising the authorities of the role, scope and potential of the military forces available in any counter insurgency planning, - and how this potential can be matched to the authorities own
political, legislative and economic aims. The authorities should therefore formulate long-
term political aims which will be backed by political and economic programmes. These in 
turn will be supported by a counter insurgency plan involving military forces police, and any 
locally raised security force organisations.

7. **Intergovernmental Agreement on Aims.** The overall plan of campaign will be a 
function of government. Before HMG agrees to support an ally in any counter insurgency 
campaign the authorities will need to agree on the overall aims, the role British forces will 
play and whether there are any constraints on their employment.

8. **A British Force Commander’s Position vis-à-vis an Ally.** A British commander of 
a force invited by an allied government will only be able to advise his ally. If he needs 
further guidance in what will probably be a complex situation, or if his advice is ignored he 
should be able to consult or have recourse to appeal through the senior British political 
representative, probably the Ambassador or High Commissioner. If there is still 
disagreement on an important matter of principle the question would be referred to HMG for 
decision. In an extreme case, if no agreement can be reached, this might lead to the 
withdrawal of forces.

9. **Suiting the Plan to the Circumstances.** The overall plan will differ from country to 
country taking account of local circumstances and the analysis of the type of insurgency 
faced. Previous experience and the appropriate use of the principles outlined in para 5 
should be used to set any plan of campaign into an overall political context. Once this has 
been settled, then a clear and achievable government aim can be agreed, and should, in 
the right circumstances, be given as much publicity as possible.

### SECTION 3 - COORDINATED GOVERNMENT MACHINERY

#### CONTROL AND COORDINATION

10. **Functions to be Coordinated.** Given the complexity and potential for friction within 
any large organisation, unity of effort is a prerequisite for success. It is a fact that different 
agencies will approach a strategic goal from different directions and with different 
philosophies. The ideal is for the government to give one person overall responsibility for 
the direction of the campaign allowing differences of opinion between agencies to be 
resolved by an impartial Director. This could be a soldier, but is more likely to be a 
politician or civil servant who, in ideal circumstances, should have ready access to his own 
government; in any case he will be working to strict government or Alliance guidelines and 
overall control. What should then be established is a command and control structure that 
reflects the security situation prevailing at the time.

11. **The Military Command System in Theatre.** In the past it was not unusual for a 
director of operations to be nominated to command all counter insurgency operations. This 
worked well in a colonial setting where the UK controlled all the levers of power and could 
also work where a single nation is involved in dealing with insurgency. In a coalition or 
Alliance operations where several nations are contributing forces to a Host Nation a 
workable chain of command and control will need to be devised to ensure a suitable *modus 
operandi* within the theatre of operations. Furthermore military commanders of those 
nations providing troop contributions normally work directly for their own sovereign 
governments. Before each new campaign fresh command and control arrangements will
have to be agreed and endorsed by all concerned before operations can begin. A
ominated ‘director’ or ‘chairman’ from the Host Nation could act as the single overall
commander of all operations particularly if an insurgency has been allowed to develop
unchecked or if radical measures are necessary to retrieve a deteriorating situation. In any
coliliation or alliance of military forces, each individual state may well have national caveats
about the use of their own military forces. A military commander will have to be aware of
these caveats and task troops in line with any restraints that may apply.

12. The Committee System. Under a committee system, such as that initiated by
Lieutenant-General Briggs when appointed Director of Operations in Malaya in 1950 and
subsequently much favoured by the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, the civil
administration provides the chairman while the police and the armed forces find the
members in the shape of the police and military commanders at each level in the
administrative hierarchy. Decisions are taken collectively and implemented by the
chairman and members through their own civil service, police and military command
structures. The members will be advised and assisted in the implementation of policy by
officials responsible for the functioning of the civil service, intelligence and psychological
operations. Each of the members has the right of appeal to his superior in his own service,
who will usually represent that service on the committee at the next highest level. This
description of the committee system may need to be altered to suit the circumstances of the
time. It worked well in Malaya but was often not suitable elsewhere. The structure of
committees can be applied flexibly, and the command arrangements at government level
adjusted to suit the circumstances of the day. What is important is to have coherence
across all the higher levels of governments, coalitions and agencies involved in countering
an insurgency and reconstructing a national authority. This will be more difficult to establish
in circumstances where sectarian differences exist.

13. Personalities. Both the Single Command and the Committee System will depend
almost exclusively on the personalities of the individuals involved. In a serious situation
which involves emergencies and counter insurgency action many different opinions and
views will emerge and these will have to be clearly reconciled. The examination of several
historical examples shows that there is invariably a dominant personality involved in any
successful counter insurgency. A system of control and coordination should normally be
capable of adaption to suit the personalities of those involved. These two types of system
could be used as the basis for further adaption to suit local circumstances.

14. Assistance to Allies. If the British Army provides military assistance to a friendly
foreign state any forces assigned would necessarily be subordinate to its government in
order to preserve the Host Nation’s sovereignty and the government’s credibility in the eyes
of its people. The forces would be obliged to adopt any coordination systems controlled by
of the Host Nation but the existence of a satisfactory arrangement would probably be a
condition for British support. It is possible that advice may be sought on the subject. In so
far as policy is concerned this advice would probably be offered at government level but the
British contingent commander may be able to make a valuable contribution tactfully at his
own level.

GOVERNMENT PLANNING

15. Initial Shortages. However rich or poor the country, the government will be beset
by a wide variety of problems. There will always be a lack of many resources in a poor
country, and a lack of forces and trained manpower in many countries to properly meet a serious threat.

16. **Appreciating the Situation.** When the government is making its appreciation as to which of its objectives can best be attained with the help of the armed forces, the latters’ professional, military advisers will be able to explain their forces’ capabilities and limitations in the context of the particular emergency. An analysis of the situation should reveal the areas in which the government and the insurgents are most vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are likely to be spread over the entire political, economic, cultural and security spectrum. A diagrammatic net assessment is given at Annex A to this Chapter which provides a useful illustration of the scope necessary to combat insurgency effectively. The aim will be to identify those government vulnerabilities which are best suited to military defensive action and those of the insurgents which are most susceptible to offensive military action.

17. **Allocating Priorities.** A coordinated national plan which would emerge from the above appreciation should cover the entire political, economic, administrative, operational and intelligence fields. Based on the analysis of the type of insurgency faced two priorities would stand out - where do the insurgents obtain their most support, and what actions by the government will achieve meaningful results quickly. An urban insurgency will require different priorities to a rural based insurgency. It may be necessary to close borders as a preliminary to actions elsewhere. The priorities would need to be addressed at this stage of the planning process. In addition other allocations of tasks and resources will follow once the major priorities are established. These could be:

   a. Roles and responsibilities between government departments to avoid a duplication of effort and muddle, and to close loopholes.

   b. Priority of action between the main fields of government activity: economic, social, military and administration. Some careful planning and coordination is required to ensure that when areas are brought under military control they can be administered and supported economically in order to avoid them falling back into insurgent control again.

   c. Priorities within each field of activity. It will be necessary to apportion the intelligence, operational and logistic effort between protecting the base area, rooting out the subversive infrastructure and destroying the insurgent forces. The dilemma is particularly acute where the insurgents are pursuing different types of activity in different parts of the country simultaneously. This kind of assessment should lead to a decision on the geographical and demographic priorities for dealing with the insurgency. Some distant areas may have to be abandoned for the time being in order to secure a base and expand control into nearer and more important areas.

18. **Government Campaign Plans.** The government should plan a campaign which would force the insurgents on to the defensive on the political and military fronts and to oblige them to react to the government’s initiatives. Protecting the population will usually have priority in the initial stages to rally support behind the government, to provide firm bases for the expansion of government controlled areas and to begin the process of wearing down and eventually eliminating the insurgent threat. It takes time to lay the foundations of a plan to beat a determined and well organised insurgency. If support for the
government can be maintained there will be a temptation to go for a quick fix. This should be discarded in favour of longer term planning for what is essentially a focused war of attrition waged with the indispensable aid of good intelligence.

MILITARY PLANNING

19. The military commander will adopt a similar approach to making his Campaign Estimate for a COIN campaign as he would for a more conventional war. The process should, ideally start with the issue of a Strategic Directive. In a perfect world it would spell out precisely the government's strategic goals and desired national aims. However, in practice the government may be unable or unwilling to be so specific. Defining the political aims for the campaign might entail revealing the concessions which it is prepared to make, or what the 'acceptable' level of violence might be. Even the characterisation of events as an insurgency may be unpalatable as in the case of Northern Ireland. These are sensitive issues, ones which politicians may not wish to address. So defining what is meant by military success when the overall government position is not clear may be difficult. In practice this may mean that the military commander is forced to make some general assumptions about the eventual goals of the campaign, and base his detailed planning upon the short and medium term security requirements. Such a vacuum highlights the usefulness of general principles to guide and organise planning. In the climate of crisis which the emergence of an insurgency can generate, the deceptive lure of the 'quick fix' may be enticing.

20. Planning on the basis of the government aims will lead to a more precise estimate of the type of forces required and how they might best be used. The roles of the armed forces can then be broken down into phases and objectives to be achieved in an agreed order of priority. Again, these objectives will determine the training programme for the units committed to the theatre.

21. As the situation develops it will be necessary to review and alter the more detailed lines of operation as conditions evolve, decisive points are reached, or set-backs occur. Because military commanders are unlikely to control the campaign, they may frequently have to adapt their plans to accord with the higher priorities of other agencies. Similarly, it may be necessary to impose an operational pause on military operations, perhaps during a ceasefire or to allow peace talks to take place.

THE MILITARY AIM

22. It follows that in COIN the military aim is not identical to the political aim, but it and the tactics employed to achieve it have to be complementary. The military aim provides a focus for all operations and because the insurgency may be widespread, determines the allocation of scarce resources. A commander may express his aim in a number of ways; the elimination of a specific guerrilla band, control of all road movement in a given sector, or the protection of key points and local officials for example. The aim can be achieved using all of the conventional methods: narrowing of boundaries, grouping, combat support and logistic allocations etc. To these can be added specific COIN aspects like reorganisation and redistribution of staff effort; the allocation of intelligence and covert agencies; raising specialised COIN units; active PINFO; PSYOPS; and allocating sufficient G5 community relations resources. The commander will utilise manoeuvre resources to concentrate force against the insurgent, with a view to unhinging him by means of surprise, speed and
firepower. Superior technology will, if used judiciously, provide the commander with the means to make the least use of manoeuvre to enable him to shift his main point of attack faster than the insurgent.

SECTION 4 - INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

23. **The Overriding Importance of Intelligence.** Those involved with insurgency generally work amongst the population in secret, especially in the early phases of any campaign, and only emerge as overt organisations in those parts of the country which they occupy as base areas during later stages. They still work covertly in areas where the government is still contesting control. Their bases in friendly neighbouring countries and their command, propaganda, recruiting and logistic organisations in sympathetic states operate under the protection of those states. Good intelligence is perhaps the greatest asset for the authorities in combating an insurgency. Without it the security forces work in the dark and random offensive operations on this basis produce nothing positive and much negative reaction amongst the population involved in the theatre and from within the international forum as a whole.

24. **Local Knowledge.** Knowledge of the country, its ethnic composition, culture, religions and schisms, the political scene and party leaders, the clandestine political organisations and their undercover armed groups, the influence of neighbouring states and the economy takes time to build up. Such background information is essential because intelligence relies on an ability to discern patterns of change in behaviour. An ability to speak the local languages is essential to understanding of cultural attitudes as well as to obtain information but the number of people who can speak the languages of a country which might invite British help may be small. The Host Nation police and its special branch should be the prime agencies for providing information and intelligence, and the best source for this is a member of the insurgency itself.

25. **The Organisation Problem.** In normal times a small, centralised and secure system provides a relatively small amount of precise information on potential major threats for the head of government and a small number of ministers. Ideally, the intelligence organisation should start expanding to match the threat as the insurgents develop the preparatory stage of their campaign. However, in the early stages it is difficult to assess the nature of the threat and to anticipate the extent to which it might develop. Financial constraints and an understandable political reluctance to expand, and possibly compromise, a secure organisation are further large inhibiting factors. Consequently, the enlargement of the service to provide the volume of detailed low level information down the chains of administrative and military command may not be put in hand soon enough. In the interests of liaison and cooperation it is necessary to produce an intelligence organisation which parallels the machinery of command and coordination from the highest to the lowest levels. To provide reliable information for commanders and staffs at formation and unit level the principle of decentralisation has to be accepted and applied. Inevitably, there will be an embarrassing interval before the expanded organisation becomes effective. Intelligence is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6.

SECTION 5 - SEPARATING THE INSURGENT FROM HIS SUPPORT

26. **General.** As indicated in para 12 of Chapter 2, the centre of gravity for any counter insurgency campaign has to be the people – which generally means for the military
commander at theatre level the people who live in the theatre of operations. It is usual at
the start of any campaign that about 90% of the population will be ‘neutral’ in their views.
As the campaign develops the population will tend to support those whom they think are
winning and thus it is axiomatic that government forces have to win this neutral population
to their side by a process of protection, stability and improvement to their conditions. This
in itself has inherent problems associated with how this can be achieved in a sufficient time
frame that does not alienate tolerance levels. For occupation or intervention forces this can
quickly lead to hostility unless a return to the status quo ante can be restored quickly.
Similarly if insurgent activity can be curtailed rapidly then there is real chance for the
population to appreciate the beneficial effects of a military presence – but only for a limited
period. This is also covered in utilising aspects of campaign authority as described in JDN
4/05 The Comprehensive Approach.

27. **Firm Base.** In this the first requirement is to secure the base areas essential to the
survival of the government and, state, its capital, the points of entry, key installations and
those areas which are loyal to the government. The provision of security in those vital
areas encourages their inhabitants to rally to the government.

28. **‘Ink-Spot’ Method of Expanding Secured Areas.** Initially it may have to be
accepted that the insurgents might control the remote areas in the hinterland, inaccessible
jungle and mountain country and territory adjoining the borders of a state friendly to the
insurgents. Success could lie in applying a long term, methodical, ‘ink-spot’ policy. As
each area is consolidated, loyal local forces would be raised to secure the area to release
mobile regular troops to secure the next area while the host state’s civil administration and
police reestablished themselves in the recently liberated territory. This is a well tried
approach to combating an insurgency, although there are difficulties about its application.
Where an ‘ink spot’ policy has succeeded in the past has been when the authorities have
enough ‘ink’ to allow it to spread across the blotting paper (i.e. troops to task) and that the
authorities remain in the ink blot area on a near permanent basis – or at least during the
campaign. If this policy is adopted then a commander will have to review his troop levels
and timings before commencing any campaign to ensure that he will have sufficient troops
and time to implement the policy properly.

29. **Eliminating of the Insurgent Subversive Support System.** The rooting out of the
insurgents’ subversive and support organisations is more important than, and an essential
prerequisite to, defeating any active insurgent groups because:

a. Insurgent groups will continue to receive food supplies, recruits and
information on the security forces from the population as long as their support
organisation remains intact.

b. The subversive organisation controls the population of the towns and villages,
denies government popular support and prevents witnesses from volunteering
information on dissidents and giving evidence in court.

c. Once the subversive organisation is destroyed the insurgents are unable to
swim like Mao Tse-tung’s fish in a friendly sea of the people. They are forced to
approach the people direct to obtain money, food and information, exposing
themselves to ambush and arrest by the security forces.
d. The subversive elements arrested are the best informants on the illegal organisation. They require careful handling by expert staff.

30. **Separation Methods.** A skilful combination of methods is needed to separate the insurgents from their subversive and supporting organisations:

a. Intelligence to identify subversive cells, usually a police special branch responsibility. In remote parts of the country where there is virtually no police presence special forces could establish bases, make friends with the villagers and eventually win their confidence to obtain identifications of the cell members.

b. Security force protection for residents and informers. This is easier said than done because political, subversive cells use subtle, and not so subtle, means of coercion.

c. The gradual spread of government control by the ink-spot method.

d. Curfews and the searching of persons leaving their houses for work and returning in the evening to prevent the smuggling of food, weapons, explosives, messages, etc.

e. Patrols, ambushes and vehicle checks particularly in urban areas.

f. Interdiction campaigns against the entry of external supplies: It should be noted that the variation in methods to achieve this are not always successful, indeed it is very often impossible to achieve a complete success. Examples of this are:

   1. Diplomatic; agreements with neighbouring or more distant countries to limit supplies of arms, ammunition, explosives and other items useful to the insurgents. The current proposal for the USA to talk to diplomats in Syria and Iran to resolve issues in Iraq is a good example.

   2. Air interdiction campaign where appropriate, such as the Coalition’s effort in the no-fly zones of Iraq before 2003.

   3. Physical barriers, for instance, the successful application of the ‘Moric Barrage’ on the Tunisian border during the French Algerian campaign and the construction of the Leopard, Hornbeam and Hammer Lines between Dhofar and South Yemen during the Omani Campaign. The Green Zone in Baghdad is a scaled down example of this and the Israeli wall around the West Bank another example of this tactic.

   4. Resettlement of vulnerable elements in protected areas.

31. **Gaining International Support.** Winning the support of foreign governments and the sympathy of the majority of their people, or at least their benevolent neutrality, and obtaining a favourable attitude in the United Nations makes the task of dealing with an insurgency much easier. It could make all the difference between success and failure. Success in applying principles with a moral content, observance of the law, restraint in the
use of force, gaining popular support and the benefits bestowed by the social and economic aspects of the national plan all help to produce a favourable international climate.

32. **Diplomacy.** Careful diplomacy will aim to:

   a. Confirm the government’s credibility and standing as the legal government.

   b. Discredit the insurgency movement as unrepresentative and criminal.

   c. Convince the international community that the government’s political aims are legitimate and that its methods are legal, moral and respectful of human rights.

   d. Gain the support of allies in providing economic investment, advice, training and, if required, an advisory mission and a military contribution. The latter may be in the form of a military contingent, naval anti-gun-running patrols, air reconnaissance, troop lift, etc. It may well include a large scale effort to retrain and reeducate large bodies of the Host Nation’s armed forces.

   e. Deny the insurgents external support, including the use of cross-border sanctuaries.

**SECTION 6 - NEUTRALISING THE INSURGENT**

33. **General.** The aim should be to defeat the insurgent on his ground using enough but no more force than is absolutely necessary.

34. **Neutralisation.** The selective destruction of insurgents is an area in which the overt security forces of the government will have their most obvious impact and is fully addressed in later Chapters. Organisations and tactics have to be adapted to suit the particular threat. Military operations can be conducted on a relatively large scale; often at battalion level or above.

35. **Patrolling.** The basis of much successful COIN action, however, is the junior commander leading a small patrol into the terrain the insurgent sees as his own. This is the area in which an army can function at its best and should be the focus for COIN training.

**SECTION 7 - LONGER TERM POST-INSURGENCY PLANNING**

36. **The Application of Government Plans.** This last principle probably holds the key to the effective application of all the other five principles. Merely providing for the military defeat of insurgents does not in any way end the authorities requirement to make suitable longer term plans to enhance the economic and social aspects of its population and to ensure that the political causes of the insurgency have been eliminated and overcome by effective planning. In the Dhofar campaign the end of insurgent activity occurred in December 1975, but the authorities had to work and plan hard for several more years to achieve continued support from the population before the causes of the insurgency had been fully rectified.

37. **Publication of Longer Term Plans.** The announcement of bold government initiatives to be started after the insurgency has been defeated can have a real and
significant effect on winning the hearts and minds of the population during any campaign. Hence the need to formulate these initiatives at the same time as plans are prepared to defeat the insurgency. The timing of any statement about longer term plans could be of crucial importance and should be handled in a sensitive and controlled manner by the appropriate authorities.

SECTION 8 - FACTORS BEARING ON THE PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

POPULAR SUPPORT

38. **Insurgent Aims.** An insurgency aims to discredit the government and its policy. It will have spent much time preparing the ground for insurgency with propaganda, using real and contrived discontents. When it considers that the government has been sufficiently undermined and that a significant part of the population has been alienated from authority it will use coercion and terror to reinforce its propaganda campaign. A few determined men using systematic terror can exact support from exposed sections of population.

39. **Hearts and Minds.** In a democracy, popular support is an essential prerequisite for success in a counter insurgency campaign. Even more traditional governments rely to some extent on the consent of the governed. A government has to be able to convince its population that it can offer a better solution, better government and a better life than the opposing insurgents in order to win the hearts and minds of its people. There can be exceptions to this general argument. The black population in South Africa were in many ways better off economically than many other black populations in Southern and Central Africa during the apartheid era - and yet were wholeheartedly behind the ANC in their efforts to change the ‘whites only’ governments during this period. The regime of apartheid cut across all other political and economic factors.

40. **The Competition for Loyalty.** Just as an insurgency needs the sympathy or the acquiescence of a sizeable percentage of the population to survive and to overthrow the government, so the government needs the people’s support to appear legitimate in its eyes and to obtain information leading to the arrest or capture of the terrorists. Violence, or the threat of it, is aimed at the citizen’s fears for his family and freedom to earn enough to feed them. Whoever can guarantee a reasonable degree of security can often command their allegiance. An insurgency is a competition between government and insurgent for the individual’s loyalty. Unless the government can offer reasonable protection, individuals are unlikely to risk their own or their families’ lives by volunteering information. The security forces could well meet an invisible barrier of passive resistance in addition to the active resistance of the insurgents.

41. **Government Protection.** Protection involves irksome restrictions on the liberty of the individual. For example, to safeguard a community either in cities, urban areas or in countryside it may be necessary to establish guarded areas and to impose restrictions on movement, night curfews, identity checks, searches and controls to deny the insurgents their contacts. The insurgents will seek to misrepresent necessary inconveniences as harsh and oppressive. Consequently, the government and its security forces have to anticipate a possible hostile public reaction to its security measures and prepare arguments to rebut insurgent propaganda in order to keep the initiative in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.
42. **Involving the Population in the Campaign against Insurgents.** Initially, when local areas are organised for defence, they should be allocated sufficient police or soldiers to provide protection. As soon as possible, however, communities should be encouraged to raise their own local defence against insurgents from reliable elements. This is not just a matter of releasing the security force garrisons for more offensive operations. It is a question of mutual trust. The trust the community initially place in their protectors is repaid by the trust the government shows in them by allowing them to bear arms in a common cause.

43. **Countering Propaganda.** Insurgent propaganda has to be monitored and answered quickly and convincingly using every possible outlet, such as newspapers, leaflets, radio and television. Depending on the circumstances in the Host Nation the media may either be government controlled or persuaded by briefing journalists and private television concerns. Specialist advice will be necessary. Possible sources of sound advice are sympathetic expatriates and friendly government advisers. In running a counter insurgency Information Operations campaign there is a risk of criticism on the grounds of eroding public freedom but the government and its security forces cannot afford to opt out. The insurgents will use all forms of propaganda, particularly to attack those government policies and security force operations which are damaging their popular support, infrastructure and insurgent forces. This is only to be expected but hostile suitable material will be much harder to answer if the security forces act outside the law. In short the government needs to be active in its use of propaganda, but it cannot afford to lie, to tell half truths, or to say things that turn out subsequently to be wrong. This is a difficult position which has to be overcome.

**POLITICAL AWARENESS**

44. **Sensitivity.** Just as the government has to be sensitive to public reactions to its policy and the measures used to implement it so commanders at all levels and individual soldiers have to be aware of the consequences of any action they may take. This is especially important should an unexpected opportunity present itself or in a sudden emergency when there is no time to seek advice or direction from higher authority. Those with a knowledge of the political scene are better able to assess the likely effect of their actions on public opinion and to make a sensible decision.

45. **Briefing the Soldier.** All ranks have to be briefed on government aims, insurgency aims and propaganda, and how the government plans to counter the latter. An understanding of the issues at stake ensures that soldiers know how to reinforce the government effort. The British soldier’s flair for getting on with people at grass roots level should be exploited. Care should be taken not to express controversial opinions, still less become involved in the political life of the country.

**THE LAW**

46. **Legal Environment.** The legal framework within which the Army works generally is outlined in Chapter 1 and elsewhere. Because observance of the law and the use of only the minimum necessary force are of sufficient importance to merit consideration alongside the principles of COIN it is useful to expand on those essential elements in Chapter 1 which contribute to a better understanding of these important issues.
47. **Acting within the Law.** Although terrorists and insurgents use lawless and violent methods, maintaining that the end justifies the means, the security forces cannot operate outside the law without discrediting themselves, the government they are supporting and providing the dissident political machine with useful and damaging propaganda material. If the government and its security forces lose the high moral ground the people have no incentive to back them. The police and the army have to act within the law of the state within which they are operating and be seen to be doing so. Appropriate emergency powers can be introduced to meet particular threats posed by insurgents in the circumstances peculiar to a particular campaign. While changes to the law can always be made to meet a new insurgent ploy or threat, the security forces must always act within the law as it stands and not anticipate a change until it becomes legally enforceable.

48. **Clarifying the Legal Position.** The soldier must be in no doubt as to his position in relation to the law. Apart from the need to brief all ranks on the law as it affects powers of search, the use of force, arrest, evidence, and other pertinent matters on arrival in a new theatre, everyone should be kept up to date with the important aspects of any emergency regulations and subsequent amendment. Any new concept of operations at the higher level and new techniques, such as searching people and premises at the lower level, will need to be checked for legality. The Army Legal Service will provide both advice and a link with the Host Nation's legal system. Ease of application should be borne in mind when drafting emergency regulations in order to avoid misunderstandings and ambiguities which the insurgents will undoubtedly exploit.

**MINIMUM NECESSARY FORCE**

49. **What Constitutes Minimum Necessary Force?** No more force may be used than is necessary to achieve a legal aim. The amount used has to be reasonable and it must not be punitive. Directly the aim is achieved no more force may be used.

50. **Deterrent Show of Force.** The need to use minimum force is not to be confused with deploying the minimum number of troops. The appearance of a force large enough to contain a situation at the right psychological moment may convince insurgents and other dissidents that the authorities are so well prepared and determined to prevent trouble that none occurs.

51. **Unnecessary Provocation.** On other occasions the display of force either prematurely or without sufficient justification may provoke the very confrontation the authorities wish to avoid. Whether to keep in the background or to deploy is a question of judgement and assessing the situation correctly. A military commander should be as wary of being committed to an unnecessary use of force as much as using more force than necessary.

52. **Illegal Use of Force.** Failure to observe the law, to use force without justification or to employ an excessive amount of force may result in:

   a. Prosecution.

   b. Civil action for damages.
c. Discrediting the government, the alienation of those already critical of the government, as well as waverers, and the loss of government supporters.

53. **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Whatever the circumstances of any military intervention or deployment in counter insurgency operations, agreed Rules of Engagement for all servicemen will be prepared prior to the start of any operations. These should take account of Host Nation requirements and British government obligations with regard to both national and international law. All troops involved in the area of operations should be issued with an aide memoire, or a coloured card to be carried at all times on duty. This card would give clear instruction on the rules governing the use of weapons and opening fire in certain circumstances.
Illustrative Net Assessment of an Insurgency

### Insurgent Overall Strategy
- Goals
- Approach (political or military)
- Location (urban or rural)
- Timing

### Insurgent Political Performance and Capabilities
- Nature of appeal
- Size and composition of audience
- Leadership
- Intelligence/counterintelligence
- Recruitment
- Training
- Mobilisation of domestic support
- Foreign aid
- Rural administration
- Protection/security
- Reforms
- Justice
- Corruption
- Indiscriminate use of violence

### Insurgent Military Performance and Capabilities
- Order of battle
- Technological sophistication
- Command and control
- Lines of communication
- Military leadership
- Combatant proficiency
- Tactical intelligence
- Ability to protect operational base
- Scope and timing of operations

### Setting
- Historical context
- Geography
- Societal, economic, and political processes
- Stability of society

### Counterinsurgent Overall Strategy
- Goals
- Timing
- Attrition-dominated strategy
- Consolidation-dominated strategy

### Counterinsurgent Political Performance and Capabilities

### Counterinsurgent Military Performance and Capabilities

### Overall Assessment
- Population and territory controlled by each side
- Political and military performance and suitability, given overall strategy
- Judgement concerning who holds the initiative
- Assessment of trends in domestic and international support for each side
- Judgement concerning who is in the best position to sustain a drive toward their overall goal
CHAPTER 4

A STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - THE PATTERN OF A COUNTER INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

THREAT AND RESPONSE – THE CLASSIC SITUATION

1. Insurgency movements generally grow slowly, methodically and work within the society they scheme to overthrow and replace. Initially, they work secretly and when they launch their overt campaign of speeches, demonstrations, strikes, marches and riots the clandestine organisational cells remain well hidden. So, the seriousness of the threat may not become apparent until the insurgents have exploited contentious issues to produce a situation which a democratic, pluralist society is ill-prepared to meet. Even then, the authorities are sometimes reluctant to recognise an incipient threat until it has developed into a serious challenge to its control because of its aversion to abandoning the habitual routines of everyday life and administration.

2. Reaction to such a situation is too often belated and inadequate so that the initial security force response could easily be ill coordinated and ineffective. The establishment of an integrated intelligence service, a vital element in counter insurgency operations, is apt to be tardy because of personal and interdepartmental rivalries and the lack of trained staff officers with sufficient local knowledge. If British forces are called in to support an ally the situation will almost certainly have deteriorated to a dangerous degree. While the host government will be anxious to obtain help it will be necessary for the terms on which it is given to be agreed at inter-government level before British troops are committed. Amongst other things this should include an agreed aim for the plan of campaign and a joint command structure.

3. If the government’s response is not to threaten the society and the institutions it wishes to protect, so giving the insurgents gratuitous ammunition for their campaign, its response should be measured and carefully graduated to meet the rising threat. On the strategic level action has to be coordinated across the whole spectrum of government and national activities. Within country measures to tackle the root cause of the problem may include the maintenance of law and order, the redress of grievances, legislation to enable the law to work effectively and economic initiatives to improve conditions. Abroad, diplomacy will aim to win support for the government’s case and to discourage support for the insurgents.

4. A state of emergency is likely to be declared, particularly if the threat persists and becomes an attritional struggle. The need to deploy troops in support of the civil power in a law enforcement role in this country has been reduced by increasing the capacity of the police to deal with all but an armed challenge from insurgents.

5. In normal circumstances the British Armed Forces would only operate in support of the authorised civil power. It is not considered that a purely military solution to an insurgency is a feasible proposition because the political and social causes can only be remedied by political action. The armed forces contribution becomes more delicate and complicated as societies become more developed, sophisticated and complex.
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT

6. For convenience the government’s response to a serious internal threat may be divided into three phases:

   a. **The Threshold Circumstances.** This is the period when the threat is evolving and developing, when the government attempts to deal with it entirely by civil measures.

   b. **Military Commitment.** During this phase the armed forces take an active part in supporting the government, the police and the Host Nation’s military forces in helping to defeat the insurgents and restore law and order. Again, as force by itself cannot defeat an insurgency, its role in providing security and in eliminating insurgents should be seen in the context of furthering the government's long term political and economic aims. At the strategic level the government has to have a clear idea as to how the insurgency is to be defeated. It has to give the armed forces a precise aim and a directive defining the objectives to be achieved. When operating in support of an ally the Senior British Officer’s position in the chain of command, his responsibilities towards HMG, either directly or through a High Commissioner or Ambassador, should be the subject of a directive. Similarly, the British contingent’s relationship with the ally on legal and other matters should be defined in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

   c. **Withdrawal.** As its name implies this is the phase of military disengagement. In the event of an internal, and perhaps an international settlement, troops may be withdrawn quickly. Such a settlement might represent a compromise consummated by a government in the host state. In the worst case it could follow a government defeat, an insurgent seizure of power and an ignominious evacuation. However, on the assumption that, with allied support, the Host Nation wins, the government would retain the initiative to arrange an agreed programme for the withdrawal of the allied forces. In the case of a prolonged struggle of attrition in which the government regains control of its disaffected territory area by area and the insurgent infrastructure is gradually eroded the withdrawal phase may last some time.

7. The various phases may not be as clearcut as described in the last paragraph and, as indicated in sub-paragraph 6c, different parts of a country may be in different phases of an insurrection and recovery processes at any one time. Indeed, this is the most likely scenario. In addition, there is seldom a precise moment when one phase turns into another. Usually, the boundaries will be blurred. Military intelligence and planners have to keep abreast of a developing situation, stay in touch with the civil authorities and police and be prepared to contribute suggestions through the system of ministerial control throughout the phases of an insurgency.

8. The involvement of British forces in another nation's internal affairs is a sensitive matter. The benefits of overt support would have to be weighed against the Host Nation’s vulnerability to criticisms of inviting neo-colonialism. Much would depend on the nature and source of the threat to British interests and how much political capital the government could gain or lose from any involvement. If a neighbouring state was clearly using and exacerbating a domestic problem to further its interests and ambitions or if the internal challenge was of such a nature as to attract a wide measure of condemnation in the
international forum a British offer of substantial military help for a beleaguered government may well receive sufficient international support or at least acquiescence. In more marginal cases military assistance may be confined to advisory missions and training teams.

THREAT AND RESPONSE – FAILED OR FAILING STATES

9. The pattern of a counter insurgency campaign in a classic situation (paras 1-5) has almost been overtaken by events in the modern world. There is value, however, in retaining this model for guidance because it may well have relevance in certain areas of the world such as the remote Pacific Islands and in former British colonies or possibly in the Balkans. More likely is a scenario where insurgency will develop in a country or across a region where the national authorities request assistance from the UN – in which case a coalition of forces may well be tasked to deal with the situation and the UK’s role in countering the insurgency will depend on the size of their commitment of forces to any coalition or NATO grouping and hence their role and function in any military activity. Beyond this scenario could be a situation where UK forces could be committed to some form of intervention in an area where a state government has manifestly collapsed and chaos and insurgency follow. Once again this could well be in conjunction with other nations. In this last scenario there may well need to be a realistic assessment of the nature of the additional tasks that will fall to the UK authorities in the event of an occupation of that state, or even part of it.

10. Events and experience now indicate that the second or third scenario described in para 9 are much more likely to occur in today’s world. Iraq and Afghanistan are clear examples of this, and it is not impossible to consider similar actions in Africa (Sudan, Somalia and perhaps the Congo) in the near future.

SECTION 2 - THRESHOLD CIRCUMSTANCES

INDICATORS

11. In a deteriorating situation, the government and civil authorities will be trying to detect the sources of subversion and to take such action as is within their power to remove the causes of unrest. They will be looking at indicators which, in the context of the political situation, will furnish circumstantial evidence as to the nature and extent of the threat. Individually, they may be unremarkable and innocuous but when seen in relation to each other they may reveal a particular tendency in a chain of events. Indicators may be provided by a wide range of seemingly unconnected occurrences such as strikes with a political motive in key industries, demonstrations in which a pattern of subversive political activity becomes apparent, rumours which discredit government ministers, local officials and the police, thefts of arms and explosives, bank robberies, seditious leaflets, propaganda from hostile countries and open or covert support from the embassies of unfriendly countries for extreme elements. Harder and firmer evidence of an organised campaign of violence will be the use or discovery of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), timing devices and heavy weapons of a military nature.

12. The security services in the country concerned may be able to interpret these events, taking into account local circumstances, and advise their senior officials and ministers accordingly. This appreciation is most important, since many of these incidents already occur with no subversive intent in normal times in democratic states. Assessing the
significance of attitudes, issues and trends, and the appropriate level of response, calls for fine judgment at a time when central and local government is likely to be under severe pressure.

THE STRAIN ON DEMOCRACY

13. Insurgents exploit the fertile ground democracies provide for terrorist initiatives but which are not so readily available in authoritarian regimes. The rights of free speech and freedom of movement can be exploited to promote their own cause. Should the government place restrictions on either to limit their activities, the insurgent propaganda machine will have ready-made issues with which to attack the authorities. While the insurgents will make the most of any security force infraction of the law, they will deliberately flout the legal system themselves, often justifying their actions by claiming that they should not be bound by a hostile code which they aim to discredit and destroy. The security forces are obliged to work within the law of the land while the insurgents can engineer compromising situations to entrap them. If the security forces were to throw off their legal constraints and operate outside the law they would merely play into the insurgents’ hands, destroying their reputation and tarnishing the image of the government.

14. All restrictive measures, whether of free expression, or in an extreme case, detention without trial, place a strain on democracy, and any decision to introduce them will not be taken lightly. Any measures chosen should be enforceable to avoid becoming counterproductive. The insurgents who created the situation will be poised to exploit public disquiet and will find ways to evade restrictions. For example, censorship can be rendered at least partially nugatory if neighbouring countries provide a platform for revolutionary speakers and make their broadcasting services available to hostile propagandists. Underground newspapers have a way of surviving and flourishing notwithstanding restrictions. The spread of mobile personal phones, the internet and modern communications make censorship most unlikely because it would be impossible to control.

15. An insurgent incident often brings a public demand for more extreme measures and governments will be under popular pressure to over-react. Indeed, provoking an ill-considered response is a classic insurgent tactic. Unnecessarily harsh and vexatious measures merely further the insurgents’ aims of alienating moderate and sympathetic opinion within and outside the country. Some curbs on the publication of information and freedom of expression may be essential in the interests of security. They should be the minimum appropriate and the case for them carefully explained so that the insurgents are handed no unnecessary ammunition for a propaganda campaign to present the restrictions as oppressive infringements of constitutional liberties.

16. The government may conclude that a combination of selective legislation and small scale but precisely directed operations by the security forces would stand a good chance of nipping the insurgency in the bud. In practice, taking such a decision is never easy. An incipient insurgency situation presents a confused picture and it may be difficult to assess its seriousness and the possible extent of the threat. In such ambivalent circumstances it is hard to convince the local population that irritating initiatives are necessary, even when timely action on a modest scale may obviate the need for sterner measures later. Furthermore, sensitivity to potential repercussions on the domestic and international political scenes firmly incline a government towards the deferment of painful decisions. A sovereign state may be particularly anxious to avoid the political embarrassment of calling
on a friendly government for help before an insurgency gains a dangerous foothold. Nevertheless, the penalty for pusillanimity and procrastination may be as disastrous for democracy as an ill-considered over-reaction. A prudent government will try to steer a deft course between the two.

**GOVERNMENT PLANNING**

17. **Initial Planning.** After several decades of international terrorist activity most sensible governments will have prepared contingency plans to deal with strikes in essential utilities and services, major demonstrations, public disorder and the occasional terrorist atrocity, although they may not all have anticipated the need to deal with an insurgency. However, as the situation begins to deteriorate a government should review its plans and start preparing measures to meet an escalating threat. Out of the review should emerge a recognition of the causes of the threat, and thus the aims and objectives of the insurgency. From that, a master plan couched at strategic level can be prepared which sets out government’s policy in the political, legislative, economic and security fields supported by a cogent persuasive and truthful public information campaign. The plan is likely to develop gradually as the gravity of the threat unfolds. Initially, the subjects of especial concern to the security forces may include:

a. The formulation of the long term political aim.

b. Reviewing the machinery for information and for countering propaganda.

c. Overhauling security measures related to identifying and interpreting indicators.

d. Integrating and expanding as necessary the intelligence and security services.

e. Drafting emergency legislation.

f. Reviewing the organisation of the police and the armed forces, including the embodiment of military and police reserves, special constables and the possible need for locally raised forces. This will be covered in more detail under the heading Security Sector Reform (SSR) later in this Chapter.

g. Making arrangements for the centralised control of operations. In the field of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) these plans are likely to be implemented at an early stage, including close civil/police/military cooperation on EOD intelligence, research and development.

h. Establishing a framework for joint civil/police and military control of security operations.

i. Revising or drawing up lists of key points for protection.

j. Joint planning of those operations which may require civil, police and military cooperation eg:
(1) Control measures designed to isolate insurgent elements from the rest of the population, which may need extensive civil and legal measures to back up police or military moves.

(2) Maintaining public services, which may make considerable demands on military units.

(3) Control of explosive substances and fire arms.

(4) Measures to maintain essential services.

(5) Protection of government officials and others at particular risk to terrorist intimidation and attack.

k. Protection of government communications.

l. Inter-governmental liaison with a particular view to ensuring sympathetic reception of subsequent measures, including military intervention should this become necessary, and monitoring and restricting the cross-border activities of subversive elements and insurgents.

m. Informing the general public of the situation and preparing them for any more drastic measures which may be necessary, particularly the intervention of the armed forces.

n. Close police/military liaison on intelligence, operational planning and training.

18. Further Planning. Should the situation continue to deteriorate, further steps may be necessary:

a. Joint training between certain British military and local civilian personnel.

b. Improving the scope and frequency of intelligence and security activities.

c. Introduction of British military intelligence officers into the existing intelligence organisation.

d. Improving information and counter propaganda activities.

e. The introduction of warden schemes, where appropriate.

f. Reassessment of the research and development programmes for weapons and equipment.

19. Training. Troops earmarked for deployment to the theatre should begin a comprehensive initial training or refresher programme on the tactics and skills used in counter insurgency operations with especial reference to any new lessons and techniques emerging from previous or current conflicts.
20. **Police.** Much will depend on the size, equipment, standard of training and morale of the police force. The efficiency of its special branch in the gaining of information and the production of intelligence will be as important as the ability of the uniformed branch to deal with the initial stages of an insurgency. If the insurgency prospers the special branch may initially lose control of the situation in some areas and be hard pressed to near breaking point in others, hence the need for military support. The organisation and role of police forces are discussed in Chapter 7.

**SUMMARY**

21. The paragraphs above describe the sort of circumstances that in more classic terms indicate that an insurgency is developing and the sort of responses that can be made by a sensible and prudent government. Taken in isolation these actions could seem to describe a slow perambulation towards insurgency. It is even possible to read into these indicators that the UK could appear to be half way towards some form of insurgency. This is not the case and all these indicators need to be properly considered in the context of their environment. Nevertheless, it is more than likely that insurgent activity will move and develop at a much faster rate and in a different manner than was formerly the case.

**SECTION 3 - MILITARY COMMITMENT**

**DIRECTION AND CONTROL**

22. Adequate preparation during any threshold phase will ease the way for the commitment of British armed forces. The earlier that liaison is established between the British services and the local forces and the closer the consultation and planning that has taken place beforehand, the smoother will be the deployment of the military contingent. However, it is seldom that all the necessary measures will have been provided for in advance and some may have to be taken retrospectively. Nevertheless, one essential measure is that no military operations should ever be undertaken until all the relevant commanders have been properly briefed by the host government and the civil, military and police authorities concerned. This briefing, which should be accompanied by a formal directive, is the basis for planning at the operational level.

23. Military assistance will only be requested when the local forces are no longer able to deal with an existing or developing threat. It follows that the aim of military intervention is to restore the situation to the point where the police once again are in a position to maintain law and order. Experience has shown that it is easier to commit the Army than to extract it. There is a danger of over-involving the military so that they replace, rather than supplement, the local forces. This situation must be avoided in all but the direst circumstances, as much in the interests of maintaining the proper relationship between government, police and the armed forces as of preserving the morale of the police and its standing with the population it will have to serve after the emergency is over.

24. The police and local forces should retain responsibility for the direction of operations, the command of their forces and as much operational commitment and control as is practicable. The British forces command their own troops and have responsibility for specific operations or parts of either operation. Every effort should be made to scale down and remove the armed forces as soon as the police or the local forces are in a position to assume full responsibility.
25. When operating in support of a friendly government, British forces have to, as in the United Kingdom, be seen to operate clearly in support of the civil power and not in isolation from it. Lack of direction and firm control may result in operations that are successful in the short term but eventually prove counter productive. To achieve a sound framework in which British military forces can support the civil authorities to good purpose the following conditions must be met:

   a. The existence of a national strategic policy acceptable to HMG, which can be clearly interpreted by military commanders and readily understood by the population.

   b. The proper coordination of civil and military action at the operational level, particularly the incorporation of local security forces into military planning whenever possible.

   c. The implementation by the local civil government of those aspects and measures of policy, planning and control which closely affect military operations.

RESPONSIBILITIES

26. Coordination. Chapter 3 emphasised the need for a well integrated counter insurgency plan and Chapter 7 describes how the machinery for coordinating the activities of civil administration, police and the military could work. The following two paragraphs show, in outline, the broad division of responsibilities between the civil administration, including the police, and the armed forces.

27. Civil Responsibilities. Those with a military significance are:

   a. The formulation of the political aim and the long term planning covering the whole duration of military commitment and its aftermath.

   b. Defining policy and, in particular:

      (1) Deciding at which levels of the government and security force hierarchy decisions on policy matters of varying degrees of importance are to be taken.

      (2) The limits to be imposed upon security force planning and operations, both overt and covert.

      (3) The policy for intelligence, its direction and coordination.

      (4) The information and counter propaganda policy.

   c. Establishing the civil machinery for liaison with the security forces on all planning and operational matters.

   d. Drafting and promulgating legislation, including emergency powers.

   e. The provision of civil intelligence.

   f. Maintenance of stocks of essential commodities.
g. Maintenance of essential services.

28. **Military Responsibilities.** In addition to purely military tasks which are covered in Chapter 7 at the operational level, the military commander may be required to supplement the civil effort in certain fields, such as:

a. Advice on the overall direction of security force operations.

b. The military contribution to joint action in:
   1. Planning.
   2. Intelligence and security.
   3. Information and counter propaganda policy.

c. Assistance in the provision of secure communications.

d. Advice on:
   1. Training.
   2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).
   3. Equipment and weapon development.

e. Assistance with helicopters, small boats and engineer resources.

**COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROJECTS**

29. Community relations projects, sometimes called ‘hearts and minds’ schemes, are defined as, activities aimed at improving the relationship between the armed forces and the local population in order to create attitudes favourable to the achievement of political and military objectives.

30. The armed forces initiate community relations projects and run them free of charge. Projects should try to meet the following criteria:

a. Benefit a wide cross-section of the community in as many areas as is practicable.

b. Meet a genuine need.

c. Be planned jointly with the local authorities.

d. Avoid overlapping, competing with or discouraging similar activities which other units may be sponsoring.

e. Be completed within a reasonable time within the resources available.
f. Must not deprive civilians of their jobs, particularly in areas of high unemployment. Local government employees and trade unions must be consulted if there is any risk of doing so.

g. Reflect credit on the Services.

31. Projects involving local people, especially when they are consulted at the outset and take part in the initial planning, stand the best chance of success. While the Service’s reputation stands to gain from helping to originate and participating in a useful and successful scheme, the servicemen should avoid hogging the limelight in a transparent effort to gain credit. Service participation may often be limited to providing expertise and acting as a catalyst to help people to help themselves. People’s needs vary from place to place and local commanders should be allowed ample discretion in choosing projects appropriate to their neighbourhood.

SECTION 4 - MILITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR)

INTRODUCTION

32. **Definition.** SSR describes the overall (and largely political) process by which effective security structures are developed in order to allow the citizens of a state to live in safety. SSR is likely to be a core task in countries emerging from conflict but may also make a significant contribution to conflict prevention in fragile or failing states. In all cases it is seen as a critical activity that provides the basis for longer-term stability and will address two broad areas; the quality of governance in the state (in terms of the relationships between security sector institutions, wider government apparatus and the general public) and the technical competence and professionalism of those in the security sector.

33. **The Security Sector.** The composition of the security sector will differ from state to state so there is no universally applicable definition of it. However, there are four generally accepted organisations that comprise the security sector:

   a. **Security Forces.** Armed forces; police and gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, government backed militias) and veterans groups.

   b. **Security Management Oversight Bodies.** The executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial planning and audit units); civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

   c. **Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions.** Judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.

   d. **Non-Statutory Security Forces.** Liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies (PSC); political party militias.
34. To be successful SSR requires all elements of national authority to be applied in a coherent fashion and in coordination with other donors and the recipient, or Host Nation. In the UK, in order to achieve a coherent cross government approach, two interdepartmental Conflict Prevention Groups have been established. These fund activities, including SSR, bringing together the diplomatic, defence and development interests of the main government departments.

SECURITY CONCEPTS

35. International consensus supports the idea that the foundation of state security action should be the protection of the people. This idea is based on two principles:

   a. The security interests of the state should not conflict with the security interests of its citizens.

   b. The state is ultimately responsible for providing the security conditions for the well being of its population. In developing countries that security is not provided exclusively by western-style statutory bodies but also comes from traditional and non-statutory systems. The conditions are not limited to law and order issues but include all political, economic and social issues that ensure life is as free from risk as possible.

   c. Ideally the security sector will be controlled and guided by a national Security Strategy. If one does not exist its development could be an early element of the SSR programme.

TENETS FOR SSR

36. The following generic tenets apply to the Armed Forces involvement in SSR:

   a. Indigenous Participation. Overcoming the tendency to use an outsider’s frame of reference is important and therefore the initiative has to rest with indigenous leaders selected during any capacity building phase. For lasting reform to work it should be ‘home grown’.

   b. Application of a Strategic Reform Plan. The military contribution will be part of a wider strategic reform plan. This will indicate priorities and the sequencing of reform. Important aspects will be:

      (1) A plan for the security sector as part of a strategy document that lays out the funding of sustainable and long term reform.

      (2) Roles and division of responsibilities between security services are defined and relationships strengthened.

      (3) Development objectives are agreed.

      (4) Measures of Effectiveness are established and agreed.
(5) The transfer of responsibility for security from the international community to Host Nation is planned.

c. **Operating within the Law.** The authority for SSR stems from the Host Nation government and that military forces act within the rule of law. All processes have to reflect high standards of governance and be supported by information operations to manage, inform and influence internal and external perceptions.

d. **Delivery.** Delivering effective reform of a Host Nation’s armed forces requires adequately resourced levels of training and mentoring. To provide indigenous forces requires trainers who will also act as force developers, monitoring and facilitating the progress across functional lines including logistics, infrastructure and personnel. Continuity of effort is necessary in terms of personnel and the overall approach to development. Reform should start and finish as soon as possible.

**SECTION 5 – SCENARIOS FOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT**

37. **A Framework.** The form and scope of military commitment will depend upon the circumstances and the seriousness of the situation as assessed by HMG in conjunction with the Host Nation government. To provide a framework for the study of the conduct of operations certain scenarios have been devised. They may not necessarily represent the sequence of events, nor is any situation in a future emergency likely to fit neatly into any one scenario. As explained in Part A of this publication an insurgency could develop at different speeds in different parts of a country. A commander arriving in a host state is likely to be faced with a spectrum of conflict covering two or more scenarios in neighbouring regions, each demanding an apt and suitable response at the appropriate level.

38. **Isolated Insurgent Incidents.** Occasionally, insurgent incidents occur for which the police have neither the training nor the equipment to provide a complete range of workable responses. Amongst the possibilities are hostage taking, the hijacking of aircraft and the seizure of ships by heavily armed, skilful, dedicated and determined terrorists. In such circumstances the police may request military assistance either to provide an offensive capability to restore the situation or to enhance security when there is a possibility that a terrorist attack might occur. The police retain full control of the incident until the decision is taken to commit troops. At this stage responsibility for the conduct of the military option is formally passed to the military commander on the spot within strict geographical and legal limits. The use of military forces as a way of extending the capability of the police in carefully defined and controlled circumstances in countries which do not maintain armed paramilitary organisations to support the police is now generally acknowledged. This scenario can occur out of the context of an insurgency or at any phase in the development of an insurgency.

39. **Administrative and Logistic Support during Police Public Order Operations.** This kind of support might be useful at an early stage when the insurgent political cells organise rallies, marches and acts of civil disobedience in conjunction with a propaganda campaign designed to promote popular causes and to bid for mass support by persuasion and coercion. An atmosphere of dissent will promote a growth in petty crime and similar occurrences which, together with the political activity, will place an undue burden on the local security forces. Clandestine training and arms smuggling will provide further indications of the political extremists’ violent intentions. As the government becomes aware
of the threat it will, hopefully, take timely steps to initiate the measures necessary during the
threshold circumstances. The police and local authorities would retain full responsibility for
the situation and military forces would be in an entirely subordinate capacity. In such
circumstances:

a. Servicemen should be employed in areas where there is unlikely to be a risk
of confrontation with turbulent elements of the local population.

b. Their tasks should be as unprovocative as possible.

c. If there is a risk of confrontation, servicemen must be briefed carefully on how
they should behave, what they should do and to whom they should apply for
assistance.

d. Uniform will normally be worn but arms will not usually be carried. In a
situation where only a few specifically selected and trained policemen are bearing
arms it would be inappropriate for military forces engaged in tasks away from the
scene of confrontation to do so.

e. The normal military command structure will be preserved, with suitable
arrangements for the injection of political guidance at national and regional levels,
and with appropriate liaison machinery established with the local civil and police
authorities at every level.

f. If the military are required to assist in the information and counter propaganda
fields a civil director may be appointed as a coordinator.

g. A Host Nation might request the help of specialist training teams for both its
police and army.

h. If military operations are to take place within this scenario they would probably
be limited in scope. Tasks needing trained disciplined manpower using specialist
skills may be the most appropriate. These tasks may or may not require emergency
legislation. If they do, any draft legislation, which may have been drawn up
previously as a contingency measure, should be reviewed.

i. If contingency plans do not already exist for issuing warnings of terrorist
attacks, especially bomb attacks, and for dealing with unexploded devices and
explosions, preparations should be put in hand.

j. Helicopters might usefully provide surveillance and help with liaison and
transport support but, at this stage, they should be kept well away from direct
involvement in disturbances.

40. **Coordinated Widespread Disorder.** When it becomes apparent that there is a
coordinating force behind a series of incidents and when these occur on a scale which is
beyond the unassisted capabilities of the police to contain, the country may be entering the
early, incipient stages of an insurgency. Then, the government will be obliged to consider a
limited commitment of troops to assist the civil authorities on operational, as opposed to
administrative tasks. While the troops remain under military command, operations continue to be planned and directed by the police. Possible tasks might be:

a. Guarding key points and manning vehicle checkpoints in disturbed areas in order to relieve local police forces and perhaps military forces as well, for more active and high profile duties such as riot control.

b. At this stage British servicemen are likely to become involved with the public and have to be properly briefed.

c. Selected men may be discreetly armed, especially if terrorist attacks are believed to be imminent and, if they are, they will be subject to the rules of engagement in force at the time. Otherwise, British troops are likely to be armed only with non-lethal anti-riot weapons until they are required to perform anti-terrorist tasks for which lethal weapons are necessary. It is possible that assistance may not be requested by a friendly Host Nation until the situation has deteriorated to the extent that it will be necessary to carry firearms from the moment our troops are committed.

d. The extent of the threat and the need to introduce British forces may not at first be apparent to the local population. The information service must take account of this and plans to explain the situation and to justify the deployment of troops must be worked out in conjunction with the host government.

e. The normal military command structure should be adequate provided that suitable arrangements are made for political, civil and police liaison.

f. Contingency plans for prolonged operations and arrangements for a closer integration of the security forces in a deteriorating situation should be prepared.

g. Emergency legislation may be required at this stage, if not earlier.

41. Insurgency. The situation deteriorates to widespread political or intercommunal violence which the police, with low level military support, can no longer contain without substantial military assistance. At this stage a party in revolt, which has been preparing the scene for escalation, might exploit the situation to launch a well planned and prepared insurgency. Alternatively, an overt or clandestine political organisation may seize the opportunity provided by a general breakdown of order to launch a deliberate guerrilla campaign. In these circumstances:

a. Roles may include both those normal police duties which the police can no longer undertake and also those counter insurgency tasks which require levels of force beyond the capability of the police or even of any paramilitary forces which the host state may have.

b. Heavy infantry weapons and artillery may be required against specific insurgent targets when there is no risk to the civilian population.

c. Information and counter propaganda policy should be coordinated in the theatre by a civilian director.
d. The British military contingent and the local or Host Nation police and armed forces will become one operational entity, known as the ‘security forces’, and will be controlled accordingly. Although in this situation joint arrangements for command and control are essential, British military forces must take care not to swamp the police and the local forces and so effectively assume control of operations. Everything possible should be done to ensure that the police and local forces retain primacy in the planning and control of operations. If this principle is ignored it may lead to unnecessary resentment and friction in the joint coordinating machinery with the Host Nation and make it more difficult to re-establish the normal machinery of administration when the threat recedes.

e. As an insurgency develops, British military assistance may be required from all three Services, for example, to provide additional fire support in remote insurgent held areas where there is no risk to civilians and to prevent the smuggling of arms and supplies across shore lines which cannot be controlled from the land side.

42. **Loss of Control in Some Areas.** Where an insurgency has succeeded to the extent that guerrilla forces have taken over control of parts of the country, they have consolidated their position sufficiently to impose their administration to levy taxes, enforce their own system of law and order and recruit sizeable numbers of recruits. If the insurgents win control of sufficient territory they may raise a regular form of army. While an insurgency would continue in the diminishing territory left to the government, more conventional war effort, in conjunction with diplomacy and war weariness on the part of the defenders, would eventually triumph. British military assistance may involve all three Services in a near conventional war role in addition to the Army led counter insurgency tasks against an urban and rural insurgency movement to clear the lost territory and regain control. In this kind of scenario:

a. Additional powers may be required to cover the consequences of an escalating conflict.

b. The principle of minimum force would still apply to the counter insurgency aspects of the campaign. For the conflict with insurgent regular forces and formed guerrilla units the normal laws of war, such as the Geneva Convention, may be more appropriate, although the rebels may not recognise them.

c. Civil affairs would play a significant part both within the areas of contention between the security forces and the guerrillas, and in the areas reclaimed from insurgent control.

d. The country would move on to a war footing and the campaign would very likely be directed at the strategic level by a war cabinet and a defence committee, or its equivalent, run by the host state’s prime minister or president in conjunction with his chiefs of staff. If the British contribution were to be a significant one the United Kingdom’s interests would be represented at a suitably high level.

**SECTION 6 - WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES**

43. **The Authorisation for Withdrawal.** The authority for any withdrawal of intervention forces or those loaned for SSR purposes will come from the Host Nation authorities. In
ideal circumstances this will be the result of achieving success on operations and significant progress in stabilising the government and authorities across the nation. The indication of the conditions suitable for a withdrawal of military forces is that the Armed Forces and police of the Host Nation are capable of providing and enforcing a satisfactory level of security across the whole area of control such that normal routine of life and social conditions can thrive before any withdrawals commence. Experience has shown that there are always differing opinions about the ‘success’ or otherwise of a campaign and the rate at which withdrawal takes place. It has been usual not to indicate a particular date for withdrawal so as to offset heightened tension and the potential for a final insurgent ‘push’ to achieve ‘victory’ which can be used for propaganda subsequently (viz Hizbollah in Lebanon 2006).

44. **The Control of Law and Order Passes Back to the Local Forces.** In the final, successful phase of operations British military forces would be withdrawn as the local security forces reassume full responsibility. The factor governing the timing of the handover is the ability of the local forces to control the security situation on their own. This condition may be fulfilled before the last remnants of insurrection are extinguished. The timing will require fine judgment and impartial, expert military advice will be needed for what is primarily a political decision. Understandably, the Host Nation will be anxious to be seen to be able to cope unaided with its internal affairs at the first opportunity and there will be pressures both within the Host Nation and in this country to withdraw the troops and to conclude an expensive commitment. The withdrawal plan should be sufficiently flexible to allow for a delay to meet an unexpected resurgence of insurgency.

45. **Timing.** Premature withdrawal can be as disastrous militarily as outstaying one’s welcome can be harmful to relations with the host country politically. A prolonged military commitment inevitably produces some strain between the friendliest of allies and a reluctance to remove troops when it is safe to do so may alienate moderate opinion and embarrass the civil authorities who are the final inheritors of the situation. The revocation of a state of emergency must go hand in hand with the programme of returning the country to a state of normality and the withdrawal of the military.

46. **Methods of Withdrawal.** The method and timing of the withdrawal will depend upon the speed with which the insurgency is defeated in various parts of the country. In broad terms there are three options:

a. **Rapid.** A single phase operation at the end of a sudden, small localised crisis at the lower end of the scale of scenarios discussed earlier.

b. **Gradual.** A determined and protracted insurgency is defeated gradually, area by area. As the rebels and their supporting political and supply organisations are methodically rooted out the military presence is scaled down and the civil police resume full responsibility for law and order. The hand over to the police and civil authorities can be phased on a geographical or a functional basis, or a combination of the two when roles and tasks are passed back to the police one at a time in each area as it is cleared. A gradual, phased hand over in the latter manner is the more usual because it ensures that the police gain a thorough grasp of each function within an area to consolidate the security force’s successes.
c. **Partial.** This is accomplished, in principle, by changing the role of the military forces from direct aid to the civil power to indirect aid to the civil authorities, thus replacing the image of force with one of peaceful assistance. In practice, it usually means withdrawing armed troops to positions out of sight of the public where they are readily available if needed, while employing small numbers overtly on tasks in aid of the civil community.

47. **OTHER FORMS OF DISENGAGEMENT.** In some more recent circumstances it may not be appropriate to have suitable phased forms of withdrawal. British troops in a coalition of forces may have to withdraw from one area within theatre and move to another area – possibly with significant changes to ROE and potential engagements with insurgents. These forms of withdrawal may well follow the sequence of a withdrawal in conventional operations. There may also, particular for isolated groups of soldiers, be a need for rapid disengagement, either within theatre or as a military force to leave the theatre altogether. In the former case it will be necessary to use the tenets of force protection to evacuate the area and rejoin larger forces. In the latter case there would probably be a need to act as if in a withdrawal during combat operations – possibly with outside reinforcement from the UK or from other Allies.

**CONCLUSION**

48. This Chapter has described in some detail the strategic concept of countering an insurgency. To some readers it may appear to be a rather pedantic rerun of previous ideas about countering insurgency when events and recent experience points towards a much changed and more rapid progression of events on a near international scale. This may well be the case and will be the subject of more detailed attention in the next, more radical, update of this publication. However, this concept does continue to be valid even if some parts of it may not be necessary or appropriate – particularly when intervening in a failed state where the armed forces and police may have collapsed and state authority and control is lost. Furthermore it would be useful in single states where a more classic form of insurgency could occur. The recent insurrection in Nepal and the unrest in Fiji are examples of this. A commander will need to develop and adjust his own considerations about an insurgency based on the circumstances at the time and his own experience.
CHAPTER 5
COORDINATION

‘To summarise..... the first requirement for the successful conduct of a counter insurgency campaign is for the government to set up a sound framework within which it can take place. This should consist of coordinating machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign, arrangements for ensuring that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people, an intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances, and a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment’

General Sir Frank Kitson

SECTION 1 - THE SYSTEM OF COORDINATION

PURPOSE

1. **Suiting the Circumstances.** As indicated in Chapter 4, to execute the British or a host government’s national plan in all its aspects, political, economic, security, reconstruction and information policy, an organisation has to be established to coordinate the activities of the civil administration and the security forces. From the latter’s point of view it provides the forum for the discussion and reconciliation of operational and intelligence issues, and priorities, with the aim of formulating a consistent policy which the civil authorities, the police and the army can implement, each in its own sphere but in the closest cooperation. Army officers who may be involved in helping to create this coordinating machinery have to appreciate that the host country’s culture, customs and political traditions are bound to be reflected in the manner in which they run their affairs. Although the principles governing the conduct of counter insurgency operations have a general relevance throughout the world, their application, particularly in the setting up of a joint, allied planning and liaison organisation, need to take account of local circumstances, especially the constitution and legal system, and how they mould the method and means of government.

2. **Roles.** The organisation will normally provide, in general terms, for the:
   
   a. Establishment of priorities.
   
   b. Coordination of intelligence and security.
   
   c. Coordination between operational and civil affairs activities.
   
   d. Joint consultation and, as far as security permits, joint planning.
   
   e. Joint direction of operations.
   
   f. Arrangements for public safety and protection of public installations. Review of the key point/vulnerable point list.

---

1 *Bunch of Five 1977 F Kitson.*
g. Direction of the psychological and counter propaganda policy.

h. Scientific advice and operational research effort.

3. **Representation at All Levels.** Committees should be established at each level of civil government where the civil administration and the security forces meet to formulate policy at the higher levels and implement it at the lower levels. Those representing the administration and the security forces have to be those who have the authority to make decisions jointly and have the power to implement them in their respective spheres. The number and title of the committees established and their detailed *modus operandi* will vary; the structure described below may serve as a suitable model.

**NATIONAL LEVEL**

4. **National Defence Council.** An allied host government will probably already have established a national defence council, or some similar body to ensure that the aims and priorities of the national plan are applied by all government agencies within their fields of responsibility. Additional points are that:

   a. The chair will normally be taken by the head of government and its permanent members will be the ministers in charge of the main departments of state. The British Ambassador or High Commissioner may attend the council in an advisory capacity and to watch over British interests.

   b. The chiefs of police and the armed forces will be in attendance for consultation but are unlikely to participate in the decision-making process of what is essentially a civil council for the determination, implementation and coordination of government policy. The senior British officer may attend in an advisory capacity or give his advice direct to the Host Nation’s chiefs of staff outside the council.

   c. Council decisions which are purely civil are implemented by the appropriate civil ministries. Decisions with operational implications are the responsibility of the defence council’s national operations committee.

5. **National Operations Committee.** This is the executive instrument of the National Defence Council, implementing its policy in the security forces’ sphere in that:

   a. The committee should include representatives of the ministries of home and foreign affairs, of the police and the armed forces.

   b. Allies contributing forces will be represented on this committee by their Ambassadors, or High Commissioners in the case of Commonwealth nations, if they do not attend the National Defence Council. The allied contingent commanders will normally attend.

   c. The chairman may be the head of the host’s government in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces or, more usually, someone appointed by him, such as the chief of the Host Nation’s defence staff. If the latter, he may be formally appointed Director of Operations.
6. **The Director of Operations.** He will be appointed by the head of government, unless the latter retains the post himself. The choice of the Director of Operations depends on the nature of the government, personalities and on the current security situation and how it may develop. If not the head of government the Director of Operations may not necessarily be the chief of the armed services or of the police but he will be linked to the overall command of the security forces whose composition and balance may influence the choice. The Director of Operations is normally the chairman of the National Operations Committee, unless the post is held by the head of government.

7. **Coalitions.** In the event of a coalition of allies operating in the country there will obviously be different coordination arrangements but these themselves will depend on whether the coalition is supporting the national authorities or is acting as an occupying power in a failed or failing state. In principle the same top level councils and committees should be formed in order to conduct and control the counter insurgency. A Director of Operations is critical to this process in that unity of coalition command is necessary to ensure coherence across the spectrum of security operations. Who this person is will depend on many factors – but the appointment will probably be crucial to the campaign.

**LOWER LEVELS**

8. **Regional, Provincial, and District Committees.** Fully integrated coordinating committees are necessary at each subordinate level based on civil administration and local government boundaries in regions, provinces, counties and/or districts or whatever their local equivalents may be. Additional features are that:

   a. The lower level coordinating bodies are usually referred to as operations or action committees.

   b. The chairman is usually the senior officer of the local civil administration in whose support the security forces are operating. Depending on the size of the area, he could be a minister appointed for the purpose, a provincial governor, the chairman of a county council or his chief executive officer.

   c. The local police and military commanders and the intelligence and security organisation representatives will form the membership. Local civilian experts may either be full members or ‘in attendance’, as the occasion demands. British formation commanders of the appropriate level would normally attend the appropriate host country’s committees.

   d. Sometimes representatives of employers’ organisations and trades unions are coopted.

9. **Town, Ward and Village Level.** Smaller, less formal committees are needed to coordinate civil, police, military and intelligence operations at the lower levels without jeopardising security or creating a cumbersome bureaucracy. This is the level at which the National Plan is implemented and has to be seen to succeed to retain the loyalty and support of the people. It is important that local interests are represented and that the people are identified with government policy. Failure at this level spells defeat. The insurgents can be expected to exploit any shortcomings. The chairman is normally the head of the civil administration, perhaps the mayor, the town clerk or the rural council.
chairman. The membership reflects the police, military and other interests already discussed in paragraph 8 above. The military representative may be a battalion or company commander, depending on the scale of the emergency. In the context of an allied operation the British representative at the appropriate level of command would probably attend this committee.

SECTION 2 - THE APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES

THE DIFFICULTIES

10. The Human Factor. The application of the principles for COIN operations and the consequent decisions resulting from them may be difficult to accept and implement - particularly for those who live in the affected areas. It should be remembered that:

a. Principles are easier to affirm than to apply.

b. In underdeveloped countries there could be a shortage of trained administrators which would hamper the development of any National Plan, to the insurgents’ advantage.

c. Established organisations and influential people may fear losing power and prestige. Legal complications, inter-departmental rivalries and dislike of change may frustrate necessary reforms.

d. There will be a need for tact, understanding and compromise as individuals and organisations are persuaded to give up some of their power and influence in the interests of greater efficiency and closer cooperation. However, should tact and reason fail to dispel personal and inter-departmental rivalries a more ruthless approach may be needed to quell or remove uncooperative elements, at least in an all-British operation. In an allied operation disagreements which cannot be resolved locally would have to be referred up the chain of command through national channels for resolution at a higher, and perhaps, political level.

e. Everyone responsible for implementing government policy should be thoroughly educated in the overall philosophy of the government’s plan of campaign and kept briefed on current and planned operations so that their reactions to a sudden crisis will promote the long term aims as well as solve the immediate problem.

f. Insurgent commanders and their staffs usually remain in the same posts and in the same areas for considerable periods to build up a wealth of background knowledge. Even though the police provide long term continuity within the security forces the Army should aim for as much stability as possible, especially in important posts, as is consistent with career planning and the length of tours in operational theatres.

g. There are specific areas in which changes have to be approached in an atmosphere of ready compromise and cooperation:

(1) Administrative reorganisation.
(2) Boundaries.

(3) Location of headquarters.

11. **Administrative Reorganisation.** In a counter insurgency situation there may be opportunities to alter the administrative control of areas and regions, but these need to be carefully thought out and agreed to avoid further social pitfalls. The following points need to be borne in mind:

   a. Limit the number of new administrative organisations to be set up because they are costly in manpower and money and take time to shake down. Make the maximum use of existing structures and avoid cutting across existing soundly based organisations.

   b. Make use of the existing administrative machinery and staffs as far as possible and adjusting them only where necessary in the interests of greater efficiency will ensure continuity, minimise institutional resistance and save scarce resources. Changes in organisation and procedures should be limited to achieving better coordination, quicker decisions and a closer supervision of execution.

   c. Joint secretariats, with British representation when working with an ally, are needed at each level of civil government and security forces’ control to cope with the extra work in order to ensure that decisions are implemented swiftly and with the least risk of compromise. They are also useful for ensuring that everyone who needs to be informed is kept in the picture, for keeping a check on progress and to enable problems to be identified early enough to take timely remedial action.

   d. Secretariats have to be kept small in the interests of efficiency and security. In a large secretariat much time is wasted in coordinating business within it. Those who work in secretariats should take care not to usurp the functions of the staffs of the civil administration, police and armed forces.

   e. The civil ministries, police and armed forces need to remain responsible for carrying out the work of their own organisations, in cooperation with each other and not in competition to avoid the confusion of overlapping functions.

12. **Boundaries.** Civil administration, police and armed forces boundaries should be the same in the interests of liaison, planning and coordination, and to avoid operational and intelligence muddles and accidents. Police boundaries usually coincide with those of the Civil Administration. In cases of disagreement military boundaries should conform to the civil/police ones because the latter are well established and will remain when the army withdraws. Occasionally, it may be expedient to adjust boundaries in order to bring a known insurgent organisation within the area of responsibility of one commander. However, the case for sticking to established boundaries whenever possible is a strong one and is discussed further in paragraph 13.

13. **Location of Headquarters and the Joint Operations Centre.** The joint operations centre at each level of command provides the focal point for the collection of information. It also provides a secure meeting place for the civil authorities, police and military
commanders and the staff machinery for disseminating decisions for implementation by all the various forces and organisations within the local boundary. Further points are that:

a. The joint operations centre should be located at the police headquarters, a well established organisation with easy access to police information and intelligence and which has its own communications plus outlets on to the civil network. In failed states it would be prudent to avoid utilising the same administrative building used by the previous regime/authorities to avoid being 'tarred with the same brush'.

b. The associated military headquarters (formation or unit) should be set up next door with ready access to the joint operations centre. If this is not feasible the military headquarters should be set up as near as possible and secure communications established between them.

c. Military and police commanders, or their deputies, should spend a significant part of their time in the joint operations centre. All operations should be planned there but both military and police forces need to retain their own headquarters for the issue of orders, day to day routine, administration and logistic support.

d. Counter insurgency operations require the cooperation of many agencies which have their own communications systems, not all of which are compatible. With so many organisations and agencies involved there are bound to be increased security risks and the problems of overcrowded accommodation. It is essential to restrict the size of the staffs in the joint operations centre to manageable proportions particularly in the operations room which controls the minute by minute activity on the ground, in order to keep the noise level down, to avoid congestion and to lessen the chance of inadvertently giving information away.

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

14. Regional Character of Counter Insurgency Operations. The system of making civil administration, police and military boundaries and the regional character of counter insurgency operations limit the scope for redeployment. In an allied country this is a matter for the host government but if British advice was requested it may be proffered on the following lines:

a. With the possible exception of the scenario mentioned in paragraph 11, rather than alter boundaries to meet possibly fleeting operational needs it is better to reinforce a formation area with extra units.

b. Should a significantly larger force be required in a region it may be necessary to upgrade the level of command, with comparable upgrading of lower levels of command. This ensures continuity of liaison, intelligence work and operations between the civil authorities, the police and the military.

15. Direction. In the circumstances of a static framework, commanders exercise control by:

a. Written directives laying down overall policy and detailing broad tasks within unit areas,
b. Frequent meetings and visits to keep in touch with the situation and to give specific orders for important operations, for example, those mounted to extend the area under government control or perhaps to exploit a windfall of good intelligence to ambush or capture a key insurgent figure or group, or to seize supplies of food and arms.

16. **Framework for Directives and Conferences.** The following is a suggested framework for directives and routine meetings:

   a. **Director of Operation’s Policy Directive.** Issued initially and reviewed periodically, perhaps quarterly, unless a major political decision requires quick revision.

   b. **Formation Commander’s Directives.** Based on the Director of Operation’s policy directive and issued in conjunction with it to implement that part of the overall plan appropriate to the formation area. It may need more frequent revision to take account of new tasks, changes in force levels, boundaries and other factors which affect the local situation.

   c. **Daily Staff Conferences.** Aimed to keep formation commanders abreast of developments. They are usually attended by police and civil administration representatives.

   d. **Daily Operational Meetings.** Held in conjunction with the staff conferences or separately to discuss intelligence developments and to issue orders for special operations, for example, to arrange a night operation.

17. **Routine Committee Meetings.** The decisions of regional or district meetings can be implemented either by issuing a directive or at the daily conference or operational meeting at the appropriate level.

18. **Command and Control.** Much emphasis has been laid on the need for centralised direction and decision making. However, the function of the committee system is essentially to provide a forum for planning and coordination. The command function remains the prerogative and responsibility of each military and police commander or civil department head. These officers and officials will be expected to consult one another before taking any initiatives or making any changes to previously agreed policy or plans. Honest and wholehearted cooperation remains essential to:

   a. Maintain mutual confidence between the three arms of the executive, the civil administration, the police and military forces. The latter includes the Host Nation’s allies.

   b. Prevent disputes and accidental engagements between the security forces. This is especially important in the context of operations conducted with allies.

   c. Ensure that all the available civil, police and military resources are available to implement the overall plan.

   d. Avoid jeopardising the security of intelligence or intelligence sources.
19. **Rapid Command Reaction.** There will be occasions when a quick decision is needed, perhaps to exploit a fleeting opportunity or to foil an unexpected insurgent initiative or change of plan. If there is no time for a military commander to consult his superior or his committee members he will have to take a timely decision and act upon it. Provided that a good understanding exists amongst the members of the local committee and within the chain of command, and that some thought has been given on how to react to foreseeable contingencies, the commander’s decision should be a sensible one. Military commanders have to consider that they can act quickly and decisively in an emergency without having to waste valuable time in consultations. A commander who tells his superior, the police officer and, if necessary, the chairman of his committee what he has done and why he has done it can expect rapid support in terms of reinforcement and cooperation to turn the situation to good account. Incidents invariably attract the attention of the media. Commanders and their public information staffs have to prepare a brief quickly to explain the event accurately to forestall hostile propaganda and questioning.
INTRODUCTION

1. **The Need for Intelligence.** Good intelligence is vital in any phase of war. In counter insurgency operations it will be in constant and continuous demand. Operations require steady success, built up over time, which will wear down the insurgent movement, restricting its capability and reducing its morale. Accurate intelligence will permit commanders to conduct operations with precision, reducing the detrimental effect on the local population and minimising casualties among friendly forces. The combined effect will be to secure and maintain the morale among the security forces and raise their standing with the civilian population. Effective and precise use of force will earn respect; vital in the campaign for hearts and minds. Ill-directed and indiscriminate use of force will serve merely to alienate any local population. It may be appreciated, therefore, that sound intelligence is a precursor to all counter insurgency operations; it must be built up quickly and sustained efficiently from the start of a campaign. To help the reader a glossary of more specialised abbreviations used in this Chapter are at Annex A.

2. **Intelligence Support to Operations.** Thorough knowledge of the extent of the insurgency and the political and military aims, command structures and logistic network of the insurgents should allow the state government to develop a long-term overall strategy and sensible military policies to defeat it. At all levels intelligence will permit commanders to put the strategy and policies into practice by the defeat in detail of the insurgents by killing, capturing or arresting individuals and depriving them of targets, intelligence, the means of command and communication, weapons, ammunition, food and other supplies. Defeat of all these elements will reduce the insurgents’ ability to maintain a campaign. Guidelines on Intelligence Support for C2W are given in Annexes B, C and D.

3. **Intelligence in Counter Insurgency Operations.** There is nothing radical in the application of the fundamentals of intelligence to a counter insurgency campaign. There are, however, three aspects which will carry greater emphasis than might be the case in conventional operations:
   a. The dominance of human intelligence (HUMINT), in low-level conflict.
   b. The influence of the civilian authority on counter insurgency operations and the consequent constraints and complications on intelligence gathering.
   c. The appearance that, at times, operations are in support of intelligence rather than the reverse.

4. **The Importance of HUMINT.** The purpose of intelligence, in any phase of war, is to determine the enemy threat; to assess his capability and his intentions, so that the commander may develop a plan to bring about its defeat. In counter insurgency operations,
this is equally the case; the insurgent has to be defeated, militarily or politically, and this can be done only if commanders are given sufficient knowledge of him by the intelligence staff. Where the insurgent lives among the population, perhaps without uniform or a recognisable military structure, his capabilities and intentions are likely to be determined only from information provided by the population and those individuals able to move in close proximity to him. Sophisticated intelligence sensors, crucial in general war, normally cannot match the HUMINT agent, informer, informant, surveillance or the reports from routine police or army patrols. Time-consuming collation of detail and painstaking analysis may then prove the key to unravelling important aspects of the insurgent’s activity.

5. **Civilian Control.** Intelligence gathering in a counter insurgency campaign will, in all probability, lack the freedom that may be enjoyed in combat operations. The primacy of civilian political control, the balance between effort aimed at defeating the insurgency and that expended on crime prevention and resolution, the rule of law and the need for admissible evidence for prosecution, will all constrain the gathering of intelligence. Military intelligence staffs may well find themselves in unfamiliar circumstances, subordinated to civilian control and methods of operating which may have conflicting aims and priorities.

6. **Principles of Intelligence.** The Principles of Intelligence, are summarised below. Their application, in combination with the four stages of the Intelligence Cycle: Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination, provides the structure within which the intelligence organisation operates. This chapter follows this structure, examining all intelligence aspects of counter insurgency operations as they occur within it. The eight principles of intelligence are:

a. Centralised Control.

b. Responsiveness.

c. Objectivity.

d. Systematic Exploitation.

e. Security.

f. Accessibility.

g. Timeliness.

h. Continuous Review.

7. The reader should also refer to other Army level publications for further information on the application of intelligence during operations.

**SECTION 2 - DIRECTION**

**INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE AND THE ORGANISATION OF INTELLIGENCE**

8. **Design of an Intelligence Architecture.** Early in a counter insurgency campaign, it will be necessary to establish a chain of operational command which reflects the political
and military requirements of the state and any allies, committed to the campaign. When
this has been established, there will be a need for a supporting structure of intelligence
staffs placed at appropriate levels in order to provide timely, responsive intelligence for
commanders. It is inevitable that an intelligence structure will develop with the campaign.
The architecture has to anticipate this and deploy progressive phases of capability which
are readily linked together. In parallel with these staffs, a communications network which
will permit the rapid, efficient passage of intelligence data of different types, upwards,
downwards and sideways throughout the intelligence community needs to be constructed.
It should also cross national, military/civilian and service boundaries so that it can link staffs
and agencies at every level. Unlike the military chain of command, which is purely
hierarchical, this network should be constructed on the principle of providing intelligence
from wherever it is available to wherever it is required. This may result in it bypassing some
levels of command in order for it to reach the appropriate user. This “skip-echelon” working
will be aided by information being available on the “pull”, rather than the “push” principle at
whatever level of command may need it. The intelligence architecture is not simply a
communications network; it includes the allocation of Areas of Intelligence Responsibility
(AIR), to each level of command. It specifies precisely where authority to task individual
collection assets is to lie and it allocates the reporting authority, ie, who is responsible for
the provision of fused intelligence reports based on information from collectors. The
intelligence architecture should form an annex to the operational directive under the title of
“The Intelligence Management Plan” (IMP).

9. **Constraints.** There will be constraints on this free flow of data caused by the
necessity to apply the “need to know” principle; vital where HUMINT source- protection is of
such paramount importance as is likely to be the case in counter insurgency operations.
Some intelligence, perhaps that provided from strategic sources, may not be made
available to all intelligence staffs at every level. For example, material with the “UK Eyes
Only” caveat may be made available from the UK exclusively for its own national
commanders. There will be a need for special handling procedures for this, and other,
material. In such circumstances a Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG) may be
established, within which there may be a HUMINT Support Group (HSG), a Cryptological
Support Group (CSG), providing SIGINT, or an IMINT Support Group (ISG). If specialist
intelligence segregated compartments are necessary, then they must be deployed, but their
use should always be kept under close review when operating with allies as they can
encourage exclusivity and reduce the mutual trust so necessary for effective cooperation.

10. **Communications Networks.** Inevitably, extensive intelligence data networks will
place a large burden on the communications available. This should be borne in mind when
designing the intelligence architecture with as much use being made of existing systems as
possible. In a COIN campaign the usage, by intelligence organisations, of available
bandwidth will outstrip that of all other users due to the need for access to national
databases, imagery products and the output of national agencies. This is particularly the
case when satellite communications are established in the theatre once forces from the UK
have been deployed.

**CENTRALISED CONTROL**

11. **The Need for Centralised Control.** Intelligence assets are normally centralised at
the highest appropriate level of command in order to be available across the widest
possible area of operations. In counter insurgency operations there are further imperatives
for centralised control. Where several intelligence organisations are working against a common target, there is the danger of overlap. Some duplication is always necessary in order to improve the evaluation of information by its being confirmed from more than a single source. The danger lies in there being a single source exploited by more than one agency each in ignorance of one-another. This can lead to false confirmation and, in turn, gives the source greater credibility than may be its worth. There is also the undesirability of wastage of effort and resources.

12. **The Director of Intelligence.** In designing the intelligence organisation, a decision has to be made to coordinate all intelligence staffs, military and civilian, local and allied, centrally. Ideally a single Director of Intelligence should be established at national or coalition level with similar posts at each lower level of command, perhaps those of civilian administrative authority or military command depending upon the circumstances.

**INTEGRATION - THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM**

13. **Establishing an Intelligence Committee.** The Director of Intelligence at national level should, ideally, chair an intelligence committee. Subordinate intelligence committees would then meet at each lower level. Each committee would owe allegiance to the next higher level which in turn would be responsible for the effectiveness and coordination of the intelligence efforts of those below them. Committees should meet regularly if there is to be a useful exchange and discussion of intelligence and a good working relationship between civil authorities, police and military intelligence staffs established.

14. **Membership of the Intelligence Committee.** Membership of the intelligence committee should be arranged mutually between the local intelligence services, civilian and military, and those of British and other allied intelligence staffs.

15. **Coordination.** Intelligence committees should ensure that:

   a. Civil, police and army boundaries are the same and accord with the civil authority and security force command system. This may not always be possible.

   b. Information and intelligence flow downwards as well as upwards and sideways to neighbouring committees where appropriate.

   c. Representatives of government departments and local experts are co-opted for special advice, with due regard for security. They might come from customs services and coastguards, such fields as the highways department, rail services, inland water transport, civil engineering, telecommunications, power and water suppliers and from a wider circle of the local community which might include farmers, businessmen and other traders.

**THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM**

16. **Functions of an Intelligence Committee.** The functions of intelligence committees are as follows:

   a. At the national/coalition level, to keep the government, the civil and military commanders, or chiefs of staff, and operations staffs informed of all aspects of
intelligence and security operations and to facilitate the exchange and provision of the intelligence necessary for the prosecution of a strategic campaign.

b. At subordinate levels, to keep their parallel operations committees and the next higher intelligence committees fully informed with relevant intelligence for operational planning.

c. To advise operational staffs on security and protective measures.

d. To develop the collection plan against which the collection agencies will be tasked.

e. Through the intelligence staffs, to direct the collection agencies, allocating tasks and priorities and time within which the information must be obtained.

f. Where possible, to establish common procedures for all local and allied intelligence and security organisations.

g. To provide an appropriate dissemination service to commanders.

17. Central Intelligence Staffs. Subordinate to the committees there should be a centralised, integrated staff capable of performing Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM), database management and fusion functions on behalf of all the intelligence staffs at that particular level. At the outset, as part of the intelligence plan, clear orders should be given on the level at which responsibility for maintenance of a master database will be performed. It is essential to prevent every level of intelligence staff running databases in parallel. Although it will never be possible to avoid some duplication of record-keeping, there should be a minimum with a single, probably the highest local, level maintaining the master database with subordinate, and other levels submitting changes to it in the form of data-change requests. Maintenance of a single database is facilitated by the “pull” rather than the “push” method of information retrieval and by close cooperation between all collectors and analytical staffs.

18. Command and Control. While intelligence committees give general direction, laying down policy and allotting particular aims, collection tasks and priorities, they do not exercise command. Command and control remains the prerogative of the commanders, civilian and military, over both their respective intelligence staffs and their collection agencies.

FACTORS AFFECTING INTEGRATION.

19. Although a single, centrally controlled, integrated intelligence organisation answering to a Director of Intelligence is the ideal, the circumstances prevailing in a state may not be conducive to such a system, particularly if a British contingent is part of an international, allied force in which the senior British officer may have limited influence. Where it cannot be achieved, a compromise solution has to be brokered between the interested parties. The establishment of a centralised system may be affected by any or all of the following factors:
a. The effectiveness and reliability of the state’s security forces and its intelligence and security organisation.

b. Willingness by all parties to cooperate, to share information and details of, perhaps sensitive, local sources, other intelligence details and, particularly at the higher levels, matters of political sensitivity.

c. The different points of view and doctrine of the security forces, local and allied. Because the state’s security forces, in particular the police, must continue to live and work among the population after the eventual departure of the allies, they will be subject to greater internal pressures and constraints.

d. The degree of authority delegated to officials at each level of the command structure, national, provincial, regional and district.

e. The integrity of, particularly local, intelligence officers and the vulnerability of intelligence services to corruption, infiltration, subversion and apathy.

f. The sensitivity of military commanders towards the local police forces which may resent the military view of their area of operations as being their “patch” in which they alone hold sway. This can cause friction with local police whose continued operations in the area, perhaps in isolation and with no consultation can, in turn, irritate the military. It is important that intelligence staffs overcome this problem as failure to integrate will seriously impede the intelligence effort.

20. **Joint Intelligence Cell.** Whether or not an intelligence committee is established, the normal focus for intelligence for British forces will be the Joint Intelligence Cell (JIC), which will be located alongside the Joint Operations Cell (JOC), forming the hub of any Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ). Within the JIC will be the senior intelligence officer and his staff. This will include CCIRM and the All Sources Cell (ASC), in which fusion and bulk of the analysis will be conducted. Representatives of the agencies, for example HSG, CSG and ISG, will be located in the ASC. In some cases it will be necessary for these elements to be afforded their own segregated area with more stringent access controls than pertain in the rest of the ASC (see paragraph 9 above.) Similar constraints may apply if a UKNIC is deployed.

**FACTORS AFFECTING ORGANISATION**

21. **General.** Whatever the design of the intelligence architecture, the organisation and the sources and agencies deployed, there are a number of factors which will be common. These need to be considered at the outset and plans made for their inclusion in the structure.

a. **Continuity.** Units should be kept in the same area of responsibility (AOR) for as long as possible. This ensures that they become familiar with the local inhabitants, the other security forces, such as the police, and the terrain and infrastructure. They are better able to get the measure of their opponents and they acquire the ability to develop information into intelligence. In short, they get a feel for what is normal as a background against which to observe the abnormal. Regrettably, operational and roulement moves are inevitable. During the period
when units change over, Intelligence Corps continuity NCOs (CONCOs) can provide the essential element of continuity. CONCOs, who remain in a single AOR throughout an extended tour in the theatre, should acquire an intimate knowledge of the local situation in their area which they can then pass on to the intelligence officers and the commanders of incoming units.

b. **Flexibility.** Just as an intelligence organisation is designed to meet a specific situation, so it has to be receptive to the adjustments needed when the insurgent threat develops in new directions, themes, strategies and tactics, or the situation changes in some other way. Such changes in the situation may make fresh demands upon specialist services, such as imagery interpretation and interrogation. Commanders, and their intelligence staffs, need to be able to respond quickly to new circumstances by redeploying resources and, where necessary, adjusting the functions they fulfill.

c. **Information Handling.** The intelligence system, whatever its shape, has to be able to cope with an increasing amount of information as units, with growing experience, become more productive and better focused. With time, it is to be hoped, the population becomes sufficiently confident to pass more information to the security forces. As this happens, sufficient intelligence-trained personnel should be made available to collate the additional information, analyse and integrate it, interpret its meaning and disseminate the resulting intelligence in time for it to be used operationally.

d. **Specialists.** The training of analysts, source handlers, surveillance operators, imagery interpreters, linguists, interrogators and other intelligence specialists must be developed as early as possible if the inevitable shortage of such skilled personnel, which exists at the beginning of any campaign, is to be overcome. The careful husbandry of scarce skills is necessary throughout a campaign, but particularly essential at the beginning until more trained specialists become available. In addition to the normal complement of intelligence staffs, there will be a requirement for some augmentation with specialists whose task will be liaison with local intelligence organisations. Such personnel are likely to deploy into the country at the very beginning of, or even before, the campaign. These, vital, posts need to be filled with well-trained experts capable of acting with a degree of initiative and away from a normal military structure. They will include:

(1) **Military Intelligence Liaison Officers, (MILO).** MILOs are military officers on the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) controlled through DI (Commitments). In peacetime they maintain a watching brief on developments in their particular geographical area of interest and are capable of deploying quickly with the minimum of support. Ideally, a MILO might be deployed in advance of the arrival of any deployed British force in order to establish liaison with local authorities, primarily for intelligence purposes, but also to ensure the smooth passage of troops into the theatre. The MILO should be equipped with a United Kingdom Military Intelligence Support Terminal (UKMIST), which will give him access to Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), and other data, including imagery, and the means to transmit reports. UKMIST provides, at minimum, core intelligence production capability and its own communications. On arrival of the main body of troops a MILO will assist
a commander by developing liaison links. Later the MILO will hand over his responsibilities to the formation intelligence staff and withdraw.

(2) **Local Agency Liaison Personnel.** Military liaison personnel will usually be deployed to the local security services, and police special branch, or its equivalent, with the principal task of preparing for the expansion of the intelligence organisation in the theatre. Others will be deployed on covert passive surveillance (CPS) or covert information and intelligence-gathering tasks. These personnel will be provided by Intelligence Corps field security units and defence HUMINT organisations, such as the Specialist Intelligence Wing (SIW) of the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC). Such personnel may carry titles such as Military Intelligence Officer (MIO) or Force Intelligence NCO (FINCO). All are likely to be both linguists and HUMINT specialists. Like MILOs, they should also be deployed early. The intelligence product of such liaison and covert intelligence specialists will be passed to the intelligence staffs through a HSG which will also be the focus for tasking from CCIRM.

e. **Theatre Liaison.** If the intelligence organisation is to work effectively and efficiently, good liaison between all intelligence organisations and agencies, local, allied, civilian and military, is paramount. The specialists referred to above, are vital elements in establishing effective liaison with local intelligence agencies. The sensitivities of such intelligence liaison duties require the liaison officer to have wide experience of military capabilities and knowledge of intelligence.

f. **Security.** The need for security, especially source protection, has to be paramount within the intelligence organisation and among those to whom it is disseminated. The “need to know” principle has to be enforced and clear guidelines given on dissemination, particularly to local, civilian authorities.

**COMPOSITION OF AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION**

22. **Intelligence Staff Organisation.** There is no fixed establishment for an intelligence organisation, nor is there any pre-determined scale on which to base its composition. Its size will be determined by the extent and nature of the threat, the commander's requirements, the architecture necessary to support operations and the intelligence collection agencies which can be made available. As no two campaigns are ever fought in quite the same circumstances it follows that the intelligence organisation for each new commitment should be custom-designed, although past campaigns will provide guidance where there are useful parallels. The size of any British contribution to a counter-insurgency campaign will have to be designed by consultation between the senior intelligence officer and the intelligence staff of the state concerned. Almost certainly, the size of intelligence staffs will grow and will be considerably bigger as the campaign develops than was the case at the outset. This likely expansion should, if possible, be allowed for when allocating working space and other resources.

23. **Intelligence Support Organisation.** The kind of specialist support that the intelligence staff would need was covered in paragraph 21 above.
24. **A Commanders’ Intelligence Requirements.** Direction will begin with a determination of the commander’s intelligence requirements. These will be the product of his mission analysis and should be discussed with the senior intelligence officer who will be able to ensure that they are accurately focused. It may not be possible, in the early stages of a campaign, to state clearly the commander’s intelligence requirements as insufficient operational information may be available on which to plan. Where this is the case, the intelligence staffs have the responsibility of giving guidance to commanders on the kind of intelligence that they will require. This may be done by means of an intelligence estimate. An intelligence estimate takes the commander’s plan, no matter how broadly stated, and compares it with existing intelligence on the insurgency. Concurrent with the intelligence estimate, the staff should apply Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The intelligence estimate and IPB together will give the intelligence staff a good idea of the gaps in their knowledge of the insurgency and these can form the basis of the initial collection plan. It is likely that, particularly in the initial stages, there will be a shortfall of intelligence. The probability is that there will be more basic intelligence available than current intelligence. The preparation of an initial collection plan will also give some indication of the necessary collection assets, and intelligence architecture that will be needed for the campaign.

25. **Direction to the Collectors.** Even when an intelligence organisation has been established, information does not flow automatically into the hands of the intelligence staff, and thus to a commander. If direction is poor, the intelligence organisation may be in danger of collecting large quantities of irrelevant information. A commander has to give his intelligence staff clear direction and a firm indication of the priorities to be allotted to his intelligence requirements. On receipt of the commander’s intelligence requirements, the intelligence staff will first, with the aid of the intelligence estimate and IPB, identify gaps in the intelligence already held. These gaps should be filled by asking collection agencies to collect against them. The questions put to the collectors are known as Information Requirements (IR) and their collection is planned carefully by the senior intelligence officer in conjunction with his CCIRM staff who will coordinate the collection plan and IRs and manage the intelligence requirements. The resultant collection plan has to, in turn, be approved by the commander prior to collectors receiving their direction from the intelligence staffs. The collection plan will normally be maintained on a collection worksheet which will show the allocation of tasks, in order of priority, to individual collection agencies and the time, and form in which information is to be reported.

**SECTION 3 - COLLECTION**

26. **Aspects of Collection.** There are two aspects of collection: exploitation, by intelligence staffs of their sources and agencies and the timely delivery of collected information to intelligence staffs for subsequent processing into intelligence, or, when appropriate, directly to weapon systems. Collection will be based on the collection plan drawn up by the intelligence staffs, under the direction of commanders and the intelligence committees during the Direction phase.
SOURCES AND AGENCIES

27. **HUMINT.** As outlined above, the most effective source of intelligence will be that derived from the direct questioning of persons. This is likely to include the following:

   a. **British and Allied Military Sources.** This will include all ranks of the security forces especially those whose duties require them to move among the local population, on patrols, on collection of locally-produced supplies, on liaison with local authorities, dockers, airport workers, aid workers and the like. It is vital that all such persons are thoroughly briefed on the gaps in intelligence which their duties might enable them to fill. They should be made “intelligence aware” so that they are always prepared to report information which may appear trivial but which, when added to other pieces, may be important.

   b. **Local Military Forces.** This will include military, paramilitary, auxiliaries and reserves. They will be of value both on duty and when on leave. Like their British and Allied counterparts, they should be encouraged to become intelligence aware. Attempts should be made systematically to brief those going on leave locally and debrief them on return.

   c. **Military Surveillance.** All the usual HUMINT sources of Observation Posts, (OP), mounted and dismounted patrols, reconnaissance units, air reconnaissance, and troops supplemented by specialist surveillance equipment, are equally useful in counter insurgency operations. They have to be tasked and briefed with great care because insurgents operate more covertly than an enemy in conventional warfare and can be harder to detect. Units will frequently be tasked to mount operations specifically to obtain information or to give cover to other intelligence-gathering operations, for example, the insertion or retrieval of covert OPs.

   d. **Covert Surveillance.** SIW will provide specialist personnel for CPS. In addition, Special Forces (SF) have a long history of success in the role of static covert surveillance and the exploitation of the information which they obtain. The use of SF for intelligence-gathering and offensive operations needs to be carefully coordinated with G3. When SF are deployed, it will be normal for there to be SF liaison officers at the HQ of the formation to which they are assigned.

   e. **Irregular Forces.** Units may also be raised locally from the police, the Host Nation’s army and from friendly sections of the civilian population for the purpose of defensive, or offensive operations against insurgents. Defensive operations include the guarding of key points and storage areas. Irregular forces may also be formed from ex-insurgents; deserters, or those who have been captured or have surrendered and who can be persuaded to serve the government. They have a role, both in intelligence-gathering and in offensive operations. Such use of irregular troops is, however, relatively sophisticated and these operations can be developed only over a protracted period in an environment which is very well understood by the intelligence organisation.

   f. **Interrogation.** Prisoners can be an important source of information. Interrogation in a counter insurgency campaign can, however, be a sensitive matter politically and is likely be subject to rigorous oversight, both officially, from the local
government and, unofficially, from the media. It is important to be fully aware of the legal basis under which interrogation takes place. Systematic interrogation of captured insurgents can have excellent results, particularly in building a picture of command structures, communications and other aspects of the insurgents’ infrastructure. In low-level conflict, interrogation is less likely to produce intelligence of immediate tactical value, simply because insurgent methods of operating, normally involve a very restricted circle within which future plans are discussed. In general terms, but not always so, interrogation should be capable of producing evidence which will be acceptable in court. It is vital, therefore, that it is conducted, strictly in accordance with rules laid down by the host-nation’s judiciary. Where necessary, the Defence HUMINT Unit (DHU) can provide both advice and interrogation teams.

g. **De-briefing.** DHU will also provide a Defence De-briefing Team (DDT); personnel skilled in de-briefing willing subjects. These will normally include British subjects with recent knowledge of the host-country and events within. Such people might include travellers, airline crews, expatriate workers and members of British diplomatic missions. If such people have remained in the country then a de-briefing team, often called a Country Liaison Team (CLT), may deploy for de-briefing operations in the host-state. Later in the campaign de-briefing may be extended to foreign nationals in the UK with recent appropriate experiences.

h. **HUMINT Support.** Both interrogation and de-briefing require close steerage and extensive intelligence support if they are to be effective. Liaison representatives will be established at appropriate JICs and will need extensive analytical and research support.

i. **Captured Documents, Equipment and Stores.** These are valuable sources. Troops have to be trained to realise their worth and encouraged to make them available to intelligence staffs at the earliest opportunity. Documents found on suspects may assist in the questioning of prisoners by providing interrogators with information which they can exploit during interview.

j. **Local Police Forces.** Local Police are an excellent source of information but they need to be handled with great sensitivity. Care should be taken not to duplicate the information collection from police officers being undertaken by their own intelligence staff. Police Special Branch equivalents are very likely to be handling their own sources among the population. It is probable that there will be a strong reluctance to disclose these sources to intelligence staffs, but their tasking, and the information they provide, should be coordinated and fused by the centralised intelligence machinery.

k. **Local Population.** Undoubtedly, the local population will, if systematically exploited, be the best source of HUMINT. Great care should be taken in developing the local population as sources and close coordination with local intelligence agencies, the Police Special Branch in particular, needs to be arranged if difficulties are to be avoided. The insurgents may use bogus informants to plant false information or uncover the source-handling network. Local informants should be given the opportunity to contact the security forces confidentially. This can be done by making confidential telephone lines or Post Office Box numbers available and by
keeping routine military patrols in close proximity to the population. Doing so will permit a budding informant to pass information without unduly drawing attention to himself. If possible, and where necessary, troops should be encouraged to obtain at least some knowledge of the local language. Informers, however, may still be afraid that their voices may be recognised by telephone operators or their writing identified by postmen. People who have good cause to fear reprisals should be given the opportunity to contact the security force with information, for example, at road blocks or on cordon and search operations, where their interviews can be concealed under the guise of interrogation. The intelligence organisation will be capable of developing a system for making contact with, or being contacted by, sympathisers.

I. Informers and Agents. Much of the useful information which reaches the intelligence staff will come from informers and agents. A small number of well-placed and reliable agents, fostered or infiltrated into an insurgent movement in peacetime, can provide information of value well beyond their cost, particularly if at the pivotal points in the insurgents’ command. If it is possible to expand sufficiently the agent network at the top level of the insurgents’ command, information may be provided on the development of the command structure and organisation, the identification of important leaders, the system of liaison between the military wing and the insurgent political leadership and the methods of acquiring funds, food and arms. At lower echelons, informers are useful for providing information on, for example, personalities, tactical plans, weapon and food hides. At these levels, if continuity is to be maintained, it is important that the agent network expands at a similar rate to that of the insurgent movement, otherwise their relative value will diminish. The problem with acting on information supplied by an individual is source-protection. In an insurgent organisation the circle of knowledge is kept small. If an informer reports the move of a weapon to a new hide, for example, perhaps only three insurgents have been made aware, the courier, the commander and the quartermaster. A subsequent, immediate operation by the security forces to recover the weapon might raise suspicions which would be on just three people. This could seriously jeopardise the security of the source. Care must, therefore, be exercised in such matters and the advice of the HSG sought when planning operations.

m. Patrolling. At times, it may well appear to the soldier fighting insurgency, that more of his efforts are being expended on gathering information than in actually combating the insurgents. This may well be the case for, in operations where the reliance on HUMINT is paramount, the foot-soldier becomes the eyes and ears of an intelligence organisation. The value of extensive patrolling and subsequent debriefing may not readily be apparent to him when, for example, the aim might be to develop a picture of patterns of insurgent behaviour against a background of normality over a protracted period, rather than short-term reconnaissance for immediate offensive action. The need to win the hearts and minds of the population in order to weaken sympathy with insurgents and increase the potential flow of information, may also be a burden on the soldier’s patience and morale as he finds himself adopting a less aggressive stance than he might otherwise have chosen.

28. Coordination. Whenever HUMINT sources are to be exploited it is imperative that all HUMINT collection agencies operating in the theatre effect liaison closely with each other. This liaison is vital to ensure:
a. **De-confliction.** No source should ever be run by more than a single agency. If a single source works for more than one agency, it is possible that his reports can, unwittingly, confirm themselves. This false confirmation, sometimes called false collateral, as well as being a danger to the intelligence process, can cause the source to gain greater credence than his worth. Furthermore, if the situation becomes known to the insurgents, they can exploit the false collateral at the expense of the security forces.

b. **Veracity.** There is always the risk of a source, if not properly handled, producing information which is unreliable, or even acting as a double agent. Tasking must be rigidly controlled to reduce the likelihood of this happening. Reliability of sources must always be evaluated with great care and records maintained by the HUMINT agency.

c. **Security.** The smaller the circle of people knowing the identity of a source, the safer he can operate. If sources are to be maintained, and confidence spread, source-protection must be effective, and be seen to be effective.

29. **Open Source Intelligence.** Intelligence derived from open sources (OSINT) is playing an increasingly important role in all phases of combat operations. Nowhere, however, will the role of the media be more important than in counter insurgency. Not only will the actions of the security forces be scrutinised closely, it will be pored over at length by press and current affairs television and radio programmes the world over and will play a major part in forming public opinion. Relations with the media are not the direct responsibility of the intelligence staff. They should remember, however, that reporters can get access where security forces often cannot. Furthermore, press teams are often out and about for protracted periods. A warm relationship, built up between intelligence staffs and individual members of the press corps can reap dividends in the form of low-level information. Many British journalists will cover the campaign for an extended period, visiting the country for, perhaps weeks at a time before returning to Britain. If an intelligence staff develops a sufficient relationship with individual members of a media team, information might be forthcoming in return for, perhaps, a sanitised update, or a security brief on their return to the theatre of operations. Intelligence staffs should not forget, however, that the media do not collect intelligence, merely information and media reports should always be regarded with caution. They are likely to include a bias to some particular purpose rather than be a straight reporting of unabridged or unelaborated facts. Commanders may have seen the morning television news coverage of the campaign immediately prior to being briefed by the staff. This can, inevitably, lead to staffs having to respond to press reports rather than leading on subjects of their choosing with unfortunate results. Intelligence officers should take steps to avoid briefings developing in this way. Local media in particular will have a vital role to play in the hearts and minds campaign and intelligence staff can expect to play a part in this with Operations and PSYOPS staff.

30. **Open-Source Publications.** In addition to the current reporting of news teams in theatre, there is likely to be considerable open-source material produced prior to the campaign which will go some way to meeting intelligence staffs’ requirements for basic intelligence. This can include atlases, encyclopedias, travel books, statistical summaries and a host of other reference books produced by the specialist-interest press covering the armed forces, the political, economic, geographical situations inside the country and much of value.
31. **Insurgent Use of the Media.** It has to be remembered that the insurgent movement will also attempt to make use of the media to spread its own views and discredit those of the government and the security forces. Intelligence staffs should attempt to catalogue insurgent publications; they can sometimes reveal aspects of the insurgent otherwise unknown.

**IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE**

32. **Imagery intelligence as a Source.** Intelligence derived from imagery, (IMINT), will play an important role in counter insurgency operations. Coverage will include imagery, ranging from map-quality prints from airborne platforms, both satellite and aircraft, some of very high resolution, to thermal imagery (TI), and Infra-red (IR), pictures. TI imagery is excellent at detecting bodies which are warmer than their surroundings, such as people concealed in dense foliage, or a warm vehicle engine. IR imagery is capable of detecting disturbed soil; valuable for detecting buried arms caches, command wires for booby traps and other insurgent devices. Collection platforms will include satellites, strategic aircraft, tactical air reconnaissance (TAR), aircraft, helicopters and Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAV), such as Phoenix. OPs and other reconnaissance troops can expect to be equipped with hand-held cameras, video recorders, TI equipment and Image intensifiers (II). Coordination of IMINT is the task of an ISG, normally found from within the resources of the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC). Where RAF aircraft with a reconnaissance role are deployed, so too will a Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell, (RIC). It is at the RIC that the first-line analysis of the results of reconnaissance sorties will be performed. There will be a constant demand for photographic coverage of areas of operations. The ISG will be able to provide intelligence derived from the analysis of all kinds of imagery. Much analysis will be done, however, not on “wet film”, that is photographic negative or print, but on “soft copy”, images on a computer screen. Although prints of images can be made available, care should be taken to ensure that they are demanded only when necessary, for example as briefing aids. Prints should not be demanded as proof of intelligence reports as a matter of course. The time taken to interpret results of an IMINT task is considerably lengthened when prints of the imagery are required.

**SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE**

33. **Signals intelligence, SIGINT, plays a vital role.** In low-level conflict the immediate value of SIGINT may be less apparent. Insurgent groups will, however, have a need to communicate and when they do via any electronic medium they are vulnerable to intercept. Besides deriving intelligence from communications (COMINT), SIGINT analysts will exploit emissions from radars and other electronic emitters. This electronic intelligence (ELINT), can enable the detection of, for example, radio-control devices and missile control, guidance and target-seeking radars. Where SIGINT collection is envisaged, a CSG will be available to coordinate its collection and to interpret the results within the ASC.

**SECTION 4 - PROCESSING**

34. **Processing as a Discipline.** The processing stage of the intelligence cycle incorporates the work of the intelligence staff in collation, analysis, integration, or synthesis, and interpretation of information.
35. **Processing Staff.** The processing staff will normally be trained intelligence operators, often from all three services, supported by specialists in the collection disciplines. Where appropriate, specialists from other arms and services will join the analytical staff, for example, engineer intelligence operators, with their specialist knowledge of, particularly, terrain, mine warfare and search. Ammunition technicians with their training in explosives, firing devices and weapon inspection are able to develop weapons intelligence in conjunction with the police forensic scientists. This discipline, based on such items as weapon matching, will be able to trace weapons to their sources of supply, to rounds they have fired, explosives and detonators to their origin and so on.

36. **The Intelligence Office.** The best results will be obtained from those intelligence organisations which are fully integrated, work to a centrally-agreed collection plan, employ suitable personnel, fusion and database managers, analysts and other intelligence specialists and approach their task in a structured, objective and systematic way.

37. **Fusion.** One of the critical tasks performed in the ASC is that of fusion. This is the collation of reports and information from the separate, single-source agencies, HUMINT, SIGINT and IMINT, into a single assessment. Each agency produces its own view of an event or activity and reports it to the intelligence staff. This is known as “single-source picture compilation”. The fused assessment, that is, the assessment made by the comparison of more than one single-source report, becomes the “recognised tactical ground, (or maritime, or air), picture”. The recognised picture will be produced at the level with responsibility for reporting, usually the level maintaining the database as it is there that the broadest view will be. This then becomes the authoritative view which forms the basis for assessments by all subordinate intelligence staff and will be disseminated upwards, downwards and to the flanks in the form of intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), which are often pictorial.

38. **Databases.** One of the fundamentals of effective processing is the maintenance of an efficient database. In a counter insurgency campaign there will be a plethora of small, apparently insignificant and unconnected data. Only effective collation and cross-referencing will enable analysts to assess the significance of individual pieces and make best use of them. Nowadays, it is likely that the database will be held in electronic form on computer. Ideally, this will be available throughout the user community, to all the analysts, the specialists and, if possible, to subordinate intelligence staffs. It should be decided at the very start at which level responsibility for maintaining all the records will lie. All other levels should have some, preferably direct, read-only, or limited write access, ideally on the “pull” principle. The database itself should be constructed, and maintained, with care. It must be accessible to from as wide a community as possible, thus centralisation is critical. It will be worth some effort to ensure that the initial design is right, that the software can meet the requirement or, if this cannot be done, that it can be amended, or updated, effectively as experience in its use grows. To hope to transfer records from a redundant system to a new one in mid-campaign is not realistic; records will be lost, or become corrupted, and efficiency will suffer. Provision has also to be made for interrogating national databases and those of collection agencies. All this will require detailed consideration, careful planning, stringent security regimes and a heavy reliance on an extensive communications network. Intelligence databases are vulnerable. They have to be well protected against fluctuations and cuts in the power supply and against viruses and unauthorised importation of software. Information must be backed up regularly and the back-up tapes stored separately, under secure, and fireproof, conditions. The database
manager should be selected with care. He, the users and technicians, have to be allowed access only in a controlled and monitored environment.

SECTION 5 - DISSEMINATION

39. **Responsibility.** Dissemination of intelligence to subordinate commanders is the responsibility of the Director of Intelligence at the highest level and of chief intelligence officers at subordinate levels. Where intelligence committees are established, individual intelligence chiefs of the separate services represented will accept responsibility for briefing their own commanders.

40. **Use of Intelligence Architecture.** It should be emphasised that intelligence should flow, not necessarily in a hierarchical manner, as is the case with orders along an operational chain of command, but quickly and efficiently, from whomever holds it to whomever needs it. This will mean that, on occasion, it will bypass some levels of command. This principle is easier to effect if information can be "pulled" from the user rather than be "pushed" by the holder. Where appropriate, graphical dissemination, for example Pictorial Intelligence Summaries (PICINTSUMs), should be used as these are the most readily assimilated. This is greatly aided by the use of information technology. INTSUMs should be disseminated at regular intervals. These can be supplemented by detailed reports on specific topics, for example, insurgent ORBATs or incidents, as required. Often these too can be disseminated regularly, perhaps weekly. As with intelligence reporting in any phase of operations, care has to be taken to avoid "circular reporting" in which parts of a summary from one intelligence staff are plagiarised in another and return to the originator as apparent confirmation of the original. This problem is particularly acute in combined operations where the different national authorities include reports from third parties in their own summaries. The best defence against this is clear orders for reporting authority and a thorough knowledge, on the part of intelligence officers, of the sources and agencies available to all the intelligence staffs providing reports for the theatre.

41. **Security.** While intelligence is of use only in the hands of operational decision-makers, its dissemination should be closely controlled. Source-protection must always be in the front of the intelligence officer’s mind. If a source is at risk, intelligence should be sanitised or disguised in such a way as to conceal its source. Access to intelligence in such circumstances should be restricted to those with a real need to know. Security of intelligence needs to always be balanced against the value to be gained from its dissemination. Agencies generally have strict guidelines for dissemination of intelligence in an emergency, perhaps when lives are at risk. Intelligence officers need to acquaint themselves with these “action on” procedures so that emergency dissemination can take place with the minimum of delay.

SECTION 6 - TRAINING

42. **Pre-Deployment Training.** All those involved in the Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination of intelligence should deploy to the theatre having made thorough preparation. They need to be clear on their role in the intelligence organisation and have had the opportunity to rehearse the issues with which they will be dealing, with those to whom they will be working. Chief intelligence officers, in particular, should take the time to examine the forthcoming operation against the fundamentals of intelligence, which
are the same for any phase of war, and attempt to order their thoughts on architectures and intelligence support in such a way that they can see clearly what infrastructure will be necessary to meet their aim of supporting the commander’s plan. Those personnel with a role which will require them to effect liaison with other authorities in the United Kingdom should have had the opportunity to make contact with them, to discuss the issues and, particularly, agree on the means with which they will communicate. Ideally, they should have the opportunity to exercise using similar communications systems before departure.

43. **Background Intelligence.** Military staff should be as thoroughly briefed as possible on the situation in the theatre of operations prior to deployment. Local MI companies will be able to assist with individual and unit training on intelligence matters, current affairs and other aspects of the insurgency.

44. **Specialist Skills.** Military staff with specialist skills should ensure that as much training as possible is done prior to arrival in theatre. Problems are much easier to solve, particularly those involving technical equipment, in a benign environment where extensive support facilities exist than after arrival. This will apply also to those members of an intelligence organisation who will be required to use computers and other types of information technology (IT). There are a multitude of different systems, with varying functionality and connectivity; thorough knowledge of them on the part of users markedly increases their value.

45. **Intelligence at Unit Level.** Further aspects of unit intelligence and security training are covered in other publications published by the Army.

**SECTION 7 - DIFFICULTIES FACING AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION**

46. **Non-Operational Requirement.** Although the immediate requirement at the start of an emergency will be for the existing intelligence organisation to expand and produce intelligence to support commanders for military and police operations, it will have to continue to provide other strategic, political and economic intelligence. The intelligence organisation will be severely stretched in the expansion phase and the recruitment of additional staff may give the insurgents an opportunity to infiltrate their agents.

47. **Security of the Expanded Organisation.** Finding, and vetting, suitable personnel and preventing insurgent penetration of a rapidly enlarging intelligence system will present difficulties and risks. The difficulties may be overcome by effort and cooperation. The risks have to be accepted with open eyes and minimised by good security.

48. **Political Direction.** Political direction of intelligence is a sensitive matter in a democracy because the system of checks and balances demands that it is not abused to promote personal, party or factional interests. In a more authoritarian regime the government’s control of intelligence is closely guarded to ensure that it retains a monopoly of power. In either case direction is usually exercised by a senior member of the government. The decentralisation necessary to counter an insurgency erodes control in three respects.

a. **Dissemination of Intelligence.** The number of people who have access to sensitive issues will increase, thus centralised control of the intelligence is more
difficult. There will be created opportunities for subordinates, newly in receipt of intelligence to take advantage of it or to be suborned.

b. **Collection Methods.** Methods used to collect information can no longer be controlled rigidly from central government. HUMINT must be handled at the lowest level. Agent handlers require the kind of local knowledge which demands that they live in close proximity to those with whom they work.

c. **Decisions on the Threat.** More importantly, there is the increase in an individual's opportunities to exercise value judgements as to which people and what groups are to be considered a threat to the state and who should or should not be targeted. Often there is not only a legal dividing line between a proscribed insurgent organisation and its legitimate political party but also between the insurgents and those who sympathise with them.

49. **Increase in Military Influence.** A further difficulty, which insurgent propagandists exploit, is that the dilution of high-level political control is exacerbated by the increased influence exercised over the intelligence system by the security forces. The charge, however unjustified, that the security forces are, thereby, involved in politics can be a damaging one. The obvious retort, that the Army is already involved to the extent that it supports a legitimate government against lawless insurgents, will not convince all. The relationship between the government, the judiciary, the security forces and intelligence should be indivisible. A situation in which the intelligence organisation and the security forces are answerable to separate authorities; government, regional, allied or factional, has to be avoided.

50. **Influence of Foreign Allies.** In combined operations, the charge may be made, and exploited by the insurgents, that the government is under the control of foreigners. The resultant sensitivity may cause the government to place greater restrictions on the freedom of action by the allies than might otherwise be the case. This might include restrictions on intelligence-gathering, particularly sensitive collection in the HUMINT and SIGINT fields.
**GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>Area of Intelligence Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIO</td>
<td>Assistant Intelligence Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>Area of Intelligence Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>All Sources Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Ammunition Technical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIRM</td>
<td>Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>Citizens' Band (radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLT</td>
<td>Country Liaison Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNR</td>
<td>Combat Net Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCO</td>
<td>Continuity NCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Covert Passive Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>Cryptological Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDT</td>
<td>Defence De-briefing Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISC</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence &amp; Security School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESM</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare Support Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINCO</td>
<td>Field Intelligence NCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>Field Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCI</td>
<td>Human-Computer Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSG</td>
<td>HUMINT Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Integrated Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Image Intensification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Intelligence Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Infra-Red/Information Requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRLS</td>
<td>Infra-red Linescan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>IMINT Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Forces Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFIT</td>
<td>Joint Forward Interrogation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSIO</td>
<td>Joint Services Interrogation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN</td>
<td>Local Area Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILO</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIO</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSTAR</td>
<td>Manportable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Intelligence Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open-Source Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Priority Intelligence Requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Request For Information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RIC     Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell
SAM     Surface-to-Air Missile
SITS    Secondary Image Transmission System
SF      Special Forces
SIGINT  Signals Intelligence
SIW     Specialist Intelligence Wing
TAR     Tactical Air Reconnaissance
TI      Thermal Imagery
UAV     Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UGS     Unattended Ground Sensors
UKMIST  United Kingdom Military Intelligence Support Terminal
WIS     Weapons Intelligence Staff
## THE INTER RELATIONSHIP OF FUNCTIONS WITHIN C2W

### SUPPORTING FACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OP SEC</th>
<th>DECEPTION</th>
<th>PSYOPS</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>DESTRUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Degrading general situation information to enhance deception effect. Providing information to fill gaps created by friendly OPSEC.</td>
<td>Degrading general situation information to enhance effect of PSYOPS.</td>
<td>Concealing EW units systems to deny information on extent of EW capabilities.</td>
<td>Concealing dedicated systems for C2W to deny information on extent of C2W destruction capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECEPTION</td>
<td>OPSEC requirements may limit information that can be revealed to enhance credibility of deception story. Deception may also inhibit OPSEC.</td>
<td>Providing information compatible with PSYOPS theme. Reinforcing PSYOPS theme in context of deception plan/information.</td>
<td>Influencing adversary to defend wrong C2 systems from friendly EA/ES.</td>
<td>Influencing adversary to defend wrong C2 elements/systems from friendly RSTA and destruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>OPSEC requirements may limit information that can be revealed to develop PSYOPS themes. PSYOPS themes may also cut across needs of OPSEC.</td>
<td>Deception story may limit selection of PSYOPS themes. Deception story may limit information that could be revealed to develop PSYOPS themes.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Causing population to the targeted areas, reducing collateral damage limitations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Deception that utilises EM spectrum may limit EW targeting of hostile CIS infrastructure.</td>
<td>PSYOPS that utilises EM targeting of hostile C2 assets. EW plans may also limit PSYOPS activity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTRUCTION</td>
<td>Deception Operations may limit destructive targeting of hostile C2 infrastructure.</td>
<td>PSYOPS activity may limit destructive targeting of C2 assets.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

1. The components of Command and Control (C2) are the Commander and his staff, including his supporting intelligence organisation, communications and information systems. All elements of the C2 process are important, largely inseparable and contribute to the successful outcome of the Commander's plan; they are also vulnerable to attack. By preventing an insurgent commander from effectively controlling his organisation contributes directly to the COIN principle of separating the insurgent from his support.

2. The nature and extent of all source intelligence required for the planning and execution of C2W operations is shown in the subsequent paragraphs.

INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT OPSEC

3. Intelligence support for OPSEC planning must focus on the capabilities and limitations of the insurgent's intelligence gathering system, in order to reduce the vulnerability of friendly C2 assets and installations to attack. Counter intelligence resources will be concentrated on the security threat. Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) are important to assess the effectiveness of the OPSEC plan.

4. Key information/intelligence requirements to support OPSEC are at Annex D.

INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT PSYOPS

5. A PSYOPS team should work very closely with the All Source Intelligence Cell to plan PSYOPS and to integrate these with the other C2W functions. As part of PSYOPS it may be necessary to conceal aspects of friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions. OPSEC may therefore be essential to the PSYOPS plan. Equally, it may be desirable in support of PSYOPS to reveal certain aspects of friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions. PSYOPS can also be used to support Deception.

6. Basic psychological intelligence - on the cultural, religious, social and economic aspects of the target country/population and its government/leadership, communications and media - is produced during peacetime in the form of Basic Psychological Studies (BPS). During operations the BPS are supplemented by current psychological intelligence, which is provided by PSYOPS analysts working in a G2/J2 cell.

7. The resultant psychological assessments are different from intelligence assessments because they use information and intelligence to identify target audiences within the opposing force, and those factors that are most likely to influence their attitudes and behaviour in favour of the Commander's mission. The conditions and attitudes of target groups are likely to change as the situation develops. Current All Source Intelligence, in particular HUMINT and SIGINT, is therefore vital, both in the planning phase, and then throughout the execution of PSYOPS, to assess the effectiveness of current campaigns, to
reinforce success and to re-allocate limited resources, if the desired effect is not being achieved.

8. Key information/intelligence requirements - both for planning and executing PSYOPS and for ensuring that the insurgent's psychological operations are ineffective - are at Annex C.

INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT DECEPTION

9. Deception aims to present a deliberately false picture to those in an insurgency. Deception is highly complex, in particular those aspects which seek to exploit insurgent C2 assets, and it demands security at the highest level. OPSEC is essential to Deception in order to conceal those aspects and indicators that would allow the insurgent to determine the reality behind the Deception.

10. EW plays an important role in support of Deception both by targeting hostile communications and by identifying those Electronic Support Measures (ESM) elements - the ability to intercept and analyse our own communications - which it may be essential to leave intact as the conduit for electronic deception.

11. Intelligence supports deception planners by analysing an insurgent's reconnaissance capabilities and identifying his perception of the 'battlefield', including his own deception doctrine, tactics/procedures, capabilities and intentions. This requires an insight into an insurgent commander's way of thinking, including the estimate process.

12. During the execution of deception operations, All Source Intelligence, particularly on insurgent movement/deployments, is required to monitor the insurgent's response and to determine whether the deception operation is achieving its aim. In analysing this intelligence, attention must also be paid to possible insurgent deception plans to protect his own operations.

13. Key information/intelligence requirements to plan/execute deception operations and to reduce the effects of insurgent deception actions against friendly C2 assets are at Annex C.

INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT EW

14. EW has applications in providing early warning of insurgent action, in self-protection, in locating and identifying hostile emitters and in exploitation. It depends on timely, directed All Source Intelligence, but Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and IMINT are especially useful to C2W planners to locate an insurgent's C2 means, to identify any communications architecture, including offensive EW capability, and to highlight any critical/vulnerable C2 systems.

15. It is essential to establish target acquisition priorities, based on a commander's concept for future operations. The decision to target insurgent C2 assets must be based on an assessment of the balance between destruction/neutralisation and exploitation, and between hard-kill and soft-kill methods. It may, for example, be necessary to ensure that certain hostile ESM systems are protected from attack, in support of the electronic deception plan. Such key decisions must be made at the highest level and should be
included in any Commander's Directive. Decisions on targeting will also have to be coordinated with allies, where this is appropriate.

16. Key information/intelligence requirements to support EW - both to degrade an insurgent commander's C2 cycle and to nullify the effects of hostile EW actions against friendly C2 assets are at Annex C.

INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

17. The physical destruction, or at least neutralisation, of hostile C2 and counter C2 assets is a central objective in any C2W operations.

18. Intelligence for physical destruction is focused on supporting the targeting process. There is a requirement for close integration with national targeting priorities. An assessment must also be made, with G2/J2 advice, on the balance of advantage of destruction against exploitation, including the possible development of a No-Strike (both passive and active measures) targeting list.

19. As C2 systems can be reconstituted, it is essential that timely Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) - based primarily on IMINT and SIGINT - is available.
KEY INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR C2W

OPSEC

1. Capabilities of insurgents to collect/process/analyse intelligence.

2. Intelligence (in particular SIGINT, HUMINT) on insurgent intelligence objectives and achievements.

3. Factors, such as cultural bias, that could influence the insurgent's interpretation of intelligence gained.

4. Assessment of hostile counter C2 capabilities to allow C2W planners to make priorities for targeting/C2-protection measures.

5. Counter intelligence on the security threat posed by agents of foreign intelligence services.

6. HUMINT (from counter intelligence, the interrogation of prisoners or captured insurgents) and SIGINT on the effectiveness of OPSEC.

PSYOPS

7. Detailed information on cultural, religious, social, economic and political peculiarities of the country and region.

8. Insurgent C2 architecture. (possibly linked with hostile forces outside the country/theatre).

9. Background information on popular radio/TV programmes and personalities, periodicals and cartoons, and important holidays, historical dates and religious anniversaries.

10. Assessment of the systems, especially communications and broadcast systems, used by the insurgent to elicit support from the populace, and mechanisms for political control.

11. HUMINT is frequently the key to successful PSYOPS, focusing on the target group's attitudes, alliances, and behaviour to identify:

   a. Vulnerabilities and susceptibilities.

   b. The leadership structure, key communicators and their relationship with the target group.

   c. Psychological profiles of key political and military leaders. Much of this can be obtained in peacetime by FCO/Defence Attaches.
d. All agencies suitable for conveying messages to selected audiences and bringing maximum psychological pressure to bear.

e. Impact on unintended audiences.

f. Hostile propaganda, analysing it for counter propaganda and defensive PSYOPS.

g. Ascertain the reaction of the insurgent to friendly PSYOPS.


DECEPTION

13. Assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the insurgent intelligence collection/analysis system.

14. Profiles of key leaders/military commanders, including analysis of their decision-making processes and identification of biases/preconceived perceptions.

15. Assessment of the hostile deception doctrine, tactics/procedures and capability.

16. Current intelligence on the insurgent's ORBAT, force dispositions and any changes/redeployment as a result of deception operations (to gauge success of the deception).

EW

17. Identify critical communications and non-communications C2 nodes for exploitation (ESM) or electronic attack - jamming/Directed Energy Weapons (DEW).

18. Identify any hostile electronic air defence systems (that are crucial to the success of air/aviation operations) for electronic attack (jamming/DEW).

19. Identify hostile ESM systems that are exploitable in support of the deception plan.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

20. Identification of hostile C2 systems (in particular intelligence collection assets), the communications architecture of those systems and the facilities that house them. This should include an assessment of the degree of redundancy.

21. Assessment of the vulnerability of hostile C2 systems including the role they play in supporting the leadership and military capabilities, in order to identify critical/vulnerable systems as potential targets.

22. Identification and location of the defensive means used to protect hostile C2 systems
23. Intelligence (in particular IMINT or SIGINT) to assist in any battlefield damage assessment of insurgent C2 targets once they have been subjected to attack.

24. Intelligence on any insurgent offensive capability and targeting priorities.

**DEFENSIVE C2W**

25. Intelligence on any insurgent C2W organisation, doctrine/operating procedures, capabilities and potential vulnerabilities during different stages of military operations (both in peace and war).

26. Counter intelligence on foreign intelligence services.

27. Targeting intelligence on hostile offensive C2W assets.

28. HUMINT on insurgent C2W intentions.
CHAPTER 7
MILITARY OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - A CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

SCOPE

1. This Chapter starts with a consideration of the operational aspects of a government’s overall strategic concept. It goes on to discuss defensive and offensive tactical methods in outline in order to provide a link with and an introduction to AFM Vol 1 Pt 9 which deals with tactics, in more detail. The government’s strategic concept establishes the political aim and provides guidance to the military on its roles and tasks. It also gives broad direction for the intelligence effort and determines the thrust, themes and emphasis of the psychological and public information campaigns.

2. Essentially, the aim and concept of military operations is to help the authorities to re-establish control throughout the country so that the civil administration can exercise its proper function. The military commander’s task is unlikely to be as straightforward as conventional military operations. His estimate has to take account of a wide range of political, economic and local interests. These factors are reflected in the way in which operations are subject to the approval of the civil administration and other elements of the local security forces. A key factor in the appraisal of a commander’s mission analysis is his estimate of the purpose of the operations he is to carry out, whether they are designed primarily to provide physical support for an existing government structure in areas which are at least nominally under its control or to restore areas under hostile control to the local authorities. His conclusion will determine whether the nature of that particular phase of the campaign is to be mainly defensive or offensive. The former case will be more likely to apply at the outset of a campaign when the control of vital areas may be essential to the government’s survival. However, unless the government can go over to the offensive to recover insurgent held areas its authority may collapse to the extent that it is obliged to grant independence or autonomy to an insurgent dominated enclave or cede it to hostile forces.

PRINCIPLES

3. The six principles identified for the successful conduct of COIN operations have been detailed in Chapter 3. The physical implementation of the military aspects of any national plan will depend on many factors, but usually begin with the securing of a firm base from which to operate. Once this is established military forces should then seize the initiative in any campaign by separating the insurgent from his support and then neutralising him and his cause. All this has been described in previous Chapters. However it is necessary to detail in military terms the more precise methods by which this concept can be implemented.

CAMPAIGN ESTIMATES

4. Estimates are a prerequisite for success in COIN. At the highest level the focus will be far broader than in tactical, military Estimates, but all should be based upon a thorough understanding of the entirety of the problem, not merely its most obvious features.
5. As in combat operations, before producing a military campaign plan, the commander should use the full Estimate process to analyse his strategic guidance and interpret it into operational and ultimately tactical plans. The balance between military and other factors will be determined by the extent of the initial government concept for the campaign (though it may neither be termed as such nor in reality will it necessarily be extensive, and in a crisis may amount to a cry for help) and in particular the role defined for the Army. Subsequently, the same discipline is required at all subordinate headquarters throughout the theatre to ensure that detailed tactical plans are appropriate at local level and accord with the overall purpose. A comprehensive analysis can offer important clues in the absence of hard information, and should enable high level contingency planning to proceed on the basis of broad assumptions. Essentially this study reduces the chance of undertaking ‘unwinnable’ COIN campaigns, and increases the chances of developing an appropriate operational role once involved.

MISSION ANALYSIS

6. If it has not been made clear to him, in his initial briefings the commander will need to establish the precise nature of the military contribution to the overall campaign in the light of political direction, for example, which agency has primacy. He will then need to determine the extent of his freedom of action, and more pressingly, the restrictions and constraints that apply. Matters such as states of command (especially if working in support of another government); legal powers (status of forces, authority to impose curfews, restrict movement, arrest and search for example); the use of force; and access to and control of the media will require clarification. There may be restrictions on the use of certain equipment such as AFVs, and in the case of a coalition operation, the lack of a common doctrine will need immediate attention (as has recently been highlighted in Iraq). Not all of the answers will be forthcoming - this is a facet of the operational environment that commanders at all levels have to learn to live with - but COIN demands a delicate touch and sound political judgement. For instance, the line between legality and guile will need careful consideration, and options such as booby trapping arms caches, entrapping intelligence sources and the like will require a commander to weigh the potential risks and gains.

7. This analysis will provide the commander and his staff with sufficient planning guidance to launch a campaign. The operational commander may well seek novel ways to apply and maximise the resources he has available. For instance, raising local militias and recruiting civilian guards to release regular troops for more offensive action. Staff branches and other staff functions will need to be reorganised. G2, C2W, PSYOPS, P Info and G5 staff branches (which should be regarded as the military overt contribution to the Hearts and Minds campaign) will assume far greater importance, whilst some units whose function in operations is mainly concerned with the application of firepower may be retasked.

8. Having established the role which the military forces are to conduct and having analysed his mission, the commander would issue a Statement of Intent that starts the process of operations. Before doing so he would be wise to discuss his thoughts with whoever has been appointed as the overall Director of Operations ensure that the broad thrust of his approach is developing in harmony with those of other agencies. Bearing in mind that in an emergency, troops could be deployed to the theatre before a full Estimate and plan have been made, the early issue of an Initiating Directive will be important. It
should further focus staff effort and if possible give clear, albeit limited, tasks such as securing key points, VIP protection and reassurance patrolling.

IMPLEMENTING THE CAMPAIGN ESTIMATE

9. Phases. Implementing the Campaign Estimate may conveniently be divided into a number of phases. As explained earlier, an insurgency will generally develop unevenly across an afflicted country. The national strategic plan will lay down priorities for the prosecution of the campaign, probably concentrating on just one or a selected few areas in turn. At the operational level the phases in any one area are not mutually exclusive and will tend to progress from one phase to the other. The police are normally organised on a regional basis corresponding to the boundaries of the civil administration, which implies that, unless there are other compelling reasons, the incoming military formations and units should be deployed on the same geographical basis.

10. Securing a Base Area. Hopefully, the host government will have firm control over sufficient of its territory to provide a secure base where reinforcing allied contingents can build up, acclimatise and establish their essential logistic units and installations. However, it is possible that the host government may have allowed the situation to deteriorate to the extent that no area is safe from terrorist activity before calling for assistance. In this instance it may be necessary to hold some logistic stocks and assets in reserve at a safe area while the first reinforcing troops to be committed secure the base area. In the worst case it may be necessary to ask a friendly nearby nation for facilities.

11. Establishment of a Firm Forward Operational Base (FOB). It may be feasible to establish a forward operational base at a suitable provincial capital which has become isolated from the area still loyal to the government. Preferably the area selected should be one with traditional loyalties to the government where the population will readily rally back to its old allegiance once it feels secure from an insurgent offensive and serious terrorist attack. An airhead may be seized by an airborne operation initially and then reinforced so that it can be expanded to secure the airfield from indirect fire weapons. The risk of this type of operation is that if it is undertaken in an area where insurgency is well developed the cost of maintaining it against an overwhelming insurgent concentration may be too great. The French disaster at Dien Bien Phu in 1953 and 1954, when an airhead was established in hostile territory too far from the base area for proper support provides an unfortunate example. The area selected has to be one that can be consolidated quickly and used as a base for further operations designed to link up with the main base and extend government control to other areas. Only allied troops invited by the host government may possess the resources to launch an operation to secure a forward operational base. Later, political factors may call for a higher profile host government effort in the recovery of its own territory and a correspondingly lower profile role for the allied forces. When it is considered safe to do so the allied troops may concentrate on securing the forward operating base and other base areas in order to release the Host Nation security forces for a more active role. The occupation and security of a forward operational base are considered in detail in Annex A to this Chapter.

12. Securing a Controlled Area. Framework operations, carefully planned and designed to clear, secure and pacify the next area to be bought under government control, are launched from a forward operational base or from the base area itself. The immediate aim of a framework, or ‘ink spot’ operation as it is sometimes called, is designed to separate
the insurgents from their supporters, food suppliers and sources of information in the designated area. These operations are essentially offensive in nature as they aim to wrest territory, and more importantly the people who live in it, from insurgent control. The offensive element is provided by cordon and search, and search and destroy operations against known fixed bases, which force the insurgents to react or surrender the initiative. Well planned and organised ambushes destroy the insurgent as he reacts. When the opportunity offers, fix and destroy operations may be used to attack known and vulnerable insurgent locations and base positions but, to succeed, the intelligence has to be very good. Special force operations may concentrate on more distant areas and valuable targets, again on good intelligence. It cannot be over-emphasised that success in offensive operations is not won by launching masses of troops into an area on the off-chance of finding and destroying insurgents. Only operations based on good information and sound planning produce results. Until the insurgents start operating in large groupings in a more conventional manner, when they provide larger targets will better results be obtained than from smaller scale operations which are well set up and based on reliable intelligence? The less spectacular framework operations aimed at separating the insurgent from his support and providing security for the population of a newly won controlled area are the ones which achieve lasting results.

13. **Consolidation of the Controlled Areas.** As areas of the hostile territory are cleared of insurgents a civil administration can be re-established. It is possible that many of the area’s former civil servants, magistrates and police may have escaped the initial insurgent take over and would be able to put their local knowledge to good use on their return. However, they and the civil police will undoubtedly need the backing of suitable military forces for some time and certainly until the neighbouring regions have been brought back under government control. The Armed Forces may be asked to help to train local auxiliary forces which will support the police on their own when eventually the military withdraw.

14. **Continued Extension of Controlled Areas.** The freshly consolidated controlled areas provide the firm bases for the extension of framework operations until gradually the entire country is restored to government control. The same steady methods described earlier in this Chapter continue to be applied. The process is slow but sure.

15. **Surveillance.** Surveillance provides accurate information regarding insurgent related activity, which contributes directly to the effectiveness of operations (overt and covert). Within the overall campaign plan a correctly focused, coherent surveillance plan, which uses limited manpower and equipment resources to maximum effect is essential. The plan should be both flexible and dynamic to take account of changing operational circumstances. Commanders should take adequate steps to integrate surveillance plans into existing and future operations. This will require a systematic approach to the task which should seek to improve the quality and scope of the surveillance results. Information gathered by surveillance is only of value when it is passed rapidly to a location where it can be analysed properly and where subsequent action can be taken if this is appropriate.

16. **Operations in Depth.** Long-range raids and penetrations designed to destroy specific targets, such as insurgent concentrations, leaders, key individuals and dumps, or to interfere with communications and depress insurgent morale are essentially precise surgical operations only launched when there is sufficiently reliable and detailed intelligence to make success certain. It may be necessary to use an existing forward operational base
or to establish one temporarily, if the latter can be achieved without arousing the enemy’s suspicions. Such operations are usually conducted by special forces.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

17. Counter insurgency operations may be grouped into two categories, defensive and offensive. General Kitson describes these categories and the relationship between them as follows:

‘Firstly there are defensive operations, which are those designed to prevent insurgents from disrupting the government’s programme. Secondly there are offensive operations, which are those designed to root out the insurgents themselves. Before discussing each in turn it is worth noticing how important it is to strike a balance between them. If too little emphasis is placed on defensive measures in order to concentrate resources on the offensive, the insurgents are offered an opportunity to achieve easy successes, which they can use to embarrass the government and thereby undermine its support. If, on the other hand, too little emphasis is placed on offensive operations, the insurgent organisation gets bigger and bigger and an ever-increasing proportion of the country’s resources has to be devoted to the Security Forces for defensive counter measures, so that eventually the insurgents achieve their aim by making it appear that the price of further resistance is too high.’

‘It is perhaps worth highlighting the ways in which political considerations affect the achievement of a good balance between defensive and offensive operations. There is almost always political pressure on Security Force commanders to devote more resources towards defensive operations because of the short-term difficulties which the government faces after every spectacular insurgent success. Furthermore, if the operational commander is insensitive to this political pressure, he stands to find himself suddenly confronted by an unnecessarily large number of specific political demands for defensive measures designed to restore confidence among the population. Those demands might easily be big enough to disrupt the offensive plan altogether and thereby upset the balance in the opposite direction. Undoubtedly the insurgent leadership will do all in its power to ensure that the balance of the Security Force’s plan is upset, both by planning their own operations with this in mind, and by the use of propaganda designed to inhibit offensive action on the part of the government’s forces.’

‘It is particularly important to understand the extent to which insurgents use propaganda when defending themselves against government offensive action. Anyone at home or abroad who can be persuaded to write, or broadcast or otherwise influence public opinion will be pressed into service. The aim is usually to try and get debilitating restraints imposed on the Security Forces, and a particularly effective line is to say that offensive Security Force action is driving uncommitted people into supporting the insurgents. Like all good propaganda this line is likely to contain at least an element of truth. What the insurgent propagandist naturally fails to point out, and what the writer or broadcaster often does not understand, is that the offensive action may be the lesser of two evils, in that failure to take it will result in a far greater increase of support for the insurgents as their organisation grows unchecked and their power to coerce and persuade correspondingly increases. Of
course the right level of offensive action depends on prevailing circumstances. The point which has to be understood is that a good balance between offensive and defensive action is difficult to achieve because of all the pressures which operate against it.\(^1\)

18. **Operational and Tactical Levels of Control.** The relationship between the operational and tactical level of control during COIN operations will differ for each situation, and is not as clear cut as is the case in conventional operations. A tactless move or over reaction at section or platoon level can easily have enormous operational and possibly political significance. In the following sections defensive and offensive tactics are covered in general terms only to give the flavour of COIN operations most of which are conducted at a tactical level.

**THE USE OF NON LETHAL WEAPONS (NLW)**

19. There is an intellectual argument that force can and should be used with few casualties and little collateral damage; this argument is enhanced by the increasing capability of modern high-technology weapon systems. Not only can these systems deliver a high destructive capability at long range and with great precision, but there is now also the ability to deny a potential enemy his goals without the use of such destructive force. These latter systems, known generically as non-lethal weapons (NLW), are designed to temporarily immobilise an enemy or render his equipment useless for the task it was designed to do.

20. The use of NLW is not new. Weapons such as batons, water canon, rubber bullets, stun grenades and electronic warfare (EW) have been used by police and armed forces throughout the world for a number of years in situations where the use of more lethal weapons would be inappropriate. What is new and has enhanced the importance of NLW is the prevailing security climate in which the use of force, especially for UN operations, has become almost common place. Until now troops on peacekeeping operations have been authorised to use lethal weapons only in self-defence. If forced to open fire, they shoot to kill. Public concern for losses among the belligerents and civilian population and the associated requirement for the minimal use of force have increased interest in the potential for NLW, especially in peacekeeping and counter insurgency operations.

21. NLW should not be thought of as a separate unique capability, nor do these weapons invite a different form of warfare. NLW represent additional capabilities for use in a military commanders’ graduated use of force to deter, defend or attack an opponent. Research and development of a whole range of techniques in the use of NLW indicates that this will become a major factor in future counter insurgency campaigns. Further details of the issues surrounding the use of such weapons are given at Annex B to this Chapter.

\(^1\) *Bunch of Five.* F Kitson 1977.
SECTION 2 - DEFENSIVE TACTICS

CATEGORIES

22. The main defensive operations are:
   a. Protective measures.
   b. Defensive C2W.
   c. Control of movement.
   d. Crowd dispersal.

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

23. The Threat. Until an insurgency reaches its final stages there is normally no front line. No area can be assumed to be safe. Even in a cleared and consolidated area the insurgents may still have a few operational cells which can launch bomb attacks or carry out assassinations. They may, as a matter of policy, attempt to reintroduce insurgent cells to launch terrorist attacks both for their propaganda value and in an attempt to force a redeployment of police and troops to take the pressure off their forces elsewhere. Protective measures will still be required in the most secure base areas, although the tasks may have been handed back to the civil police or auxiliaries.

24. Balance. Protective measures in high risk areas are manpower intensive. Many of the tasks are routine and boring, and soldiers tend to lose their vigilance after long periods without an incident. If possible, troops on such duties should be rotated with those on more active operations and every effort must be made to keep a training programme going.

25. Tasks. Protective measures include:
   a. Personal protection for VIPs and troops, both on and off duty.
   b. Small convoys.
   c. Large road movements.
   d. Picketing routes.
   e. Guarding installations.
   f. Rail movement.

DEFENSIVE C2W

26. Defensive C2W is used to deny, negate, diminish or turn to friendly advantage, enemy efforts to destroy, disrupt, exploit, deceive and/or deny information to friendly command systems, including its supporting communications, information and intelligence activities. Safeguarding friendly command systems is a fundamental consideration as
failure to do so is likely to result in loss of freedom of action and initiative, mis-direction of effort, or failure of the operation. The primary objectives of Defensive C2W are, therefore, to:

- Reduce the vulnerability of command support assets, procedures and installations to attack.
- Reduce the effects of insurgent deception actions against friendly command systems.
- Nullify the effects of insurgent EW actions against friendly command systems.
- Deny the insurgent the ability to exploit allied command systems.
- Ensure that the insurgent’s PSYOPS are ineffective.
- Briefing troops on PSYOPS topics, both to inoculate them from the effects of hostile propaganda, and to ensure that they are fully informed about the facts and developments within a counter insurgency campaign.

**CONTROL OF MOVEMENT**

27. **Explaining the Necessity for Movement Restrictions.** Prohibitions and restrictions are always annoying and distasteful to the public. There has to be a clear need for them, they should be fairly applied within the law and the necessity for them explained to the public. The civil authorities are responsible for imposing collective measures and the security forces for enforcing them. Before they are imposed the measures may be discussed between the civil authorities, the police and the military authorities to make sure that enforcement is a practical proposition and that the necessary police and soldiers are available to put them into effect. The principal methods are:

- Road blocks and check points.
- Control points.
- Curfews.

28. **Aims.** Controlling movement may have any of the following aims:

- To make it easier for the security forces to enforce the law, thus increasing public confidence in the government’s ability to protect them. With the fear of retribution removed, individuals who have information are more likely to divulge it.

- To disrupt insurgent groups and plans by making movement difficult. Unable to contact their subordinates quickly and easily, the insurgent district leaders are obliged to exercise command by directive, instructing their sub-units and cells to carry out a quota of ambushes, assassinations and sabotage over a specific period. Consequently, the latter’ attacks, while annoying, are insufficiently well coordinated to produce effective results.
c. To dominate an area to prevent crowds from gathering and to deter hostile action.

d. To control the movement of crowds which do form and prevent their reinforcement.

e. To discourage the illegal movement of arms, explosives, medical supplies and food. Sometimes, the setting up of road blocks in a random pattern may surprise a courier or net a vehicle carrying explosives or supplies. This will add to a feeling of insecurity amongst the insurgent's communications and logistic organisations.

f. To seal off an area to prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives and subversive propaganda material.

g. To arrest wanted persons.

h. To record movement to detect patterns and obtain information.

i. To facilitate the movement and operations of the security forces.

29. **Control of Movement.** Control measures have to be applied firmly. They need to be continued no longer than is strictly necessary. The lifting of controls in one area may act as an incentive to the population of another to expose or help to drive out insurgents.

30. **Planning the Control of Movement.** Likely public reaction has to be taken into account during the planning stage. Agitators will be quick to exploit any adverse reaction and the need for any unavoidable irksome restrictions should be anticipated and explained to weaken hostile propaganda. Ill conceived measures which lead to the collapse of public services causing unnecessary public discontent should be avoided. The committee system exists to discuss plans and their likely consequences and a sound plan needs to be based on good intelligence, which involves close liaison with the police special branch. The plan should cover:

a. Allocation of forces, including those for joint army/police patrolling.

b. Allocation of central and localised reserves.

c. Establishing channels for requesting military assistance.

d. The siting and control of surveillance devices.

e. The reception, accommodation and feeding of troops.

f. The preparation of any special stores and equipment, eg, movable barriers for crowd control, knife rest barricades, oil drums and sand to fill them.

g. The distribution of photographs and descriptions of wanted people.
h. Rehearsing control measures and testing communications. If a sudden movement restriction is to be imposed on a particular area to effect surprise the security aspects of a rehearsal have to be taken into account.

i. Measures for keeping the public informed.

CROWD DISPERsal

31. In spite of measures to prevent it, unlawful crowds may assemble. The civil police (if they are present) may be unable to cope with the situation and military assistance may be required. The size of a crowd is no indication of its attitude. A large one containing many curious onlookers may be docile, until agitators get to work on it. A small crowd may be peaceful or it may be a concentration of those with extreme views. The military commander on the spot has to use his own judgment as to how to deal with any particular situation.

32. The role of the police varies in accordance with its strength, organisation and employment policy with regard to the use of force. An armed police force with a strong paramilitary capability is likely to be well trained and prepared to deal with a riot, and the threshold of violence to warrant calling in the military will be correspondingly high. If military forces are called in the situation is likely to be very serious. Other more conventionally equipped police forces may be forced to seek military assistance at a comparatively early stage.

33. Riot and crowd control are essentially urban operations, although they may also occur in large villages. A military commander should appreciate the situation carefully to see if a crowd can be contained and allowed to disperse of its own accord through boredom. The unnecessary use of force to disperse a crowd often leads to increased antagonism and resentment, a heightened degree of violence and a more intractable and serious situation. As with counter insurgency situations, the long term effects are the important ones.

34. In an urban setting, particularly at the beginning of an emergency, it may pay to deploy a screen of joint civil and military police patrols, perhaps backed by helicopters, as soon as serious trouble is anticipated. Their sighting reports will provide the joint operations room with early warning of the assembly points, size, demeanour and movement of crowds and perhaps the identity of any agitators who are inciting violence. If the demonstrators do not prove amenable to the normal police methods of crowd control the civil police riot squads will be committed first. They will probably use CS smoke or baton charges, or both, to break up the mobs into smaller and more manageable groups, which are easier to disperse, while snatch squads arrest the ring leaders. Initially, the Army will be kept in the background, partly as a reserve of final resort and partly, perhaps, to help the police form an outer cordon to prevent unruly mobs from one area reinforcing crowds in another. Should the situation deteriorate to the stage when the police are no longer able to cope, military forces will be called upon to intervene, either with riot squads or firearms. Wherever troops or police are committed it may be necessary to picket the roofs of buildings, block side streets and watch subway exits to secure their flanks and rear. It may well occur that no civil police are present at the scene of the disturbance and thus military action of some sort may be accelerated in any sequence of dealing with the mob.
SECTION 3 - GAINING THE TACTICAL INITIATIVE

CATEGORIES

35. Tactics which can gain the initiative include the following:

   b. Patrolling.
   c. Rapid Reaction Forces.
   d. Ambushes.
   e. Search Operations.
   f. Larger Scale Operations. To destroy, or at least dislocate and disrupt, insurgent units and formations.

C2W OPERATIONS

36. C2W is used to deny insurgent commanders effective command of their forces through destruction, disruption, exploitation, deception, influence or denial of all or part of their command system, including its supporting communications, information and intelligence activities. C2W is a particularly effective, and often the most economical, way of reducing an insurgent's combat effectiveness. It is applicable at all levels of command. The primary objectives of C2W directed against insurgent combat potential are to:

   a. Slow down his tempo in relation to that of the Security Forces.
   b. Disrupt his activities.
   c. Degrade the insurgent commander's ability to command.
   d. Disrupt his ability to generate and sustain offensive action.

PATROLLING

37. General. The types of patrol and their purpose are the same for counter insurgency operations as for conventional warfare with suitable modifications. While both reconnaissance and standing patrols have an important part to play offensive patrolling has to be executed with discretion. Like their counterparts in conventional operations patrols rely on good information and they are even more vulnerable to ambush. A type of patrol peculiar to counter insurgency operations is the framework patrol system, a method of patrolling specifically designed for this kind of warfare. The system is described in paragraph 40.

38. Reconnaissance Patrols. The presence of patrols generally has a steadying effect on the population of those neighbourhoods which are loyal to the government. Sending weak patrols into areas hostile to the government is an act of folly. The patrol may be
forced into a hasty and undignified retreat to avoid injury or death from ill-disposed crowds pelting them with stones. The loss of face, and possibly weapons, merely encourages the insurgents and depresses the morale of the loyal population as well as the security forces. However, well planned patrolling taking into account the nature of the threat can achieve useful results in an urban or rural setting. Tasks may include:

a. Gathering information by observation and contact with the civilian population.

b. Harassing insurgent movements by carrying out snap checks and searches.

c. Dealing with such minor incidents as are within the capabilities of the patrol.

39. **Standing Patrols.** After the initial deployment of the military forces the establishment of a network of overt and covert standing patrols occupying key positions provides an important means of acquiring information and furnishing a security force presence which can help in dominating an area. Their tasks might include:

a. Obtaining general information on activity and noting any significant patterns.

b. Observing the movement and activity of terrorists, curfew breakers and crowds.

c. Identifying ring-leaders and law-breakers.

d. Directing patrols, police, reserve units to incidents and calling for the appropriate air support.

e. Giving covering fire to vehicle and foot patrols should they come under a level of attack which necessitates the use of firearms.

f. Assisting in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies and riots by passing information to elements of the security forces involved in crowd dispersal.

g. Engaging snipers who open fire in their vicinity and dominating areas to prevent snipers from taking up fire positions.

40. **Framework Patrols.** Framework patrols provide a mixture of information, protection and a security force presence. They operate on a team multiple system which varies in accordance with the environment, urban or rural, the threat, their task and the involvement of other security force elements. The patrols work from firm bases and, where possible, within the ambit of standing patrols. They may be mounted or move on foot. Their aim is to deter an insurgent attack or sniping operation by saturating an area and threatening the escape route of a bomber or sniper. In broad terms their tasks are to:

a. Provide local protection for security force bases.

b. Inhibit insurgents’ freedom of movement by random deployment at different times in different areas. Framework patrolling should avoid creating a pattern of predictable habits.
c. Increase the chance of intercepting an insurgent sniper.

d. Provide an instantly available detection and reaction force on the ground.

e. Provide a regular update of local information.

41. **Disruptive Patrolling.** As in other forms of warfare success cannot be obtained by defensive measures alone. The aim is to bring troops into contact with the insurgents on favourable terms. The essential prerequisite is good information, which may be obtained from a variety of sources; the coordinated efforts of special branch and military intelligence building up a painstaking picture, the cultivation of local inhabitants, reconnaissance, standing and framework patrols, tracking and, sometimes, a lucky contact. Small patrols operating discreetly may overhear voices or the clatter of cooking pots in camps where the enemy believes himself to be secure. Even the smell of bad sanitation may betray a position. In jungle country, where it is seldom possible to deploy and close a cordon successfully, an offensive patrol has a better chance of scoring a success. Because only a few weapons can be brought to bear effectively the patrol does not have to be strong in numbers. Taken unawares, the shock of surprise on insurgents is normally so great that they turn and run. As mentioned above, disruptive patrolling must be used with judgment to avoid falling into ambushes. Used judiciously it is an excellent way of keeping small groups of insurgents on the move, inducing a sense of insecurity and dislocating insurgent plans.

**RAPID REACTION FORCES**

42. Isolated police and home guard forces have to be confident that they will be supported quickly and effectively if they come under attack. Should a number of posts be overrun, many others will be intimidated into either deserting their posts, entering into a cooperative arrangement with the insurgents while outwardly remaining loyal to the government or even going over to what they regard as the winning side.

43. Part of the plan to support such isolated posts is the defensive framework of military garrisons. However, the maintenance of a successful defence and control over an area depends on the ability to take quick offensive counter action. Reserves have to be held in readiness to go to the aid of threatened detachments. Routes, and where they exist, alternative routes need to be reconnoitred to avoid the risk of ambush because an insurgent attack on an isolated post may have the additional aim of destroying the relieving force. APCs provide protection against small arms fire but are vulnerable to handheld anti-armour weapons and should not be used blindly in a relief operation. Air support provide a rapid means of transporting a mobile reserve, or part of it, but again their vulnerability, especially on landing, has to be considered.

44. Reserves kept at short notice provide a useful rapid reaction force to take advantage of a situation provided by an unexpected contact or an intelligence windfall. When appropriate, such reserves should have tracker dogs, and heavy weapons, including armed helicopters, should be on call.

**AMBUSHES**

45. An ambush is a surprise attack made by a force lying in wait, relying on shock action. Ambushes are usually deliberate but drills need to be developed to enable a section or
patrol to move rapidly and quietly into an ambush position. The latter type, designed to take advantage of an unexpected opportunity to exploit surprise and gain the initiative, is called an immediate ambush. Encounters are usually brief and at close range, the quarry either being destroyed by a combination of killing zone and cut-off tactics, or escaping from a badly sprung ambush, perhaps to turn the tables on the ambushers. A perfect ambush in the most favourable circumstances, where the entire insurgent force is caught exposed in the open could allow the commander to call on them to surrender, in which case some valuable prisoners could be gained for interrogation. Ambushes may be laid with any combination of the following aims:

- The destruction of an insurgent force.
- The capture or killing of a wanted insurgent.
- The capture or destruction of weapons and equipment.
- The gaining of intelligence.
- Deterring the insurgent from using an area.
- Preventing the insurgents from approaching friendly positions.
- Acting as a diversion to draw attention away from another area or operations.

46. Like framework patrols, ambushes are sometimes deployed on an area basis with the object of increasing the chances of trapping an entire insurgent force.

**SEARCH OPERATIONS**

47. The aim of this type of operation is to isolate a selected area by deploying a cordon, either by stealth or at such speed that the intended quarry has no chance to escape, and then searching it thoroughly. Such operations are usually carried out jointly by the police and the military with the purpose of:

- Capturing wanted persons, arms, radio transmitters, supplies, explosives or documents.
- Disrupting insurgent activities.
- Eliminating insurgent activity in a specific locality, particularly with a view to expanding a controlled area.
- Gaining evidence to support prosecutions, where this is appropriate.
- Information to support future operations.

48. The establishment of the cordon and the search are two separate activities but are mounted as one operation. Because the search part of the operation is usually a lengthy affair which disrupts the life of a locality while the people are confined to their homes, cordons and searches should only be mounted on reliable information. A series of fruitless
operations merely alienates the population from the government and provides the insurgent with unnecessary propaganda.

49. However, cordon and search operations are not easy to execute, because of the difficulty of closing the cordon so quickly that the insurgents have no chance to escape. It is easier to position a cordon in open country with a good road network and with the help of air support when the security forces have the advantages of mobility and observation is good. In close jungle country it is virtually impossible to position and link up a cordon because movement will be slow and noisy, and observation restricted to a few metres. In such an environment the kind of raids by fighting patrols stand a far better chance of success.

LARGER SCALE OPERATIONS

50. In cases where an insurgency controls large areas of the countryside the insurgents may raise and deploy a sizeable force consisting of several large groupings. Such a situation is most likely to occur where they have access to a friendly neighbouring country which they use as a haven to assemble, train and equip a field army undisturbed.

51. Ideally, such forces should be engaged and destroyed in battle while they are relatively small and before they pose a major threat. This may not be feasible for a number of reasons. The threat is likely to develop in a remote area while the host government has its hands full securing vital areas close to the capital, the main towns and their surrounding well-populated and economically important rural areas. If the government is to survive it has to consolidate its control over the vital areas initially and then extend its authority to neighbouring inhabited regions because a counter insurgency is essentially a battle for the loyalty and control of its subjects. The Host Nation may have neither the troops available nor the means of projecting force over a considerable distance into a remote and possibly mountainous, jungle region. A premature effort resulting in defeat may demoralise waverers in some of the vital secure or marginally controlled areas sufficiently to tip the balance against the government. There may also be a risk that operations on the border of a stronger, hostile neighbour may provoke an unwanted intervention on the pretext that the neighbouring country’s borders have been violated or its security threatened.

52. Before the authorities coalition forces can go over to the offensive they may have to await the build-up of their own forces and the arrival of allied forces in sufficient strength. Some of the additional troops may help to form a central mobile reserve, while others release experienced troops from framework operations to go into reserve. Whether a newly arrived British contingent is allotted straight to the mobile reserve or whether it spends a preliminary period on framework operations to acclimatise, familiarise its troops with the physical and human environment and acquire some experience in local minor tactics will be a matter of judgment in the light of circumstances.

53. If the British contingent is to form part of the central mobile reserve it will be a matter for inter-governmental agreement, based on Service advice, as to the composition of the force. The kind of support the host government may need cannot be predicted in advance. It will depend on the size and nature of the threat, the adequacy of the Host Nation’s resources and the terrain. The requirement may vary from infantry with an air support capability at the lower end of the scale to a balanced force of all arms backed by offensive air and transport support at the other. If the Host Nation has a long coastline vulnerable to
the infiltration of insurgent supplies, maritime air reconnaissance forces, naval forces, with perhaps, some amphibious capability, may be needed. Special forces will almost certainly be useful. If the British contribution is to be part of a major allied effort the governments concerned, in conjunction with the host authorities, will agree on an apportionment of types of forces and tasks in accordance with the long term plans of campaign.

54. When the moment is right for an offensive against the insurgent’s groupings and formations, usually once the host government has established control over its vital cities, towns and populated rural areas, it will be necessary to decide on the aim and purpose of large scale operations. The goal of the annihilation of the insurgents forces represents the perfect solution. In practice it may be difficult to achieve because once the insurgents realise that they face an overwhelming threat their tactic is to leave small parties to delay the government forces while the main bodies split up into small parties to exfiltrate the encircling troops. An insurgent leadership is normally quite prepared to leave their delaying elements to their fate.

55. While destruction of the insurgent main forces may legitimately be the security forces aim, a lesser result may lack perfection but be nearly as useful. If their main forces can be compelled to abandon a hitherto secure area, broken up with the loss of heavy casualties, useful prisoners seized, logistic stockpiles destroyed, communications disrupted and the links with their supporting political and supply organisation severed, the insurgent will need time to recover, even across a friendly border. The time bought may be used by the government and its security forces to deny the former enemy base to insurgent reinfiltiration, to consolidate the administration’s control over formerly marginal areas and extend the ‘ink spot’ process to new areas. A significant insurgent defeat will have a heartening effect on the population and will encourage waverers to support the government.

56. There are a number of pre-requisites for the success of a large scale operation:

a. **Good Intelligence.** A blind blow in the dark seldom achieves anything. The locations of insurgent, headquarters and leaders is as important as knowledge of the insurgent’s positions and security screen. Equally important is good intelligence on the insurgent’s supporting political and logistic organisation. Special forces may be given the task of seizing or killing those key leaders whose whereabouts are accurately known. Their demise will also help to disrupt the insurgent command organisation at the moment when the rebel forces and their supporting organisation need quick decisions and orders.

b. **Isolation.** The area chosen for the operation should be isolated as far as possible to prevent insurgent reinforcement or exfiltration. If the escape of small parties cannot be stopped, the insurgents should not be able to evacuate formed bodies of men. Enemy escape routes should, as far as possible, be blocked.

c. **Surprise and Deception.** Obtaining surprise presents the greatest difficulty. Preparations and preliminary moves which cannot be hidden have to be disguised. Patrolling to obtain information should be carried out in as many areas as possible, with no obvious emphasis on the selected area. Rumours of possible operations planned to take place elsewhere may be fed into the insurgent intelligence organisation through channels which the insurgents are known to trust. Feints may
be launched in such a manner as not to arouse suspicions as to the location of the real operation, its aims and its objectives.

57. The execution of such an operation requires rapid deployment to encircle the main enemy forces, including the delivery of troops to isolated locations by helicopter. Insurgent forces should not just be surrounded by a cordon, which is likely to prove porous in the best circumstances, but located and pinned down. The latter requirement may best be achieved by special forces. Once surrounded, disorganised and broken up, the insurgents need to be pursued relentlessly. Against large insurgent formations, conventional, limited war, or medium intensity conflict operations will be needed, but care has to be taken to choose the scene, to fight the battle on terms favourable to the Allies and to keep the initiative. Reserves should be held ready for committal to reinforce hard pressed units, to exploit success or to block enemy escape routes.

58. Finally, success has to be followed up by rooting out the insurgent political and logistic support organisation and replacing it with the host government’s administration. The people in the area need to be protected from future covert rebel infiltration by its political cells and a new terrorist network as well as another occupation by insurgent main forces. Consolidation of the government’s authority will depend as much on a constructive and imaginative rehabilitation campaign as on protection backed by the establishment of a good intelligence service. Mass regroupment of the population should be avoided although it may be necessary to resettle exposed isolated communities, which are vulnerable to a resumption of insurgent initiatives, in securely guarded villages, preferably as close to their fields as possible.

SECTION 4 - OPSEC IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

GENERAL

59. OPSEC gives an operation the desired overall degree of security. It is defined as the process which gives a military operation appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the adversary knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces.

THE AIM AND SCOPE OF OPSEC

60. The aim of OPSEC is to deny to the adversary the information he needs to be able to identify dispositions and capabilities, and the intelligence to assess friendly intentions. OPSEC is a force-wide process which addresses the overall security of the whole operation or exercise, in the light of the adversary’s known or suspected Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities. It is not intended to provide blanket security: the insurgent may know that friendly forces are in the area of operations; or that further operations are planned. The intention is to conceal from an insurgent those indicators from which he could deduce vital elements of our plans, to:

a. Increase the element of surprise and reduce the insurgent’s capability to interfere with friendly operations.

b. To increase security and thus prevent the insurgent obtaining information that would assist in his offensive planning process.
c. To analyse continuously the intelligence likely to be available to an insurgent, thus allowing friendly force plans to be reviewed in the light of probable adversary knowledge.

THE USE OF OPSEC IN COUNTER INSURGENCY

61. Surprise is one of the most important factors in counter insurgency operations. The insurgents are frequently dispersed over a wide area, using the local population as both cover and to provide themselves with information and supplies. Insurgents will often have an excellent intelligence "net" which will keep them informed on all activities in the area and, where appropriate, allow them to disperse or hide whenever they are threatened.

62. While it will not be possible to conceal all activities involved in a major security force operation, OPSEC has to be applied to conceal such details as: the scale of the operation, timings, target areas for searches, routes in/out of the area of operations, drop-off points, specialised equipment and other details from which an insurgent could deduce the operation's objectives, specific targets and timescale.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPSEC

63. OPSEC is a commander's responsibility. It is a G3 function. A staff element within G3 Operations should be responsible for the specific coordination, implementation and monitoring of any OPSEC plan.

MEDIA SECURITY POLICY

64. A media security policy should be formulated at an early stage, certainly prior to deployment, after consultation between Intelligence, Operations, Military Public Information/Relations and Legal staffs. This policy should be coordinated at the highest appropriate level to prevent inadvertent disclosures outside the operational area. A media security policy in the area of operations should be directed by the commander, in consultation with the MOD, and in accordance with his overall OPSEC policy.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPSEC AND DECEPTION

65. The aim of OPSEC is to deny an insurgent knowledge of friendly forces, whereas deception aims to present a deliberately false picture. Deception is thus not necessarily a part of OPSEC, but OPSEC is essential to deception - in presenting a false picture; it is vital to this conceal those indicators that would reveal the true nature of events. At the operational/strategic level, however, major movements or preparations may be necessary which cannot easily be concealed. At this level, the OPSEC plan may therefore need to incorporate elements of any deception plan.

SECTION 5 - EW IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

66. General. EW is one of the five primary functions of C2W together with OPSEC, PSYOPS, Deception and Destruction.

67. The Electromagnetic Environment. Due to the wide variety of potential counter insurgency campaigns and contrasting Electromagnetic (EM) environments, operations
conducted in the EM environment will be different for each deployment. During any COIN campaign the EM environment will also be influenced by both military and civilian systems. The priority at the start of operations, will be the production of a detailed plan of the operational EM environment. It will be important to identify and note the electromagnetic signatures of each active element of the EM spectrum, in order to produce the EW ORBAT.

68. **EM Spectrum Threat.** When considering the threat posed by the EM spectrum, the following factors should be addressed:

   a. The protection of friendly communications, and target acquisition systems against exploitation and attack.
   
   b. The most appropriate way of defending against EM guided and homing weapons.
   
   c. The gaining of information about a potentially complex EM target array.
   
   d. The most appropriate method to attack such a complex EM target array.

69. **Current Trends for the EM Spectrum.** There is widespread and growing use of the EM spectrum by military and civilian organisations. Combat Net Radio and trunk communications are essential to the effective command and control of armies. Paramilitary organisations also have easy access to EM systems that are mobile and operate throughout the EM spectrum. Modern communication and radar equipments are characterised by an increasing use of digital signal processing, providing a low probability of intercept and anti-jam techniques (such as frequency hopping, direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) and burst transmissions). The use of digital encryption devices are also becoming commonplace. In addition to communications, military technology uses the EM spectrum to aim weapons, guide smart munitions, collect information and disseminate the resultant information, conduct night operations, counter command and control facilities and to protect soldiers, communications systems and their facilities. Radars are increasingly used for navigation, surveillance and in fire control systems. In countering units any EW threat can expect to a mix of Former Soviet Union (FSU), Western and commercial radio and radar equipments, in addition to guided and homing weapon systems.

70. **Future Technologies.** There will be a significant shift away from insecure voice at tactical levels of command, as data entry devices, encryption and the use of low probability of intercept techniques become more widespread. At higher levels of command an increased use of secure single channel and multi-channel systems is likely. Operations in the future could involve the use of radio frequency weapons (capable of disrupting or destroying EM systems and weapon guidance systems), mobile telephones and similar systems that operate above the 500 MHz frequency level. The pace of introduction of advanced communications equipment is likely to increase as the cost of technology declines. For example, hand held, battery powered, DSSS transceivers, and man-portable, direct access satellite systems are both available commercially. If EW is to make a realistic contribution to the Commander's surveillance and military information requirements, it will be essential to identify, at the earliest opportunity, what use the adversary is making of the EM spectrum. To achieve this, light rapid response EW detachments are required to be deployed at the earliest opportunity. After this the required EW resources can be deployed and allocated tasks accordingly.
MILITARY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

71. Although EW equipment and the principles of EW support apply equally to General War and COIN, the military information needs of the Commander in COIN may often vary in emphasis from those in General War. These requirements will often focus on non military topics such as politics, economics, demographics, religion and ethnic distribution. In COIN, understanding the population and its culture will be a significant factor. With the application of advanced communication information systems, (CIS) together with sound planning, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) can provide immediate threat warnings, targeting data, from which military information can be gained to are surveillance, reconnaissance and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).

72. Effective reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition combined with military information plays an important role in COIN operations. Full use should be made of the entire range of surveillance techniques and equipments available including observation, monitoring, patrols, and attended and unattended electronic, optical and acoustic surveillance devices. As a key component of surveillance, ESM has the potential to make a major contribution to a commander's military information requirements.

73. Informing large numbers of the population about the current situation and influencing public opinion (PSYOPS) could in certain situations, be essential to the successful conduct of an operation. This capability is of particularly relevance during COIN operations in those states, where the population relies almost totally on radio and possibly television for their access to information. The ability to transmit relevant accurate and timely information on unused commercial radio and television bands could also be an important asset in preventing an escalation of hostile activity.

THE ROLE OF EW IN COIN OPERATIONS

74. General. A detailed plan, combined with the identification of all detectable emissions will be essential in order to determine whether the emissions belong to friendly, neutral or potentially hostile EM systems. To achieve this and to ensure that the correct EW assets are deployed to meet the threat, a capable ESM recce system, supported by a comms and non-comms parametric data base, will need to be in-theatre of the earliest possible moment. As EM emissions are not restricted by national or regional boundaries the physical extent of the operational EM environment is not directly related to the geographical Theatre of Operations. Thus, advantage must be made of all available national and international "stand off" military information systems, in addition to the military information product from those formations deployed. Any friendly system radiating in the EM spectrum can be exploited by hostile EW systems to disrupt or compromise PSO. The coordination of EW and military information could be an important factor in the success or otherwise of any operations.

75. Application of EW. EW has long been recognised as an essential feature of warfare and is a key component of Command and Control Warfare (C2W), which has equal utility in war and OOTW. EW in COIN operations will provide the Commander with a flexible, non-intrusive surveillance system and ECM can be used to counter homing and guided weapon systems, to protect key military and civilian installations, such as hospitals, airports and densely populated areas. ECM used in this way could provide a minimum force defence, against sophisticated homing devices which would be difficult, if not
impossible, to identify the source of this type of electronic attack. EW used in this manner would also reduce the risk of, or reason for, retaliatory action being taken by insurgents, which in turn could lead to a reduction in the level of violence. However, successful EW operations will depend on information collection, smart jamming, data fusion and the rapid dissemination of information.

76. **ESM.** The presence, or indeed the perceived presence, of widespread and impartial electronic surveillance in the theatre of operations can help to deter hostile activity by insurgents. Electronic surveillance will remove the element of surprise from actions that insurgents might take, especially if it is known that the information arising from that surveillance is shared with others. The loss of surprise will greatly improve the opportunity for the security force to anticipate offensive action by the insurgents. This could well degrade the effectiveness of the aggression and could make such action seem less worthwhile. Effective electronic surveillance can also assist a commander to identify suspects. In each case, the likelihood of aggression being rewarded is reduced, the risk of the insurgent being publicly exposed to the community is increased and the threat of anticipatory responses by security forces is heightened. ESM can be used to cue other surveillance systems and ECM (offensive jamming). ESM will also have a role to play in the development of friendly Electronic Protect Measures (EPM), which will in turn reduce the jamming threat to friendly users of the EM spectrum. These combined EW disciplines will have a major contribution to make to the overall operational security (OPSEC) plan. A list of circumstances whereby ESM can assist a commander in fulfilling his military information requirements is at Annex C.

77. **ECM.** The Rules of Engagement (ROE) will dictate whether ECM can be used as a minimum force non-lethal weapon system by forces engaged in COIN operations. In a situation where the involvement and likely proximity of the local population makes the principles of minimum force and the use of non-lethal weapons particularly important, a communications and non-communications jamming capability should be considered as essential. Electronic Defensive Aid Suits (DAS) should become a standard fit, to vehicles employed on convoy escort duties. As the effects of jamming are difficult to attribute, there may be situations where ECM action can be taken with minimal risk to friendly forces and with little chance of aggravating the situation. Circumstances where a commander may choose to use ECM are at Annex D.

78. **EPM.** EPM is that division of EW which involves actions and measures taken to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite enemy use of EW. EPM are equally significant in COIN operations. Electronic equipment forms the basis of tactical comms electronic surveillance and weapon systems for all modern security forces. EPM are also required to maintain OPSEC and protect CIS during military deployments. To improve OPSEC, it will be essential to have the capability to identify those areas of the EM spectrum, that are seen as a direct threat to the security of all deployed friendly forces.

**COORDINATION**

79. **General.** The need for EM spectrum planning and coordination, during operations increases as security forces and insurgent groups throughout the world continue to develop the use of advanced electronic systems. EW planning will be the responsibility of the Commander in coordination with any Host Nation. To assist the Commander, an EW Coordination Centre (EWCC) should be formed, which needs to be located alongside the
G2/J2 and G3/J3 branches. The staffing level within this organisation will vary in size and will be dependent on the scale of EW assets deployed. As a minimum requirement an EW Liaison of Officer (EWLO) from each Service providing EW assets to the security forces should be assigned to the EWCC. The role of the EWLO within the EWCC would be to assist in the control of resources and to advise on national equipment capabilities. If no EWCC if formed, then an EWLO should be assigned to the Operations (G3/J3) staff at the highest appropriate military headquarters.

80. **EWCC.** The EWCC will be the staff agency established in a force HQ to coordinate EW operations and to liaise closely with the G2, G3 and G6 branches. EWCC staff will be required to identify and resolve EW planning contradictions in the early phase of any operation. This will be achieved through a detailed knowledge of EW capabilities, limitations and the concept of operations for the deployed forces. Efficient coordination and full employment of the EW assets available, together with timely adjustment of priorities, are also critical to the success of any EW operation. To achieve effective coordination, control and tasking the EWCC staff will also require a clear understanding of a commander's military information requirements, the collection plan and the potential target array.

81. **Organisation.** The composition of the EWCC/EWLO team will be determined by several factors, which include the theatre of operations, the overall structure of the force and the level of EW operations to be conducted. The EWCC staff will provide a direct link to the EW planners of their respective service staffs. The staff will require a fully integrated CIS, with the following minimum capability.

a. **Communications.** The EW CIS requirement will depend on the level of EW participation in counter insurgency operations. However provision should be made for secure voice, high data rate comms, and in some instances telegraph. The EWCC must be able to communicate with all supporting EW units, authorities and agencies.

b. **Automatic Data Processing (ADP).** EWCC requires ADP support, in the form of low radiation computers, accredited for the storage of sensitive material. Database software designed to handle the Electronic Warfare Mutual Support (EWMS) date, EW reports and on line analysis support.

82. **Data Exchange.** The requirement could be to establish procedures within a multinational HQ that will allow the timely exchange of communications and non-communications ESM information and parametric data. This will enhance contingency planning, military information assessments and the execution of operations. The exchange of information is designed to assist the coordination of EW activities, improve EW knowledge and support the operational plan. The information requirements exchange should include:

a. Friendly force data which should be exchanged as a matter of routine during peace and PSO.

b. Threat information derived from EW.

c. Coordination of military information derived from all other sources.
SECTION 6 - DECEPTION

GENERAL

83. Deception is a double edged weapon - if used in the wrong place at the wrong time, and needs careful handling. It can be applied by either side in any campaign and across the strategic, operational and tactical spectrum of conflict. It can also be used profitably in psychological operations, public information and in state planning to sow doubt and division in the opponent’s camp. Deception is defined as those measures designed to mislead the opponent by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner that is prejudicial to his interests.

THE AIMS OF DECEPTION

84. The aims of deception are to:

a. To gain surprise.

b. To maintain security.

c. To give a commander freedom of action to carry out his mission by deluding an opponent as to his actions.

d. To mislead the opponent and thus persuade him to adopt a course of action which is to his disadvantage and which can be exploited.

e. To save lives of own troops and minimise expenditure of time and resources, thus economising on effort.

THE CATEGORIES OF DECEPTION

85. All types of deception aim to implant a false idea in the opponents mind and all deception presupposes effective counter surveillance and OPSEC to prevent the enemy from observing genuine activity. Deception measures are categorised as offensive or defensive:

a. **Offensive Deception Measures.** Offensive measures are used for the active dissemination of false evidence to the opponent in order to mislead him about future intentions. The prime purpose of offensive deception is to achieve surprise.

b. **Defensive Deception Measures.** Defensive measures offer false evidence to an opponent who holds the initiative. Credible substitutes are used to divert his attention and effort away from genuine dispositions and targets. The prime purpose of defensive deception is to improve security.

THE USE OF DECEPTION IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

86. Deception can, if applied correctly, be a force multiplier and its use at operational and tactical levels in any counter insurgency campaign can pay dividends and materially assist the governments overall campaign plan. It should be noted that, for the military
commander, deception measures should be applied to defeating or neutralising insurgents more effectively. Deception measures to influence the general public should remain under the control of the state authorities.

SECTION 7 – SPECIAL FORCES IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

87. The organisation of special forces units, the high quality, versatility and comprehensive training of special forces troops, and their capacity to work equally well as individuals or in small groups make them particularly suitable for counter insurgency. Most countries possess special forces units, many of which are specially trained for counter revolutionary warfare operations in addition to their tasks in general and limited war. They will play an important part in any future counter insurgency campaign, frequently making a contribution out of all proportion to their small numbers. Possible ways of employing them should be considered at all stages of planning and developing counter insurgency operations. However, they should be used to complement rather than replace conventional units. Further general details are contained in Annex E.

SECTION 8 – AIR POWER IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

BACKGROUND

88. Before the Second World War it was normal practice for both Italy and the UK to utilise air forces to dominate large areas of their colonial empires. The reasoning behind this was that the technological gap between the imperial powers and the locals population was so large as to render effective opposition impractical. Since the Second World War, this reasoning rapidly became invalid.

89. The use of air forces in the Gulf War and more recently in the Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the enormous potential of advanced technology for surveillance, target acquisition and attack of targets for those air forces that possess the technology. These major improvements have also been achieved with few casualties and little collateral damage to infrastructure near the target area. Linked with the possibilities inherent in the use of non lethal weapons by aircraft, there has been a reintroduction of air power having a major role in future counter insurgency operations.

THE PRESENT POSITION

90. Recent experience in peace support operations point also to the inherently flexible application of air power in covering, not only counter insurgency campaigns, but other more generalised conflicts where the technological gap between the various belligerents could be large. The use of air power to deter and neutralise the effectiveness of ground forces in Yugoslavia and the use of suppressive air power by the Israeli Air Force against their Arab opponents over the years to counter terrorism highlights the use that could be made of this technological gap.

91. The use of air power, which includes attack helicopters, airships light aircraft and air transport resources, in any counter insurgency campaign will no doubt be constrained by the overall political aims for the campaign, but, within these constraints, the growing number of possibilities for the use of the improved capabilities of air power could well
provide a military commander with a wider range of military options for his campaign estimate.

SECTION 9 – AN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

GENERAL

92. In modern times counter insurgency now involves a wide variety of participants and groupings, often in loose or ad hoc alliances, frequently operating outside the geographic area in dispute, or even globally. The causes of these insurgencies are equally complex; religion, ethnicity, politics, poverty and perceived oppression are among the many factors behind them. Military action alone cannot resolve such situations, but it can set the conditions for resolution by other parties. There is a need for coherent activity – a cross-government approach – from all instruments of national power and where possible with other International Organisations (IOs).

93. The Impact of the International Media. Virtually all crises are conducted under the spotlight of the international media. The maintenance of public support is crucial for democratically accountable governments, and this influences the options they can take, including military action, and the presentation of these options to different audiences. In order to gain and maintain public support, national and international governments need to show a degree of transparency in their actions, and these actions should be in accordance with received ethics and international law. The influence of the media has increased as access to regional and international media has increased. This has been brought about by advances in technology in radio and television, such as satellite broadcasting, by the increasingly porous nature of international borders and by the availability of relatively cheap printing or copying equipment that has brought newspapers and other printed material to a much wider audience. Consequently, there is a need to be proactive in ensuring that the presentation of military actions is positive while at the same time, countering the insurgent’s attempts to undermine public support.

94. The Impact of Technology. As well as the role that is played by technology in increasing access to the media, there is an ever increasing dependence on Information Technology (IT) by both military forces and by civilians. This introduces new opportunities that can be exploited, and new vulnerabilities that have to be protected. Many people now have the ability to access information direct via the Internet and, without necessarily knowing its pedigree and source, place considerable credence on it; this is particularly so in societies without a free press. The Internet can be used to spread or circulate information and opinion, including rumour, with a speed inconceivable a few years ago. All this reinforces the need for a proactive information campaign with an international reach.

95. The previous Army publication on counter insurgency (AFM Vol 1 Pt 10 of Jul 2001) had no Chapter on Information Operations because this activity was in its infancy and neither doctrine nor procedures were in place. Since then Information Operations have expanded to include both the UK government and other agencies are fully involved in harmonising information operations to allow a commander to make full use of this campaign tool in Iraq and Afghanistan in fast moving situations. There is a need for a fresh Army publication to take account of these developments which has not yet been produced. Commanders and staff should be referred to JWP 3-80, the Joint publication produced by
DCDC. This provides a useful background and guide for land commanders. JWP 3-80-1 Information Operations Tools also provides additional information.

SECTION 10 – PERSONNEL

MORALE

96. The Soldier and his Family. Troops will often be operating in small groups for long periods in trying conditions. If accompanied they may be concerned for the safety of their families in the theatre if their married quarters and shopping centres are targets for terrorist attack. On the other hand, when the families are separated but safe, soldier's families may be worried by radio, television and press coverage of action and casualties in the areas where the soldier is stationed. When a campaign lasts for a considerable time lack of progress may discourage soldiers and their families. The insurgents may try to aggravate a discouraging situation with a propaganda campaign. With or without hostile propaganda, rumours spread and may be difficult to dispel or refute when troops are deployed in small detachments over a wide area.

97. Promoting Good Morale. While motivating soldiers with good and sound reasons for the Army’s intervention in an emergency and the need for continued, patient commitment is the duty of the commander and a function of leadership at all levels, certain other measures can be taken to help to maintain morale by providing:

   a. Reliable information services; UK national and local newspapers, and Service news sheets.
   b. A quick and frequent mail service to and from home.
   c. Free welfare telephones.
   d. Television receivers and CD/DVD recorders.
   e. Welfare services.
   f. Gymnasium equipment in protected areas where outdoor recreation is not feasible.
   g. Local leave centres in secure and attractive surroundings, if possible in a temperate climate, and periodic home leave.
   h. A rapid and efficient system for notifying relatives of deaths and casualties as they occur.

MEDICAL

98. Small Detachments and Wide Deployment. Providing medical support for small and widely scattered detachments places a strain on the medical services. The problem can be alleviated by:

   a. Refresher training for all ranks in first aid to ITD 5 standards.
b. Providing sufficient combat medical technicians for each isolated detachment.

c. Provision for quick casualty evacuation on all operations, including armoured ambulances or ambulances with armoured protection, especially in urban areas or on routes subject to sniping.

d. Using helicopters and light aircraft to evacuate casualties direct to hospital or to fly forward doctors and medical teams.

e. Aeromedical evacuation to the UK for definitive treatment as required.

f. Ensuring that all ranks receive a comprehensive health briefing before deployment.

99. **Veterinary.** A veterinary service may be required for the acquisition or replacement, and the treatment of protection, sniffer and tracker dogs and for the provision and treatment of pack animals.
FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASES

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

1. A forward operational base may be defined as an area providing a firm base from which aggressive action against the insurgents can be developed. Its establishment will be undertaken as a joint operation.

2. The normal requirements and characteristics of a forward operational base are:
   a. It should be a formation base, established at a seat of local government. If this is not possible easy access to the centre of local administration is essential.
   b. It should be located in an area from which operations can be successfully developed throughout the formation area. Projected pacification operations and operations in depth must be within convenient helicopter range.
   c. It must contain a suitable airfield site. In some circumstances a Tac T(SR) airfield may have to suffice initially, but it must be capable of quick development for use by Tac T(MR) aircraft for which it may be necessary to bring in or to air drop large quantities of engineer plant or stores.
   d. The immediate vicinity of the base should be at least temporarily free from insurgent interference.
   e. It should be easily defensible. If it is surrounded by natural obstacles so much the better; if not, the ground of tactical significance that lies outside the immediate perimeter should be controlled.
   f. The area of the base must be large enough to accommodate the logistic units and dumps necessary to support the force being deployed, but as small as possible to facilitate its defence.
   g. The base should be accessible by road or track so that tracked vehicles and heavy plant can be brought in, probably by a one time road convoy. This requirement is not always possible to achieve, and more extensive use of air transport may have to be made to bring in vehicles and plant. It will probably be impossible to establish a secure land line of communication.

OCCUPATION

3. The occupation of a forward operational base may be entirely peaceful but if it has to be undertaken in the face of some opposition, careful consideration must be given to the method of approach. If a combined air and land approach is employed, it is important to plan the correct balance and to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of the two forces. As an example, it may be necessary for the airfield site to be secured initially by parachute troops,
followed by a rapid build up with some forces air landed and some moving by road. Whatever the precise circumstances, the following factors must be considered:

a. There can be no question of seizing a forward operational base in the face of strong opposition. This would be an operation of quite a different nature and would in any case be contrary to the tactical concept. Whether or not parachute troops are employed, the close defence of the airfield should be established as soon as possible.

b. It is likely that insurgent sabotage, stay-behind and reconnaissance parties will begin to operate against the base within a short space of time.

c. In planning the build up, careful consideration must be given to possible threats. Infantry supported by armour and/or artillery are likely to be the first requirement but if there is an air threat some priority may have to be given to air defence. Engineer plant and stores may also be needed early to develop the airstrip rapidly.

d. Both the air and land approach operations will need to be carefully planned and executed.

e. It is possible that civil demonstrations against the appearance of foreign troops may take place during the occupation of the base.

DEFENCE AND SEQUENCE OF BUILD UP

4. General. The measures outlined below envisage defence against insurgent sabotage raids or attacks of up to battalion strength, supported by mortars. The defence commitment of the base will be reduced as the surrounding countryside is cleared of insurgents and as the controlled area is enlarged by pacification operations. When planning the defence, full use must be made of any available RN/Army/RAF and administrative units. Every man capable of bearing arms must be incorporated into the defence organisation, and must be fit and trained for combat duties, including patrolling within the base.

5. All Round Defence. Every unit or staff of an administrative installation must be given a sector to defend with arcs of fire, weapon pits, obstacles and patrol areas. Installations must be protected from sabotage and insurgent attacks, special attention being given to items particularly attractive to the insurgent, eg, weapons, ammunition, explosives and parked aircraft. The maximum use must be made of wire, mines, booby traps, alarm systems, illumination, surveillance devices and guard dogs, together with improvised devices such as caltrops. All main and isolated positions must be organised for all round defence. Guard posts and detachments in isolated positions covering approaches to the base must be dug in, with overhead cover, be protected by wire, mines and improvised obstacles, and have reserves of ammunition, supplies and water. A duplicated system of communication between all posts in the base must be established. The use of booby traps can be a two edged weapon. In a hot humid climate is essential that early warning devices are checked regularly to ensure they are in working order, and the danger of our own troops initiating booby traps during these checks must be appreciated and provided for by briefing them from carefully kept minefield records.
6. **Command.** If the formation commander assumes personal command of the forward operational base, he and his staff tend to become immersed in detail and are unable to pay as much attention as they should to operations in depth. Someone else is needed to command the base area, as every component of the force or its echelons will be located there and the co-ordination of the defence and detailed command is a large task. To nominate the headquarters of an infantry battalion detracts from the unit’s offensive capabilities. The same disadvantage applies to the headquarters of a field regiment, although perhaps not to the same extent. There is little doubt that the appointment of a deputy force commander provides the best solution; a specific commander and headquarters must be nominated for the control of the forward operational base.

7. **Sequence of Build Up.** The build up of the base may take weeks depending on the distances involved and the resources available. The sequence for land forces might be:

   a. An air assault by parachute troops and its reinforcement by an infantry battalion group, if possible by surface route rather than by air.

   b. The assumption of overall control of the defence by the assault battalion group.

   c. A key plan which directs the deployment of units and installations to selected areas.

   d. Reception arrangements by the assault battalion group for the follow-up echelons arriving by air.

   e. Offensive patrolling by the assault battalion in areas close to the base.

   f. The hand over of sectors of the perimeter to follow-up battalion groups.

   g. Frequent clearance searches of the base area and adjacent country.

   h. The reception of a one time road convoy.

   i. Follow-up battalions patrol offensively in their TAOR.

   j. The opening up of an airstrip.

   k. The assault battalion group may still be primarily concerned with the defence of the base and the provision of the counter attack force.

   l. The establishment of a limited controlled area.

   m. The expansion of the controlled area.

   n. The introduction of local military and paramilitary forces to assist in the defence of the base, the patrolling of the controlled area and the establishment of defended villages etc.
Operations in depth start concurrently with the establishment of the controlled area.

The progressive reduction of the number of infantry required to ensure the security of the base. Initially the infantry commitment is likely to be high, but as soon as the domination of the immediate surrounding area is successful the numbers can be reduced.

8. **Defence Problems.** The ideal defensive plan should ensure that no insurgent small arms, rockets or mortar fire can damage anything in the base. This will seldom, if ever, be practicable because of the size of the problem. For example, if it is assumed that the forward operational base covers an area of approximately 2000 metres by 2000 metres, with one side totally protected by the sea, and the insurgents only have mortars with ranges of up to 6000 metres, this still leaves an area of approximately 100 kilometre map squares from which insurgent mortars could be fired and achieve a hit on a part of the base. This illustrates the size of the area around the base that must be converted into a controlled area as quickly as possible. Insurgent rockets may present an additional problem because they have considerably longer ranges than mortars, but due to their inaccuracy they are mainly a harassing threat. Every effort must be made to prevent insurgent small arms from engaging aircraft approaching and leaving the airfield.

9. **Patrolling.** While the area of the base itself should be patrolled by any units located in the base the infantry battalions should be used for offensive patrolling in the TAOR in the following ways:

   a. In general, offensive patrolling should extend from the perimeter of the base out to the limit of the range of enemy mortars and rockets. This patrolling must of course be tied in with, or be part of, the controlled area patrol programme. A comprehensive and detailed random patrol plan will be needed, and the maximum use must be made of listening devices, detectors and surveillance equipment.

   b. Patrols must operate within the range of artillery support and be adept at laying ambushes.

10. **Security Measures.** In addition to normal security precautions the following require special consideration in connection with the defence of the base:

   a. The declaring of prohibited and restricted areas for civilian movement.

   b. Under some circumstances it may be necessary to stop all movement except patrolling within the base after dark

   c. Local labour, which always constitutes a major security risk, must either be carefully screened and supervised or escorted.

   d. The timings and methods of patrolling, changing guards and detachments, and other routine matters must be varied.

   e. Guards and patrols might be supported by tracker and guard dogs.
Depending upon the nature of the threat, full use must be made of all forms of illumination, including floodlights, searchlights if available, and illumination provided by mortars, artillery or aircraft.

The provision of earthwork protection for vulnerable equipment and stores.

Harassing fire can be used to disrupt the insurgents’ routine and to inhibit their use of particular areas.

11. Reserves. In addition to the mobile reserve, which is held ready for use within the controlled area as a whole, a small central reserve for the defence of the forward operational base is essential. Tasks for this reserve must be planned and rehearsed and must include a well co-ordinated fire plan. The infantry reserve might use helicopters or MICVs/APCs. Helicopters are particularly vulnerable if there is an opportunity to get behind the insurgents to cut off their withdrawal. Helicopter landing sites are vulnerable to ambush but the risk can be reduced by a short period of prophylactic fire from artillery or armed helicopters immediately before landing.

12. Armour. CVRs provide valuable fire support whilst the base is being established. Their presence alone often acts as a deterrent. Thereafter, they are likely to be required for both defensive and offensive tasks.

13. Artillery and Mortars. The defence of a forward operational base depends very much on fire support. All artillery and mortars in the base must be co-ordinated through the senior artillery officer to ensure that the best use is made of the available fire power. There will usually be an urgent requirement to fly in, or to move in by road, artillery and mortars. Locating equipment will also be needed if the insurgents have mortars. The following points should be borne in mind:

a. Artillery is invaluable for breaking up insurgent concentrations and for counter battery fire. In addition to airportable field artillery some medium guns are useful to provide a destructive effect and to attack insurgent morale.

b. When close support defensive fire is required on or near the perimeter of the forward operational base it will be provided by a combination of field artillery, firing over open sights when necessary, infantry mortars, armed helicopters and offensive air support.

c. If the size of the base is small it may be necessary to establish some fire support sub-units away from the base but within range.

14. Air Defence. In counter insurgency operations the enemy is unlikely to have any air power, but the possibility of sneak air attacks, perhaps from a neighbouring state sympathetic to the insurgents, has to be considered.

15. Engineers. Engineer considerations are likely to be critical both for the selection of the site for the forward operational base and for the rate of development of the operation, particularly the opening of the Tac T(MR) airhead. Engineer tasks in the base may include:
a. The construction and maintenance of the Tac T(MR) airhead together with the necessary bulk fuel installations, maintenance facilities and protective defences.

b. The forward Tac T(SR) airstrip.

c. VSTOL sites.

d. The improvement of port or beach exit facilities.

e. Combat engineer support.


16. **Control of Air Space.** In the initial stages, apart from insurgent action, hazards to low flying aircraft in the area of the forward operational base arise from collision and from friendly artillery and mortar fire. Because of the nature of the insurgent threat and the fact that, at least initially, the forward operational base must expect attack from any direction, the close co-ordination and control of weapons and aircraft is most important. This is the task of the fire support co-ordination centre (FSCC) and the air support operations centre (ASOC).
NON LETHAL WEAPONS (NLW)

1. The use of NLW is not new. Weapons such as batons, water canon, rubber bullets, CS gas, stun grenades and electronic warfare (EW) have been used by police and armed forces throughout the world for a number of years in situations where the use of more lethal weapons would be inappropriate. What is new and has enhanced the importance of NLW, is not only the increasing number of military operations, but also the high visibility of such operations, including counter insurgency, where satellite technology makes it possible for the public to see in minute detail how the operations proceed. Such public scrutiny has highlighted the inability of armed forces to respond to situations with anything other than lethal force, which in many circumstances, especially those associated with peacekeeping, have proved to be inappropriate.

2. The public concern for casualties among the combatants and civilian population has increased interest in the potential for NLW in the expectation that they can provide armed forces with a more appropriate but less than lethal response when required. The public expectation has been fuelled by the increasingly high profile, some might say exotic, non-lethal technologies considered in the media.

3. Counter insurgency operations may involve non-lethal or lethal weapons or both, and no one situation can be limited to a specific level of lethality. NLW contribute to the application of military force in pursuit of military/political aims and objectives and are already a part of an existing spectrum of force. It is therefore wrong to talk about NLW in isolation and consequently, terms such as "non-lethal warfare", and "conventional warfare" become unspecific and contentious.

THE CATEGORIES OF NLW

4. General. The categorisation of NLW can be difficult, depending upon which definition is used and the interpretation given to it. However, despite the rather unspecific meaning of the phrase, NLW can be broadly categorised into those that are designed to impair or immobilise:

   a. Persons. Systems targeted against personnel include:

      (1) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). PSYOPS uses information warfare and the media to reduce the morale and combat efficiency of enemy troops or to influence the emotions of the populace in order to persuade them to or dissuade them from taking a specific action.

      (2) Acoustics. Noise, whether it be audible or inaudible (infra- and ultrasound) can be used to immobilise individuals or disperse crowds by causing discomfort, disorientation and nausea.

      (3) Calmative Agents and Irritants. These systems are used to calm or disperse riotous crowds or individuals and will include current agents such as CS gas.
(4) **Visual Stimulus and Illusion (VSI).** VSI uses high intensity strobe lighting and holography to cause temporary vertigo, disorientation and nausea.

(5) **Lasers and Incapacitants.** Low energy (dazzle) lasers and incapacitants (ie stun grenades) are used to temporarily blind, dazzle or immobilise individuals.

5. **Equipment and Material.** Systems targeted against equipment and material include those designed to impair or prevent mobility, neutralise weapons, exploit or disrupt communications or degrade the infrastructure. Such systems include:

   a. **Anti-Traction Agents.** Combustion alteration technologies to impair or immobilise equipments.

   b. **Sensor Damage Lasers.** Targeted against vehicle optics to prevent mobility and target acquisition.

   c. **Metal Embrittlement.** Polymer and super adhesive agents to disable mechanical linkages and alter material properties causing general equipment and weapon failure.

   d. **Radio Frequency Weapons (RFW).** To cause electronic failure in ignition systems, communications, radars, computers and navigation aids.

   e. **Conductive Ribbons.** To short circuit power lines, fuel additives to contaminate fuel supplies and the introduction of computer viruses to disrupt communication and economic centres.

**THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING NLW**

6. **Advantages.** The principal advantages of NLW are that:

   a. They can be deployed to reinforce deterrence and military credibility by providing the commander with a graduated response over a wider range of military activities.

   b. They can reduce the risk of rapid escalation, especially in Operations Other Than War by offering a progressive incremental increase in lethality. Equally, in specific situations, they can provide the opportunity for de-escalation.

   c. They can provide a public and politically acceptable alternative means of conducting operations in that they enable force to be used with the likelihood of fewer casualties and less collateral and environmental damage.

   d. They can prolong the situation at a low casualty rate in order to buy time for negotiation.

   e. They can have positive implications for use at the strategic level for relatively little cost in terms of expense, resources and national commitment.
f. They can enhance the capability of forces in a wider variety of tasks that otherwise may have been too costly in terms of manpower and resources, too sensitive politically or publicly unacceptable.

g. They can be used covertly to create uncertainty, fear and low morale amongst insurgents.

h. They can reduce the cost of rebuilding the infrastructure and economy.

7. **Disadvantages.** The main disadvantages of NHW are that:

a. With the prospect of few casualties and little collateral damage, the use of armed forces could become more acceptable and thus a more frequently employed instrument of Government policy.

b. The use of some NLW would be restricted due to international treaties, conventions and laws. Others would receive bad publicity if used against an unsuitable target or had lethal consequences.

c. The need for reliable information in the employment of NLW is paramount, not only to portray their non-lethality to insurgents but also to assess the vulnerability of the target and to verify their effectiveness after a strike. Verification could be difficult but is essential if counter allegations are to be avoided.

d. They do not destroy insurgents although they may adversely influence their cohesion and will to fight. Their use may be perceived as lacking decisive action.

e. The damage caused by some NLW may be difficult to control, for example the use of computer viruses and RFW. Similarly, the effect of many NLW can be difficult to assess.

f. Some NLW are omnidirectional or have poor or no target acquisition systems. There is therefore a danger of friendly or non-combatant casualties unless strict command and control arrangements are made and Rules of Engagement (ROE) followed.

g. The long term after-effects on individuals is not known.

h. The use of NLW may heighten the resolve of the insurgent in that he responds with lethal force. Thus the use of NLW should always be backed up with the ability to use lethal force if necessary.

i. Additional protection may be required for those deploying some NLW.

**GUIDANCE IN THE USE OF NLW**

8. In the absence of any practical experience to base firm and clear principles, the following guidelines would be appropriate for the potential use of NLW in future:

a. Win the information war and seek the support of the media.
b. NLW can either be used alone, provided they are backed up with the ability to use lethal force, or, as a compliment to lethal force. Their use should be controlled by ROE and should not be allowed to jeopardise the right of soldiers to defend themselves with lethal force.

c. The employment of NLW should be consistent with extant Treaties, Conventions, International and national Laws. Their use should also be morally and ethically justifiable.

d. NLW should be used proportionately (the least destructive way of defeating insurgents) and discriminately (the protection of non-combatants from direct intentional attack).

e. In planning the employment of NLW, the operational response to all possible reactions should be fully rehearsed.

f. Responses from the medical, legal, civil and public affairs authorities as a consequence of unintended results and side effects caused by the use of NLW should be fully prepared.

g. NLW should be fully integrated with lethal weapons in order to provide a graduated response to a situation based upon the use of minimum force and perception of the threat.

h. NLW should not be deployed without consideration to counter measures.

i. NLW should not be deployed without consideration to any political-military instructions that may be given.

j. NLW should be employed in such a manner so as to minimise fratricide.
ESM AND SURVEILLANCE

1. A fully equipped EW unit can provide a low profile surveillance system, to meet a commander's military information requirements, as follows:
   
   a. A flexible surveillance capability, that can be used in a mobile, static or non incursive "stand off role" from airborne platforms.

   b. Early warning of an outbreak or escalation of violence, thus buying time for a range of preventative government and (or) military actions to be effected.

   c. The production of military information reports, that can assist a commander to construct impartial and accurate reports.

   d. Monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals and any demilitarised zones.

   e. Monitoring the movement or build up of insurgent forces.

   f. Production of the threat assessment.

   g. A non-hostile immediate threat warning capability.

   h. If required, provide a high profile surveillance capability.

   i. De-conflicting claims and counter claims of aggression or over reaction by security forces or insurgents.

   j. Identify potential insurgent intelligence collection capabilities.

   k. Assess friendly vulnerabilities from a hostile perspective.

   l. Enable the commander to plan for both passive and active OPSEC measures.

   m. Determining the morale and motivation of the insurgents and the general population.

   n. Surveillance of trade routes and the movement of goods in support any enforced sanctions.

2. All these measures can be adopted at any stage of an insurgency or could supplement those that are already in place.
1. ECM can provide a commander with an effective non-destructive and non-lethal electronic defence system. Arrange of equipment capable of providing the following (in order of priority) is required:

   a. Disrupt or black-out an insurgent's communications and information systems in the event of an escalation towards armed conflict, in order to prevent or stall an offensive.

   b. Defensive aid suites for convoy escort vehicle.

   c. The disruption or blacking out of inflammatory propaganda broadcasts on radio or television.

   d. A method of transmitting community information broadcasts over commercial systems, to include television and radio.

   e. Defensive jamming to counter the potential enemy's intelligence collection capabilities.

   f. Protective (Screening) jamming to deny the potential enemy access to friendly critical communication nodes.

2. If the insurgency has access to more sophisticated surveillance equipment and is providing a severe military threat to the security forces then ECM could help to provide for:

   a. The disruption or blacking out of an insurgent's surveillance and fire control radars, to protect the movement of friendly aircraft, shipping and convoys.

   b. The disruption or blacking out of an insurgents surveillance and fire control radar to prevent an escalation in hostilities.
THE USE OF SPECIAL FORCES IN COUNTER INSURGENCY

TASKS

1. **General.** One of the main characteristics of most special forces is their capacity to carry out a very wide spectrum of tasks ranging from discreet, advisory visits of a few days through to a prolonged campaign involving complete special forces units. Some possible tasks are outlined below. More details on the employment of British Special Forces (UKSF) in these roles can be found in the bibliography at the end of Part 2.

2. **Training Teams.** Their wide range of skills and language qualifications make special forces troops particularly suitable for military assistance programmes.

3. **Raising and Training Indigenous Forces.** The raising and training of local forces is a traditional and effective task for special forces troops. US Special Forces made a significant contribution to the Vietnam War in this role while the SAS carried out a similar task with the Firqat in Oman. When involved in this task special forces troops are often involved in leading or advising the indigenous forces on operations, but on other occasions, for political reasons, they may be debarred from combat.

4. **Deep Penetration Patrolling and Surveillance.** Skills developed for operations in limited and general war can be applied most effectively in those counter revolutionary campaigns where large areas have fallen under the control of revolutionaries. The SAS operations on the Jebel Akhdar in 1959, in the Radfan in 1965-7, in Borneo in 1962-66 and the US Special Forces operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Indo-China are all examples of this activity.

5. **Counter Insurgency Teams.** Special forces are sometimes called upon to provide specially trained teams to support the Civil Power in UK for incidents involving armed terrorists, such as the siege of the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980.

6. **Plain Clothes Operations.** Special forces may be called upon to conduct operations in plain clothes in a counter revolutionary campaign. The quality of the individual and his high level of basic training make the special forces soldier especially suitable for this task. Additional training will normally be necessary for such specialised and sophisticated operations. Before special forces are involved in this activity, either on internal operations or on operations abroad in support of allies, the legal aspects and the wider political and security implications must be carefully considered.

CONSTRAINTS

7. The main constraints on special forces operations are:

   a. **Manpower.** Special forces are usually few in number. Casualties cannot be easily or quickly replaced because of the long selection and training process.

   b. **Reaction Time.** Although in a strategic sense special forces can react
promptly and with notable flexibility, tactically there can be some constraint. The reason is that, in spite of the high level of training of the special forces soldier, the precision demanded of delicate counter insurgency tasks requires time for careful planning and preparation. Moreover, once deployed in the field their tactical mobility will be limited. Because communications are usually conducted on schedules for operational reasons, and because movement on foot in hostile territory and difficult terrain is inevitably slow, retasking and redeployment take many hours and sometimes days. However these constraints need not be too serious - particularly for COIN operations within the designated theatre.

c. **Endurance.** Once deployed the endurance of special forces is limited by what they can carry on their backs unless resupply is guaranteed. In hostile environments such as the desert or mountains the provision of water can present a major problem. This should not be a serious constraint within the theatre of operations in-country during a counter insurgency campaign.

**PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT**

8. **High Value Operations.** Special forces are a precious but numerically limited asset unable to absorb large casualties due to misemployment. To get the most out of them, they need to be used precisely for they can achieve results out of all proportion to their size.

9. **Command.** Special forces should be regarded as strategic or operational assets and be kept under the theatre commander’s hand. Tactical control should be delegated for specific operations to the appropriate level. There is sometimes a tendency for special forces to proliferate in COIN. Centralised command at the highest level helps to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort and lack of coordination. However a careful synchronisation of special forces and main force activity is essential to avoid misunderstandings.

10. **Access to Intelligence.** The nature of special forces' tasks makes it essential for them to have access to all available relevant intelligence if operations are to stand a chance of success.

11. **Mission Command.** The employment of special forces must be tied in with the overall plan for the campaign and their commanders must be given a clear directive specifying what is required and stating any limitations on methods of execution. Special forces must be commanded by their own officers and it is these officers who should work out and execute the detailed plan, providing regular progress reports to the overall commander.

12. **Security.** Success so often depends upon surprise and surprise depends upon good security. The inherently discreet nature of special forces makes them the ideal military arm to exploit intelligence from sensitive sources. The compromise of such sources not only entails a serious loss of capability, but may raise acute political difficulties. The media can pose a particular threat to security in counter revolutionary operations and it is essential to work out a sound public information plan with the public information staff.
LIAISON

13.  **Within the Security Forces.** It is most important that special forces establish and maintain close liaison with all other security force units and formations with responsibilities in the same area. It is likely that special forces liaison officers or NCOs will be attached to the appropriate headquarters and units.

14.  **On Behalf of the Authorities.** There may be occasions when the state authorities will wish to contact third parties or perhaps those acting for the insurgents. This unusual form of liaison may involve special forces for this role. Such tasks would require the full consent of the appropriate UK military authorities before such duties were undertaken.

LEGAL ISSUES

15.  There is a widespread misconception that special forces are, or should be exempt from the legal constraints which bind armed forces. This is a misguided and dangerous notion. The legal constraints covered in Chapter 1 apply to special forces operations just as they do to the more conventional type of operation. Flouting the law is invariably counter productive both in the short and long term. Once members of any special forces have been discredited in the courts and the media it is difficult to justify their continued employment and the insurgents will then have removed a major obstacle to the achievement of their aims. Successful special operations have to be mounted within the law and any temptation to ignore legal constraints must be resisted.

16.  Each member of the British Special Forces is held responsible for his actions under British military and civil law in exactly the same way as are other soldiers and policemen. It is therefore incumbent on those planning special forces operations to be aware of, and to think through carefully, the legal implications of any intended action. In any case where a point of law might arise legal advice should be sought in the planning stage.

CONCLUSION

17.  Special forces are a valuable asset in any counter insurgency campaign. However, they can only be effective if those directing the campaign appreciate their potential, their limitations and the principles governing their employment.
CHAPTER 8
LOGISTIC PLANNING FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 - PRINCIPLES AND PLANNING

PRINCIPLES

1. The principles governing combat service support (CSS) generally are described in Chapter 1 of Combat Service Support, AFM Volume 1, Part 6 Combat Service Support. Here, they are merely listed as a reminder to the reader:

   a. Foresight.
   b. Efficiency.
   c. Simplicity.
   d. Cooperation.
   e. Agility.

2. The same principles also apply to counter insurgency operations but with appropriate allowances for the intensity of operations, at least in the preparatory and insurgency phases.

PLANNING FACTORS

3. Some modifications to normal practice are necessary to allow for the circumstances under which counter-insurgency operations take place:

   a. Deployment of the security forces in small detachments over a wide area.
   b. Land communications are vulnerable to insurgent interference. An insurgent ability to disrupt lower flying aircraft or helicopters may complicate the provision of air supply.
   c. Dependence on local resources, for example, construction, purchase, storage and perhaps distribution, which adds to the overall security problem.
   d. A possible need to assist the civil administration with the maintenance of public utilities and essential services.
   e. Because counter-insurgency operations are manpower intensive there will be pressure for economy in CSS manpower.
   f. While, on the one hand, lower rates of expenditure of combat supplies reduce the CSS burden, the dispersed deployment mentioned in sub-para a above increases it.
g. If the security forces assisting a Host Nation are multi-national there will be problems of coordination and standardisation.

h. The need to guard and protect vehicles and routes used for CSS may well affect routine logistic planning factors related to manpower ie who conducts this protection task – front line units or CSS units.

The Combat Service Support System in COIN Operations

4. The Geographical Factor. The normal layout of the rear and forward support groups for conventional warfare operations may have to be adjusted to meet the conditions peculiar to counter-insurgency operations. The layout will be determined by:

a. Operational and geographical considerations: if during the insurgency when guerrilla operations are widespread a ‘hub and spoke’ system may be more appropriate. The ‘hub’ will correspond to the rear support group, located near the main point of entry, and the 'spokes' to the forward support groups deployed to support combat units throughout the area affected by the insurgency. Should the insurgents consolidate an area sufficiently large to support more conventional operations or should a neighbouring state intervene on behalf of the insurgents it would be necessary to set up a normal rear and forward support group organisation with the 'hub and spoke' system superimposed on it.

b. Host Nation infrastructure: the layout of airfields, ports, the railway and road systems, inland waterways, depot facilities, including cold storage, in relation to the area of operations.

5. Security. The Main Supply Area (MSA) and its static installations should be sited in an area where there is least risk of attack, commensurate with operational and geographical factors. If the scale and intensity of the operation warrant the establishment of a forward support group (FSG) its units are likely to be more at risk and will require more security force effort to defend them. While a quiet area is desirable, ease of access to the MSA group and the air/rail/sea port of disembarkation on the one hand and convenience for forward distribution on the other may be the determining factors. The greater the amount of air and helicopter lift that is available the more it will be possible to cut out intermediate bases with the advantage of economies in grounded resources, guards and theatre transport. The use of Joint Sea Basing would ease the physical security and protection of these vulnerable installations.

6. Operational Security. Care should be taken that CSS preparations do not prejudice the security of information and plans. Sudden increases in stock levels, exceptional amounts of road, rail and air movement, the arrival of new combat service support (CSS) units in the forward areas and the local purchase of unusual items are just some examples of changes in a normal pattern of replenishment which might betray a future operation. A combination of secrecy, insofar as it is possible to hide CSS preparations, and convincing cover plans help to preserve security. Discretion in dealing with contractors and taking care not to discuss operational matters, especially future plans, in the hearing of local labour are essential, if elementary precautions to keep our secrets secret.
7. **Fragmentation and Dispersal of Combat and CSS Units.** There may be a tendency to fragment and disperse CSS units to support widely deployed security force sub-units. However, the support of isolated detachments in villages is a problem better solved by the unit logistic staff than by an uneconomic dispersal of CSS units. The use of helicopters can be vital provided that they are not exposed to the fire of insurgent small arms and anti-aircraft weapons. Nevertheless, some dispersion of CSS units may be inevitable under the 'hub and spoke' system. It will be necessary to exercise a careful control of resources to keep the size and number of CSS units down to an affordable burden on the Army’s assets.

**THE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN**

8. **Reconnaissance Party.** Points to note are that:

   a. The reconnaissance party sent to a new theatre is likely to be organised on a joint service basis with the Army providing, perhaps, the major element. The party will aim to make early contact with the Host Nation government through the local British diplomatic representative in order to assess the resources available in the theatre and to provide an estimate of the requirements which must be sent out from the United Kingdom.

   b. It follows that a reconnaissance party has to include a strong CSS element headed by a sufficiently senior officer, who is fully aware of the kind of operation envisaged and of the CSS requirements to support it. He should have the authority to arrange liaison with the Host Nation and allies, to take decisions and to make recommendations to the Ministry of Defence at home and, through the high commissioner or ambassadorial staff, to the Host Nation’s ministry of defence. A Service lawyer should be included in the reconnaissance party. He will advise, in conjunction with the Foreign Office staff in-country, on the content of any Status of Forces Agreement, if one has not already been negotiated.

   c. The earlier the reconnaissance party is sent out and the sooner CSS preparations for the arrival of our forces are made the better.

9. **Initial Planning.** The CSS element of the reconnaissance party have to make arrangements with the host government, through the high commission or embassy, for the following facilities with regard to the reception and logistic support of our forces:

   a. **Liaison.** A liaison machinery for coordinating CSS requirements with the Host Nation, any other allies and the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom.

   b. **Bases.** Proposed location of the support groups.

   c. **Provision of Resources.** What supplies, from fuel and rations to consumer items, can be provided locally and what has to be brought in from the United Kingdom or friendly neighbouring countries.

   d. **Special Requirements.** It may be necessary to put in hand the provision of:
(1) Covert vehicles, such as covered vehicles, for use as TCVs and recovery vehicles.

(2) The supply of any protective clothing, from non UK sources if this is necessary.

e. **Equipment Support.** The equipment support plan must be geared to providing special requirements:

   (1) Enhanced electronic repair facilities to deal with extra radios, CCTV systems, alarms and ECM equipment.

   (2) Local modifications to vehicles, eg, armouring.

f. **Expansion of CSS Units.** The build up of CSS units must be planned to support the combat element as it arrives, taking into account the assistance available from the Host Nation.

g. **Accommodation and Real Estate.** The estimated requirement for operational and logistic accommodation and real estate should be prepared as soon as possible. If it is possible and appropriate this estimate should be passed to the Host Nation. If appropriate the procedures for obtaining accommodation on loan, by requisition, on hire or by purchase should similarly be worked out with the Host Nation’s authorities with all possible speed. The availability of local labour, building material, services (electricity, water, sewage, etc) should also be ascertained.

   Detailed planning for the establishment of base installations, hospitals, transit and leave camps and the siting of unit camps needs to be put in train at the same time.

   In conjunction with the intelligence and operations staffs it will be necessary to draw up a plan for the provision of protection from blast, mortar bombs, RPGs and shells for key or exposed headquarters, installations, isolated bases and positions.

h. **Labour.** Detailed requirements for each installation and area in terms of skilled and unskilled labour.

i. **Port Facilities.**

   (1) Alongside berthing, discharge rates using existing unloading facilities and storage accommodation at and near the main port of entry.

   (2) Unloading and lighterage facilities at small ports.

   (3) Inland water transport.

   (4) Road and rail exits.

   (5) Requirement for reinforcing RE and RLC specialist units to help run the ports.

   (6) Liaison with the harbour authorities.
j. **Airports.** Points to note are:

(1) Agreement on the main entry airfield and availability of forward airfields or airstrips in conjunction with the air force element of the reconnaissance party.

(2) Agreement on aircraft schedules leading to a planned flow of reinforcements and supplies.

k. **Rail Transport.** Estimates of freight to be moved, schedules, loading and off-loading arrangements and security. Any requirement for specialist troops.

l. **Allocation of Main Supply Routes.** In a country with a limited road network it may be necessary to allot time blocks for the road movement of resupply convoys and routine troop movements.

**Communications.** Good communications are essential to the efficient running of a CSS organisation, particularly one likely to be spread over a wide area. Telephone lines are vulnerable to sabotage and espionage. Radio and, in particular, radio relay is required. Radio relay rebroadcast stations have to be located in secure areas.

11. **Accounting.** The accounting system developed is likely to be a mixture of peacetime procedures augmented by a special budget for operational, combat service support, works services, utilities, and transport. There will be a need for financial staff on any advance party. Agreement with the host government, if this is appropriate, will be needed on the following topics:

a. Cost sharing.

b. Accounting procedures.

c. The need for banking facilities and the opening of imprest accounts.

**SECTION 2 - REPLENISHMENT AND RESOURCES**

**REPLENISHMENT PLAN**

12. **Ground Replenishment.** The G4 staff tasks are to:

   a. Decide on the stock levels to be held in the MSA, the FSG, if one is required, and by units to provide for:

   (1) The predicted intensity of operations.

   (2) A cushion of reserves to meet interruptions in the replenishment system by insurgent action and,

   (3) The changing dependency of units.
b. Bid on the MOD and on the Host Nation government for commodities and work out a movement and distribution plan to transport material from the entry points to the main base installations.

c. Organise distribution points for commodities in the operational areas and allocate dependency for units based on the nearest or most appropriate source of supply.

d. Arranging rail transport, road convoys, inland and coastal water transport, fixed or rotary wing airlift or air dropping.

e. Traffic control and route protection; it will be necessary, in conjunction with the G3 staff, to arrange:

   (1) Escorts and pickets.

   (2) ‘Route open days/times’ in high risk areas.

   (3) Avoidance of a routine and predictable pattern of convoy movements in areas where there is high risk of insurgent attack.

f. Units are to be responsible for the movement of material from the distribution points or CSS installations to their own areas. Units may require helicopter lift or pack animals in difficult country.

13. **Air Replenishment.** Fixed or rotary wing aircraft may be used to advantage for replenishment because:

a. Forces can be supplied in inaccessible areas avoiding the necessity for a vulnerable surface supply route.

b. Troops are able to move with light scales of equipment unencumbered with echelon transport, thus exploiting the principle of flexibility to give them a good level of tactical mobility.

c. Subject to the capacity of the airlift resources, weather and terrain air replenishment is quicker than overland resupply and can be sustained over any likely distance.

d. Reserve stocks can be reduced and held centrally allowing the establishment of fewer but larger bases situated in more secure areas.

e. Reducing the dependency on surface routes lessens the risk of ambush and cuts the convoy protection commitment, which is expensive in combat unit manpower.

f. Rapid casualty evacuation improves a wounded man’s chances of survival, which is good for morale.
g. The urgent needs of the civilian population in isolated areas can be met quickly.

14. **Air Dropping.** This method is less economic than airlanded resupply but is often necessary in very broken country where there are no landing zones, even for helicopters, without engineer work. The penalties for air dropping are that the recovery of parachute equipment may be difficult or impossible and there may be a serious risk that the supplies fall into enemy hands.

15. **Landing Strips and Helicopter Pads.** These should be constructed whenever possible and as soon as possible to economise in airlift.

16. **Cooperation.** There is a need for close cooperation between the CSS, operations and air staffs.

17. **Use of Local Resources.** While the maximum use has to be made of local resources to reduce the lift requirement from the United Kingdom, care should be taken not to cause shortages in the host country’s home market with consequent price rises causing an inflationary pressure, although there are obvious political advantages to be gained by boosting the local economy. The apparent ready availability of local supplies may be mistaken for a non-existent plenty with local entrepreneurs eager to exploit a rapidly growing market created by an influx of troops. If the civil population suffers from shortages and inflation the insurgents will be handed a ready propaganda weapon with unfortunate results for the host government and for inter-allied relations.

**SECURITY**

18. **Insurgent Infiltration of Labour.** It has to be assumed that local labour will be infiltrated by hostile intelligence agents. It will be difficult for incoming units and security sections to distinguish between loyal and disloyal elements. To reduce the potential threat to base installations, ports, airports, roads and railways reliance should be placed on good unit and installation security and an efficient local vetting system. The method of vetting has to be agreed with the host government (if this is appropriate) whose police and security units will be largely responsible for its implementation. The system may never be foolproof and measures need to be taken to guard vulnerable installations from terrorist attack and to prevent the leakage of plans and intentions. All soldiers, especially CSS troops employing civilians, have to be carefully briefed on security matters.

19. **Protection of Labour.** Labour has to be protected from insurgent attack and intimidation. If the Host Nation cannot provide suitable protection, additional combat units may have to be deployed in an escort and protection role. In the worst case it may be necessary to bring in pioneer and labour troops to replace local labour coerced into leaving the employment of the British element of the security forces.

20. **Installations.** CSS installations need to be suitably sited for security and defence, and effectively guarded. In the best case the Host Nation will provide protection. If this is not possible, extra combat troops may have to be provided because CSS units do not have sufficient men to carry out their functions and guard themselves except against the lightest of threats. Some installations may hold such vital stores that only British troops should man
and guard them. Nevertheless, CSS troops have to be sufficiently well trained in infantry skills to be able to defend themselves in an emergency.

SECTION 3 - MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

BACKGROUND

21. The possible need to help the civil administration with the maintenance of public utilities and essential services is always present and the potential commitment must be seen in the context of the types of military assistance which might be requested in escalating scenarios. The machinery of government may have broken down in parts of the country and there may be a requirement to provide help to maintain the commercial life of a Host Nation as well as humanitarian aid.

22. Normally, at least a skeleton work force and managerial staff will remain loyal to the civil administration and stay at their posts, reducing the demand for specialist service reinforcements. However, if the local labour has been intimidated to such an extent that none dare go to work the bill for specialists may be beyond the Army's resources, or perhaps of all three Services put together. Even if the Host Nation is supported by a number of allies the combined coalition resources may prove insufficient, at least initially. A practicable compromise may be achieved if at least some of the labour can be coaxed back to work with a guarantee of protection from the local forces as the arrival of outside reinforcements begins to bolster confidence. Whether sufficient labour can be persuaded to return depends on the attitudes and customs of the host state and whether the insurgents are prepared to concede that individuals have no choice in the matter in the face of determined administrative action.

23. There may be occasions when a civil administration considers that it is necessary to impose a curfew. In such circumstances the authorities will almost certainly call on military forces to help run the minimum services necessary to maintain the essentials of daily life.

PLANNING

24. Contingency planning for the restoration or maintenance of essential services is a lengthy process that should be conducted as soon as is feasible so that military options can be prepared. An RE Military Works Force stationed in UK is the military focal point for all such contingency planning and this unit should be included in any planning where this type of contingency can be anticipated.

25. When a contingency plan is executed the CSS staff element in the reconnaissance party will establish, in conjunction with the civil authorities, and advised by the High Commission or Embassy staff, in the host country, the precise requirement to suite the circumstances. The following factors will be of relevance:

a. A breakdown of the civil authorities' request for assistance in terms of specialists, tradesmen and unskilled labour, taking into account the size of the labour force which has remained at work.

b. In the event of the requirement being in excess of the planned reinforcement figure, to place them in order of priority. The priorities will reflect the order of
importance of the utilities and services to be maintained as perceived by the civil authorities and agreed by the reconnaissance party.

c. The requirement will be signalled to the appropriate UK authorities who will arrange to meet as much of the bill as is feasible and report shortfalls to the reconnaissance party, who in turn will inform the civil authorities.

26. It is possible that some of the excess demand may be met from specialists and units nominated for other contingency plans which are unlikely to be activated. Additional specialists and tradesmen may be found from CSS units in the home base or other theatres, the training organisation or from the other two Services.

MILITARY - CIVIL RELATIONSHIPS

27. Command. Military forces employed to maintain utilities and essential services are used solely as organised labour under their own commanders. The latter effect liaison with the appropriate civil authorities and plant management to decide how best the troops can be employed. As mentioned earlier, military specialists will need protection, if possible by the local police or security forces but, in certain high risk circumstances, from British forces. The civil authorities should be warned if there is a possibility that the troops might be withdrawn if a higher priority civil or military commitment should arise. As such drastic action may have serious consequences any proposal to withdraw military specialist support should first be discussed in the appropriate joint civil-military committee.

28. Civil Authority Action on the Logistic Aspects of Military Operations. The corollary to military aid to the civil ministries is the need for liaison with the civil authorities to ensure that the latter warn the Armed Forces of any decision they may take which might require a carefully prepared security force reaction. The closure of a factory, the removal of squatters, the dismantling of an illegal settlement or the clearance of a slum might lead to a serious confrontation for which the security forces should be well prepared. An intention to dispense with or restore street lighting would affect resupply movement timings as well as night patrolling tactics and a sudden, unnotified change might endanger soldiers’ lives and give away a surveillance plan. Again, in ideal circumstances, all such matters could be discussed in the forum of the local joint committee.

29. G1 and G4 Liaison with the Local Population. The local committee system also provides a point of contact which can be used to explain government and security force requirements to local leaders and to explain the need for measures which might cause quite unnecessary friction. Such matters might include the need to block off an approach which might be used by insurgents to attack both civilian and military targets, the need to restrict movement in the interests of security and to explain how damage and compensation claims might be processed and complaints considered properly.

30. Meeting the Essential Needs of a Civilian Population under Curfew. If a curfew is imposed the civil authorities are responsible for taking measures to meet the problems caused by the disruption of private, domestic life, industry and commerce. The authorities will almost certainly require military assistance to deal with such foreseeable difficulties as:

a. Disruption of water supplies.
b. Food shortages and the need to buy some food daily, particularly in a hot country. Essential food deliveries may have to be made to areas where there are no local shops.

c. Fuel distribution.

d. Treatment of sick and maternity cases.

e. Hygiene. Threats to health due to accumulating rubbish, lack of indoor sanitation and interruption in the sewage disposal system.

f. Isolated police stations must be resupplied and administered.

g. Animals need husbandry, particularly cattle and goats which have to be milked regularly.

h. Crops have to be sown and reaped at particular times of the year.

i. The homeless and refugees need to have a place in any plan.
CHAPTER 9
CONTACT WITH THE MEDIA

SECTION 1 – THE ROLES OF THE COMMANDER AND THE CHIEF PINFO OFFICER

1. It is of great importance that a commander maintains a close working relationship with his chief PINFO officer. When speaking to the media, and in accordance with QRs, individuals should restrict themselves to matters of fact at their own level. A military commander should not normally make any statement concerning government policies, political decisions, or on topics which are likely to be politically sensitive. In today's world almost any topic raised to a commander is likely to be sensitive – and thus more than ever a commander will need to use his common sense when questioned, and should take advice on the spot or by reference to the MOD. The question as to whether or not communication with the media is desirable from both the political and operational points of view should also be considered. Care, too, will need to be taken to ascertain whether there are any legal or security restraints on an item of information before it is released. PINFO staff should always be consulted before statements are made to the media. The rule of thumb to adopt is not to talk above your appointment and grade.

2. The chief PINFO officer at a headquarters is the source of all operational information for the media and it is he who authorises contact with them. To this end, his office has to provide a continuous day and night information service manned by a staff who are fully in the operational picture. If the office is to provide an authoritative, considered, consistent and credible information service, the press office should receive prompt and accurate information from subordinate headquarters and units. It should also receive early warning of projected operations together with clear instructions on how to deal with media enquiries, preferably in the form of a question and answer brief. However, provided that the information is received in time in notes or narrative form the PINFO staff will be able to polish the brief and provide suitable answers to all likely questions.

3. A large number of journalists representing the press, radio and television can be expected to report on counter insurgency operations.

SECTION 2 – MEDIA REPORTING. CLEARANCE, ATTRIBUTION AND EMBARGOES

4. To facilitate an effective two-way passage of information and to minimise unnecessary media queries, standing orders should give guidance on the limits of the information which may be disclosed. There are also conventions to be observed when journalists pose questions on certain sensitive subjects.

5. Before any information is passed to the media it should be cleared for release by the appropriate military agency, eg G2, G3, and the appropriate Host Nation authorities or police authorities where this is applicable and appropriate.

6. Conventions also cover the way in which information may be attributed to a source. Mutually understood and accepted by both sides they help to promote good working relations between the Army and the media. Before a briefing journalists need to be told if there are any reporting restrictions. If a journalist does not wish to abide by them he will
refuse to attend. For the purposes of defining what may be reported and to whom it may be attributed briefings are divided into three categories:

a. **Attributable.** This means that the information given can be used as a direct quotation and attributed to a particular source or individual. Journalists will assume that any statement is attributable unless they are clearly told otherwise. Those not in full-time PINFO appointments should only speak to journalists attributably. The term ‘attributable’ means the same as ‘on the record’. However it is ambiguous and should not be used.

b. **Non-attributable.** This means that the information given may be used, but its origin must not be revealed, and it should not, therefore, be attributed to any individual or spokesperson.

c. **Not for Use.** This means exactly what it says. It applies to the issue of information in the form of an explanatory briefing, which cannot be published. Such briefings will only be given at the highest level.

7. Information may also be given to the media under cover of an embargo, usually for security or privacy reasons. The embargo specifies that the information may not be used before a given time and date. The restriction should be used sparingly and never merely for convenience.

8. The above directions and restrictions apply equally to off duty, informal and social contacts with the media.

**SECTION 3 – HANDLING THE MEDIA**

**GENERAL**

9. The journalist in an operational area has a tough, highly competitive and sometimes dangerous job. His or her primary purpose is to get a better story than his or her competitors and to get it in time for the earliest possible publication. The basic precepts to be applied in dealing with the media are:

a. No unnecessary hindrance is to be offered to a journalist’s freedom to operate. It is in the interests of law and order that the press should have facilities to expose terrorism, acts of violence and the intimidation of civilians.

b. A member of the media has the same rights, liberties and obligations under the law as any other citizen.

c. Any entry into military premises and any contact with military personnel should be in accordance with standing instructions.

**THE RIGHTS OF THE MEDIA**

10. Journalists have the opportunity to speak to anyone, visit anywhere, and photograph anything they wish, providing it does not conflict with the law and does not involve any entry
into political areas. The same applies to matters concerning the security forces’ operations, or when life is endangered.

11. In practice this means that the media may conduct their business subject to the following caveats:

a. They have no right to enter MOD property without the permission of the officer responsible for that property.

b. The final decision as to whether or not to give an interview rests with the soldier and then only with the concurrence and guidance of PINFO staff.

c. Journalists may normally photograph all personnel and equipment in public places from public places. They may not photograph personnel, equipment or property within MOD premises. If there is a security reason why the security forces do not wish a photograph to be published, eg, an EOD team at work, this should be explained to the photographer, who is then in the wrong if he or she persists. If necessary a journalist may be removed from the scene and any film may be confiscated, but should be handed to the police in connection with any arrest action deemed appropriate.

d. If a commander on the ground believes that the media are prejudicing security during an operation he should deal with the matter by persuasion, admonition or as a last resort, and only if a criminal offence is suspected, by physical restraint or arrest.

e. It is possible that reporters may deliberately wish to expose themselves to danger against the advice of the security forces. If they do not yield to persuasion, a clear warning must be given, in front of witnesses, of the possible consequences of their actions and that they must accept responsibility for them.

f. Reporters may ask for priority at a checkpoint. They have no right to this but they have deadline pressures. Where practicable operationally and when the request is seen to be reasonable, the reporter should be allowed to pass without delay.

INFORMATION FOR THE MEDIA

12. All operational information for the media is to be given by the PINFO staff or UPO, or by those authorised to do so when accompanied by one of these officers.

13. Commanders, or those authorised by them, may communicate directly with the media when the information given is strictly factual and relates solely to that commander’s formation and does not touch on any politically controversial area.

14. PINFO staff approval is required before any member of the security forces agrees to give a statement or interview to the media. Before considering any request for a facility, PINFO staff must be aware of who the interviewer is, what agency, publication or programme he represents and agree the scope and line of questioning. Whenever possible, the best spokesperson, irrespective of rank, should be used, particularly if he or
she can speak authoritatively. A member of the PINFO staff should be present at an interview.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE MEDIA

15. Any person claiming to be a member of the media should produce an authenticated press card, of which there are many varieties. Unless security forces are satisfied that a journalist is bona fide, facilities should not be granted.

16. In certain circumstances members of the media may be accredited to the security forces and be given authenticated credentials.

MILITARY FAMILIES

17. No official restriction can be placed on Service families in dealing with the media. However, they should be advised by their heads of family to seek advice from PINFO staff before making statements or commenting to the media on official military matters.

IMPARTIALITY

18. All members of the media must be afforded the same information service to enable them to do their job. However, there are situations where discretion may be exercised by PINFO staff.

19. No journalist can be guaranteed exclusive rights to any story. Should journalists discover their own exclusives, their ‘scoop’ must be respected and the information not divulged to others, unless they make an approach on the same topic.

20. Where facilities for the media are limited or there are operational or security reasons for keeping press invitations to a minimum, PINFO staff will arrange for a rota system by which a pool reporter covers the story for everyone.

21. Detailed guidance on the handling of the media will be given in local or theatre standing orders.

SECTION 4 – GUIDANCE ON REPORTING TO THE MEDIA

WORDING OF STATEMENTS

22. Any statement must be confined to what has been cleared and confirmed as fact. Speculation and comment must be avoided. When an urgent press enquiry requires an immediate response, a brief holding statement should be made, with the proviso that a more detailed statement will follow once the facts are confirmed. All statements must be made by, or cleared with, PINFO staff.

REPORTS OF SHOOTINGS

23. These reports need to include:

a. Time.
b. Location of security forces.
c. Location of firing point if known.
d. Number and type of shots fired at security forces (if known).
e. Any military casualties.
f. Whether fire was returned or not.
g. Insurgent casualties, if known.
h. Any additional relevant information (civilian casualties, etc).

REPORTS OF EXPLOSIONS

24. These reports should include:

a. Time and location.
b. Time of warning and to whom, if any; length of warning time.
c. Casualties if any (civilian and/or military).
d. Estimate of damage.
e. Estimate of size and nature of device (from an EOD report).
f. How device was positioned.
g. If possible, explain any delays in reaction (possible ambush or booby traps).

REPORTS OF DISTURBANCES

25. These reports should include:

a. Time and location.
b. Security forces involved.
c. Numbers of civilians involved.
d. Types of Weapons used by the rioters (if any).
e. Response by security forces, including use of weapons.
f. Casualties, civilian and/or military.
g. Arrests if any, numbers only.
REPORTS OF FINDS

26. Reports of finds will need to be cleared with G2, G3 EOD controllers, and police before being announced. The details will normally be confined to:

   a. Location, but not so detailed as to prejudice legal requirements.

   b. Description of a find in general terms (number of weapons, quantity of explosive, amount of ammunition).

NAMING INDIVIDUALS

27. Normally soldiers are not named, nor is any indication given of their rank.

28. Names of arrested persons are not given to the media. Queries should be referred to the police.

29. PINFO staff should be given details and any relevant background information on anyone who has been detained by the security forces. This information is not necessarily for dissemination to the media but to ensure that the PINFO staff are fully in the picture.

CASUALTIES

30. Names of security forces’ casualties are only disclosed to the media in fatal and very serious injury cases but only after the next of kin or the alternative next of kin have been informed. Neither names nor units are given for seriously injured or unlisted cases. If asked about a casualty before the next of kin have been informed, the media should be advised that a statement will be issued as soon as this has occurred.

31. Any statement on wounded security forces’ personnel should be kept as brief as possible, and only confirmed when the full extent of the injuries is known.

LEGAL LIMITATIONS

32. No statement should be made if there is any possibility of prejudicing a conviction. All statements concerning arrests should be made by the police.

33. Once an investigation, trial, enquiry, arrest or charge is announced a case becomes sub judice, and requests for information should be referred to the police.

34. Once a matter has been referred to a minister, no statement can be made by PINFO staff. When a ministerial response is given, that is the one that should be used by PINFO staff.

CONVENTIONS

35. Experience has resulted in certain conventional answers being given to routine media enquiries. If this convention is broken journalists are alerted to a possibly controversial topic. Conventional answers should be adhered to rigidly and not elaborated
upon. Once a convention is broken, a dangerous precedent is created. As a matter of policy, PINFO staff will not comment on anything relating to:

a. Intelligence matters.

b. The off duty or private affairs or addresses of security forces and their families.

c. Future operations.

d. Government policy or political decisions.

e. Reports and speeches which have not been seen by them.

f. Movement of VIPs.

g. Matters outside the responsibility of the security forces.

h. Military advice given to ministers or to the police.

i. Investigations, inquiries or criminal cases which are still in progress.

CHAPTER 10
CIVIL MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC)

SECTION 1 - THE PLACE OF CIMIC IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Background. In a world with a growing population and increasing urbanisation, military forces, when deployed on operations, are more likely than before to have contact with the civilian population. The relationship of the military with, and their treatment of, the local population in the area of operations inevitably will be subject to media scrutiny. Furthermore, the conditions and prospects of any indigenous population will probably be a dominant consideration in determining the desired conclusion of any campaign particularly in COIN operations. Commanders can expect to be bound by political and humanitarian imperatives to discharge international, moral and legal obligations to civilians. Counter insurgency operations can be disrupted by the deliberately hostile actions of the populace, the failure of the population to cooperate fully with the security forces, or the uncontrolled displacement of civilians as a result of insurgency. However, civilians can also help to substantially enhance military effort and effectiveness. Gaps in Combat Service Support can be closed by use of local civilian resources; and, if commanders recognise the potential, synergistic advantages can be obtained by harnessing government and community support as a potential force multiplier. Although a core element of military operations for many years CIMIC has gained in prominence with increased UK involvement in complex operations – normally stability and counter insurgency operations.

2. A Multi-Dimensional Environment. Any operational environment is likely to be complex, unstable and unpredictable. When planning and conducting operations, intolerance of collateral damage (casualties and materiel), damage to the environment and legal issues will be constraining factors, as will social, political, cultural, religious, economic and humanitarian considerations. Military success alone will achieve little beyond containment of a situation unless the conditions for the pursuit of civil objectives by civil actors are created.1

3. Harmonisation of Effort. The civil actors engaged in a conflict or crisis situation will have varying mandates, competencies and capacities. The harmonisation of civil and military efforts will increase coherence and synergy in generating the effects required by the strategic objectives. CIMIC is the process by which this harmonisation is achieved, the nature and extent of which will vary depending on the specific operational circumstances. Collaboration across government and beyond, in accordance with the principles of the Comprehensive Approach, will harmonise all contributions, enabling better identification and achievement of desired outcomes. This approach is supported at the operational and tactical level by integrating CIMIC staff and the CIMIC process into the chain of command because CIMIC is a command led process.

SECTION 2 – THE PURPOSE OF CIMIC

4. Purpose. CIMIC is a function of operations conducted to allow the Commander to interact effectively, on a day-to-day basis, with the civil environment in the Joint Operations

---

1 The term ‘civil actors’ may be taken to include IOs, donor organisations (eg International Monetary Fund (IMF)), other security forces (eg civil police), NGOs, the corporate sector (including private security providers), national and local authorities, and local populations.
Area (JOA). It provides for co-operation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange between military forces and in-theatre civil actors. It thereby assists the Commander with the achievement of the military mission and maximises the effectiveness of the military contribution to the overall mission. CIMIC can be a force multiplier where it releases military resources for other operational tasks or increases the effectiveness or efficiency of military activity.

5. **Applicability.** The co-ordination of civil and military planning is a basic tenet. CIMIC is a practical application of co-ordination at the operational and tactical levels. It is necessary throughout the spectrum of tension and conflict, shaping the operational environment to the mutual benefit of both military and civil actors. Hence CIMIC should be an integral part of any Campaign Plan from the outset of a planning process.

6. **Utility.** CIMIC contributes to:

a. **Planning.** Military liaison with civil agencies provides a fundamental input to military planning processes and contributes to the setting of conditions for mission success.

b. **Support to the Force.** By influencing the attitudes and conduct of civil agencies and populations, CIMIC can maximise support to operations, minimise interference, increase Campaign Authority and enhance force protection, thereby maximising freedom of manoeuvre for the commander. In addition CIMIC contributes to fulfillment of the commander’s obligations to ensure that operations are conducted within all applicable law.

c. **Support to the Civil Community.** Support to the civil community can involve information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications, specialist expertise or training. Any support given should contribute to the military mission, although civil objectives may be supported where civil authorities and agencies would otherwise be unable to carry out their tasks. Hence the military mission may be expanded to include the conduct of tasks normally the responsibility of civil authorities.

**SECTION 3 – THE CIVIL CONTEXT**

7. The nature of civil-military relationships varies at each level of command.²

a. **Strategic.** Operations by UK forces are conducted in accordance with national political objectives and direction from Cabinet and Ministerial levels. Intra-government and inter-agency relationships, including the interface between the Ministry of Defence 9MOD), senior military commanders and their national and international political and policy decision-making bodies, should be governed by the principles of the Comprehensive Approach. Such an approach at the strategic level ensures that planning is consistent with the wider political objectives and strategy. This consistency has to be maintained at the operational and tactical levels.

² The term CIMIC is only applied to the operational and tactical levels. Inter-agency co-operation at the strategic level is encompassed with the Comprehensive Approach.
b. **Operational.** CIMIC at the operational level facilitates the relationship between military commanders and national authorities, International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the civilian population within the area, necessary to ensure effective planning, preparation, support and execution of operations. This level of CIMIC is the concern of deployed formation headquarters.

c. **Tactical.** This is the level at which interaction between the military and civilian sectors takes place on the ground and hence is the concern of all servicemen and women. It is the level at which the CIMIC process and activity have the most immediate effect and may have implications through to the strategic level.

**SECTION 4 – CIVILIANS AND CIVIL ORGANISATIONS**

8. **General.** A complex civil sector will be a feature of all counter insurgency operations and should be considered as much part of the solution as part of the problem. The degree of co-operation and co-ordination between military and civil organisations will vary depending on the type of organisation. Civil organisations are categorised broadly as:

a. **Other Government Departments.** While various Other Government Departments (OGDs) may become involved in the management of crises, the most critical are the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID). DFID works with a wide range of implementing partners in the civil sector and may work with armed forces to facilitate the efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance, or to promote a secure environment (e.g., security sector reform) so that economic, social and political development can take place. If requested by MOD, DFID may second a Humanitarian Advisor to the commander.

b. **Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit.** To improve inter-departmental co-operation and co-ordination, the Government has established the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), an inter-departmental team mandated to increase the UK’s capacity to deal with immediate post-conflict stabilisation. The PCRU will:

1. Develop strategy for post-conflict stabilisation, including linking military and civilian planning and working with the wider international community.

2. Plan, implement and manage the UK contribution to post-conflict stabilisation, including practical civilian capabilities needed to stabilise the environment in immediate post-conflict situations.

The PCRU is a developing organisation which, as it becomes established, will have implications for the way in which military activity (including CIMIC) is conducted.

c. **International Organisations.** IOs are established by inter-governmental agreements and include the various United Nations organisations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The UN Development Programme administers and co-ordinates most developmental technical assistance. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs is likely to be responsible
for co-ordinating the activities of relief agencies including the UN High Commission for Refugees and the World Food Programme.

d. **International Committee of the Red Cross.** The International Committee of the Red Cross is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation. It has an important humanitarian role in armed conflict, protected by international law. It is responsible for operating the Central Tracing Agency (maintaining records of prisoners of war, inspecting their camps and providing relief), providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and for monitoring the protection of cultural property. It also works to settle disputes and help states to comply with the law of armed conflict. Parties to any conflict are under a legal obligation to give the Red Cross all possible facilities to enable it to carry out its humanitarian functions. As far as possible, similar facilities should be granted to national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

e. **Non-Governmental Organisations.** The generic title of NGO encompasses a wide range of organisations with varying mandates, roles and priorities. Some may have been operating in the crisis region for a long time prior to the deployment of military forces. Many may be willing to co-operate with the military, through the exchange of information and the co-ordination of resources, when working towards a common purpose. Others, especially those providing humanitarian assistance or protection to vulnerable populations, will be constrained by their mandate or principles as to the level of co-operation they are willing to have with the military. Establishing mechanisms for co-operation is essential, and regular peacetime liaison will help the military and NGOs to understand each other better. Some NGOs operate under umbrella organisations to provide greater coherency. The existence and utility of NGOs is acknowledged in Article 71 of the UN Charter. They fall into one of two categories:

1. **Mandated.** A mandated NGO has been recognised officially by the lead IOs in a conflict or crisis and authorised to work in the affected area.

2. **Non-Mandated.** A non-mandated NGO has no official authorisation but may be sub-contracted by an IO or a mandated NGO. In other cases they obtain funds from private donors. There are examples of non-mandated NGOs created to support certain factions in a conflict, often as a means to deliver external support. Contact with such NGOs should be avoided or handled with caution as contact may undermine Campaign Authority and obstruct the mission. It is the role of CIMIC staff to determine the status of NGOs and to advise the Commander.

f. **Donor Organisations.** Donors may include national agencies such as DFID or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and international bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As these organisations may control much of the funding for humanitarian, reconstruction and developmental activities, they will have an important role in long term planning.
g. **The Commercial Sector.** Commercial organisations are likely to be established already in the crisis region or become engaged in the early stages of emergency relief and post-conflict reconstruction. Indigenous businesses may be a useful source of information, as well as playing a critical role in the reintegration of demobilised armed forces into society. External commercial organisations may provide investment thereby creating opportunities for the local population.

h. **Private Security Companies.** Increasingly, private security companies are being engaged to provide services such as area security, close protection, escort and guard duties. The activities of these companies may complement or hinder the mission, and it is the role of CIMIC staff to assess the impact and to advise the Commander accordingly. Provided they take no direct part in hostilities, the Law of Armed Conflict affords their personnel protected civilian status. However, in complex situations, the commander may have to assess the activities of such companies and their personnel to determine whether they remain within or have breached their protected status. Positive engagement with security companies may influence and moderate their behaviour and may offer advantages such as access to intelligence information.

i. **Local Authorities and Populace.** Commanders should develop an understanding of traditional laws and customs as they apply to civil communities and should incorporate local perceptions of security and need into their planning, gaining insight from existing local solutions. Liaison should be established as early as possible with government and non-governmental authorities and with local representatives, without whose co-operation the military mission is unlikely to succeed.

j. **Dislocated Civilians.** Crisis and conflict may lead to the unwilling movement of civilians from their homes. Specific terminology to describe such people includes:

   (1) **Internally Displaced Persons.** Any person who has been forced to flee their home as a result of conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised state border.

   (2) **Refugees.** Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his or her home country and is unable or unwilling to seek the protection of his country or return to it.
INTRODUCTION

1. The terminology defined in this section has been culled from a variety of sources and is generally accepted for use in counter insurgency operations. The definitions are not legal definitions and have no particular status in law. They define the terms in common military usage.

Glossary

2. **Agent.** ‘An agent is a person specifically recruited, trained and infiltrated into a hostile organisation with the task of gaining and reporting information about its activities.’

3. **Base.**
   a. ‘A locality from which operations are projected or supported.’
   b. ‘An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support.’

4. **Base Area.** ‘The area, virtually free from guerrilla interference, that has a defensive perimeter, and from which operations may be mounted and supported.’

5. **Civil Disobedience.** ‘Active or passive resistance by elements of the civil population to the authority or policies of a government by unconstitutional means.’

6. **Civil Disturbance.** ‘Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order.’

7. **Clandestine Operations.** ‘Activities to accomplish intelligence, counter intelligence and other similar activities, sponsored or conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.’ See also Covert Operations.

8. **Command and Control Warfare (C2W).** The military part of Information Warfare is C2W which is defined as the integrated use of all military capabilities including Operations Security (OPSEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Deception, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Physical Destruction, supported by All Source Intelligence and Communications and Information Systems (CIS), to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary’s C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against similar actions.

9. **Community Relations Projects.** ‘Projects undertaken by Security Forces aimed at improving the relationship between themselves and the local population. These projects often help to create favourable attitudes for specific political or military objectives.’
10. **Control Measures.** ‘Restrictive measures imposed upon a civil population and relating to such matters as movement, registration or the possession of foodstocks or weapons. They are normally designed to separate the insurgents from the bulk of the population and deprive the insurgents of the resources they require.’

11. **Counter Guerrilla Warfare.** ‘Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces or non military agencies against guerrillas.’

12. **Counter Insurgency.** ‘Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by the Government to defeat insurgency.’

13. **Counter Intelligence.** ‘Those activities concerned with identifying and counteracting the threats to security posed by hostile intelligence services or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.’

14. **Counter Insurgency Operations.** (COIN operations) ‘A generic term to describe the operations which forces may have to undertake when maintaining and restoring law and order in support of an established government. These operations will have to counter threats posed by civil disturbances, terrorism and organised insurgency, irrespective of whether they are nationalist, communist or racially inspired, or directed from within or outside the state concerned.’

15. **Counter Subversion.** ‘That part of counter intelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of subversive activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception and repression of individuals, groups or organisations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.’

16. **Counter Terrorism.** ‘Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.’

17. **Covert Operations.** ‘Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation: ie disguised but not concealed.’

18. **Deep Operations.** ‘Operations designed to locate, disrupt and destroy hard core insurgents, with a view to reducing insurgent pressure and giving other operations a better chance of success.’ Deep operations in COIN at the strategic level of conflict will tend to cover political, diplomatic and psychological operations, whereas, at the operational level of conflict deep operations will generally be of a military nature.

19. **Dissident.** ‘An individual who takes covert and overt action against a government.’

20. **Effectiveness.** ‘The ability of a target audience to respond to a psychological objective’. (used in a psy ops content)

21. **Forward Operational Base.** ‘An area providing a semi-permanent firm base from which actions against the insurgents can be developed. It should be established at or near a seat of local government as a formation base and will normally have an airfield, or an airstrip capable of quick development.’
22. **Framework Operations.** The term given to all overt military operations contributing to the defeat of the insurgent in an area.

23. **Guerrilla Warfare.** ‘Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.’

24. **IED.** Improvised (or homemade) explosive devices.

25. **Informant.** ‘A person who gives information.’

26. **Informer.** ‘A member of an organisation who passes information to the opponents of the organisation.’

27. **Insurgency.** ‘The actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change.

28. **Insurrection (Revolt) and Rebellion.** When people revolt they openly express their dissatisfaction with the established government or its policies. When such an expression is armed and organised it becomes a rebellion. When a rebellion has a large measure of support and aims to overthrow the government a state of insurrection exists.

29. **Internal Security.** ‘Any military role that involves primarily the maintenance or restoration of law and order and essential services in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience, using minimum appropriate force. It covers action dealing with minor civil disorders with no political overtones as well as riots savouring of revolts and even the early stages of rebellion.’

30. **Limited War.** ‘International armed conflict, short of general war’. It may be limited geographically, by objective, by the scale of forces or by the weapons employed or by time but will be conducted overtly by formations of regular troops. Now overtaken by the term ‘Operations Other Than War’ (OOTW).

31. **Low Intensity Conflict.** Low Intensity conflict embraces forms of violence, often loosely controlled, with tactical or international political aims. These frequently include the overthrow of the established government. Each situation is unique but the range of conflict includes Civil Disorder and Revolutionary War. This term is now obsolescent. See also para 32.

32. **Pacification Operations.** ‘Military operations designed to clear and hold an area of immediate insurgent influence and re-establish civil control’. Military forces will continue to provide security until paramilitary and police forces can accept responsibility.

33. **Paramilitary Forces.** ‘Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resemble them in organisation and training and in the mission they undertake.’

34. **Prohibited Area.** The definition of a prohibited area will vary as it depends on the terms of the enactment or regulation which creates such an area. Generally it is automatically an offence to enter or be in a prohibited area, and security forces are given
power over and above the general law in relation to using force to repel or apprehend anyone in the area. Where it is the local custom to carry arms, a prohibited area will often be one where the carriage of such weapons is forbidden.

35. **Psychological Mission.** ‘A statement of the attitudes and/or behaviour required of a specified target audience to support the accomplishment of a commander’s mission’. In addition:
   a. A commander’s mission may be supported by more than one psychological mission.
   b. The identification of psychological missions is the end product of the psychological operations appreciation.

36. **Psychological Objective.** ‘A description of the actual responses required of a target audience to support the accomplishment of a psychological mission’. This implies:
   a. Psychological objectives are identified through the target analysis process.
   b. A psychological mission may be supported by a number of psychological objectives and involve several target audiences.
   c. A psychological objective is pursued through the identification of lines of persuasion (see paragraph 53 above) and supporting themes and symbols (see paragraphs 56 and 57 below).

37. **Public Information.** ‘Information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support’.

38. **Public Relations (PR).** ‘The deliberate, planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain mutual understanding between an organisation and its public’.

39. **Revolutionary War.** Revolutionary War generally aims to overthrow the state and its social system and is normally associated with communism or left wing ideology. It may develop through a series of phases: preparatory, guerrilla activity and finally conventional military operations. Mainly associated with communist inspired revolutions.

40. **Sabotage.** ‘An act, excluding a normal military operation, or an omission calculated to cause physical damage in the interests of a foreign power or subversive organisation.’

41. **Security Forces.** ‘All indigenous and allied police, military and paramilitary forces used by a government to maintain law and order.’

42. **Subversion.** ‘Illegal measures, short of the use of force, designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its subjects.’

43. **Terrorism.** The use of threat of violence to intimidate a population for political ends.
44. **Terrorist.** ‘A supporter of a dissident faction who resorts to violence in order to intimidate and coerce people for political ends’.

**TERMS USED IN AN ALLIANCE CONTEXT**

45. **Psychological Operations (Psy Ops).** ‘Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, psychological consolidation activities and battlefield psychological activities’.

   a. The term ‘psychological warfare’ is not authoritatively defined, but it is essentially psychological operations directed at enemy audiences.

46. **Strategic Psychological Activities (SPA).** ‘Planned psychological activities in peace and war which normally pursue objectives to gain the support and co-operation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war.’

47. **Psychological Consolidation Activities (PCA).** ‘Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly control in order to achieve a desired behaviour which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders’. The above definition is valid in the contexts of general war and OOTW. In the context of counter insurgency operations, PCA will normally support politico-military objectives.

48. **Battlefield Psychological Activities (BPA).** ‘Planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of combat operations and designed to bring psychological pressure to bear on insurgent forces and civilians under insurgent control in the theatre of operations, to assist in the achievement of the tactical objectives’, but it should be noted that:

   a. The above definition is valid in the contexts of general war and OOTW. In the context of counter insurgency operations, BPA may be directed at insurgents, terrorists, etc, and civilians under their control to assist in the achievement of politico-military objectives. BPA in counter insurgency operations may be conducted in close conjunction with PCA directed at civilians not under immediate hostile control.

   b. There would be logic in expanding the definition to embrace activities supporting the achievement of both operational and tactical objectives. Such expansion would be consistent with the US categorisation of psychological operations into strategic, operational and tactical activities.

49. **Propaganda.** ‘Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. It can be categorised as:

   a. **Black.** Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than a true one.'
b. **Grey.** Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source.

c. **White.** Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.

d. **Cohesive.** Directed at loyal or uncommitted audiences.

e. **Divisive.** Directed at hostile audiences.

50. **Target Audience.** ‘An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations’.

51. **Psychological Situation.** ‘The current emotional state, mental disposition or other behavioural motivation of a target audience, basically founded on its national, political, social, economic and psychological peculiarities but also subject to the influence of circumstances and events’.

52. **Susceptibility.** ‘The vulnerability of a target audience to particular forms of psychological operations approach’. Assessment of susceptibility forms part of the target analysis approach.

53. **Psychological Operations Approach.** ‘The technique adopted to induce a desired reaction on the part of the target audience’. This equates to the ‘lines of persuasion’ identified within the target analysis process.

54. **Psychological Media.** ‘The media, technical or non-technical, which establish any kind of communication with a target audience’.

55. **Receptivity.** ‘The vulnerability of a target audience to particular psychological media’.

56. **Psychological Theme.** ‘An idea or topic on which a psychological operations approach is based’.

57. **Key Symbol.** ‘In psychological operations, a simple, suggestive, repetitive element (rhythm, sign, colour, etc) which has an immediate impact on a target audience and which creates a favourable environment for the acceptance of a psychological theme’.

58. **Intelligence Cycle.** ‘The sequence of activities whereby information is obtained, assembled, converted into intelligence and made available to users. This sequence comprises the following four phases:

   a. **Direction.** Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies.

   b. **Collection.** The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the in production of intelligence.'
c. **Processing.** The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation.

d. **Dissemination.** The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it’.

59. **Cover.** ‘Those measures necessary to give protection to a person, plan, operation, formation or installation from the enemy intelligence effort and leakage of information’.

60. **Deception.** ‘Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests’.

**TERMS USED IN A BRITISH CONTEXT**

61. **Psychological Themes.** ‘Ideas or topics on which a psychological operation is based’.

62. **Key Communicator.** ‘An individual who possesses persuasive powers which can influence or effect changes in attitude, opinions or behaviour among other individuals or groups of which the key communicator is a member’.